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ABSTRACT 
Since the signing in Washington of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 
between the PLO and Israel, tremendous changes have taken place in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. These have had a major impact on the Palestinian population and 
have been carefully monitored by the international community. Although the 
Declaration of Principles did not specifically hint at the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, it nonetheless envisaged an entity that has most of the elements required for a 
sovereign state. The election of the first Palestinian parliament was one of these 
elements. The election of the first Palestinian Legislative Council was, therefore, 
considered by many not only as being a major step in the build-up of a Palestinian state, 
but also as an essential component for the establishment of a democratic Palestinian 
state. 
The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse the dernocratisation process in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas and the role of the Legislative Council in this process 
since the general elections in 1996 until the end of 1998. In order to do so, the 
researcher essentially concentrated on two necessary prerequisites for democratic 
development, namely the elections and the first Palestinian Legislative Council. In Part 
One of the thesis - based on a public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank 
(including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and a survey within the Legislative Council - 
the main dimensions of the elections and the performance of the Legislative Council 
were laid out. Part One, therefore, indicates whether or not the Legislative Council is an 
effective democratic institution in its foundation and whether or not it is operating in a 
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manner which reflects democratic values. Part Two of the study examines whether or 
not the Legislative Council plays an effective role in the Palestinian political arena and 
discusses the main impediments in the way of the development of a democratic 
Palestinian regime. 
Despite the fact that the elections were an outcome of the Oslo agreements reached 
between Israel and the PLO - towards which many Palestinians have a negative attitude 
- the majority of the Palestinians were proud and excited over their chance to participate 
in the first national elections of January 1996. For the Palestinian electorate, the 
elections were a first experience not to be missed and an expression of their desire for 
change. They considered the elections not only as a first step towards national 
independence, but were hoping that by voting they could help instigate the creation of a 
democratic, effective and more orderly political system, which could provide them with 
stability and economic prosperity. There was perhaps an insufficient understanding that 
democracy does not only consist of elections, but is based on a whole range of 
democratic prerequisites which have been largely absent in Palestinian society and 
which take time to develop. As. a result, the high expectations in regard to the first 
elected Legislative Council have made room for disillusions. Neither democracy nor 
political and economic prosperity have come overnight, and now the Legislative 
Council is - in part wrongly - blamed for that. The thesis will place what appears to be a 
fairly bleak evaluation of the Legislative Council in perspective. 
The researcher has aimed, thus, to provide a clear picture of the viability of the 
Legislative Council firstly as a democratic institution, and secondly, as an essential 
element in the Palestinian democratisation process. 
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This study will show that the foundation for democracy seems to be strong and both the 
Council members and the Palestinian public are receptive to the idea of democracy, but 
that the efforts towards actual democratic transformation are obstructed by severe 
political circumstances that prevent substantive change. 
As a result, it will become clear that the failure of the Legislative Council to function 
effectively is not a consequence of the Arab or Islamic culture, neither is it due to 
economic and social conditions. On the contrary, from the thesis it became clear that 
there are fertile grounds upon which Palestinian democracy could be based. The public 
is receptive and responsible and their electoral choices proved to be sensible and 
rational. The Council members seem to be equally responsible and aware of their 
democratic responsibilities. However, for an institution such as the Legislative Council 
to function properly, one major component is missing and that is sovereignty. As such, 
the study concludes that continuous presence of the Israeli occupation authority on 
Palestinian territory, the control it has over movement and the usage of Palestinian 
resources, and its interference in and pressure on the Palestinian decision-making 
establishment, render any attempt for a democratically viable institution meaningless 
and absurd. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE THESIS I 
PART ONE: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 
ITS FORMATION AND ITS INTERNAL ORGANISATION 
CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY, THEORETICAL APPROACH AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW IN PALESTINLAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 7 
1.1. PART ONE: METHODOLOGY 
1.1.1. Research Resources 7 
1.1.2. Public Opinion PoR 8 
1.1.2.1. Sample size 8 
1.1.2.2. Fieldworkers 9 
1.1.2.3. Area and Sampling frame 9 
1.1.2.4. Sampling points and their selection 10 
1.1.2.5. Household selection method 12 
1.1.2.6. Selection method within the household 12 
1.1.2-7. Validation 13 
1.1.2.8. Breakdown 18 
1.1.2.9. Use of additional polls 19 
1.1.3. Survey within the Palestinian Legislative Council 19 
1.1.4. Interviews 20 
1.1.4.1. The Sample 21 
1.1.4.2. Procedures of the Interview 23 
1.1.4.3. Constraints 24 
1.1.5. Secondary Sources 24 
1.2. PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 25 
1.2.1. Historical Background of Democratisation. Studies 26 
1.2.2. Definitions 32 
1.2.2.1. Democracy 33 
1.2.2.2. Democratisation 36 
1.2.2.3. Partial Democracy 39 
1.2.3. Different Theoretical Schools 40 
1.2.3.1. Classifications and Different Interpretations of Schools 41 
a 
1.2.3.1. LErik Hoffman 42 
1.2.3.1.2. William Reisinger 43 
1.2.3.1.3. David Potter 44 
1.2.3.1.4. Karen Remmer 46 
1.2.3.2. Different Schools 48 
1.2.3.2.1. The Modernisation Approach 49 
m Seymour Martin Upset 50 
b. Samuel Huntington 58 
1.2.3.2.2. The Transitional Approach 62 
m Rustow 62 
b. O'Donnell et al. And Shain et al. 65 
1.2.3.2.3. The Structural Approach 69 
m Barrington Moore 70 
b. Rueschmeyer et al. 72 
1.2.3.2.4. Conclusion 73 
1.2.4. Literature on Voting Behaviour and Political Culture 76 
1.2.4.1. Literature on Voting Behaviour 76 
1.2.4.2. Democracy and Political Culture 78 
1.2.5. The Middle East and Literature on Democracy 83 
1.2.5.1. Arab Culture and Islam 84 
1.2.5.2. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 88 
1.2.5.3. Oil 90 
1.2.6. Democracy and Palestine 91 
CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PALESTINIAN GENERAL 
ELECTIONS 94 
2.1. PART ONE: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 
AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE 96 
2.1.1. Historical Background 96 
2.1.2. Preparations for the Elections 100 
2.1.2.1. Registration 102 
2.1.2.2. The Central Elections Commission 102 
2.1.2.3. Election Observers 103 
2.1.2.4. Problems 104 
2.1.3. Voter Turnout 107 
2.1.4. Voting According to Political Affiliation 115 
2.1.5. Agenda and Campaign Slogans 125 
2.1.6. Important Factors when Voting 130 
2.1.6.1. Education 131 
2.1.6.2. Democratic Values 132 
2.1.6.3. Religion and Religious Values 133 
2.1.6.4. Residence (Locality) 134 
2.1.6.5. Gender 136 
2.1.6.6. Age 139 
2.1.7. Satisfaction with the Legislative Council 140 
2.1.8. Expectations 141 
2.1.9. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility in 
Voting 144 
2.2. PART TWO: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 
AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS 146 
2.2.1. Important Factors in Voting 147 
2.2.2. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility of the 
Palestinian Electorate in Voting 149 
2.2.3. Promises and Campaign Slogans 154 
2.3. PART THREE: PROSPECTS FOR VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN 
FUTURE ELECTIONS BASED ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC AND THE COUNCIL MEMBERS 159 
2.3.1. Would People Vote in Future Elections? 160 
2.3.2. Reasons for Not Voting in Future Elections 165 
2.3.3. Important Factors When Voting in Future Elections 169 
2.3.3.1 Education 171 
2.3.3.2. Democratic Values 172 
2.3.3.3. Religion and Religious Values 173 
2.3.3.4. Gender 175 
2.3.3.5. Age 176 
2.3.3.6. The Campaign 177 
2.3.3.7. Struggle History 178 
2.4. CONCLUSION 179 
CHAPTER THREE: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL 183 
3.1. PART ONE: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE 
ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 184 
C 
3.1.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different 
Factors 184 
3.1.1.1. Democracy 188 
3.1.1.2. Effectiveness 189 
3.1.1.3. Responsiveness 193 
3.1.1.4. Independence from the Executive Authority 194 
3.1.1.5. Pluralism 199 
3.1.2. Level of Satisfaction with the Legislative Council 200 
3.1.3. Reasons behind Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative 202 
Council 
3.1.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction 202 
3.1.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction 206 
3.1.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future 209 
3.2. PART TWO: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL 
MEMBERS ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 211 
3.2.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different 
Factors 211 
3.2.2. Level of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative 
Council 214 
3.2.3. Reasons for Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council 215 
3.2.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction 215 
3.2.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction 218 
3.2.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future 220 
3.3. CONCLUSION 223 
CHAPTER FOUR: PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL DEMOCRATIC 225 
4.1 Ranldng of Countries According to their Level of Democracy 226 
4.2 Level of Democratic Awareness Amongst the Council Members 230 
4.2.1. Voting Behaviour 231 
4.2.2. Constitutional Amendments 232 
4.2.3. Accountability 234 
4.2.3.1. Accountability of the President 234 
4.2.3.1. Accountability of the Cabinet 236 
4.2.4 Highest Source of Interpretation 237 
4.2.5. Level of Adherence by Council Members to Other Basic Democratic 
Principles 238 
d 
4.3 Willingness of Council Members to Act According to Basic Democratic 
Tenets 240 
4.3.1. Adherence to the Constitution and Reliance on Religious Interpretation 242 
4.3.2. Breaking the Law to Protect National Security 243 
4.3.3. Impeachment of the President 245 
4.3.4. Women in the Legislative Council 247 
4.3.5. Alcohol Drinking as a Personal Choice 249 
4.4. Conclusion 250 
PART TWO: DOES THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PLAY AN 
EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE SYSTEM? 
Abstract 252 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY AND PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC 
DEVELOPMENT 253 
5.1 The Structure of the Palestinian Authority 253 
5.1.1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation 254 
5.1.1.1. Background 254 
5.1.1.2. The Political Development of the PLO 255 
5.1.2. The Palestinian Authority 258 
5.1.2.1. The Structure of the Palestinian Authority 258 
5.1.2.2. Ambiguities and Difficulties caused by the Structure of the PA 261 
5.1.2.2.1. The Executive Authority and the Legislative Council 261 
5.1.2.2.2. The Palestinian Authority and the PLO 263 
5.1.2.2.3. Israel 265 
5.2. Perceptions on Democratic Development in the Palestinian Autonomous 
Areas 266 
5.2.1. Public Perceptions 266 
5.2.2. Expert Perceptions 269 
5.2.2.1. Culture and Arab Society 269 
5.2.2.2. Nature of the Palestinian Authority 271 
5.2.2.3. The Israeli Impact 272 
CHAPTER SIX: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
IN PRESENTING ITS CONSTITUENTS 274 
6.1. Evaluation of the Palestinian between the Legislative Council and the 
Public in View of Public Opinion 275 
6.2. Evaluation of the Relationship between the Legislative Council and the 
Public According to the Council Members 279 
6.2.1. In General 279 
6.2.2. Effectiveness in representing views and needs of the population 280 
6.2.3. About the knowledge by Council Members of the needs of the people 284 
6.3. Conclusion 288 
CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPACT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON 
PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 289 
7.1 The Legislative Council and the Executive Authority 291 
7.1.1. The Nature of the Relationship between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council 291 
7.1.2. Case Study of the Relationship between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council 299 
7.1.3. Conclusion 310 
7.2. The Legislative Council and President Yasser Arafat 314 
7.3. Conclusion ' 320 
CHAPTER EIGHT: IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICIES ON 
PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 322 
8.1. Perceptions of the Israeli Impact 323 
8.2. Chronology of Events 325 
8.3. Conclusion 334 
CONCLUSION 336 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 347 
ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Questionnaire: Public Opinion Poll on the Elections and the PLC (In 
English) 374 
Annex 2: Questionnaire: Public Opinion Poll on the Elections and the PLC (In 
Arabic) 378 
Annex 3: Questionnaire: Opinion Survey within the PLC (In English) 381 
Annex 4: Questionnaire: Opinion Survey within the PLC (In Arabic) 386 
Annex 5: Results of Public Opinion Survey on the Elections of the PLC 392 
Annex 6: Results of Opinion Survey of the Council Members 431 
f 
INTRODUCTION: 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Since the signing in Washington of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 
between the PLO and Israel, tremendous changes have taken place in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. These have had a major impact on the Palestinian population and have been 
carefully monitored by the international community. Although the Declaration of 
Principles did not specifically hint at the establishment of a Palestinian state, it nonetheless 
envisaged an entity that has most of the elements required for a sovereign state. The 
election of the first Palestinian parliament was one of these elements. The election of the 
first Palestinian Legislative Council was, therefore, considered by many not only as being a 
major step in the build-up of a Palestinian state, but also as an essential component for the 
establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. 
The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse the democratisation process in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas and the role of the Legislative Council in this process since the general 
elections in 1996 until the end of 1998. In order to do so, the researcher will essentially 
concentrate on two necessary prerequisites for democratic development, namely the 
elections and the first Palestinian Legislative Council. In Part One of the thesis - based on a 
public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza 
StriP and a survey within the Legislative Council - the main dimensions of the elections and 
the performance of the Legislative Council will be laid out. Part Two of the study intends 
to examine the main impediments in the way of the development of a democratic 
Palestinian regime. The combination of the data found in the two parts of this thesis will 
indicate that Palestine can be classified as a "partial democracy"'. Indeed, general and 
presidential elections have taken place in the Palestinian autonomous areas, there is limited 
accountability by the government, there is a degree of freedom of expression, there is 
political opposition and there are independent organisations critical of the state. In this 
thesis, it will be argued that given the experience of the Legislative Council and the 
attitudes of the electorate, the potential for ftirther democratisation in Palestine does exist 
provided that it enjoys full sovereignty in the near future. For now, however, ftuther 
development in the political institutional structure is hindered by the current political 
environment and the political realities that render progress in the peace process more 
important than finiher enhancement in the democratic nature of the Palestinian political 
system. 
Despite the fact that the elections were an outcome of the Oslo agreements reached between 
Israel and the PLO - towards which many Palestinians have a negative attitude - the 
majority of the Palestinians were proud and excited over their chance to participate in the 
first national elections of January 1996. For the Palestinian electorate, the elections were a 
first experience not to be missed and an expression of their desire for change. They 
considered the elections not only as a first step towards national independence, but were 
hoping that by voting they could help instigate the creation of a democratic, effective and 
more orderly political system, which could provide them with stability and economic 
prosperity. There was perhaps an insufficient understanding that democracy does not only 
consist of elections, but is based on a whole range of democratic prerequisites which have 
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been largely absent in Palestinian society and which take time to develop. As a result, the 
high expectations in regard to the first elected Legislative Council have made room for 
disillusions. Neither democracy nor political and economic prosperity have come 
overnight, and now the Legislative Council is - in part wrongly - blamed for that. The 
thesis will place what appears to be a fairly bleak evaluation of the Legislative Council in 
perspective. It will examine the impediments hindering the proper and effective 
functioning of the Legislative Council. It will become clear that the transitional nature of 
the Legislative Council and the political and socio-economic environment of which it is 
part makes it difficult for the Legislative Council to be an effective controller of the 
Palestinian democratic process. Throughout the thesis, the researcher will outline the 
causes for concern vis-A-vis the Legislative Council and its impact on the democratisation 
process. It will be argued that the transitional nature of the peace process and the 
limitations this process has on the Legislative Council are major constraints on the ability of 
the Legislative Council to ftdfil its responsibilities in a manner as a parliament would in a 
fully democratic and sovereign state. 
To facilitate the presentation of the thesis, it has been divided into eight principle chapters. 
Each chapter will provide an overview and analysis based on secondary sources as well as 
primary sources collected on a study-trip to the Palestinian autonomous areas for the 
duration of one year and a half 
Before entering into the specifics of the Palestinian democratisation process and its 
challenges, it is necessary both to clarify the methodology upon which the thesis is built and 
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to determine which theoretical approach is utilised for the proposed area of this study. 
Chapter One will include the methodology, the theoretical framework and the literature 
review for this thesis. In this chapter, it will become clear that none of the main existing 
theoretical approaches on democratisation. are fully applicable to the Palestinian case as 
those approaches examine the process of democratisation in sovereign states. As such, 
once Palestine is sovereign, the terms modernist approach, transitional approach or 
structural approach may become more relevant. In any case, keeping in mind that the thesis 
examines the process of democratisation under partial sovereignty rather than full 
sovereignty, the researcher will argue that some elements of the transitional approach help 
in understanding the Palestinian democratisation process. As will be explained in Chapter 
One, the emphasis in the transitional approach on the elite and the phasing of the 
democratic process is valid in the Palestinian case. 
Chapter Two will provide an analysis of the elections, and an overview of the election 
results will explain why the opposition groups did not participate in the elections, and 
assess the consequences of this boycott. The chapter will also analyse how people voted 
during the elections, whether they would vote differently in future elections, and what the 
Council members think about the voting patterns of the population. 
Chapter Three will focus on the perceptions of both the electorate and the Council members 
of the Legislative Council in general. Based upon the survey material, Chapter Three will 
first exarnine how the perfonmance of the Legislative Council is evaluated according to 
some basic tenets of democracy. Also in this chapter, the level of satisfaction or 
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dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council will be analysed. The hopes or scepticism of 
both the Council members and the public about the performance of the Legislative Council 
in the future will bring Chapter Three to a close. 
Based upon further results of both the public opinion poll and the survey conducted within 
the Legislative Council, Chapter Four will explore whether or not the Legislative Council is 
inherently democratic. In doing so, the extent to which there is an understanding of 
democratic tenets amongst the Council members and a willingness to act accordingly will 
be assessed. 
Chapter Five is intended as a background chapter, which will help to clarify the arguments 
in the remaining chapters of this thesis. In it, the structure of the Palestinian Authority and 
its ambiguities will be discussed. Moreover, a short overview will be provided of various 
expert perceptions on where the blame falls for the slow progress in Palestinian democratic 
development. 
Chapter Six will examine the degree of the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in 
representing its constituents. In doing so, it will become clear whether or not the 
ineffectiveness of the Council members is due to their inadequate knowledge of the public's 
needs or whether it is due to the gap in expectations between the public and the Council 
members about the capabilities of the Legislative Council. 
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Chapter Seven will assess to what extent the functioning of the Legislative Council is 
impeded by internal dimensions. In undertaking this assessment, the researcher will 
concentrate on the relationship between the Legislative Council and both the Executive 
Authority and Arafat in his capacity of President of the Palestinian Authority as well as 
Chairman of the PLO. 
Finally, Chapter Eight will analyse in how far the Legislative Council is less effective than 
it could be, given the Israeli policies and the limitations placed on it by the peace 
agreements. 
The conclusion will assimilate the threads of the thesis. The findings of this study will be 
surnmarised and a final evaluation of the role of the Legislative Council in the 
democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas will be provided. 
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PART ONE: 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 
ITS FORMATION AND ITS INTERNAL ORGANISATION 
CHAPTER ONE: 
METHODOLOGY, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PROCESS OF 
DEMOCRATISATION IN PALESTINE 
I. I. PART ONE: METHODOLOGY 
The main aim of this study is to find evidence of the potential emergence of a democratic 
regime in the Palestinian autonomous areas. Part One of this chapter will outline the 
research methods used by the researcher to generate the necessary information for this 
thesis. 
1.1.1. Research Resources 
Before entering into more detail about the specific research tools and resources used for this 
study, it is useful to briefly sum up what the backbone of this research consists of. The 
author relied on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are mainly made 
up of the following components: 
1. a major public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the 
Gaza Strip, 
2. a survey conducted within the Palestinian Legislative Council, interviews, 
3. some official and non-official documents. 
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4. The secondary sources comprise mostly of books, journals, magazines and newspapers. 
1.1.2. Public Opinion Poll 
A public opinion poll' was conducted from 20 to 22 August 1997, exploring the Palestinian 
electorate's voting record, their assessment of the Legislative Council, their Council 
members, and whether their attitudes towards these issues are changing. The survey also 
includes questions on if and how Palestinians would vote in the future and on what basis. 
The survey was conducted within a short time fi-ame of three days to increase the 
probability of finding potential respondents at home and to avoid sudden events which 
might influence responses or opinions. 
1.1.2.1. Sample size 
A random sample of 1,195 people over the age of 18 was interviewed face-to-face 
throughout the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, 756 
people were surveyed. In the Gaza Strip, 439 people were surveyed. The sample size has 
been determined according to the adopted standards of the discipline of statistics. 
According to those standards, when conducting a survey with a sample size of 
approximately 1,200, the margin of error is reduced to 3% and the level of confidence rates 
at 95%. 
I For questionnaire in English, see Annex 1. For questionnaire in Arabic, see Annex 2. For full results, see 
Annex 5. 
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A margin of error of 3% means that if on a certain question, 40% of the people answer 
positively, in actuality the result can vary between 37% and 43%. By a level of confidence 
of 95% it is understood that if one were to ask the same question 100 times, in 95% of the 
cases the answer would fall within the margin of error. In this case, 3%. 
1.1.2.2. Fieldworkers 
In order to be able to conduct a public opinion poll professionally and within a short time- 
span, the author sought and received co-operation of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre (the JMCC). The JMCC is a reputable, independent Palestinian 
media and research centre that, amongst other things, has been conducting regular opinion 
polls since 199 1. For the purposes of the opinion poll conducted for this research, the 
JMCC provided skilled interviewers with a strong experience and training in the field. 
To reduce the risks of bias from the interviewers, each fieldworker received only twenty 
questionnaires. Therefore, with a sample size of 1,195, sixty fieldworkers conducted the 
interviews in sixty different sampling points. 3 
1.1.2.3. Area and SMpling frame 
All 450 population concentrations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the 
Gaza Strip were considered for selection. These concentrations include cities, towns, 
2 For more information on this issue, see for example: Backstrom, C. H. and Hursh-Cesar, G., Sgyey 
Research, (second edition), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 198 1. 
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villages, and refugee camps. Hamlets were excluded, as many of their residents also reside 
in other concentrations. Moreover, only population concentrations with more than 700 
residents comprise the sampling frame. 
1.1.2.4. Sampling points and their selection 
Based on published population estimates provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) and the Health Development Information Project (HDIP), 4 population 
concentrations were subdivided into sampling points. The number of sampling points per 
population is proportionate to the centre's size. In practice, each population concentration 
was divided by one thousand. In other words, if a certain village has a population of 
10,000, then it will be assigned ten sampling points. Since the population of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip totals 2,4 million, the overall number of potential sampling points is 
2,400. 
All 2,400 potential sampling points were included in Excel. Sixty of those were randomly 
selected from the combined West Bank and Gaza Strip population base. Jericho was 
selected as a sampling point in any case. This was required because, whilst its small 
3 For more information on fieldworkers, interviewers and their training, see: Backstrorn and Hursh-Cesar, 
Survey Research, pp. 237-246. 
4 Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, Small Area Population in the West Bank and the Gaza 5WZ West Bank: 
Ramallab, November 1994. 
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population size makes the probability of its selection small, its political significance makes 
its selection necessary. 5 
In the West Bank, people from the following areas were surveyed: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin & 
refugee camp, Sanour & Maythaloun, al-Shuhada & 'Arabeh, al-Yamoun & Burqeen, 
Qabatia & Zababdeh. Nablus: Nablus, Nablus & Balata refugee camp, Beit Dajan, 'Asira, 
Salfit, Bureen- Madama. Tulkarem: Tulkarem. & refugee camp, Tulkarem-town, Nazlet Issa 
& Baqa Sharqia, Zeita, Sida. Qalqilia: Qalqilia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Beit Jala & Beit 
Sahour, Deiheisheh refugee camp. Hebron: Hebron (2)6 , Fawar refugee camp, 
Beit Ummar, 
Dura, Bani Na'im, Beit Ula. Jerusalem: Old city, A-Ram & Dahyat al-Bareed, Beit Hanina 
& refugee camp, Silwan & Ras al-Amoud, Sheikh Jarrah & Wadi al-Joz. Jericho: Jericho. 
Ramallah: Ramallah, al-Bireh, Jalazoun refugee camp & Jifna, Beitunia, al-Mizra' al- 
Sharqia. 
In the Gaza Strip, people were surveyed from: Khan Younis (3), Rafah, Rafah/Bloc, 
Maghazi reftigee camp, Sabra, Khan Younis refugee camp, Sheikh Radwan, al-Darag al- 
Tuffah, al-Nasr, Jabalia refugee camp, Shati refugee camp, Breige reftigee camp, Beit Lahia 
& Beit Hanoun, Shaboura reftigee carnp, al-Rimal, Shoujai'a, Jabalia al-Balad, Deir at- 
Balah, Tal al-Sultan, Nseirat refugee camp. 
The political significance of Jericho grew as a result of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement between Israel and the 
PLO, which, at the time, made Jericho the only town in the West Bank that came under the Palestinian self- 
rule control. 
6 Due to the size and for interview purposes, cities were divided into neighbourhoods, which were randomly 
selected and treated in the same way as any other village or town. Therefore, when a number has been added 
behind a city name, that number indicates the amount of neighbourhoods selected within this city. 
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In the sample, 56.4% of the respondents were from the West Bank, 6.9% from Jerusalem, 
and 36.7% from the Gaza Strip. 7 Of the surveyed people, 31.6% said that they live in 
villages, 23.9% in refugee camps, and 44.5% in towns or cities. 
1.1.2.5. Household selection method 
From a randomly selected starting location in each sampling point, households were 
systematically selected using a predetermined selection interval. Since most population 
concentrations are not well planned, nor is there a well-defined bloc system, interviewers - 
particularly in villages and refugee camps - were asked to go to a specific place (mosque, 
primary school, etc. ) to begin their route. They were instructed to start from that place and 
then take the fourth street on their left. After having determined the street, they were 
instructed to choose the third house on their right, the following third house on their left, 
and so on. The number of floors in each house was also taken into consideration, as was 
the number of streets where the households were selected. In cities, the same method was 
used, but included the division of the city into neighbourhoods. When the 60 primary 
sampling points are selected from 2,400 units, a city like Gaza could be expected to be 
chosen 10 times since it has a population of 250,000. Therefore, due to size and for 
interview purposes, cities were divided into neighbourhoods, which were also randomly 
selected and treated in the same way as a village for the selection of households. 
1.1.2.6. Selection method within the household 
More people were interviewed in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, because the West Bank has a larger 
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8 Respondents within the households were selected using Kish tables. The Kish table is an 
objective, internationally accepted selection procedure. It consists of the interviewer asking 
the two following questions: (1) How many people 18 years and older reside in this 
household?. (2) How many of those are women? Based on the answer to these questions, 
the adult to be interviewed is selected according to the table 1 below. 
Table 1: 
1 adult 2 adults 3 adults 4 or more 
adults 
No women Adult Eldest Middle-aged 2nd oldest male 
1 3 6 10 
I woman Adult Male or female Youngest male Middle-aged 
man 
2 4 7 11 
2 women Youngest Oldest woman Oldest or 
woman youngest man 
5 8 12 
3 women Middle-aged Middle-aged 
9 woman 
13 
4 or more 2nd youngest 
women woman 
14 
Usually, three attempts are made to interview the selected household member. If, after 
three attempts, an interview has not been completed, a replacement household will be 
randomly selected from the next household block. 
1.1.2.7. Validation 
population than the Gaza Strip. 
8 Leslie Kish, "A Procedure of Objective Respondent Selection within the Household", Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, (44), 1949, pp. 380-3 87. Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, SMMey Research pp. 
95-97. 
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Validation procedures were conducted on 30 percent of the data to ensure accurate 
selection, recording, coding, and data entry of the completed interviews. If 5 percent or 
more inaccuracies had been found, validation would have been conducted on the entire 
sample. This proved to be unnecessary. 
At this stage, it is also worth mentioning that throughout the thesis, whenever survey results 
are used in an argument, the researcher added under each table the probability of Chi 
square (p) and the degrees offreedom (dj). This was done to indicate to the reader whether 
or not the relationship between variables is valid or results from chance alone. 
29-I Pearson's Chi square (X ) is a test widely used by social scientists 0 to examine the 
differences between nominal" and ordinal 12 level variables. Although it does not show the 
strength of the relationship between variables, it does provide evidence as to whether the 
relationship between two or more variables is due to chance alone or whether statistical 
significance exists between the variables concerned. 
The explanation that follows is basic. For more detailed knowledge on the topic, see: Backstrom and Hursh- 
Cesar, Survey Research; Norusis, M. J., SPSS/PC+ for the IBM PC/XVAT, USA: SPSS Inc., 1986; Norusis, 
M. J., SPSS 6.1 -, Guide to Data Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997. 
10 Norusis, SPSS/PC+ for the IBM PCIXT/A , p. B-97. 
II In an opinion poll, a nominal measurement distinguishes and classifies one person from another. For 
example: male versus female, Muslim versus Christian. Responses are merely labels and a respondent can 
only fit into one of either labels or categories. Moreover, the numbers or codes indicate differences that 
cannot be mathematically compared. For example: "I"= student, 'T' = farmer. In this case, "25' is not higher 
or better than "I". Nominal measurement is the simplest form of measurement. (Backstrom. and Hursh-Cesar, 
Smn Ue Research, pp. 132-133. ) 
12 Ordinal measurement is used when a question is constructed in such manner that the responses or values do 
not only imply classification, but also ranking and ordering of the data. Accordingly, ordinal data allow a 
researcher to compare responses or values. Ordinal measurement does not give the researcher the degree of 
difference between different values. In order to be able to know the degree of difference between values, 
researchers use interval level questions. Example of ordinal measurement question: "What age group do you 
14 
The value of Chi square (X2) is calculated from the summation of the differences between 
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the observed frequencies' and the expected frequencies . In short, 
2 X2=, Z, 4 LOy-Ed' 
Ey 
("0 "= observedftequency, - 'E "= expectedftequency) 
The higher the summed differences between the observed and the expected frequencies, the 
higher the Chi square value. It is clear that the Chi square value would also increase 
according to the number of values and categories being tested. Therefore, when calculating 
the significance of Chi square (p) in a relationship between variables, it is crucial to take 
into account the number of categories for the variables, i. e. the number of rows and the 
number of columns in the table. This is what determines the degrees of freedom (dfi. 
Statisticians in testing the relationship between variables consider them vital. '5 The degrees 
of freedom are calculated as follows: (row-I)x(column-1). The crossed value of Chi square 
and the degrees of freedom is the significance of Chi square. Usually, the significance of 
Chi square is set at 5%. This implies that if the value of the significance is higher than 
0.05, the relationship between variables results from chance. On the other hand, if the 
belong to? ". Example of interval level question: "What is your exact age? ". (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, 
Surygy Research, pp. 132-133. ) 
13,, Observed frequencies" are the actual frequencies/results obtained from the survey. (Backstrom and Hursh- 
Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 363-364. ) 
14,, Expected frequencies" are the frequencies that should occur by chance if no relationship exists between the 
tested variables. (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Surygy Researc pp. 363-364. ) 
15 For more detailed information on the topic of "degrees of freedonf', see: Norusis, SPSS/PC+ for the IBM 
PC/XT/AT, p. B-98; Norusis, SPSS 6.1: Guide to Data Analysis, p. 330. 
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value of the significance of Chi square is lower than 0.05, then statistical significance 
between the variables under study can be assumed. 
In this thesis, the researcher did not make all the above calculations in order to know the 
significance of Chi square. Instead, the researcher employed the computer programme 
SPSS 6.1 16 , which, with the help of some commands, computes Chi square, and its 
significance and the degrees of freedom. An example of an output of results by SPSS 6.1 
can be viewed in figure I below. 
F kure I 
16 For more information on SPSS 6.1 see: Nonisis, SPSS 6,1. Guide to Data Analysis. 
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C32 Election expectations by AGE 
Age 
AGE 
Coun -- 
18-25 yr 26-35 yr 36-45 yr 46-55 yr 
1 21 3 4 
C32 
68 67 48 27 
met my expecta t 
158 144 61 39 
somewhat met m ý 
100 106 75 22 
didn't meet my 
53 49 19 17 
no answer IIII 
Column 379 366 203 
(Continued) Total 31.7 30.6 17.0 
100.0 
C32 Election expectations by AGE 
Age 
AGE Page 2 of 
Coun-- 
Missing 
Row 
99 Total 
C32 
1 12 233 
met my expectat 19.5 
38 451 
somewhat met mý 37.7 
14 338 
didn't meet my 28.3 
12 173 
no answer 14.5 
Column 76 
Total 6.4 
100.0 
Chi-Square 
------------- ----- 
Value 
------ -- 
Pearson 
----- 
55.30263 
Likelihood Ratio 52.25813 
Linear-by-Linear . 05107 
Association 
Minimum Expected Frequency - 
Number of Missing Observations: 
0 
105 
8.8 
Page 1 
51 Total 
1233 9.5 
11 451 
37.7 
21 338 
28.3 
23 173 
14.5 
66 
5.5 
DF 
15 
15 
1 
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1.1.2.8. Breakdown 
A breakdown of the opinions of the surveyed people according to selected subgroups will 
be included in the annex of this thesis. The interviewees were divided according to the 
following subgroups: 
1. gender, 
2. age, 
3. residence, 
4. refugee status, 
5. education 
Only were the breakdown shows a particular phenomenon of use in this study, will it be 
included in a certain chapter. 
In general, 51.2% of the respondents were male, whilst 48.8% were female. Moreover, 
59.2% of the surveyed people were married, 28.8% single, 4.9% widowed, 1.4% divorced, 
whilst 5.7% did not reveal their marital status. The average age of the interviewees was 33 
years. 
For the purpose of information, below, an overview of the occupation of the respondents 
has been included: 
9 Students: 14.6% 
9 Labourers: 11.3% 
* Housewives: 31.9% 
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9 Farmers/fishemien: 1.8% 
o Retired: 1.9% 
o Businesspeople/Private business: 8.4% 
9 Employees (e. g., secretaries, municipal employees, teachers, nurses): 19.6% 
9 Professionals (e. g., doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers): 2.1% 
4o Unemployed 4.8% 
e No answer: 2.4% 
1.1.2.9. Use of additional polls 
In order to highlight how public opinion on certain issues has changed or remained the 
same over time, the researcher of this thesis has sometimes made use of additional polls, 
which were conducted by the JMCC in the past. The researcher has received pennission 
from the director of the JMCC to do so, and has made sure that proper references have been 
made. 
1.13. Survey within the Palestinian Legislative Council 
In September 1997, the researcher of this thesis, again in co-operation with the JMCC, 
conducted a survey 17 within the Legislative Council in order not only to analyse the public's 
views, but also to take into account the opinions of the Council members themselves. 
Anonymity was emphasised in the research and the Council members were not obliged to 
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mention their names on the questionnaires. Some of the questions asked to the Council 
members were similar to those asked to the Palestinian people in the public opinion poll. 
This was done in order to check potential discrepancies between the answers of the Council 
members and the public. Furthermore, the Council members were asked additional 
questions allowing the researcher to gauge their attitudes and beliefs on such concepts as 
majority rule and minority rights, due process of law, and many more concepts that could be 
considered the basis of democratic thought. 18 
Prior to the survey within the Legislative Council, the author sought and was given the co- 
operation of the office of the Speaker of the Legislative Council, Mr. Ahmad Qrei'. The 
author and a JMCC researcher attended 15 Council sessions, approaching the Council 
members to fill in the questionnaires. After one month, out of the 88 Council members, 43 
filled in their questionnaires. 
1.1.4. Interviews 
Interviews were mainly used as an additional means of data collection to fill up gaps or to 
reinforce points in this study. Moreover, given the contemporary nature of the subject of 
this thesis and, consequently, the scarce availability of secondary resources, interviews 
proved sometimes the only plausible manner to gather specific information. 
17 For questionnaire in English, see Annex 4. For questionnaire in Arabic, see Annex 5. For full results, see 
Annex 6. 
18 The reasoning behind the researcher's choice of certain concepts will be explained later in the thesis, when 
the Council member's opinions about those concepts will be examined. 
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1.1.4.1. The Sample 
Overall, the people interviewed by the researcher can be categorised into six categories. 
The interviewees were asked predetermined questions: some were consistent with questions 
asked in the surveys; others were additional questions, depending on the affiliation and 
position of the interviewee. The six categories were: 
1. Legislative Council members: The main aim of the interview with some key 
Council members was to obtain a more comprehensive answer to some of the 
questions asked in the survey conducted within the Legislative Council. 
Moreover, by interviewing some Council members the author attempted to 
construct a clearer picture of why the interviewees stood in the first general 
elections, what their experience (achievements, challenges, programmes, 
suggestions, evaluation) has been like and what their expectations for the future 
were. Their opinions on contemporary issues such as the impact of Israeli 
policies, the issue of corruption, the declaration of a Palestinian state, the 
leadership of Yasser Arafat and so on, were also valued and taken into 
consideration by the researcher. 
2. Members of the Executive Authority: Interviews with Ministers of the Palestinian 
Authority evolved mainly around the relationship between the Executive 
Authority and the Legislative Council. They were also asked to give suggestions 
about what (if anything) could or should be changed in the future. 
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3. Members of the opposition groups: Leaders and members of the main secular and 
religious opposition groups and parties were interviewed mainly about two 
subjects: Firstly, they were asked why their respective parties had decided to 
participate or to boycott the first Palestinian general elections, and what their 
standpoint thereof was. They were also asked about the role of their respective 
parties nowadays and in the future. Secondly, they were questioned about their 
views of the political situation and the performance of the Palestinian Authority, 
including the Legislative Council. 
4. Members of the PLO leadership: Members of the PLO leadership were especially 
asked about the role of the PLO nowadays and its relationship with the 
Palestinian Authority. 
S. Academics & members of the NGO community: The framework of the interviews 
with Palestinian academics and members of the NGO community was more 
loose, rather than specific. Depending on the field and experience of the 
interviewee, the author attempted through discussions to attain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the subject, built on the first hand experience 
and specialisation of the interviewees. 
6. Members of the public: Interviews with members of the public were mainly 
conducted with ordinary people such as shopkeepers, students, businessmen, 
restaurant-holders, and bankers. The main purpose of the interview was to gauge 
the mood in the street in a face-to-face manner. 
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1.1.4.2. Procedures of the Interview 
Most interviews were conducted between July 1997 and October 1998, and were dependent 
on the timetable of the interviewees and the presence of the researcher in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas. 
None of the interviewees objected to the recording of the interview. However, to be on the 
safe side and in order to enhance the understanding of the tapes afterwards, the researcher 
made a point of always combining tape recording during the interview with note-taking. It 
is also worth mentioning here, that on some occasions, although the interviewees did not 
object to the recording, they specifically requested for their names not be mentioned in this 
script. The researcher will respect their wishes. Also, in some instances, the interviewees 
specified that some of the information provided was "off the record", even when the 
conversation was being recorded. Here again, the author will honour their instructions. 
In most instances, the time for the interviews was arranged beforehand and the allotted 
time-slot was usually one hour. However, on one occasion, a Minister was interviewed 
spontaneously between two Council sessions, reducing the interview time to fifteen 
minutes. It should also be noted that interviews with members of the public were not 
arranged beforehand. 
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1.1.4.3. Constraints 
The researcher faced a number of constraints when attempting to set up or conduct an 
interview. Following is a list of the main difficulties: 
1. Some of the interviewees were difficult to reach. Sometimes, attempts to set up an 
interview were very time consuming and frustrating, or could only materialise through a 
number of contacts. 
2. Although most interviews went quite smoothly, there was sometimes an impression that 
the interviewees were reluctant to give some pieces of information, especially given the 
fact that the researcher is a foreigner. 
3. The language barrier proved sometimes difficult, due to the researcher's poor Arabic or 
the interviewees' poor knowledge of English. On one occasion, the researcher, 
therefore, had to conduct the interview with the assistance of a native Arabic speaking 
researcher. 
1.1.5. Secondary Sources 
Reliance by the author on secondary sources could be considered minimal, mainly due to 
the contemporary nature of the subject at hand. A literature review on the sub ect will, j 
however, be included in Part Two of this chapter. 
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1.2. PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
As more and more countries embraced democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War, interest 
in the process of democratisation was revived. This renewed interest brought with it new 
ideas and perspectives about democratisation. Nonetheless, whilst new developments did 
indeed occur, studies that were published before - during the period of the Cold War - 
retained some validity. They provided not only various explanations about why and how 
democracy had developed successfully in some places and not in others, but often continued 
to serve as a backbone for later studies and analysis on the topic. 
In the following pages, the researcher will first provide a historical background to the 
discipline of democratisation studies. Before giving an overview of the different 
approaches to the study of democracy and democratisation and before determining which 
elements of those approaches are relevant for the purpose of this study, some definitions 
will be given of the main concepts used in the thesis. 
In this chapter, the relevant literature on voting behaviour and political culture will also be 
reviewed. The researcher contends that the literature on voting behaviour and political 
culture deserves special attention as most scholars - regardless of which theoretical 
approach they adhere to - recognise the importance of these aspects. Indeed, any 
examination of democracy and democratisation would be incomplete without taking into 
account political culture and voting behaviour. 
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Finally, a literature review of the various ways in which the process of democratisation in 
the Middle East has been examined will be provided. The literature on democratisation or 
the lack thereof in the Middle East will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter. In 
the researcher's view, some important dynamics not relevant to the process of 
democratisation in other parts of the world, play an important role in the Middle East. 
Precisely as a result of those dynamics in the region, many scholars were sceptical about the 
potential of democracy in the Middle East and refrained from examining its possibility. 
Larry Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, for example, in their work, Democracy in Developing 
Countries'9, studied democracy in 26 countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. They 
did not include any Middle Eastern and/or Moslem country in their study and justified this 
exclusion by arguing that these states "generally lack much previous democratic experience, 
and most appear to have little prospect of a transition even to semi-democracy". 20 
In conclusion of this chapter, an explanation of why the study of the process of 
democratisation in Palestine is relevant will be provided. 
1.2.1. Historical Background of Democratisation Studies 
The debate about democracy" and democratisation is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, it 
started around 300 BC with Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle. Whereas Plato 
19 Diamond, L., Linz, J. L., and Lipset, S. M., (eds. , DemogMcy in Developing Countries. Volume Two: 
Africa, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988. 
20 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, (eds. ), Democracy in Developing Countries , P. xx. 
21,, Democracy" derives its meaning from two Greek words: demos (people) and kratia (rule or authority). 
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despised democracy and dismissed it because he did not believe that it could provide for the 
well-being of its citizens, Aristotle was a vehement defender of democracy. 
Since the Greek philosophers, many great minds have attempted to write about what they 
thought to be the best form of government or what they envisaged democracy should 
consist of. 
As a result of these many endeavours, 'democracy' began to mean something totally 
different than at the time of Plato and Aristotle, and it became increasingly difficult to agree 
on a universal definition of the concept, as philosophers began to define it according to their 
own interpretations and beliefs. John Stuart Mill, for example, feared "false democracy" 
and "full-fledged democracy"; De Tocqueville was apprehensive about the "tyranny of the 
majority"; whilst Locke emphasised the notion of "consent". Other thinkers such as 
Hobbes were apprehensive about democracy and majority-rule. He believed that the only 
way to protect human property and life was to consolidate the power of the ruler. 
Rousseau, agreeing with Locke, argued that the best form of government was that where the 
will of the general was exercised. Whilst philosophising about the potential of democracy, 
Rousseau also recognised. its dangers and difficulties, leading him to conclude that 
democracy could only be successful for Gods and not for men. He wrote: 
"If there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically. A 
government so perfect is not suited to men. 22 
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Until the turn of this century, most scholars continued to examine democracy from a 
normative perspective. Very few adopted an empirical or a cross-cultural approach in the 
study of democracy. In this period, the emphasis continued to be on what was good for 
human beings or for societies. Very few scholars addressed the issue of how to reach that 
good state of affairs. The work of Habermas and his colleagues of the Frankfurt School in 
Germany and Von Hayek of the Austria School were classic examples of the latter trend. 
The more elaborate and empirical study of democracy started primarily in the United States. 
Although the emphasis was on examining and analysing the factors behind why voters in a 
democratic culture like the US voted in one way or another, these attempts soon became the 
foundations upon which scholars studying democracy based their methodologies. Scholars 
such as Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Campbell, Almond and Verba, belonged to this trend and 
examined American voting behaviour before conducting further research on American 
democracy. It is from their studies that variables such as voter turn-out, citizenry, party- 
affiliation, issue voting, and cultural and socio-economic variables were derived and, 
consequently, used by scholars such as Lipset, V. 0. Key, Huntington, Eckstein, Lane, 
Rustow, or Dahl. Of course, the impact of earlier studies by thinkers such as Weber and 
Marx, de Tocqueville or Burke upon the work of most scholars mentioned above can not be 
denied. However, as the empirical approach was the main approach used by the researcher 
of this thesis, - it is important to keep in mind where the origins of the empirical approach 
in 
research lie. Indeed, whereas Weber, for example, reached his conclusions normatively, a 
22 Quoted from Dahl, R. A., "Furdier Reflections on the 'Elitist Theory of Dernocracy"', American Political 
Science Revie , (60), no. 2, June 1966, p. 296. 
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scholar like Lipset used the empirical approach in reaching his conclusions, albeit 
substantiated by citations from classical thinkers. 
Until the 1950s, most research on democracy was conducted by Western scholars about 
countries in the West. Perhaps this was because, as Huntington argued, the political science 
discipline was more developed in the part of the world where democracy was more 
developed. 23 From the mid-seventies onwards, however, the literature has witnessed more 
interest in the development of democracy in the Third World. This increased interest can be 
explained by two main factors: 
1. There emerged an increasing demand for democratisation in Third World regions and 
scholars studying democratisation increasingly considered democracy as a viable 
alternative for the authoritarian or totalitarian systems in place. 
2. The collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the claim that "Western" political 
tradition is more viable and its tools are more capable of addressing the political, 
economic, social, and existential needs. This does not mean that Western political 
tradition and thought has been adopted by those examining the Third World without 
qualification. In most instances, Western or local intellectuals examined democracy as it 
pertained to the Third World cultures and environment. Very few adopted the Western 
model unconditionally. Those who did, were not received positively by local academia 
and other circles and were criticised as being by-products of Western cultural 
imperialism. Especially among "local" intellectuals and politicians the debate whether or 
23 Huntington, S. P., "One Soul at a Thne: Political Science and Political Refornf', American Political Science 
Review, (82), no. 1, March 1988, pp. 3-10. 
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not to accept the Western model of democracy is ongoing. As Bernard Lewis wrote 
about one of those regions in his book The Future of the Middle East: 
"The challenge of Western culture has been a major theme in Middle Eastern debate 
for almost two centuries. ... Middle 
Eastern rulers, leaders and thinkers have offered 
and will no doubt continue to offer various responses to this challenge - imitate, 
adopt, adapt, absorb, or complain, denounce, reject. ; 
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The emergence of more literature on democracy in the Third World fits well with the three 
waves of democratisation described by Samuel Huntington in his book The Third Wave: 
Democratisation. in the Late Twentieth CenIMU. 25 According to Huntington, the first wave 
started in 1828 and ended in 1942. To him this stage was associated with Pax Britannica. 
The second wave started in 1943 and ended in 1974-75. In this wave, certain countries like 
Germany Italy, Japan, and later Brazil and Argentina became democratic. According to 
Huntington, 26 the influence of the United States was instrumental in the democratisation of 
those countries. The third wave started in 1975 and brought many countries into the 
democratic world, particularly in Southern Europe and in Latin America. The research by 
Samuel Huntington will be discussed in greater depth in section 1.2.3.2.1. of this chapter. 
Huntington's work was only introduced at this stage in order to illustrate that the emergence 
of literature on democracy and democratisation about regions other than the "West", seems 
to run parallel with the trend towards democratisation in those regions. 
24 Lewis, B., The Future of the Middle East, London: Phoenix, 1997, p. 6. 
25 Huntington, S. P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth C Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 199 1. 
26 Huntington, S. P., "Will More Countries Become Democratic? " Political ScienceQuarterl J99), no. 2, 
Summer 1984, pp. 193-218. 
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In conclusion, ever since the Greek philosophers the study of democracy and 
democratisation has been exhausted with attempts at interpreting the ideal of "democracy", 
and has attempted to solve its riddles. Many studies have tried to determine the necessary 
prerequisites or requisites for democracy to be established. They analysed why democracy 
has been successful in some countries and failed in others, and why some variables - 
whether socio-economic, cultural, religious or class-based - pushed forward the transition 
towards democracy in some states, whilst the same conditions hindered democracy in 
others. Some other scholars have concentrated on examining voting behaviour. They have 
tried to determine, on the one hand, to what extent voting is essential in political 
development or the process of democratisation, and, on the other hand, what the role of the 
voter is in bringing to power representatives who act in a manner that reflects the will of the 
public. 
No matter what aspect of democracy scholars were concentrating on, two points stand out: 
(1) The meaning of 'democracy' has evolved over time and has been defined and 
interpreted differently by different scholars. Thus, the concept of democracy is not static. 
(2) Scholars and thinkers, especially in this century, did not blame the inherent nature of 
democracy for any problems in establishing democracy. Rather they put the blame for the 
lack or failure of democracy with inter alia culture, class structure, economic constraints, 
practical problems facing the state, and the imperfections of the citizens and/or rulers, who 
may have acted in an irresponsible or irrational manner. All the above stated reasons for 
the failure of democracy will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. In the meantime, 
it is worth noting that the terms "(ir)rational" and "(ir)responsible" will be used by the 
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researcher throughout this thesis, especially concerning voting behaviour. Therefore, the 
researcher considered it useful to include some quotes at this stage of the thesis in order to 
clarify the meaning of these terms. Dahl (1966), explained that not only the citizens should 
be wise and rational, but also their leaders. He wrote: 
'aware both of their critics and of the real life problems ofpopular rule, writers 
sympathetic to democracy have emphasised the needfor wisdom, virtue, and-setr 
restraint not only among the general body ofcitizens but among leaders as well. j27 
Prominent scholars such as V. 0. Key, for example, argued that voters may vote irrationally 
and irresponsibly if the information presented to them was misleading. V. 0. Key wrote: 
voters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed, 
yet in the large the electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as we should 
expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of 
information available to it. '2" 
To vote 'correctly', voters must pass through a process of learning on how to vote in a 
'responsible' manner. As Fiorina has commented: 
"there is an inertial element in voting behaviour that can not be ignored, but that 
inertial element has an experiential basis; it is not something learned at mommy's 
knee and never questioned thereafter. , 29 
1.2.2. Definitions 
In order to prevent conftision and before giving an overview of the main schools of thinking 
on democracy, it is essential to define some concepts which will be used frequently 
27 Dahl, "Further Reflections on ...... p. 296. 
28 Key, V. O., The Responsible Electorate, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 7. 
29 Fiorina, M., Retrospective Voting in America New Haven: Yale University Press, 198 1, p. 102. 
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throughout this thesis. The importance of definitions can not be underestimated. As De 
Tocclueville explained: 
'It is our way of using the words 'democracy'and 'democratic government'that 
brings about the greatest confusion. Unless these words are clearly defined and 
their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, 
much to the advantage ofdemagogues and despots. "30 
The main concepts which will be defined below, are: (1) democracy, (2) democratisation, 
and (3) semi-democmcy. 
1.2.2.1. Democrac 
As mentioned before, the term democracy is a literal translation of two Greek words, and in 
its original meaning refers to the "power of the people'. On this literal translation, all 
scholars agree, but once beyond that point, there is considerable disagreement as to exactly 
what 'democracy' entails. As Giovanni Sartori argued: 
'The term democracy standsfor something. The question is not only: "at does the 
word mean. It is also, and concurrently, What is the thing? nen we try to answer 
the latter quety, we discover that the thing does not correspond to the word or 
resembles it inadequately. We discover, that is, that there is littlefit between the 
facts and the name. ... 
What democracy 'is' can not be separated from what 
democracy 'should be' 
*A 
democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values 
bring it into being. J. 31 
The researcher of this thesis shares the view described above by Sartori. One could argue 
that democracy is like God to the believers. It can be conceived but not defined. We know 
the essence of democracy, but all we can do is to ascribe to it an attributed list, including 
concepts such as: justice, rule of law, equality, rule of majority, rights of minority, judicial 
30 Sartori, G., The Theory of Democragy Revisited, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987, p. 3. 
31 Sartori, The Theory of Democma Revisited, p. 7. 
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review, elections, and separation of powers. Nobody really knows how to reach the ideal of 
'democracy', but they know that it entails these basic tenets. According to E. P. Thompson, 
democracy is a "process set in motion without anyone knowing for certain where it is going 
to end"32 . Some have said that there are social, economic, and cultural prerequisites 
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reach democracy, others, like Tatu Vanhanen34, believed that democracy is part of human 
evolution. In other words, those scholars who set certain conditions necessary to attain 
democracy differ among themselves as to whether all these conditions should be reached in 
parallel or whether one condition has to proceed the other. 
Although scholars seem to have been unable to reach a common definition of democracy, 
and regardless of how it has been defined or how it is culturally perceived, there seems to 
be a consensus on the importance of democracy. To many Moslem thinkers, shura is 
synonymous with democracy35. According to Huntington, "democracy is a universal system 
of government"36 , and James Bryce noted that "the trend toward 
democracy now widely 
visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress" 37 . Jeremy Bentham also 
agreed on the importance of democracy and argued that it was the best tool to arrive at the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. 
32 Quoted from Lindberg-Hansen, S. E., Third World Democratisation: a Partly annotated bibliography of 
Recent Literature, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark (CDR Library Paper no. 94.3, 
September 1994). 
33 This will be discussed in more depth in section 1.2.3. of this chapter. 
34 Vanhanen, T., Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, Routledge: London, 1997. 
35 Khalid Mohammad Khalid defined 'Shuraa' in Islam as "the democracy that gives people the right to 
choose their rulers and their deputies and representatives, as well as the right to practise freedom of thought, 
opinion and opposition7'. Quoted in Ayubi, N., "Islam and Democracy", in: Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, 
M. and Lewis, P., (eds. ) Democratisation, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 349. 
36 Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: ...... p. 7. 
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Having established, above, that the concept of democracy is non-static and always in 
motion, and despite the different and complex interpretations of democracy, it is necessary 
to establish a working definition for this thesis. Most scholars agree that democracy 
involves a certain level of public participation in decision making. As the examination of 
the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996 and the public perception of the 
Legislative Council constitute an important part of this thesis, the researcher found it 
appropriate to select some requirements and definitions which stress the importance of 
public involvement in democracy. Russell J. Dalton, for example, argued in his article 
"Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change ., 38 : 
"democracy requires an active citizenry, because it is through discussion, popular 
interest, and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and 
carried out in a democracy. Without public involvement in the process, democracy 
lacks both its legitimacy and its guidingforce. P 39 
The importance of public participation is also reiterated in Lipset's4o definition of 
democracy "in complex societies". He defined democracy as follows: 
"[It is] a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunitiesfor 
changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanismfor the resolution of the 
problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which 
permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions 
through their ability to choose among alternative contendersfor political office. "41 
37 Quoted from Huntington, "Will More Countries p. 194. 
38 Dalton, R. J., "Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change", hi! p: www. oac. edu/cpi-bin/zd. c 
39 Dalton, R. J., "Democracy and its Citizens: p. 5. In the same article, Dalton also stipulated the 
following: "A major goal of democratic societies is to expand citizen participation in the political process and 
thereby increase popular control of political elites. " (p. 6) 
40 Lipset, S. M., "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", 
American Political Science Review, (53), 1959, p. 7 1. 
41 Although in the Political Man (198 1), Lipset warns against the increasing role of the citizens which could 
become negative if excessive (pp. 227-229). 
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More generally, Schumpeter defined democracy as "a set of procedures for constituting 
govemmenf', leading Mary Ellen Fisher, in whose article Schumpeter was quoted, to 
conclude the following: 
"Democracy involves a set of rules by which representatives are elected, policies 
are chosen, and laws are made and enforced #, 42 
For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher will rely on Lipset's definition of democracy 
because of its specificity and comprehensiveness. 
1.2.2.2. Democratisation 
Concerning the tenn 'democratisation', the researcher of this thesis, again, will opt for a 
broad definition, because as was the case with 'democracy', different causes, conditions, 
requirements, requisites or prerequisites for democratisation have been considered by 
different scholars, and 'causes' for democratisation could vary from one country to another. 
This does not imply that any confusion exists about the term dernocratisation itself. It does, 
however, mean, as Samuel Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the 
Late Twentieth CentM argued, that "causes of democratisation [could] differ substantially 
from one place to another"43 , and causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a 
democratisation wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in 
that wave. 44 In spite of this, however, Huntington stressed, in general, that "elections, open, 
42 Fisher, M. E., Establishing Democracies, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, p. 3. 
43 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 38. 
44 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 380. 
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, 45 free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua noW , and he 
emphasised that political reform should be gradual and incremental and should be 
, 46 "undertaken by moderate, realistic men and women in the spirit of one-soul-at-a-time' . 
Most writers on democracy and democratisation would not refute the stages and the 
conclusion which Huntington reached in The Third Wave. Very few would disagree with 
the idea that what might work for one country may not for another as the political 
environment is highly complex and involves many quantifiable and non-quantifiable 
variables. As Prezeworski has noted: democratisation is "a process of institutionalising 
947 uncertainty' . It might, therefore, be more practical to 
define 'democratisation' in general 
tenns, as David Potter did. He kept the definition of 'democratisation' very broad when he 
wrote: "The word 'democratisation' refers to political changes moving in a democratic 
direction. 9148 
The working definition of the term 'democratisation' for this thesis, however, will be the 
one formulated by Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Noble. They defined 
democratisation as follows: 
45 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 9. 
46 Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: p. 9. Robert Dahl's Polyarchy also emphasises the need for 
expanding political institution before the expansion of political participation (pp. 33-40). Similarly, Eric 
Nordlinger argued that the identification of national identity, then the establishment of effective political 
institutions and then political participation increases the chances for the non-violent and non-authoritarian 
systems to develop (Nordlinger, E., "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change" World 
Politic , (20), 1968, pp. 494-530). 47 Quoted in Strom, K., "Democracy as Political Competitiorf' in: Marks, G. and Diamond, L., (eds. ), Re- 
examining, Democmcj: Essgys in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipse , Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993, 
p. 43 
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'Political democratisation entails the expansion ofpolitical participation in such a 
way as to provide citizens with a degree ofreal and meaningful collective control 
over public policy. '49 
At this stage, it is also useful to define the term 'political development', as it will 
sometimes be used in this thesis. The researcher realises the negative connotations with 
which the term 'political development' is sometimes associated. As was described in the 
Dictionary of Modem Politics: 
"Political development has obvious problems in avoiding a purely ideological bias 
in which the more nations were seen as more developed, the more they came to 
resemble Western liberal democracies, or whatever else was taken as the 1deal. '50 
The researcher wishes to assert here that the term 'political development' in this thesis is 
used without any orientalist connotations. Political development could, thus, be defined as 
"the institutionalisation of political organisations and procedures". "' Another appropriate 
description of political development is found in the Dictionga of Modem Politics. It reads 
as follows: 
'The basic idea, operating by analogy with economic development, is that there 
exists a fairly objective path of political progress through which societies move 
towardsJurther political sophistication. 62 
48 Potter, D., "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis, (eds. ) Democratisation, p. 
3. 
49 Brynen, R., Korany, B. and Noble, P., "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalisation and 
Democratisation", in: Brynen, R., Korany, B., and Noble, P., (eds. ), Political Liberalisation. and 
Democratisation in the Arab World, Volume 1. Theoretical Perspectives, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1995, p. 3. 
50 Robertson, D., (ed. ), A Dictionga of Modem Politics, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1993, p. 382. 
51 Definition from Samuel Huntington, quoted from: Deegan, H., The Middle East and Problems of 
Democrac Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 5. 
52 Robertson, (ed. ), A Dictionq! y of Modem Politics, p. 382. 
38 
1.2.2.3. Partial Democrac 
When examining democracy and the process of democratisation, it is useful to have a 
concept which describes regimes which can no longer be described as being authoritarian, 
but are not yet full-fledged democracies. They are involved in a process of democratisation 
and can be classified as partial democracies or semi-democracies. 
13 The Palestinian 
Authority, for example, which will be scrutinised in this thesis, does not fit in either the 
category of a democracy or in the category of non-democracies. The introduction of the 
concept of partial democracy can help to measure how far the Palestinian Authority has 
progressed in the process of democratisation. As Mary Ellen Fisher explained, the 
introduction of the term semi-democracy allows for less extreme classifications, as it leaves 
room between the two extremes of democracy and non-democracy, for regimes that can not 
be classified under either of those categories. She wrote: 
"One question to keep in mind is whether to treat democracies and non-democracies 
as separate categories or, instead, as points along a continuum rangingftomfull 
democracies, on the one hand, to non-democracies, on the other, with space in the 
middle for semi-democracies (those governmentsfulfilling some democratic criteria 
but not all). )j54 
Partial democracy was. defined by David Potter as follows: 
"Partial democracy is a type of political regime in which the accountability of 
government to citizens is more or less qualified, military, traditional or other non- 
elected establishments within the state restrict the effect of elections and 
compromise the authority ofthe elected government. "" 
53 As will be discussed in section 1.2.3.2.1. of this chapter, to Lipset, for example, semi-democracy could 
result from some economic developments; whilst to Rustow, for example, it could mean a phase prior to the 
attainment of democracy. 
54 Fisher, Establishing Democracies, p. 5. 
55 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, p. 5. 
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According to Potter, partial democracy is constituted by the following characteristics: (1) 
there is a limited accountability of government to the citizens, (2) there are elections, but 
they are not necessarily fair and free, (3) citizens enjoy some degree of freedom of 
expression, (4) there is a political opposition, but it is usually not sufficiently organised to 
exert real pressure, and (5) there are some independent organisations critical of the state, 
but they are usually carefully monitored. 
The researcher acknowledges that the term 'partial democracy' is only one way to describe 
a limited form of democracy, and that there are many other concepts which could bridge the 
gap between democracies and non-democracies, such as controlled democracy, restrictive 
democracy, de facto one-party democracy, or oligarchal democracy. 56 For the purpose of 
this study, however, the introduction of the term 'partial democracy' seemed most 
appropriate. 
1.2.3. Different Theoretical Schools 
Over time, many scholars have examined democracy and the process of democratisation. 
They have attempted to determine the required prerequisites of democratisation or tried to 
outline the variables vital to sustain democracy. As a result, many schools of thought on 
democracy and democratisation developed. In the first part of this section, the researcher 
intends to present different classifications of those schools of thought. Then, in the second 
56 For a comprehensive overview of the different types of democracy, see: Collier, D. and Levitsy, S., 
"Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation and Comparative Research", World Politic (49), April 
1997, pp. 43045 1. 
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part, the most prominent scholars in each of the selected theoretical approaches or schools 
will be discussed. 
1.2.3.1. Classifications and Different Interpretations of Schools 
The complex nature of the study of democracy and democratisation has led to the 
accumulation of many studies on the topic. Over the years, several attempts were made to 
classify these studies into categories. Below, some of the attempts of classification will be 
reviewed, starting with those by Hoffinann and Reisinger, and moving on to Potter and 
Remmer. 
Whilst Erik Hoffinan concentrated on classifying studies which dealt with the pre-requisites 
of democracy, William Reisinger also covered studies of the transition towards democracy. 
Both Hoffman and Reisinger's classifications were both published recently and their work, 
therefore, is timely and also covers more recent literature. Potter was included in the 
overview because his classifications organise theories in a manner that is useful for the 
purposes of this thesis. The theories, which will be reviewed in the thesis, will, therefore, be 
mainly based and structured according to Potter's categories. The importance of Remmer 
lies in her attempt to classify new theorists, who examined the impact of the international 
political enviromnent since the global changes in the late 1980s and the 1990s upon the 
internal political or socio-economic conditions of regimes. 
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The classifications discussed below are only a selection of many attempts to structure the 
abundant literature on democracy and democratisation. The overview, however, intends to 
illustrate two main points: 
1. The classification of theories can be drawn according to different criteria. 
2. By classifying theories, there is a potential danger that some studies do not fall in any 
category and are, therefore, not mentioned or excluded. 
1.2.3.1.1. Erik Hoffinan 
According to Erik Hoffinan57, the different theories on democracy and democratisation can 
be classified into two main categories. 
1. The first category consists of studies in which the importance of variables such as the 
elite-mass consensus, political inclusion, civil liberties, socio-economic equality, citizen 
activism, and responsive national, regional, and local government bodies, is stressed. 
These studies can be traced from Aristotle, Rousseau and de Tocqucville to Upset, 
Eckstein and Robert Putnam. These studies are usually supported empirically with 
institutional and cultural data. 
2. The second category consists of studies in which the importance of variables such as 
inter-elite competition, procedural rules, mandates of elected representatives, interest 
groups politics, an effective civil service bureaucracy, and public acquiescence to 
national politics, is accentuated. This second category includes, amongst others, studies 
57 Hoffmann, E. P., "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics", in: 
Eckstein, H., Fleron, F. J., Hoffinann, E. P. and Reisinger, W. M., (eds. ), Can Democrao Take Root in Post- 
Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-SociM Relations, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. 
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from Plato, Burke, Weber, Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington. 
Evidence from these studies indicates that their authors favoured both presidential and 
parliamentary forms of government. 
Hoffinan argues that whereas the first approach focuses on the cultural as well as the socio- 
economic preconditions of democracy, the second contends that "democratic institutions 
and norms can emerge and receive support as a by-product of intra-elite power struggle, 
58 
without a democratic populus being in place" . 
1.2.3.1.2. William Reisinger 
William Reisingerý9, writing in the same book as Hoffman, was more elaborate than his 
colleague. Whereas Hoffinan's classification seemed to address only the pre-requisites for 
democracy, Reisinger's typology included theories on democratisation. that emphasise 
transition to and sustainability of democracy. He clustered democratisation theories into 
fourtypes: 
1. Those which focus on various societal aspects. This category includes, amongst others, 
Lipset (1959), who examined the level of economic development, and Almond and 
Verba (1963) and Inglehart (1990), who examined public attitudes as requisites for 
democratic development. 
58 Hoffinann, "Democratic Theories in: Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffinan, and Reisinger, (eds. ), Can 
Democ[acy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, pp. 106-107. 
59 Reisinger, W. M., "Survey Research and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russia7', in: Eckstein, Fleron, 
Hoffinan and Reisinger, (eds. ), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?. 
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2. Those which use historical case studies to identify the factors in influencing political 
change, such as Moore (1966) and Rueschmeyer et al. (1992). 
3. Those which focus on the strategies of elites during the struggle over the shape of 
political life. This group includes scholars such as O'Donnell et al. (1986) and 
Prezeworski (1988). 
4. Those which examine the nature of democratic institutions in order to assess whether or 
not they would survive the challenges they would inevitably face. Scholars belonging to 
this cluster include: Lijphart (1984) and Linz (1990). 
According to Reisinger, the studies belonging to the first two clusters emphasise long-term 
developments, whilst downplaying the actions made during the process of transitions away 
from authoritarianism. The opposite is the case for the studies classified in the last two 
clusters. 
1.23.1.3. David Potter 
David Potterýo classified the theoretical approaches to democracy and democratisation into 
three main types: 
1. The Modernisation Approach, to which he ascribed scholars such as Lipset and 
Diamond. The Modernists, whose work is primarily quantitative, focused on socio- 
economic development as their central factor in democratisation. 
60 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation. 
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2. The Transition Approach, which includes scholars such as Rustow, O'Donnell & 
Schmitter, and Shain & Linz. The Transitionalists targeted the political elite as the main 
focus of their attention when examining democratisation. As will be discussed later, to 
the transitionalists the path towards democratisation follows a general route. 
3. The Structuralist Approach, to which Moore and Rueschmeyer belong. To the I 
Structuralists, the essence of democratisation lies in the structural changes of class, state I 
as well as transnational power. Any historical route to liberal democracy is determined 
fundamentally by changing structures, not by initiatives and choices of the elite. 61 
Potter noted that whilst the three approaches focus on specific factors in their analysis, all 
of them refer to common "explanatory factors", such as economic development, social 
divisions, the state and political institutions, political culture and ideas, and transnational 
and international engagements, including war. 62 Moreover, according to Potter, scholars 
belonging to any of his different theoretical classifications have found that the empirical 
evidence related to democratisation in any country is so complex and multi-faceted that not 
one single theoretical approach has been able to completely capture the complexity of the 
democratisation process and explain it in a satisfactory manner. 63 Potter, however, quickly 
made sure to silence any critic who might start to wonder about the useftilness of theory in 
understanding the dynamics of democratisation. He wrote: 
61 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, p. 22. 
62 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, pp. 
24-31. 
63 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, p. 23. 
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"to ignore theory and engage only in endless descriptions ofa particular set of 
events can never produce answers to questions about why democracy is here and 
notthere. 64 
1.2.3.1.4. Karen Remmer 
Karen Remmer65, in her article "New Perspectives on Democratisation" argued that as a 
result of the dramatic changes in the global political, economic, and security systems of the 
early 1990s, the need for theoretical revisions in the field of comparative politics was 
essential and urgent. As a result of this belief, Remmer attempted to introduce a 
classification of new approaches to adapt to the realities in the post cold war era. 
According to Rernmer, each of those approaches "takes us beyond pre-existing theoretical 
contributions and highlights an important facet of the democratisation. proceSS,,. 
66 The new 
approaches can be classified into four categories: the structuralist approach, the elite 
compromise approach, the strategic choice model, and the rational choice model. She 
mentions examples of each model as follows: 
1. The Structuralists, including scholars such as Rueschmeyer, and Stephens and Stephens, 
whose book, Cgpitalist Development and Democrac (1992) is a good example of this 
approach. 
2. The Elite Compromise Approach, represented by scholars such as Higley and Gunther, 
who wrote Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America. 
64 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Dernocratisation, pp. 
22-23. 
65 Remmer, K. L., "New Theoretical Perspectives on DemocratisatioW', Comparative Politics, October 1995, 
pp. 103-122. 
66 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 104. 
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3. The Strategic Choice Model. This model is represented by scholars such as Adam 
Przeworski, with his book Democracy and the Market (199 1). Another contribution to 
this approach is the book Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic 
Approac , which was written 
by Prezeworski, Pereira and Maravell. According to 
Remmer, the crux of the approach of Prezeworski, Pereira and Maravell consists of the 
following: 
"[they] criticise the high transitional costs imposed by neoliberal programmes 
of economic reform and seek to identify an alternative reformist strategy that 
will allowfor the restoration ofeconomic growth under democratic conditions. 
Their analysis emphasises the importance of social policy, active state 
coordination of economic development, and democratic decision-making 
processes. 67 
Indeed, according to Prezeworski, emerging democracies are threatened by economic 
decline. Accordingly, he wrote that: 
"fto] evoke compliance and participation, democracy must generate 
substantive outcomes: it must offer all the relevant political forces real 
opportunities to improve their material welfare. , 68 
4. The Rational Choice Model, including scholars such as Barbara Geddes, who 
represented this category in her book, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Cgpaciiy in 
Latin America (1994). Geddes, Remmer argues, places institutional arrangements rather 
than 'generic regime fragilities at the core of political analysis. By doing so, Geddes 
provides an explanation for the emergence of bureaucracies, state capabilities, and 
rational development policies in democracies. According to Remmer, the model used by 
Geddes advances the understanding of contemporary developments by exploring the 
consequences of institutional variations among democracies for state sector reform. In 
67 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 112. 
68 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 112. 
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doing so, Geddes sheds new light upon the conditions under which elected governments 
limit opportunities for distributive politics, strengthen the hands of technocrats, and 
enhance the prospects for collectively rational politiCS. 
69 Remmer summarises the core 
of the Rational Choice Model, used by Geddes, as follows: 
"[According to Geddes], democratic policy reflects the institutionally shaped 
sets of incentives facing elected officials who are confronted with a collective 
action problem whose solution depends upon specific sets of democratic 
institutions. "70 
Moreover, in Geddes' view, achieving collective rational reforms depends on the number of 
political parties, party discipline, and parity of power. 
1.2.3.2. Different Schools 
In the following pages the researcher will try to examine and highlight some of the works 
on democracy and democratisation. Not everything will be covered: it would be impossible 
to do so. As. the scope of this study allows only for brevity and selection, the researcher has 
tried to examine the schools and approaches regarded by many as seminal. 
Based on David Potter's classification of theories on democracy and democratisation, as 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter, the researcher will in the following pages 
concentrate on the studies of the main scholars in those categories. In the view of the 
researcher, Potter's classification proved to be comprehensive, and covers most of the 
literature on the subject. His analysis on the 'theoretical convergence' between the various 
69 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 116. 
70 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 116. 
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economic, social, institutional, cultural and international factors that effect the 
democratisation process provided the researcher with a clearer insight into the subject 
matter . 
71 An additional advantage of Potter's study is that it also covered the post cold war 
issues identified by Remmer. Nevertheless, some additional studies will also be discussed 
as they are relevant to the purpose of this thesis. 
1.2.3.2.1. The Modernisation Approach 
Before examining the theory of Seymour Martin Lipset, who is one of the main protagonists 
of the Modemisation approach, it is necessary to define the terni 'modernisation'. 
According to the DictionM of Modem Thoud , 'modernisation' denotes: 
"the attempt to amend practices, institutions, laws and customs in order to align 
them with the modern world, the assumption being that it is they, and not the 
is 72 modern world, that must change . 
Alternatively, Karl Deutsch defined modernisation as follows: 
"Modernisation is a complex process of social change which is significantly 
correlated with major changes in politics. YW3 
To Potter, modernisation implies "socio-economic development", the extent of which is 
measured quantitatively using indicators or 'requisites'. The value of these indicators does 
not lie in their potential to explain causation, but rather in their ability to establish 
71 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, pp. 
22-37. 
72 Scruton, R., (ed. ), A Dictionya of Modem Thou , London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 354. 
73 Deutsch, K., "Social Mobilisation and Political Developmenf, in: Welch, C. (ed. ), Political Modernisation, 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishers, 1967, p. 153. 
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correlations. 74 In the case of Lipset, those correlations imply universality and linearity of 
relations between variables: 'universality' in the sense that they are empirically relevant in 
any country (e. g. number of TV-sets as an indicator for wealth), and 'linearity' in the sense 
that the relationship between variables is linear (e. g. no education means no democracy, 
some education means some democracy). 
a. Seymour Martin Lipset 
To Potter, Lipset's Political Man 75 is a classic work which explains dernocratisation using 
the Modernist approach. While this book was used by Potter in his explanation to the 
Modernist Approach, the researcher of this thesis relied more on Lipset's earlier work 
"Some Social Requisites of Democracy"76 which was regarded by Larry Diamond and Gary 
Marks77 as the "more seminal and durable" of Lipset's work. In fact, this article was later 
reprinted as a chapter entitled "Economic Development and Democracy" in Political Man 
and it seems to be mainly on this chapter that Potter has based his analysis of Lipset. 
The main problem Potter, and other scholars, had with Lipset's work lay in Lipset's belief 
in the linearity of the relationship between economic development and democracy, as many 
74 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, p. 12. 
Rustow, and many others, criticised Lipset because he merely established 'correlations'. See for example: 
Rustow, D. A., "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, April 1970, pp. 
337-364. 
75 Lipset, S. M., Political Man, London: Heinman, 1960. 
76 Lipset, S. M., "Some Social Requisites of ... ". 
77 Diamond, L. and Marks, G., "Seymour Martin Lipset and the Study of Democracy", in: Diamond and 
Marks, (eds. ), Re-examining Democrga: Essgys in Honour of SMnour Martin Lipset. 
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examples around the world negated this assumption. As Diamond and Marks have noted, 
this linear relationship has not been as strong as Lipset has professed. In their opinion, "it 
has been subject to weakening or reversal at middle levels of development" . 
78 As a result of 
this belief, Diamond reformulated Lipset's assumption and introduced the 'human 
development indicator M as the single most powerful predictor of the likelihood of 
democracy. He wrote: 
'The more well-to-do the people ofa country, on average, the more likely they will 
favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic systeinfor their country. 00 
Despite the strong criticisms Lipset faced concerning his assumption of the linearity in the 
relationship between economic development and democracy, his work had a major impact 
on circles studying democracy and democratisation. In his foreword to the book, Re- 
examining Democracy: EssUs in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset, Robert Merton, an old 
professor of LiPset, noted that Lipset is "one of the truly consequential social scientists of 
our time" and one of the most cited authors of all times. "' Diamond and Marks also gave a 
special tribute to Lipset. They wrote: 
78 Diamond and Marks, "Seymour Martin Lipset and... ", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds. ), Re-examinin 
Democ , p. 6. 79 ; Human development indicator" is an index developed by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and it represents an unweigbted average of three measures: adult literacy, life expectancy, and per 
capita GDP (Diamond, L., "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered", American Behavioural 
Scientistl (35), no. 415, March/June 1992, p. 458). 
80 Diamond, "Economic Development and ...... p. 468. 
81 Merton, R. K., "Foreword: Notes on the Young Lipsef', in: Diamond and Marks, (eds. ), Re-examinin 
Democracy: Esspys in Honour of SaMour Martin Lips , p. x-xi. 
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'No social scientist or sociologist has contributed more to advancing our thinking 
about democracy-in all its dimensions, both comparatively and in the United States- 
than Seymour Martin Lipset. 82 
As mentioned above, throughout his studies Lipset focused primarily on the importance of 
the relationship, or one should perhaps say the 'correlation', between democracy and 
economic development. He defined this correlation in terms of wealth, industrialisation, 
urbanisation, education and legitimacy. 13 He summarised his conviction that economic 
development gives rise to a more democratic political culture in the Political Man, by 
asserting that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
84 democracy" . 
According to Lipset, economic development improves the social and economic conditions 
of the working class, and strengthens the middle class and increases their number. An 
economically better-off working class, and a large middle class are essential for the 
development of the political order and for the emergence of democracy. The benefits of 
economic improvement for the working class, were explained by Lipset as follows: 
"For the lower strata, economic development, which means increased income, 
greater economic security, and higher education, permit those in this statusto 
develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of 
politics .. Increased wealth and education /ofthe lower class] also serve democracy by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures 
which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make 
them less receptive to supporting extremists ones. 85 
82 Diamond and Marks, "Seymour Martin Lipset and... ", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds. ), Re-examinin 
Democraa, p. 1. 
83 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 75. 
84 Lipset, holitical Man, p. 3 1. 
85 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 103. 
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In Lipset's opinion, as a result of economic development, the lower classes would no longer 
be isolated. On the contrary, they would become part of the national culture, with values 
similar to those of the middle class. As illustrated by Lipset's quote below, the middle class 
was another class to which Lipset ascribed an important role in the process of 
democratisation. He stated: 
"[ijncreased wealth ... also affects the political role of the middle class through 
changing the stratification structure so that it shiftsfrom an elongatedpyramid, 
with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class. A large 
middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward 
moderate and democratic parties andpenalise extremist groups. 86 
The third class, the upper class, is highly distrusted by Lipset as, in his opinion, it is this 
class which retards political development. Lipset argued that if wealth is concentrated only 
in the upper class, as is the case in poor countries, then this class will be more inclined to 
mistreat the majority of the public. 
'The poorer a country is, and the lower the absolute standards ofliving ofthe lower 
classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as 
beyond the pale ofhuman society... B7 
Consequently, in this scenario, the upper classes would not only resist any pressures 
towards democratic development, but their often arrogant political behaviour would serve 
to intensify extremist reactions on the part of the lower classes. "8 It is from this vantage 
point that Lipset introduced the need for 'political values' for sustaining democracy. '9 
86 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 103. 
87 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of .. 11, p. 83. 
88 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 104. 
89 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 7 1. 
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These political values, according to Lipset, are associated with wealth and can only develop 
under good economic conditions. In his opinion, better economic conditions produce civil 
servants that carry with them 'universalistic' norms; whereas poverty produces deficient 
bureaucrats and nepotism. 90 
In addition to a value system, Lipset emphasised the role of 'intermediary organisations' 
that are relatively independent from state authority, in sustaining democracy. In Lipset's 
opinion, the existence of these organisations is also associated with the nation's wealth. 
These organisations are not only important in enhancing public participation and in 
communicating with the public, but, according to Lipset, they are essential in acting as 
sources for countervailing power and inhibiting the state or any single major source of 
private power from dominating all political resources. 9' 
According to Lipset, under the conditions mentioned above, including economic 
development, the role of the lower and middle classes, the presence of a value system, and 
the role of intermediary organisations, democracy could be viable. Although Lipset argued 
that these conditions are more relevant to the countries of north-east Europe and the English 
speaking countries, they are nonetheless also pertinent to the viability of democracy 
elsewhere. According to Lipset, it is only under such conditions that regimes could be able 
to attain legitimacy. Lipset defined legitimacy as follows: 
90 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of ..... p. 84. 
91 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of ..... p. 84. Brzezinski, Z. and Huntington, S. P., Political Power 
USA/USSR.. Similarities and Contrasts. Convergence or Evolution, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978, 
made a similar argument. However, they believed that the upper classes tend to be more inclined to participate 
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'Eegitimacy involves the capacity ofa political system to engender and maintain the 
belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate orproper onesfor 
the society" 92 
The legitimacy of a democratic regime depends on its ability to resolve conflicts, which 
Lipset contends, to be prerequisites for democracies. 93 Since cleavages are characteristic of 
all societies, the ability to reconcile those cleavages in a manner that is appropriate to 
society at large can only be achieved when there is legitimacy. 
According to Lipset, good economic conditions and the ability of the West, for example, to 
resolve its problems and internal social conflicts provided the respective countries with 
legitimacy and the political culture that are amicable to democracy. According to Lipset, in 
these countries there is little difference between the democratic left and right, "as the 
socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state". 94 This, Lipset 
argued, enabled the working class from having their rights of citizenry and political access. 
In Upset's opinion, the situation in the Latin and East European countries was different. 
The inability, or unwillingness, of these countries to absorb the working-class attempts at 
integration into the body politic led to alienation from the system. To Lipset, the 
communists' ability to take over the working class leadership and trade unions prevented 
the regimes from tolerating the workers and as such suppressed their inclusion into the 
in politics. They argued that, unlike the situation in the USSR, civic associations in the USA "are a means 
through which those of higher socio-economic standing participate in and limit the political system". (p. 104) 
92 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 86. 
93 A point to which Rustow, whose work will be discussed in section 1.2.3.2.2., has given great attention. 
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system. This situation, Lipset argued, "precludes an easy prediction that economic 
development will stabilise democracy in these East European countries". 95 
As for Asian and African countries, Lipset argued that poverty, low educational levels make 
it unlikely that many of those governments will become democratic. He wrote: 
"Given the existence of poverty stricken masses, low levels of education, and 
elongated pyramid class structure, and the ýPremature' triumph ofdemocratic left, 
the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia andAftica is 
bleak" 96 
In short, according to Lipset's argument, the need for a substantial middle class, political 
values, and economic development are essential for the success of democracy anywhere in 
the world. These, however, although being basic prerequisites, may not suffice. As Lipset 
explained: 
"Unfortunately, an increase in wealth, in the size ofthe middle class, in education, 
and other related factors will not necessarily mean the spread ofdemocracy or the 
stabilising of democracy. 07 
Citing Weber's explanation behind Russia's failure to acquire Western liberties, Lipset 
accepted Weber's analysis which stated that European liberty had been bom in unique, 
perhaps unrepeatable, circumstances at a time when the intellectual and material conditions 
98 for it where exceptionally propitious. Despite his acceptance of the idea that the European 
situation was unique, Lipset refused to read it as a reason for pessimism in the potential of 
94 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 100. 
95 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 100. 
96 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 101. 
97 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 103. 
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democratisation outside Europe. Lipset contended that political democracy exists and has 
existed in a variety of circumstances. However, the problem for him remained that: 
"democracy is not achieved by acts ofwill alone; but men's wills, through action, 
can shape institutions and events in directions that reduce or increase the chance 
for the development and survival ofdemocracy. "9 
More than thirty years after Lipset's article, discussion about it remains as controversial as 
ever. Despite the gaps in Lipset's article, as discussed earlier and as will be examined later 
by other scholars, the impact of Lipset and the importance of socio-economic development 
have remained essential in any discussion about democratisation. As Larry Diamond 
argued: 
Economic development is not aprerequisitefor democracy. Injact Lipset wrote of it as a 
'requisite'. meaning literally something that is essential but does not necessarily have to 
exist in advance. In a much neglected passage of [Lipsets] essay, he anticipated a 
crucial element of democratic experience in the contemporary developing world: 'a 
premature democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the 
growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or 
autonomous private organisations. "100 
Having said that, Diamond was not dogmatic about the modernist approach. Arguing that 
one could clearly notice positive correlations between development and democracy, and 
infer causality, he did not deny that other questions needed to be addressed. Such questions 
included: Why and how does development generate democracy? Under what circumstances 
does it fail? Therefore Diamond argued as follows: 
"We remain highly dependent for the answers to these questions on the evidence 
ftom case studies and comparative historical analysis. "'0' 
98 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of ..... p. 103. 
99 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 103. 
100 Diamond, "Economic Development and... ", p. 487. 
101 Diamond, "Economic Development and ...... p. 472. 
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b. Samuel Huntington 
Although David Potter did not refer to Huntington as a modernist, his emphasis on the need 
for political and economic reform as well as on the modernisation of state structures 
undoubtedly posts him in the modernist school and made him one of its most influential 
theorists. What distinguishes Huntington, and other influential writers like Dahl, from other 
modernists like Lipset or Diamond, is that Huntington, like Dahl, did not subscribe nor 
accept any single factor or theory in explaining democracy. This, to this researcher, makes it 
understandable why Potter did not classify Huntington or Dahl in any of his classifications. 
As mentioned, Huntington put forward a multiplicity of factors (such as cultural, political, 
economic, social, and external conditions) as prerequisites for democratisation. On some 
occasions, he emphasised political reform, on other occasions he argued for the importance 
of economic development or for the need for a culture which valued accommodation over 
the strife for power. In other instances, he stressed the need for political participation as a 
prerequisite for democracy and for the rationalisation of authority. What is clear, however, 
and what will be illustrated below, is that Huntington's pattern of thinking evolved over 
time. 
In his book Political Order in Changing Societies'02 , which he wrote in 1968, Huntington 
emphasised the importance of reform in societies which had low levels of political 
102 Huntington, S. P., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. 
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institutionalisation. He argued that innovative reform was essential in order to avoid 
revolutions. In Huntington's opinion, this reform included "rationalisation of authority, the 
differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participatiorf'. 103 He summed up 
the essence of reform as follows: 
Teform means the changing of traditional values and behaviour patterns, the 
expansion of communications and education, the broadening of loyalties from 
family, village, and tribe to nation, the secularisation of public life, the 
rationalisation of authority structures, the promotion of functionally specific 
organisations, the substitution of achievement criteriafor ascriptive ones, and the 
furthering ofa more equitable distribution ofmaterial and symbolic resources. "'0' 
In addition, Huntington argued that another essential prerequisite for successful 
dernocratisation of societies was the ability of social forces, produced by modemisation, to 
assimilate successfully into the system in order to be able to achieve a new social 
consciousness as a result of modernisation. 105 
The above themes were also detected in his later writings, particularly in his often cited 
article "Will More Countries Become Democratic"106 which he wrote in 1984, and his 1988 
article "One Soul at a time: Political Science and Political Reform"'07 . One noteworthy 
difference, however, is that whilst in the sixties Huntington was optimistic about the 
success of democracy if certain broad conditions were to be met, he became less so in the 
eighties. Although he still argued in the eighties that certain broad economic, social, 
103 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 93. 
104 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societiesl p. 140. 
105 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 140. 
106 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", pp. 193-218. 
107 Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: pp. 3-10. 
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108 
external, and cultural conditions were necessary for the success of democracy , in his 
opinion the prospects for such changes had become increasingly bleak. Huntington 
attributed his pessimism to the power of the Soviet Union, the unreceptiveness of certain 
cultural traditions to democracy, the problem of poverty, and the prevalence of violence in 
many societies. These realities led Huntington to conclude that "the limits of democratic 
development in the world may well have been reached" 109. 
According to Huntington, major variables changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
He elaborated upon those changes in his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 
Twentieth Centu 110, which he wrote immediately after the end of the Cold War. In The 
Third Wave, Huntington argued that in each of the three waves he analysed, the causes 
responsible for democratisation in one wave differed from those in the other waves. "' In 
the third wave (starting in 1975), for example, he referred to causal factors such as the 
12 
declining legitimacy of non-democracies, economic development' , Christianity, the role 
of political leaders, and the imýact of external factors! 13 In addition, according to 
Huntington, the causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratisation wave 
108 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", pp. 198-209. 
109 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 218. 
110 Huntington, The Third Wave. The content of this book has already been introduced earlier in this chapter 
in sections 1.2.1. and 1.2.2.1. 
111 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 3 8. 
112 Huntington distinguished between economic development resulting from industrialisation and wealth 
resulting from oil. He wrote: "in contrast to patterns in the oil states, processes of economic development 
involving significant industrialisation lead to a new, much more diverse, complex, and interrelated economy, 
which becomes increasingly difficult for authoritarian regimes to control. " (Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 
65. 
111 Vanhanen, Prospccts ufDcmocracy, p. 17. 
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were likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave. 114 Lastly, 
Huntington argued that the causes for democratisation in a certain wave differed from one 
country to another, and the variables, which brought democracy for one country, varied 
from that of another country. In the researcher's opinion, the scope of Huntington's Tbird 
Wave is very broad, allowing his work to be applicable in explanations of the process of 
democratisation. in many different countries at many different times in the twentieth 
century. This was viewed by some as a major advantage and by others as a hazard. 
In summary, Huntington attributed democracy to a complex web of factors. In his opinion, 
each country may need a different formula or a different combination of variables in order 
for democracy to prevail. However, one could sense from Huntington that there are 
essential conditions, such as gradual political reform and an accommodating culture, that 
have to be met. Whilst the stress of Huntington on the need for political reform in all its 
facets - institutionalisation, political participation, etc. - is clear, the researcher noted that 
culture became increasingly salient in Huntington's writings, instigating a major intellectual 
debate even prior to the publication of his often mentioned article "The Clash of 
Civilisations". Already in 1984 Huntington had argued that a political culture which 
embraced the values of "mutual trust among members of the society" was more favourable 
to democracy than one which valued "hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to 
authority". ' 15 This issue is one which deserves close attention when discussing democracy 
in the Middle East. 
114 Huntington, Ile Third Wave p. 3 go. 
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1.2.3. Z 2. The Transitional Approach 
m Rustow 
One of the fierce critics of the earlier scholars who emphasised certain causal conditions or 
pre-requisites to democracy, was Rustow. In his famous article, "Transition to 
Democracy"116 , published in 1970, Rustow rejected the modernist approach. He argued: 
'Economic growth may be one of the circumstances that produces the tensions 
essential to the preparatory or conflict phase' 17 , but there are other circumstances 
that might also serve. Mass education and social welCare services are more likely to 
be the result ofdemocratisation. A 18 
Rustow criticised Lipset's work as follows: 
'Eipset's data leave it entirely open, for example, whether affluent and literate 
citizens make the better democrats; whether democracies provide superior schools 
and a more bracing climatefor economic growth, ... #A 
19 
Democracies such as Sweden, France, and the United States, Rustow argued, developed at 
periods of a low level of economic development. 
Rustow's own approach was based on the "political-historical perspective". 120 Based on the 
historical approach, Rustow found that the factors responsible for keeping a democracy 
stable may not be the ones that brought democracy into existence. He, therefore, stressed 
115 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 209. 
116 Rustow, D. A., "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model", CgWarative Politics, April 1970, 
pp. 337-364. 
117 Rustow specified four phases in the process of democratisation. They will be discussed below. 
118 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: ...... p. 363. 
119 Rustow, "Trdnsitions to Democracy: ...... p. 342. 
120 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 347. 
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the need to distinguish between "function and genesis"121 when explaining democracy. 
' 22 It 
is upon this argument that Rustow based his new approach to the study of democratisation, 
in which he specified four indispensable phases to reach democracy. They were (1) 
national unity, (2) a serious conflict, (3) a 'conscious adoption' of democratic rule, and (4) 
the 'habituation' of both leaders and citizens to those democratic rules. '23 This approach 
would later be referred to, by many such as Potter, as the transitional approach. 
To Rustow, 'national unity' was the background condition for democratisation as it should 
precede all the other phases of democratisation. This condition, he argued, could only be 
reached by a "political community large enough to achieve some considerable degree of 
modernity in its social and economic life"124 . According to Rustow, once the stage of 
national unity has been reached, the process of democratisation itself is set off by a 
prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. This conflict arises as a result of the 
emergence of a new elite that "arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group 
into concerted action7125. The commitment of the new elite to democratic transition does 
not stem from their good will, but rather from their belief that democracy provides the best 
hope for the resolution of the conflict which arose as a result of industrialisation or other 
reasons, depending on the society in question. This explains why future democracies can 
not fOllOw the footsteps of others. Different countries have different struggles and different 
121 RustOw, "Transitions to Democracy: ...... p. 346. 122 On, of the Inain differences between the Modernists and the Transitionalists is that the Modernists 
attempted to explain the conditions for democratisation (= 'function'), Whilst the transitionalists focused 
mainly On the question of why a democracy came into being in the first place (-- 'genesis'). 123 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: ...... p. 
361. 
124 Rustow' "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 35 1. 
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means and ways to resolve those conflicts. Rustow explained the motives of the new elite 
and the reason behind the different democratisation experiences of different societies as 
follows: 
"democracy was not the original or primary aim [ofthe new elite]; it was sought as 
a means to some other end or it came as afortuitous by-product ofthe struggle. ... a 
country is likely to attain democracy not by copying the constitutional laws or 
parliamentary practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestlyfacing 
up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective proceduresfor 
their accommodation. 426 
Thus, democracy is acquired by a process of conscious decision-making, at least on the part 
of the top political leadership, who have a variety of mixed motives. As Rustow argued, 
"no country ever becomes a democracy in a fit of absentmindedness"127 , rather democracy 
results from a series of negotiations followed by compromises. 
Once compromises are reached amongst the political elite, it is essential that they are 
transmitted to the civil servants and the public at large. This is where the 'habituation 
phase' of Rustow's model comes into effect. In this phase, leaders and electorate alike 
change from a generation which accepts democracy as a duty to another generation which 
embraces democracy wholeheartedly as a result of habit. 128 Thus, the essence of democracy, 
Rustow concluded in his article, is "the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever 
125 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 352. 
126 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 353 & 354. 
127 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 355. 
128 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", pp. 358-363. 
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129 
changing issues anudst ever-changing alignments" . Essential for that, Rustow noted, was 
the sincere belief in democracy and its values. He explained: 
"Democracy... is by definition a competitive process, and this competition gives an 
edge to those who can rationalise their commitment to it, and even greater edge to 
those who sincerely believe in it. A30 
In later years, Rustow like many other scholars, became less dogmatic in his analysis, and 
even recognised the importance of economic factors in democratic transition, something 
which he denied more than twenty years earlier in his famous article. As noted in 
Anderson's article'31, Rustow wrote prior to his death: 
It certainly remains true that domesticfactors provide the crucial settingfor the 
emergence of democracy and that democratisation is a political rather than an 
economic or psychological process. Nevertheless, a quarter ofa century later, I 
would emphasise the interaction between economic andpoliticalfactors and also 
the importance of international relations in 'making the world saferfor democrac y 
as Woodrow Wilson put it. PA32 
b. O'Donneft d aL and Shain dA 
Whilst Rustow's analysis of the stages of democratisation employed concepts that were 
134 never operationalised'33, other transitionalists, most prominent of whom are O'Donnell , 
135 136 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead , and Shain and Linz , shifted the analysis from 
129 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 363. 
130 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 358. 
131 Anderson, L., "Introduction; Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. 
Rustovv,, Cowarative Politics, (29), no. 3, April 1997, pp. 253-261. 
132 Anderson, L., "Introduction; Transitions to Democracy:... ", p. 261. 
133 Vanhanen, Prospects of Dem2gma p. 2 1. 
134 O'Donnell, G., Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics 
Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1973. 135 O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L., (eds. ) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: ProMects 
ae--MogjaQý, Baltimore: John Hospkins University Press, 1986. 
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generalising political development to focusing more on the third and fourth stages of 
Rustow's model. They particularly focused on the role of the elite during the period of 
transition from authoritarian rule. This period, according to O'Donnell et al., should begin 
with 'the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime', and could 
conclude with either the installation of some form of democracy, or the return to some form 
of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. 137 
The emphasis on the elite in transitional regimes was already obvious in the book entitled 
Modemisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, 
which O'Donnell wrote in 1973. In this book, he focused on the importance of the elite and 
not on the values and participation of the citizens, as, for example, Ahnond and Verba 138 
did. Moreover, challenging the economic development model of Lipset, O'Donnell, in this 
well received study of Latin America, found that the increased economic development of 
Latin America countries produced 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes rather than 
democratic ones as Lipset would have stipulated. According to Diamond, O'Donnell 
argued that this resulted from the emphasis of the economic elite on the production of 
capital goods rather than consumer goods, because the production of consumer goods 
becwne saturated. 139 For a country to deepen its industrialisation level in order to enable it 
to produce capital goods required that trade unions and parties with mass appeal be 
136 Shain, Y. and Linz, J., (eds. ), Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
137 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, (eds. ) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule p. 6. 
138 Almond, G. and Verba, S., The Civic Cult ure: Political Attitudes and Demogkc_y in Five Nations Boston: 
Little Brown, 1963. 
139 Diamond, "Economic Development and... ", p. 473. 
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repressed. As a result of this, military coups took place in various countries. Those coups 
brought civilian and military leaders (bureaucratic-authoritarian) to power, who were 
supported primarily by large foreign and domestic capital. In addition, according to 
Huntington, O'Donnell believed that economic growth which is generated from a 
concentration on imports was more likely to lead to a stronger form of authoritarian rule. 140 
The work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead developed the initial arguments of 
O'Donnell (1973) by distinguishing various types of authoritarian regimes and elites. They 
distinguished between 'democratisation' and 'liberalisation', between 'transition' and 
'consolidation', between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners', and between 'moderates' and 
4 oppontunists'. 
According to O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, the democratic camp within the elite 
during the period of transition could prevail and the course of democracy could 'be 
consolidated, only if this camp was able to (1) neutralise actors who were unconditionally 
authoritarian, (2) promote preferences and practices compatible with the functioning of 
democracy, (3) increase the number of democratic actors and (4) agree to subordinate their 
strategies (including competition among themselves) to the imperative of not facilitating a 
return to authoritarianism. 141 In short, Potter summarised O'Donnell et al's arguments as 
follows: 
140 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 200. 
141 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation, p. 
17. 
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"democratisation is largely contingent on what elites and individuals do, when, 
where, and how. A42 
Similar to O'Donnell et al., Yossi Shain and Juan Linz in their book Between States: 
InteTim Governments and Democratic Transitions 143 , emphasised the impact of the actions 
and willingness of the elite in determining the future of democracy during a period of 
transition. Although their argument did not deviate from O'Donnell et al., they introduced 
a new typology of transitional regimes, including: (1) the opposition-led provisional 
government, (2) the power-sharing interim government, (3) the incumbent-led interim 
government, and (4) the international interim government set up by the United Nations. In 
general, Shain and Linz described an interim government as follows: 
'The interim government usually operates within a context ofvolatility andpolitical 
vulnerability marked by uncertainty, anxiety, and high expectations concerning the 
future distribution ofpower and loyalties. The nature and the action of the interim 
government are of enormous political moment. The degree of boldness and skill 
with which it makes certain policy decisions, and its willingness and ability to 
fashion an efficient succession (whether based on continuity or disjunction with the 
past), can help to determine whether or not the character and conduct of its 
successors will be democratic. "44 
Whilst types of interim governments differ depending on the circumstances from which 
they emerged, they are, according to Shain and Linz, all characterised by a crucial role for 
the elite. Despite the important role of the elite, and especially of the moderate section of 
the elite, which is essential in order for democracy to succeed in the period of transition, 
other factors might jeopardise the consolidation of democratic principles. Such factors 
142 Potter, "Explaining Democratisation! ', in: Potter, Goldblan, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation p. 
17. 
143 Shain and Linz, (eds. ), Between States. 
144 Shain and Linz, (eds. ), Between States, p. 7. 
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include: corruption, the large powers of the military, increasing social inequalities, and 
weakening of political participation and representation in the system. 145 In order to evade 
the influence of those factors which might undermine any effort towards democratic 
consolidation, mechanisms that regulate the work of the elite should be adopted. As 
Przeworski put it: 
"The decisive step towards democracy is the devolution ofpowerfrom a group of 
people to a set ofrules. "46 
1.2.3.2.3. The Structural Approach 
To the researcher of this thesis, a major shortcoming of the transitional approach lies in the 
notion that when maldng decisions, elites are driven by conditions outside their power. As 
Munck argued, "actors make choices, but not in circumstances of their own choosing". "' 
This shortcoming was addressed by such theorists as Moore and Rueschmeyer, regarded by 
many as the main proponents of the structural approach. According to the structuralists, the 
actions of the elite can only be explained by the limitations imposed on them by structural 
impediments. Addressing the issue from a socio-economic angle, Moore and Rueschmeyer 
also differed with Lipset and other Modernists, who argued that increased wealth produced 
more democracy. According to the Structuralists, increased wealth could lead to one of 
three different developments: (1) democracy, (2) authoritarianism or (3) fascism. 
145 Little, W., "Democratisation in Latin America, 1980-1995", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), 
Democratisation pp. 183-194. 
146 Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern E"o e and L 
AMen New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 14. 
69 
m Barrington Moore 
In 1966, Barrington Moore in his major study Social Origins of Dictatorshipand 
148 
, y: Lord and Peasant 
in 
-the 
Making of the Modem World emphasised the DemocMc 
impact of the socio-economic structure of societies on democratic development. This line 
of thinking later became a school in its own right. In his study, Moore raised the question as 
to why some countries took the path of democracy, Whilst others became fascist or 
authoritarian. To Moore, the answer lay in the social and economic structure of the 
peasantry and the role of the bourgeoisie in forcing the aristocracy to change the way in 
which it dealt with the peasantry. According to Moore: 
"a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable 
element in the growth ofparliamentary democracy. "49 
By adopting the case-oriented approach and by focusing on long-term historical change, 
Moore sketched three routes to modem democracy. The first path is a 'bourgeois 
revolution', where combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy emerged after a 
series of revolutions'50, such as the French Revolution or the American civil war. The 
second route, 'the revolution from above', was also capitalistic, but emerged in the absence 
of a strong revolutionary culture. This path experienced reactionary political manifestations 
147 Munck (1994) quoted in: Potter, "Explaining Democratisatiorf' in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, 
(eds. ), Democratisation p. 23. 
148 Moore, B., Social Origins of DictatomIn and Demo c: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Mo .: p gýu 
Worl Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
149 Moore, Social Origins of Dicj4jMWp and Democ p. 418. 
150 According to Goldblatt, the term 'bourgeois revolutions' was not clearly applied by Moore. It could refer 
to three types of change: (1) to radical political change, where the bourgeois is the key revolutionary agent or 
(2) to a revolution where the bourgeois emerges as the most powerful political class, regardless of who 
initiated the revolution, or (3) to the process of political change where a state structure is established and 
public policies are implemented, thus setting the basis for capitalism. Goldblatt, pp. 55-56. 
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from the bourgeoisie, who exchanged "the right to rule for the right to make mone)M15'. 
This led to fascism as was the case in Germany and Japan. The third path, 'the revolution 
from below', was the route to modem democracy where revolutions had their main origin 
among the peasants. This led to communist regimes as was the case in the Soviet Union and 
China. According to Moore, India is unique as it does not fall in either of the routes 
outlined above. It did not become a modem industrial society because it did not experience 
a bourgeois revolution, nor a conservative revolution from above, nor a communist one 
from below. 152 
In summary, according to Moore, the path which a country followed to reach modem 
democracy, depended primarily on the linkage between, on the one hand, economic and 
class divisions and, on the other hand, the political interests and motives of the peasantry, 
aristocracy and bourgeoisie. As Moore argued, the relationship between the aristocracy and 
the peasantry provided the key in a country's development towards fascism, 
authoritarianism or democracy. If the aristocracy pursued policies that repressed the 
peasantry, then, the opportunity for democratic change was bleak. If, however, the 
aristocracy responded positively and adapted to the commercialisation of agriculture in a 
manner that provided the peasantry with more benefits, then, the chances for democracy 
were higher. Whatever actions the aristocracy took, depended on the bourgeoisie, since, to 
Moore, they were the pillars of liberal and democratic ideologies. Moreover, in Moore's 
151 Moore, Social Origins of DjqjgpnW and Democracy p. 437. 
152 Moore, Social Origins of DicLalMrshi and Democracy pp. 413414. gp 9 
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opinion, capitalism was not built on hereditary or status values, but rather on the balanced 
exPloitation of economic resources. Thus, in short, "no bourgeois, no democracy. "153 
b. Rueschnwyer et A 
In their book, Cgpitalist Development and Democracy'54 , Rueschmeyer, et al., examined 
thirty four advanced capitalist countries in Latin and Central America. They analysed the 
relation between the transformations of society accompanying economic development and 
the chances for success of democracy. To Rueschmeyer et al. 'the balance of class power' 
is the primary reason behind the transformations of society. The ability of the subordinate 
classes to succeed in their struggle against the dominant classes to participate in and be part 
of the ruling establishment is essential in the process of democratisation. To Rueschmeyer 
et al., dernocratisation is brought about by the efforts of the urban working class to attain 
the expansion of the right to vote, union rights and so on. Therefore, in countries where 
industrialisation is strong, the strength of the working class grows, whilst the power of the 
landed class diminishes. Rueschmeyer et al. argued that capitalism and democracy go hand 
in hand. In other words, capitalist economic development will lead to democracy and 
freedom. In their opinion, democracy is the characteristic political form of capitalism. "*' 
153 Moore, Social Ori&s of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 418. Commy to Moore, Therbor Goran (1983) 
argued that democracy had "always and everywhere" been a struggle against the bourgeoisie. (p. 270). But 
scholars such as Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, argued that the development of capitalism 
strengthened democracy by shifting the balance of power in society from the land owners to organised 
workers. However, they differ from Moore in that they identified the subordinate classes, mainly the urban 
workers, as the primary agents of democratisation (Remmer, p. 108). 
154 Rueschmeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, CgRitalist DevelMment and DemqpMcy Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996. 
155 Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Coitalist Devel-Mment and Democrac p. 1. 
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In their quantitative cross-national comparisons of many countries, Rueschmeyer et al. 
found a positive correlation between development and democracy. 156 They arrived at Us 
positive correlation by integrating variables such as social class, state, and transnational 
forces into their theoretical framework. 157 Moreover, the authors argued that it is not 
capitalism as such that led to democracy. Democracy developed primarily because the 
change in "the balance of class power in favour of the subor(linate interests". 158 In general, 
it is possible to conclude that Rueschmeyer et al. were optimistic about the advance of 
democracy in developing countries. 
1.2.3.2.4. Conclusion 
In general, it is possible to conclude about Potter's three approaches that, although they 
studied the issue of democracy and dernocratisation from different angles, four main 
elements were of particular relevance to the researcher. They are: (1) The importance of the 
elite, (2) the stress on development, (3) the relevance of culture, and (4) the role of the 
middle class and industrialisation. 
Having reviewed the ma or approaches to the study of democracy and democratisation, it is j 
essential to establish which aspects of these approaches are relevant to the purpose of this 
study. 
156 Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Cgpitalist Develgpment and Pgmocmu, p. 3. Potter argued that 
Rueschmeyer et al. departed slightly from Moore as they accepted the statistical association found between 
modernisation and democracy (Potter p. 23). 
157 Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on... ", p. 108. 
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1. From the modernists, the researcher will first adopt the quantitative approach by 
examining voting behaviour and the attitudes of the elite and the representatives. 
Accordingly, the researcher will draw on Huntington's and Dahl's emphasis on 
institutional and political reform, and to a lesser extent on Lipset's emphasis on wealth. 
This is not a testimony to the inappropriateness of Lipset's wealth theme. On the 
contrary, as will be discussed later in this thesis, the researcher found a high correlation 
between regime popularity and the economic conditions of the Palestinian people. 
However, as the Palestinian economy is for a major part negatively influenced by the 
Israeli occupation, 159 the analysis of Lipset becomes less valid since its focus is on 
internal development and not on external influences. 
2. From the transitional approach, the role of the elite will be examined by looking at the 
impact of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the elite in determining the path 
towards dernocratisation. As will be discussed later in the thesis, one of the most 
striking additions to the Palestinian political system is the transformation of the 
Palestinian leadership from one that was operating in an environment that was 
"revolutionary", spontaneous and less structured, to another that is limited by a new set 
of rules established by a reality, which brought with it responsibilities emanating from 
signing the agreements with Israel, obligations to the international community in return 
for funds, and expectations of the Palestinian public. This new political elite that is part 
and parcel of the peace process, agreed to hold the first elections for the Legislative 
Council because it was required to do so by the Oslo and Interim agreements and not 
158 Ruescbmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Cgpitalist Devel2p-m-ent and Demogýac p. 302. 
159 According to Sarah Roy, Palestinian society witnessed 'de-development' as a result of occupation. (Roy, 
S., The Gaza SjdR: The Political EconoLny of De-Deve , Washington DC, 1995. ) 
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because it upheld a high belief in democracy. In this regard, the transitionalist approach 
provides ftu-ther insight in the Palestinian democratisation process as it argues that at 
some stage in the democratisation process, the elite will consciously adopt democratic 
rule by necessity rather than by conviction or belief. As will be argued and exemplified 
in the thesis, democracy under the Palestinian Authority rule is still partial and its 
progress to Rustow's "habituation phase" in democratic development may, on the one 
hand, be enhanced by the Legislative Council, but may, on the other hand, be in jeopardy 
due to the lack of sovereignty and the elements of self-interest and/or corruption 
motivating part of the current elite. 
3. From the structural approach, the researcher will focus on the impact of external 
influences as described by Rueschmeyer et al. Although the emphasis in the study of 
Rueschmeyer et. al rested on class, they did also focus on the importance of transnational 
power on the class struggle. Furthermore, referring to Moore's typology of revolutions, 
the Palestinian revolutionary movement will be briefly examined. 
In addition to the relevant elements of the three approaches discussed above, and as the 
crux of this thesis evolves around the examination of democratisation in Palestine, 
including the role of the Legislative Council, and the impact of the public in voting for the 
Council members, the researcher thought it essential to discuss the relevant literature on 
voting behaviour and political culture. This will be done in section 1.2.4. below. In 
addition, the researcher believed it necessary to give attention to scholars who have written 
on the issue of democratisation. specifically in the Middle East as they have taken into 
account factors which are characteristic of the region. These factors include: (1) Islam and 
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political culture, (2) the Arab-Israeli conflict, and (3) oil. The importance of those factors 
will be discussed in section 1.2.5. below. 
1.2.4. Literature on Voting Behaviour and Political Culture 
1.2.4.1. Litemture on Voting Behaviour 
Literature on voting behaviour is abundant and varied. Schumpeter was one of the pioneers 
who assessed voter behaviour. He believed that the significance of voting was that it 
brought into office a group of politicians who administered the political and legislative 
aspects of government. Beyond this point, the electorate had no role. Schwnpeter wrote: 
"democracy does not mean and can not mean that the people actually rule in any 
obvious sense of the terms ýpeqple' and 'rule'. Democracy means only that the 
people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them. 
160 
Thus, in Schumpeter's opinion, besides voting politicians into office, there is not much 
voters can do. The electorate is inherently emotional and unequipped to make any other 
decisions, leading Schumpeter to conclude ffiat "democracy is the rule of the politiciaW'. 161 
Thus, democracy entails in the first place competition amongst candidates for the votes of 
the citizens. 
The assessment of Schumpeter, above, was largely normative. It was not until survey 
research studies were introduced that the political science discipline, and consequently the 
study of voting behaviour, became more focused. As Gabriel Almond has argued: 
160 Schumpeter, J., Cgpitalism. Socialism and Demgg-a-cy, London: Allen and Unwin, 1976, p. 284. 
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'The development of survey research brought to bear on politics a set ofprecision 
tools enabling us to movefrom relatively loose and speculative inferences regarding 
psychological properties from the element of communications, from clinical 
materials, andfrom behavioural tendencies. P? 162 
Empirically based behaviouralist'63 studies of voters started with Paul Lazarsfeld in 1940. 
The study of Lazarsfeld et aL'64 of Erie County, Ohio is regarded by many as the 
cornerstone of voting behaviour studies as it was the first serious study that adopted the 
scientific methodology in survey research. In 1948, Lazarsfeld, along with Bernard 
Berelson and William McPhee of Colwnbia University, conducted another study in Elmira, 
New York and their work culminated in the publication of their book, Votin , 
165 published 
in 1954. In this study, Berelson and his colleagues argued that voting by all people, 
including the less informed or less involved voters, was advisable. They wrote: 
"if the voting decision were left to the deeply concerned, well-integrated, 
consistently-principled ideal citizens, the political system might easilyprove too 
rigid to adapt to changing domestic and international conditions. " 166 
In 1952, another group from the University of Michigan started to analyse voting behaviour 
in the presidential elections. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller's analysis 
161 Schumpeter, CaRitalism. Socialism and DemocMa p. 285. 
162 Ahnond, G. A., "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept", in: Ahnond, G. A. and Verba, S., 
(eds. ), The Civic Culture Revis London: Sage Publications, 1980, p. 16. 
163 According to the behaviouralists, political studies should be concentrated with research of facts, i. e. what 
is rather than what ought to be. The behaviouralist approach contrasts with the 'legal' and 'institutional' and 
, philosophical' approaches to political phenomena. According to Jeffrey Stanyer (1984), behaviouralism 
emphasises elite and mass behaviour and examines the relationship between politics the subject, and politics 
the activity. (Stanyer, J., "The Quest for Science of Politics: Comparative Politics7, in: Englefield, D. and 
Drewry, G., (eds. ), Information Sources in Politics and Political Science: A Survey World-wide, London: 
Butterworths, 1984, p. 60. 
164 Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H., The PepRle's Choice, New York: Cohunbia University Press, 
1944. 
165 Berelson, B., Lazarsfeld, P. and McPhee, W., ýý, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. 
166 Derelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, Vot ing, p. 316. 
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167 
of the 1952 Presidential elections in their book, The Voter Decides , was regarded as a 
landmark in political science research as it examined the impact of party allegiance, and 
I image and issues of candidates on the electorate. Their later work, The American Voter 68 , 
was considered by many to be their masterpiece. In this work, Campbell et al. argued that 
the electorate was ideologically unaware and that issue preferences were not related to party 
identification. 
The selection of voting behaviour studies discussed above, provided many scholars with the 
tools necessary to examine whether voters determined democracy, whether parties shaped 
voting behaviour, or whether voting behaviour was an outcome of certain cultural or 
specific socio-economic conditions. 
1.2.4.2. DemocMcy and Political Culture 
Over time, numerous studies have been conducted about the impact of culture on voting 
behaviour. De Tocqueville's Demogmcy in America 169 is regarded by many as the most 
important book ever written on political culture and democracy. Most notable of recent 
167 Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W., The Voter Decides Evanston: Row Peterson and Company, 1954. 
168 Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D., The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1960. 
169 De Tocqueville, A., Democrapy in Americ (2 volumes), London: Fontana, 1968. 
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studies are two books written by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba: The CiViC CUlWre17O, 
171 
published in 1963, and The Civic Culture Revisited . 
In The Civic Culture, the authors argued that stable democracies emerged as a result of a 
&civic culture' which implied plurality and the non-monopoly of power. Of the five 
countries they examined, Almond and Verba, found that Britain was the most democratic, 
followed by the USA. According to them, in both countries the trust in the government was 
high and the role of the citizen was perceived as making a difference. To the authors, 
therefore, a country's political culture largely influences the social and political behaviour 
of its citizens. Where civic culture is strong, democracy is strong. According to Gabriel 
Ahnond in The Civic Culture Revisited, the Civic Culture study was based on the 
"rationalist-activist model" of democratic citizenship. He defmed this model as follows: 
It is the model ofa successful democracy that required that all citizens be involved 
and active in politics, and that their participation be informed, analytical, and 
rational. )p 172 
Almond did not believe that the rationalist-activist model was the only component of civic 
culture. In his opinion, it was essential to combine it with "its opposites of passivity, trust, 
and deference to authority and competence". 173 
170 Almond, G. A. and Verba, S. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Dpmocragy in Five Nations, 
Boston: Little Brown, 1963. 
171 Ah-nond and Verba, (eds. ), The Civic Culture Revisite 
172 Almond, "The Intellectual History of... ", in: Almond and Verba, (eds. ), The Civic Culture Revisite p. 
16. 
173 Almond, "The Intellectual History of... ", in: Almond and Verba, (eds. ), The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 
16. 
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Other studies also focused on the importance of political culture and political socialisation, 
but did not necessarily follow the same model as Almond and Verba. Harry Eckstein, for 
exwnple, studied political culture and its role in the process of democratisation, by using the 
"congruence theory", which is sometimes also called the "authority-culture" model. The 
"authority-culture" approach of Eckstein, argued that stable democracies required the 
social, economic, business, and religious institutions to be democratic, and their power 
relations to be similar to that of the state. As he explained: 
"Governments perform well to the extent that their authoritypatterns are congruent 
with the authorily patterns of other units of society. " '74 
Thus, Eckstein focused on a specific type of relationship amongst individual members of 
society, rather than on collective societal value systems. Therefore, as Dalton argued, 
Eckstein's work is "especially relevant to present concerns because it discusses the dynamic 
aspects of culture and culture's role in processes of political Cl=ge,,. 175 
In general, it is possible to conclude that some scholars, such as Schn-titter et al. 176 and Di 
Palma'ý7 were sceptical about the role of political culture in democratisation. This 
scepticism was illustrated by a quote from Max Kaase when he wrote that political culture 
was similar to "trying to nail jelly to the wall". "' Many other scholars, such as Arend 
174 Eckstein, H., "Congruence Theory Explained! ', in: Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffinann and Reisinger, (eds. ), Can 
Demogmcy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? p. 4. 
175 Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens: ...... p. 2. 
176 Schmitter, P., Whitehead, L. and O'Donnell, G., (eds. ), Transitions to DemopM: Latin America and 
Southern Egne, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
177 Di Palma, G., To Craft Democracies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
178 Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens:... ", p. 2. 
so 
Lijphart179 and Robert Putnam'80, strongly supported the use of the notion of political 
culture. Putnam, for example, argued that the differences between the north and the south 
of Italy were a result of their different civic traditions. 18' The strong beliefs by some 
scholars in the importance of political culture becomes even more clear when reading 
Dalton's comments on Putnam's study. He wrote: 
'Putnam's study showed that culturalfactors were more influential than economic 
differences between regions, and that cultural patterns reflected historical patterns 
ofcivic association. )t 182 
It is also the opinion of the researcher of this thesis that the notion of political culture has 
become increasingly important, especially in view of the recent dernocratisation efforts 
and/or democratic consolidation experiences in areas which do not share the western 
cultural tradition. Moreover, the researcher agrees with Dalton who argued that because the 
world is in flux, it is increasingly possible to use the cultural theory as a predictive tool, as 
it helps to determine how the congruence between culture and institutions develops. 1133 
Also, as Diamond has argued, the study of political culture is essential because, "political 
culture may be a crucial link between economic development and democracy". 184 
179 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Demopacy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: 
University of California press, 1968. 
180 Pubwn, R., Making DemocMa Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
181 To Putnam, civic tradition was "like neighbourhood associations, choral societies, co-operatives, sports 
clubs, mass-based parties and the like". (Putnam, Making DernopEggy Work, p. 173. ) 
182 Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens: ...... p. 3. 
183 Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens:... ", p. 4. 
184 Diamond, L., "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy", in: Diamond, L., (ed. ), Political Culture 
and Demomcy in Devel2Rin& Countries, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 2. 
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From the above, it is clear that it is important to also take into account political culture 
when examining the process of democratisation in Palestine. In the literature on Palestine 
and other parts of the Arab world, the cultural dimension has been frequently used as a 
factor enhancing or impeding the democratic process. Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the 
Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus summarised the debate on political 
culture as follows: 
"Some see in Arab and Islamic political culture obstacles to the democratisation 
process. Islam, it is argued, emphasises sacred as opposed to secular sources of 
authority, and divine as opposed to popular sovereignty. It is also claimed that 
Islam stresses values of law and order rather than those of rebellion against 
tyranny,, that it institutionalises inequality with regard to religious minorities and 
women; that it does not embrace the principle offteedom ofexpression and belief 
Others see as an obstacle to democratisation Arab culture's traditional emphasis on 
narrow loyalties to family, tribe, and ethnic community, or postulate Arab and 
Islamic lack of tolerance or opposition and defectors. "18*5 
Shilmki does recognise the impact of political culture, which according to him, changes 
according to the level of democratic development. He wrote: 
'Then regimes change, attitudes and behaviour change; cultures become adaptable 
to deMoCraCy. ', 186 
The importance of political culture in the Arab world and especially in Palestine will be 
discussed in greater depth in section 1.2.5.1 of this chapter and in Chapter Five of this 
thesis. 
185 Shikaki, K., "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine", 
Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 2, Winter 1996, pp. 11-12. 
186 Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National ...... p. 12. 
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1.2.5. The Middle East and Literature on Democracy 
In general, compared to literature written about other parts of the world, it is safe to say 
that, at least in English, very little has been written about democracy in the Middle East. 187 
Sven Erik Lindberg-Hansen, in his bibliography on democratisation in the Third World, 
cited about 600 studies on Africa south of the Sahara, 286 studies on democratisation in 
Asia and the Pacific, about 400 on Latin and Central America, whilst only 60 on the Middle 
East. Of those 60 studies on democratisation in the Middle East, 6 were written on Tunisia, 
33 on Algeria, 3 on Iran, 4 on Morocco, and II on Egypt. Hansen did not find any major 
studies on democratisation concerning Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the other 
Gulf states, Libya, or Palestine. 188 
In addition, most of the literature written on the Middle East consulted by the researcher of 
this thesis lacked quantitative analysis; very few relied on survey research. Exceptions 
include, for example, Lipset who referred to a survey of six Middle Eastern countries 
conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research in 1950-5 1.189 
Mark Tessler, from the University of Wisconsin also examined some political issues 
pertaining to North Africa. Besides the above examples, almost all the litemture has 
examined Middle East democracy from either of three perspectives: (1) from the juncture of 
Islam and Arab culture, (2) from the perspective of oil-generated wealth, or (3) from the 
187 Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds. ), Political Liberalisation and Dmocratisation in the Arab World p. 4. 
188 Lindberg-Hansen, Third World Democratisation: a Partly annotated bibliogWhy of Recent Lit 
189 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", pp. 80-81. 
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context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other scholars, such as Gause M'90, preferred to 
combine the impact of the three perspectives. He noted: 
"Three specific regionalfactors in the Arab worldpresent disincentives to rational 
leaders considering liberalisation of their political systems - the prevalence of 
international conflict in the Middle East, the power of transnational ideological 
platforms based on Arabism and Islam, and the centrality of exogenous rents in the 
flscal profile of the state. Taken together they can contribute to an explanation of 
the relative lack ofliberal regimes in the Arab world P, 191 
Examples of literature on democracy and the process of democratisation in the Middle East 
from the above mentioned perspectives will be provided below. 
1.2.5.1. Arab Culture and Islam 
192 In his article "Will More Countries Become Democratic? " , Samuel Huntington pointed 
explicitly to Islam to explain why, in his opinion, prospects for political development in 
Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, were low. '93 To Huntington, it is 
not Arab culture, but rather the Islamic religion which has been the main hindrance to 
economic development, and thus democracy. In his opinion, "Islam ... has not been 
hospitable to democracy"194 . This, according to Huntington, was exemplified in the case of 
190 Gause 111, G., "Regional Muences on Experiments in Political Liberalisation in the Arab WorW, in: 
Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds. ), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World. 
191 Gause III, "Regional Influences on... ", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds. ), Political Liberalisation and 
Democratisation in the Arab World, p. 302. 
192 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", pp. 193-218. 
193 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 216. 
194 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 208. 
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Lebanon, the only Arab country with large Christian population. Of all Arab countries, only 
Lebanon, he argued, sustained democracy and its democratic institutions only started to 
collapse after the Moslem majority began to assert itself in the 1970s. 195 Huntington 
blamed the 'consummatory nature' of Islamic culture where no distinction existed between 
religion and politics, nor between the spiritual and the secular, and where political 
participation. was historically 'an alien Concept% 196 
Not dissimilar from Huntington were Kedourie'97 and Lewis 198 , who also attributed the 
authoritarian nature of the Moslem world to the Islamic religion. Kedourie argued that 
challenges to state power were absent from the Middle East as a consequence of the 
region's Islamic tradition. According to him, whereas in the West, citizens organised 
themselves according to their various social, economic, and political activities into a 
multiplicity of groups and associations, no such traditions existed in the Arab world. He 
noted: 
'There is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world - which are the 
political traditions ofIsIam - which might makefamiliar, or indeed intelligible, the 
organising ideas of constitutional and representative government. The notion of the 
state... the notion ofpopular sovereignty..., the idea ofrepresentation, ofelections, 
of popular suffrage, ofpolitical institutions being regulated by liaws laid down by a 
parliamentary assembly ... of society being composed of a multitude of self- 
195 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 208. Although not referring to Islam, Lipset (1959) also 
argued that of all Arab countries, Lebanon was the only one that had strong prospects for democracy. 
However, whilst Huntington linked Lebanon's democracy to religion, Lipset emphasised the socio-economic 
and literacy aspects of the Lebanese society. (Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of... ", p. 8 1. ) 
196 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become... ", p. 208. 
197 Kedourie, E., Democracy and Arab Political Culture Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 1992. 
198 Lewis, B., The Sha ord University Press, 1994. ping of the Modem Middle New York: Oxf 
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activating, autonomous groups and associations - all ofthese are profoundly alien 
to the Muslim political tradition. 'A99 
The lack of representative bodies in Islamic political tradition was also stressed by Bernard 
Lewis in his book The ShMing of the Modem Middle East. According to Lewis, 
"Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any 
other kind of elected or representative assembly. ... There was no point, since the 
needfor a procedure ofco-operate, collective decision never arose. '200 
It should be noted, however, that whilst Lewis, in his book in 1994 blamed the limited 
possibilities for democracy in the Middle East on Islam, he acknowledged in a later work 
entitled The Future of the Middle East2o, that there were additional impediments to the 
development of democracy in the Middle East. These included fundamentalist tendencies, 
corrupt regimes, the suppression of women, and an unjustifiable fear of Western culture. 
However, according to Lewis, the main challenge for political development in the Middle 
East remained the relationship between those elements carrying the banner of Islam and 
those carrying the banner of liberal democracy. VVhilst the fundamentalists, Lewis argued, 
were fortunate in having mosques as a means to spread their views, the liberal democrats 
were often seen as upholding the same principles of the corrupt regimes, and, as a result, a 
"loan-word like dimuqrattiyya lacks the resonance of sharl V'. 202 Lewis summarised this 
argument as follows: 
"In the struggle between democracy and findamentalism for power in Muslim 
lands, the democrats suffer form a very serious disadvantage. As democrats, they 
are obliged to allow thefundamentalists equal opportunity to conductpropaganda 
and to contend for power. If they fail, they are violating the very essence of their 
199 Kedourie, DemogMa and Arab Political Cultme, pp. 5-6. 
200 Lewis, The ShMing of the Modem Middle East pp. 4546. 
201 Lewis, The Future of the Middle E. 
202 Lewis, The Future of the Middle East. D. 8. 
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own democratic creed Paradoxically it is the Western concern for democratic 
freedom, even at the cost of Western values and fteedom itsey, ' that sometimes 
prevents the Muslim secularists ftom dealing with this problem in the traditional 
way Thefundamentalists are under no such disability. " 203 
In the researcher's opinion, the debate around culture and Islam is very much central in the 
study about democracy in the Arab World. The researcher wishes in no manner to imply 
that Islam and Arab culture are incompatible with democracy. However, it is the 
researcher's view that Islam and Arab culture could influence the possibility and the extent 
of the democratic process and that because of three main reasons: 
1. The influences of the ulama, are significant and certainly restrict secular tendencies 
either on a goverrunental level or within Arab society itself Some examples include: 
Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Hamas in 
Palestine. 
2. Some premises of the religious establishments and the cultural impediments present 
within Arab society do seem to clash with the tenets of democracy. The researcher often 
wondered how democracy could become a reality in societies with clear imbalances in 
personal freedom. In societies where, for example, only men are allowed to file for a 
divorce, where the inheritance laws clearly favour males, or where Islamic jurisprudence 
has yet to agree on whether women are allowed to work or hold office. In the 
researcher's opinion, therefore, the extent to which Islam influences daily life, law and 
politics in Arab societies has to be considered when examining the possibility of 
democratisation in those countries. 
203 Lewis, The Future of the Middle P. 11. 
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3. There is a continuing failure of the various Islamic religious movements to arrive at 
common interpretations of issues that are relevant to democracy. For example, to date 
there is no agreement on how to choose leaders, or whether or not shura is synonymous 
with democracy. It is, therefore, the researcher's contention that before these issues are 
settled, the tendency to consider Islam and Arab culture as impediments to the 
development of democracy will remain and will continue to be emphasised in all venues 
on democracy and the Arab world. 
1.2.5.2. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
A number of scholars have blamed the impact of the regional environment, and more 
specifically of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the failure to foster democracy in the Middle 
East. As Salwa Ismail noted in her article "Democracy in Contemporary Arab Intellectual 
Discourse 19204 : 
'The immediate context for the rise of the discourse of azmat al-dimuqratiyya (the 
crisis of democracy) is woven by critical events: the 1967 defeat, the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, and the Gulf War of 1991 - the same events that unleashed a 
flood of self-criticism, debates, and conferences devoted to the study ofthe general 
crisis. "at does democracy have to do with thosejunctures? In diagnosing the 
disease as azmat al-dimuqratiyya; some symptoms exhibited by theArab masses are 
explained, mainly apathy and a refusal to get involved These symptoms were noted 
in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion and again during the Gulf War. From the 
diagnosis, an analysis of thefeatures and causes of the azma unfolds. A multitude 
of causes including dependency, unequal social relations, social and cultural 
retardation, illiteracy, and the relation between contemporaneity and authenticity 
constitute the background of the azma, whose main features are limited 
participation and repressive practices by the state. , 205 
204 Ismail, S., "Democracy in Contemporary Arab Intellectual Discourse", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, 
(eds. ), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World. 
205 Ismail, "Democracy in Contemporary... ", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds. ), Political Liberalisation 
and Democratisation in the Arab Worl , p. 95. 
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Therborn Goran2()6 also identified the detrimental impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on 
democratisation in the Middle East. In his article, "Beyond Civil Society: Democratic 
experiences and their Relevance to the Middle East' ', he wrote: 
... the external situation ofMiddle Eastern societies has been strongly unfavourable 
to democratisation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has destabilised the whole 
Mashreq, again and again putting arms andforeign policy in theforeground To 
the strong US interests in the region, i. e. in the Israeli state and in Arab oil, 
democracy and human rights are off focus. Peace in Palestine would change the 
international situation fundamentally, in a direction strongly favourable to the 
democratisation ofthe region. " 207 
The impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict has had considerable impact on the possibility of 
democratisation in the Arab world. Nowhere is this as evident as in people's distrust of the 
United States and to a lesser extent of Europe. To many in the Arab world, the countries 
that champion democracy are the countries that supported Israel politically, economically 
and militarily. This does not imply that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be interpreted as 
the main obstacle to democratisation in the region. The researcher of this thesis accepts the 
external impediments to democracy, but contends that internal factors equally contribute to 
the lack of democratic development. 
206 Goran, T., "Beyond Civil Society: Democratic Experiences and their Relevance to the Middle East", in: 
Ozdalga, E. and Person, S., (eds. ), Civil SocigM Democmcy and the Muslim World, Istanbul: Numune 
Matbassi, 1997. 
207 Goran, "Beyond Civil Society:... ", in: Ozdalga and Person, (eds. ), Civil Sociely. Democragy and the 
Muslim World, pp. 52-53. 
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1.2.5.3. Oil 
Luciani is one of the scholars who described the negative impact of oil on the 
dernocratisation process in the Arab World. In his book The Arab State, Luciani 208 argued 
that democracy is largely absent from the region as a result of the presence of oil, which 
turned the regimes into "rentier states". In his opinion, these states, "display little tendency 
to evolve towards democratic institutions'9209 because their wealth was not derived from 
internal sources such as taxation, necessary for political development and reform, but rather 
from oil. Thus, their economic development was not due to industrialisation or sound 
economic policies, rather it resulted from the presence of oil. This view was also shared by 
Huntington. He argued that: 
"in contrast to patterns in the oil states, processes of economic development 
involving significant industrialisation lead to a new, much more diverse, complex 
and interrelated economy, which becomes increasingly difficultfor authoritarian 
regimes to control. , 210 
In conclusion of this selected literature review on democratisation in the Middle East, the 
researcher's view on the matter can be summarised in three main points: 
1. Few scholars tackled the issue of democracy and democratisation in the region 
quantitatively. Most studies concentrated on culture and Islam. 
2. Those who did study the topic, did so mostly in a normative manner. Efforts by local 
research centres such as the JMCC in Jerusalem or the University of Jordan in 
208 Luciani, G., (ed. ), The Arab State, London: Routledge, 1990. 
209 Luciani, (ed. ), The Arab State, p. xxiv. 
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Amman, to provide empirical data through conducting polls about many issues 
pertaining to the Middle East, including democracy, are often unknown or ignored by 
scholars. 
3. Most scholars examining the region are sceptical about the prospects for 
democratisation. They disagree amongst each other about the reasons for their 
gloomy evaluations: some blamed the lack of democracy in the Arab world on the 
characteristics of Islam or on Arab culture; others put the blame on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict or on the presence of oil in the region. Still others preferred to explain the 
lack of democratisation by a combination of the above perspectives. 
1.2.6. Democracy and Palestine 
It is the researcher's contention that researching the process of dernocratisation in Palestine 
is in many ways unique. Ironically, at the same time, it has the potential of providing an 
excellent "lab" for determining the possibility for democratisation. or explaining the lack 
thereof in other countries in the Middle East. 
The first reason why the study of democratisation in Palestine is unique, is because, unlike 
studies on democratisation in other countries in the world, this research is concerned with 
assessing the level of dernocratisation in an "entity", which is not yet a state. Indeed, the 
Palestinian Authority merely enjoys the status of an interim self-government on a piece of 
land of which the fmal borders have yet to be determined. This unique situation, of course, 
210 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 65. 
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resulted from the decades of Israeli occupation and the consequent peace process, which led 
to a partial and uncompleted Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. Clearly the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major factor influencing the process of 
democratisation under the Palestinian Authority. In the last chapter of this thesis, the 
researcher will discuss to what extent the Israeli occupation and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
form impediments on the road to Palestinian democracy. If the researcher's findings are 
that despite the Israeli factor there still is a transition towards democracy under the 
Palestinian Authority rule, then the excuse of the Arab-Israeli conflict used by many 
scholars to explain the lack of democratisation in other countries of the Middle East 
deserves reconsidering. 
The second reason why the study of democratisation in Palestine deserves attention, lies in 
the fact that the Palestinian Authority is one of the few regimes in the Arab world which has 
held presidential and parliamentary elections that were viewed by most observers as being 
fair and free. This again puts a question-mark behind another explanation many scholars 
adhered to in order to expWn the lack of democracy in the Middle East. As discussed in 
section 1.2.5. above, many scholars stipulated that the political culture of the Arab world 
and the religion of Islam are incompatible with the development of democracy. However, 
the Palestinian electorate, who is for the majority Muslim, cast its vote in the January 1996 
elections and, by doing so, gave legitimate power to its Council members and its president. 
A closer look at this first Palestinian election experience might, therefore, indicate that the 
political culture of the Muslim world is not that incompatible with the transition towards 
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democracy. Perhaps the findings in the thesis of this researcher will exemplify the beliefs 
of Esposito and Piscatori, who wrote: 
T is difficult to ascertain or to predict whether the evolution ofMuslim thinking 
about democracy will lead them to convert their views into action and what 
particular form democratisation might take in diverse Muslim cultures. It is clear, 
however, that in the new Muslim world order, Muslim political traditions and 
institutions are evolving, just as social conditions and class structures are changing. 
Both are importantfor thefuture of democracy in the Middle East. )j 211 
Finally, the study of dernocratisation in Palestine is both unique and an excellent "lab" for 
studies on this topic in other Arab countries, as to the researcher's best knowledge, only in 
Palestine public opinion polls and quantitative research can be carried out freely and 
without interference. The availability of reliable quantitative data and the possibility to 
conduct surveys freely may allow for a deeper insight into the various dimensions of the 
issue of democratisation, which might also be useful for studies on this topic in other Arab 
states. 
211 Esposito, J. and Piscatori, J., "Democratisation and Islarn", Middle East Journals (45). ni 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PALESTINIAN GENERAL 
ELECTIONS 
Elections, being one of the principal pillars of democracy, will be the topic of this chapter. 
When examining Palestinian political development and the potential contribution of the 
Legislative Council to a more democratic environment, it is necessary to first examine how 
people voted and what factors moved them to vote for certain candidates, Whilst rejecting 
others. The composition of parliaments is, after all, not only a result of the type or political 
affiliation of the candidates that ran or did not participate in the elections, but is also 
dependent upon the voting behaviour of the electorate. For the past two years, the 
performance of the Legislative Council has come under scrutiny and criticism by the 
Palestinian public. However, it is the belief of the researcher that an elected parliament can 
not be solely held responsible for its good or bad performance, or for its contribution or lack 
thereof to democratic state-building. Not only can the effectiveness of a parliament be 
impeded or enhanced by the political conditions in the country, but its democratic 
performance can also be affected by the electorate as it is their responsibility to elect 
representatives who respect democratic principles. As Mishler and Rose argued: 
'Eegislatures may contribute to public support for democratic regimes, but the 
existence of a legislature - even a representative and responsible one - is not 
sufflcient to guarantee either the establishment or persistence of democraqv. t212 
212Mishler, W. and Rose, R., "Support for Parliaments and Regimes in the Transition toward Democracy in 
Eastern Europe', Legislative Studies QuarteLly, (19), no. 1, February 1994, p. 7. 
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Based on survey results, an attempt will be made in this chapter to draw a clear picture of 
the level of maturity of the Palestinian electorate in their first voting experience in the 
general elections of January 1996. Some light will also be shed on whether or not to expect 
changes in voting behaviour in future elections. The main questions to be answered in this 
chapter, therefore, will be: Did the Palestinian electorate vote in a mature manner and for 
representatives who represent democratic principles? What were the main factors 
determining the vote or non-vote of the Palestinian electorate? Was there a significant 
difference in voting behaviour between Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and Palestinians 
from the West Bank? Were gender, education, age, or even refugee status important factors 
influencing voting behaviour? And will voting behaviour change in future elections? 
This chapter has been divided into three main parts. Part One will place the first Palestinian 
general elections into its historical context and will provide a general overview of the 
preparation for and the course of the elections. Part One, based on survey results, will also 
analyse the level of maturity of the Palestinian electorate during the elections. Part Two, 
also based on survey material, will describe how the Legislative Council members view the 
way people cast their votes. Lastly, Part Three of the chapter raises some perspectives 
about likely Palestinian voting behaviour in any Riture, elections. 
In it also important to keep in mind that in this chapter, the researcher will not only 
concentrate on the role of the elite in the democratisation process as a transitionalist such as 
O'Donnell would do. It is true that elections would not have taken place if the Palestinian 
elite did not agree to them. It is also correct that the decision to hold elections placed the 
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Palestinian Authority in what the transitionalist Rustow referred to as the third phase on the 
path to democracy. Indeed, as will be discussed in this chapter, the Palestinian elite made a 
conscious decision to hold elections because this is what was agreed upon in the peace 
agreements with Israel, not because of a deep conviction that democracy is the best form of 
government. However, the findings of this chapter, the methodology used, and the 
emphasis on examining voting behaviour and the attitudes of the public's representatives 
based on survey results is more of an approach used widely by Modernists. Also, unlike the 
transitionalists, the researcher of the thesis believes that when examining democratisation, 
the role of voting behaviour and the importance of citizen participation cannot be ignored. 
2.1. PART ONE: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 AND THE 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE 
2.1.1. Historical Background 
On 20 January 1996, Palestinians living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem went to the polls for the first time in their history to elect their President and the 
representatives to the Legislative Council. Although numerous political, geo-political and 
technical constraints surrounded the elections, the elections were valued as a democratic 
step, ftirthering progress on the path towards reaching a peaceful resolution of the Arab- 
Ismeli Conflict. 
213 
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Prior to the first Palestinian national elections, the Palestinian people were already 
represented. For years, Palestinians, whether living under occupation or in the Diaspora, 
have looked to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) as the body that legitimately 
represents them in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This was recognised de 
facto by Palestinians, Arabs and the international community long before the PLO was 
recognised de jure as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the 
Rabat Arab Summit of October 1974.214 
The PNC contained an average of 600 members representing various political factions, 
women's organisations, labour unions, student organisations, political factions (including 
parties which were in opposition to Chairman Arafat or mainstream Fatah and upheld 
different strategies about the Palestinian struggle), refugees, minorities, Palestinians in the 
Diaspora and Palestinians living in the homeland. Although this body was not elected, the 
PNC was regarded by mosel-' as a body representing all sectors of Palestinian society. Its 
members were appointed by the PLO's Executive Committee according to a specific quota, 
approved by the PNC. It was the PNC - in its nineteenth session held in Algiers in 1988 
216 
_ 
which called for the two-state solution and the recognition of Israel and it was through the 
PNC that the Palestinian people opted for the peace process which was officially initiated in 
Madrid in 1991. 
213 Andoni, L., "The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party Rule? ", Journal of 
Palestine Studies, (25), no. 3, Spring 1996, p. 16. 
214 The Rabat Resolution, 28 October 1974. 
215,, Mosf', because the Islamists were not included in the PNC. 
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Thus, the tradition of popular representation has been part of Palestine's political history 
and - as will be examined later in this chapter - it may partially explain the success of the 
recent elections. 
The end of the cold war and the political reality that surfaced in the aftermath of the Gulf 
war, brought about renewed interest and new challenges in the Middle East. On the one 
hand, the Palestinian leadership was faced with intense pressures: the lack of a common 
stand and fi-agmentation in the Arab world, the influx of Palestinians into Jordan - creating 
a new wave of refugees - and the marginalisation of the leadership in Tunis. 
On the other hand, the other governments of the region, similar to the Palestinian 
leadership, were faced with a single superpower whose agenda, "the New World Order", 
focused on settling regional disputes and increasing globalisation. The time was ripe for 
starting negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
Madrid Conference paved the way for negotiations between the various Arab parties and 
Israel. 217 It created the environment which ultimately brought about the secret negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians that culminated in the signing of the Declaration of 
218 Principles (DoP) in Washington on 13 September 1993 . Article I of the DoP stated that: 
"the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self 
Government Authority and an elected Council (the "Council'gfor the Palestinian 
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding 
216 Political Communiqud of the l9di Session of the Palestine National Council, 12-15 November 1988. 
217 Ashrawi, H., This Side of Peace: A Personal Acco , London: Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 10-11. 
218 Butt, G., "The Deal that Could Change the Middle East", Middle East International (MEI), no. 458,10 
October 1993. 
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five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. '219 
Article III of the DoP220 was dedicated to the elections. It stated that: 
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may 
govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, ftee and general 
political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and 
international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. 
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the 
elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of 
holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry intoforce ofthis 
Declaration ofPrinciples. 
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just 
requirements. " 
Article IV of the DoP221 established the jurisdiction of the Council, specifying that it "will 
cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiatione'. 
219 The Interim agreement and the Declaration of Principles have been published in full by the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre (JMCC). References to these documents in this thesis are taken from the texts as published by the 
JMCC, and page references, therefore, refer to that publication. See: JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank an e Gaza Striv & Declaration of PrinciDles On Interim Self-Government Arranizements Jerusalem: 
Occasional Document Series, August 1996, p. 249. 
220 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim AgreemLn I p. 249. 
221 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreeme , p. 249. 
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2.1.2. Preparations for the Elections 
The elections for the Council and the President were perceived amongst Palestinians as an 
interim preparatory step towards the fulfilment of the Palestinian national right for an 
independent Palestinian state. As such, these elections were embraced by the Palestinian 
leadership and extensive efforts were invested to ensure a free, fair, and democratic process 
to pave the way for future institution building. As As'ad Ghanem wrote in an article in the 
Middle East Joumal: 
'Most Palestinians supported the elections of 1996, which they viewed as preparing 
the ground for a transitional period during which thefinal status ofthe Occupied 
Territories would be determined. Elections were considered the mostfitting means 
of choosing the participantsfor thefinal status negotiations with Israel, and as the 
way to set up a democratic political system that would be differentfrom the systems 
in the surrounding Arab countries. '222 
The preparations for the elections and the elections themselves were regulated by the 
223 Election Law, which was promulgated by Arafat on 7 December 1995 . The election Law 
had been drafted by the Legislation Department of the Palestinian Authority (Diwan al- 
Fatwa wa al-Tashrei') and was a result of two previous drafts: one written by Birzeit 
University; the other written by Dr. Anis al-Qassem., head of the Legal Committee of the 
PNC. As becomes clear from the introduction of the Election Law quoted below, Arafat 
promulgated the Election Law based on several laws and the approval of various 
institutions: 
222 Ghanem, A., "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections", 
Middle East Journal , (50), no. 4, Autumn 1996, p. 514. 223 Palestinian Election Law, Gaza: Central Elections Commission (CEC), 7 December 1995. 
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'The President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, 
President ofthe Palestinian National Authority, 
Having seen the basic law ofthe Palestine Liberation Organisation; 
having seen the law no. 5 of 1995, referring to the Transfer of Powers and 
Competencies; 
having seen the Electoral Law for the Council ofRepresentatives no. 24 of 1960, 
and the laws amending it,, 
having seen the Resolution no. 32 of 1960, ofthe Administrative Governor General, 
regarding elections in Gaza; 
having the approval of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, with the participation ofthe presidency of the Palestinian National 
Council, 
having the approval of the Council ofthe Palestinian national A uthorityý and 
based upon the powers bestowed in me, I hereby declare thefollowing Law: . 224 
According to Article Five in the Palestinian Election Law for the year 1995, the elections 
were to be based on a majority electoral system, multi-member constituencies and freedom 
of choice lists 225 . 
226 As shown in figure I below, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
including Jerusalem, were divided into 16 electoral constituencies - according to population 
distribution - for the Legislative Council elections. However, these areas were considered 
as one constituency for the election of the president of the Palestinian National Authority. 
It is worth noting that, according to the Interim agreements, the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip were divided in zones A, B and C227 and that the jurisdiction of the Legislative 
Council varied accordingly. As for the Jerusalem constituency, it does not fall within these 
224 CEC, Palestinian Election Law, p. 1. 
225 Definition of 'freedom of choice list': The voter may switch freely both within and between lists. Voters 
have several votes and each may compose 'his' list from the proposals submitted by the parties. (Nohlen, D., 
Elections and Electoral Systems, Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 1996, p. 62. ) 
226 Dajani, M., Democrapy in Palestine: Palestinian Elections for the Presidengy of the PNA and the Members 
of the Legislative Council (Al-DemogMa fi Falastin), AI-Ram: CEC, 1997, p. 155. 
227 Further details and a map outlining the zones A, B and C are included under section 2.1.3. of this chapter. 
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zones as it remains under total Israeli jurisdiction. Similarly, the Hebron constituency was 
treated as a special case during the elections pending an agreement. 
Firure 1: 228 
Distribution of Seats According to Constituencies 
B. #**- 4 
T. k- 4 
QWqi. 2 
Jeýo 1 
Gý 0 
Sý: CEC, July 1997 
2.1.2.1 Registration 
H. I.. 10 
The pre-election process started with a media-campaign, organised by the Palestinian 
Authority, urging Palestinians living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip 
to register for the elections. The campaign included the distribution of stickers, frequent 
broadcasts on the Palestinian radio and various articles and announcements in the daily and 
weekly press. 229 Seven thousand teachers were trained to conduct the registration process, 
going door-to-door to register all Palestinians over the age of 17. The process of 
registration started on 12 November 1995 and ended on 2 December 1995, after which the 
election register was announced and the public was allowed to submit objections to it. 
2.1.2.2. The Centml Elections Commission 
228 The data illustrated in figure I were compiled from information in: Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 55. 
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The election process for the first Palestinian Legislative Council and the Presidency of the 
Palestinian Authority was administered by the Central Elections Commission (CEC). The 
CEC was established in pursuance of Presidential Decree Nwnber (3), issued on 21 
December 1995. This decree stated that "the Commission shall function pursuant to the 
provisions of the Election Law and/or any other legislation related to elections in 
Palestine", and "... shall issue the regulations and pamphlets necessary for the fulfilment of 
its duties". 230 According to Article 22.1 of the Palestinian Election Law, the CEC was to 
be the highest body responsible for the administration and supervision of the elections. 231 
2.1.2.3. Election Observers 
International and local observers monitored the electoral process to ensure that it was 
conducted in accordance with international standards and with the Election Law. Their task 
was to observe whether the elections were fair and free. According to Gregory Mahler from 
the University of Mississippi, the standard of election observation was very high. In an 
article in Electoral Studies, he commented: 
'The Palestinian election o January 1996, thefirstftee and democratic election if 
ever heldfor the Palestinian people, may have been the most carefully observed and 
conscientiously scrutinised election in modern times. 232 
229 Dickie, P., "Elections on Course; Hamas Reffises to Run", The Jerusalem Times, 17 November 1995. 
230_ Daiani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 222. 
231 CEC, Palestinian Election Law p. 11. 
232 Mahler, G., "The Palestinian Election of 1996", Electoral Studies, (15), no. 5, p. 414. 
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During the elections, the international observers were allowed to observe all stages of the 
election process. These stages included: voter registration, the candidates' election 
campaign, the actual voting, vote counting in each polling station, and evaluation (including 
the resolution and evaluation of claims made by candidates or their representatives) at 
district and national levels. 
In accordance with Article 5.3 of Annex 2 of the Interim agreement, election observers 
were invited ftom all parts of the world: the European Union, the United Nations, the 
United States of America, the Russian Federation, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Norway, 
South Africa, the Non-Aligned Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the Islamic 
Conference Organisation. Delegations from other goverrunents or intergovernmental 
organisations were also present. 233 In total, 519 international observers participated in the 
process. In addition to the international observers, the Local Palestinian Observers 
Committee recruited also more than 2,000 volunteers. 
2.1.2.4. Problems 
As will be illustrated below, in general, the Palestinian general elections were evaluated and 
viewed as being fair by those who observed them, even after taking into account the 
numerous signs of mismanagement and confusion which occurred both before and during 
the elections. 
234 
233 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian-interim AgLeement, p. 84. 
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It is also the researcher's opinion that, the problems and interference which did occur, did 
not significantly affect the election process, and this mainly because - as a result of the 
Israeli withdrawal from several major West Bank cities only weeks earlier - the popularity 
of both Arafat and Fatah at the time of the elections could not be challenged, with or 
without interference. This, however, should not undermine the importance of the fact that 
interference and attempts at confusing both the candidates and the electorate did occur. 
A series of announcements by Chairman Yasser Arafat caused confusion only days before 
the election campaign was about to start. Although Israel had agreed the addition of five 
Council seats two weeks earlier, Yasser Arafat left it until 26 December 1995 to announce 
in Presidential Decree Number (5) that four seats would be added, one in the constituency 
of Gaza city, one in Khan Younis, one in Hebron, and one in Jerusalem, bringing the total 
amount of Council seats up to 88.235 Furthermore, although Arafat initially announced that 
nominations would re-open, for one day, only in the constituencies where new seats were 
added, he later overturned this decision and announced a two-day period for nominations in 
all constituencies. As suggested below, many election observers at the time suspected 
Yasser Arafat of alternative motives for his decisions. 236 One suggestion was that Arafat 
wanted to ensure that Fatah had the dominant number of candidates in each area. Another 
was that Arafat wanted to give Hamas supporters a final chance to nominate themselves as 
candidates. 
237 
234 Barghouti, M., "Posteuforia in Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, p. 94. 
235 Dajani, DemogM in Palestine , p. 224-225. 
236 Arafat's motives for interference will be discussed in further depth in section 2.1.4. of this chapter. 
237 "Arafat Causes Chaos as Campaigning Starts", Palestine Re M, 5 January 1996. 
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Arafat's interference did not end with the above, but was extended to the election 
campaign. Article 55 of the Election Law stipulated that all candidates were free to 
exercise their right to campaign within a 22 days period prior to the polling day. 23' 
However, on 30 December 1996, Arafat announced that the campaign period had been 
shortened to two weeks, and would not open until 5 January 1996. This last interference 
caused Carl Lidbom, Head of the Intemational Observer Team, to make a highly publicised. 
statement, in which he stated his doubts over Yasser Arafat's actions. The statement 
commented as follows on Arafat's shortening of the election campaign: 
id ... an already very short official election campaign of 22 
days has now been 
arbitrarily shortened to 14 days without any explanation being given for this 
shortening, which breaches the Election Law and adds to the difficulties ofthe 
independent candidates and the opposition parties. ... The events of the pastfew days have created confusion and uncertainty, and give the impression of the 
arbitrary use ofpower to redesign the electoral architecture. '239 
In response of Carl Lidbom's statement, the Central Elections Commission extended the 
campaign period, which eventually started on the compromise date of 2 January 1996. 
An additional problem arose concerning the candidates' access to the media. According to 
Article 57.1 of the Election Law, all candidates - for the presidency and for the Council - 
were to be provided with equal time by the public-run media to present their platforms. 240 
However, it soon became clear that the 20 day campaign period for the 672 candidates was 
238 CEC, Palestinian Election Lgw, p. 23. 
239 "Enough is Enough", Statement by Carl Lidbom, head of the European Union Electoral Unit, I January 
1996. 
240 CEC, Palestinian Election L, p. 24. 
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not sufficient for this goal to be attained. 241 Consequently, a tendency emerged whereby the 
major Fatah candidates, the candidates backed by Yasser Arafat and the candidates who 
were already members of the Palestinian Authority attained superior media access 
compared to other candidates. As As'ad Ghanem. described in his article on the elections: 
'The law barred the PNA ftom being involved in electoral publicity or tlying to 
convince persons to vote for any specific candidate; but it assigned the PNA the 
responsibility to publish declarations stressing the importance ofparticipating in 
voting. The rule was openly broken: even during the period of the election campaign 
candidates continued to serve as ministers in the PNA and thus enjoyed a clear 
advantage over all other candidates because oftheir access to the media and the use 
of their oJfIcial titles in public election meetings. There was also extensive press 
coverage of the members of Fatah and the PNA, and their associates, including 
Arafat himself 242 
Despite the above mentioned problems, on 21 January 1996, the international observers, 
headed by Mr. Carl Lidbom, relayed their observations about the course of the elections at a 
press conference held in Ramallah. Mr. Lidbom confirined that the first Palestinian 
national elections took place in accordance with international standards and declared them 
fair and free. 
243 
2.1.3. Voter Turnout 
On 20 January 1996 the Palestinian electorate turned up en masse to vote not only to 
express their support for the democratic principle behind the elections, but also - indirectly - 
in support of the peace process. The total number of Palestinians who registered to vote 
241 Usher, G., "West Bank Towns under Arafat's Contror, MEI, no. 516,5 January 1996. 
242 Ghanem, "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period:... ", pp. 521-522. 
243,, Will of the People Expressed", Palestine Report, 24 January 1996. 
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was 1,028,280.672,755 people registered to vote in the West Bank and 355,525 in the 
Gaza Strip. 244 Eventually, an average of 75.86% of the registered voters turned up and 
voted. As shown in figure 2 below, voter turn-out in general was lower in the West Bank 
than in the Gaza Strip. Whereas voter turnout in the West Bank reached 70.13%, the 
percentage in the Gaza Strip reached 87.18%. 
Fleure 2: 245 
Voter Turnout in the First Palestinian Elections 
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The difference in voter turnout between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can be explained 
by a munber of factors. Firstly, the lower average voter turn-out in the West Bank compared 
to the Gaza Strip can be attributed to the low tumout in Jerusalem of 42.47%. Due to a 
successful Israeli intimidation policy and the significant presence of Israeli military forces 
around the polling stations, many Palestinians felt intimidated. Indeed, five days before the 
244 Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 49. 
245 The data illustrated in figure I were compiled from information in: Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 49. 
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The difference in voter turnout between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can be explained 
by a number of factors. Firstly, the lower average voter turn-out in the West Bank compared 
to the Gaza Strip can be attributed to the low tumout in Jerusalem of 42.47%. Due to a 
successful Israeli intimidation policy and the significant presence of Israeli military forces 
around the polling stations, many Palestinians felt intimidated. Indeed, five days before the 
244 Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 49. 
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245 The data illustrated in figure I were compiled from information in: Dajani, Demgpra i Pal tep. 49. 
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election day, posters - signed by the Israeli Likud party - were plastered all over East 
Jerusalem, reading as follows: 
"Warning and Caution to the Honourable Resident., This Saturday, 20 January, 
1996, electionsfor the National Authority will. be held in Jerusalem. An resident of y 
Jerusalem who votes in the Authority elections might lose his Israeli ID card. We 
beg you to think and think again before voting. You have to decide between voting 
for the Authority or keeping your Israeli ID card. 246 
Furthermore, the Israeli delay in redeploying from Hebron also caused a sense of frustration 
among Westbankers, particularly in Hebron, where the turnout was only 66.4%. 
Secondly, higher voter participation in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank might be 
explained by the fact that, at the time of the elections, Gazans felt the presence of the 
Palestinian Authority far more than residents in the West Bank. Israeli troops redeployed 
from the major West Bank cities barely a month before the national elections, and most 
areas around these cities still remained under Israeli control. The redeployment map below 
(figure 3) shows the subdivision of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as stipulated in Article 
11.3 of the interim agreement, into areas A, B and C. 247 Area A consists of less than 3% of 
the West Bank and is the only area which falls under total Palestinian jurisdiction. In area 
B, the Palestinian police assume responsibility for public order for the Palestinians and are 
deployed to accommodate Palestinian needs and requirements. However, in area B, Israel 
continues to have the overriding responsibility for security. This area consists of 
approximately 22% of the West Bank. Area C, 75% of the West Bank continues to fall 
under full Israeli jurisdiction. 
re 3: 
246,, Jerusalem: Voters and Candidates Warned Off', Palestine Repo , 19 January 1996. 
247 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement p. 16. 
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Moving on to the survey results concerning the elections, one notices that they reflect the 
trends found above. Analysing the elections based on a popular survey has distinctive 
advantages. As will be found out below, the survey results do not only confirm the official 
results, indicating that the survey sample utilised is representative, but also allow for deeper 
analysis in so far as, by using survey material, specifics and information on voter behaviour 
can be deduced, which can not be obtained by examining the official results. Whereas in 
the survey sample views are classified separately according to gender, area, education and 
age, this is not possible with the official election data. 
In general, out of 1,195 people surveyed, 64.6% said that they voted in the elections of 
January 1996, whilst 34.4% answered they did not vote. 248 Also, as shown in figure 4 
below, voter participation was comparatively higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West 
Bank. In the sample, 72.7% of the interviewees in the Gaza Strip confirmed that they voted 
in the 1996 elections, compared to only 59.9% in the West Bank. 
Firure 4. 
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248 For full results of the public opinion poll, see Annex 5. 
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Whilst no striking differences were found between men and women, refugees or non- 
refugees, or according to area or education in deciding whether to vote or not, the variable 
of age proved to be an important factor. Table I below, indicates that the older people 
tended to vote less than the younger generation. Indeed, whereas 63.6% of the surveyed 
respondents between the age of 18 and 25 said that they voted in the January 1996 
elections, only 45.5% of the interviewees over 55 years old said so. 
It is worth bringing to the attention that, although the results in table I indicate that voting 
did not increase throughout age, it did overall, allowing the researcher to conclude that the 
relationship between the variables of age and voting are statistically significant. At this 
stage, it is also worth reminding that under each table illustrating the results of the survey 
conducted by the researcher, the value of Chi Square is given. If the value of Chi Square is 
equal or smaller than 0.05, the relationship between the variables illustrated in a respective 
table is statistically significant, i. e. the relationship between the variables is not a 
coincidence or resulting from mere chance. 
Ta--ble I., Did vou vote In the Januarp 1996 elections? 
Age 
18-25 26-35 3645 46-55 55+ 
N=379 N=366 N=203 N=105 N=66 
Yes 63.6% 64.2% 71.4% 69.5% 45.5% 
No 35.6% 35.5% 28.1% 28.6% 50.0% 
No answer 0.8% 0.3% 0.5% 1.9% 4.5% 
df 10 
Chi square . 0019 
The survey also questioned the reasons behind the decision of the survey respondents not to 
vote in the January 1996 elections. In this instance, the level of education of the 
respondents proved to have an important influence upon the reasons given not to vote. As 
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shown in table 2 below, the three most important reasons given by survey respondents for 
not voting were: 
1.1 did notfind candidatesfor whom I wanted to cast my vote: Especially more educated 
interviewees cited this reason. This reason is the most rational motive for not voting. 
Most likely, the higher educated people were able to digest the election information 
more critically, and then decided that they did not find a candidate of their liking to vote 
for. Campbell et al. in "The American voter" reached similar conclusions on the impact 
of education upon voting behaviour. According to them: 
'The greater an individual's education, the more likely he is to attend to sources 
of political information and hence to know 'what is going on. His view of 
political objects and events will be more specific and more highly 
differentiated 
... The educated person is distinciftom the less educated not 
only in the number of facts about politics at his command, but also in the 
sophistication of the concepts he employs to maintain a sense of order and 
meaning amid theflood of information. Infact, it is psychologically sound to 
presume that the two phenomena go hand in hand 249 
It is the researcher's contention that respondents who answered that they did not vote 
because they did not find a candidate for whom they wanted to cast their vote, decided not 
to vote out of rejection rather than apathy. Educated respondents were more critical, and 
hence more sceptical than interviewees who received less education. They looked at the 
candidates' qualifications, and perhaps also found that the political groups they supported 
did not take part in the elections. They were less compromising. By not voting, they were 
sending a message. 
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2.1 did not register on time: This reason was given more often by the least educated 
people. Only 8.3% of the respondents who received college and above education replied 
that they did not vote because they did not register on time, compared to 23.9% of the 
interviewees who only went to elementary school. 
3.1 did not believe that it would make a difference: This reason was given nearly twice as 
often by the least educated people than by the most educated people. As indicated in 
table 2, below, 15.2% of the respondents who received up to elementary schooling 
replied that they did not vote because they did not believe that it would have made a 
difference, compared to only 8.3% of the interviewees who went to college and above 
gave that reason. 
It is the researcher's belief that the second and third reasons are more a result of 
indifference and apathy rather than of rational thinking. 
Table 2 also indicates that a significant proportion of the respondents (31.6%) answered 
"other reasons" for not taking part in the elections. These 31.6% comprise mostly people 
who (1) were sick on the day of elections; (2) are 18 years old now, but were not at the time 
of the elections; (3) are returnees who did not receive their identity card on time for the 
electionS. 250 
249 Cambell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D., The American V New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1960, p. 476. 
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! able 2. FRV didyqu not vote? 
Total Up to Elem. Up to Prep. Up to Sec. Some College & 
College above 
N=411 N=46 
_N=77 
N=132 N=104 N=36 
I did not register on time 17.0% 23.9% 14.3% 16.7% 20.2% 8.3% 
I did not believe that it 13.4% 15.2% 13.0% 13.6% 14.4% 8.3% 
would make a difference 
I did not find candidates for 21.9% 10.9% 2 6.0% 22.7% 21.2% 27.8% 
whom I wanted to cast my 
vote 
I am in opposition/against 1.2% - - 4.8% - 
Oslo 
Not convinced 2.7% - 2.6% 3.8% 3.8% 
I was out of the country 5.1% 2.2% 1.3% 4.5% 7.7% 13.9% 
Others 31.6% 45.7% 33.8% 30.3% 21.2% 36.1% 
No answer 7.1% 2.2% 9.1% 8.3% 6.7% 5.6% 
df 35 
Chisquare . 0582 
2.1.4 Voting according to Political Affiliation. 
When analysing voting behaviour according to political affiliation, it is necessary to point 
out that not all political factions participated in the January 1996 elections. The most 
prominent parties and factions such as Hamas, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) all decided 
to boycott the elections. Some members of these boycotting parties did run in the elections 
as independents, but not under the banner of their respective parties. In most cases, the 
electorate realised the party affiliation of these candidates and voted for or against them on 
the basis of this knowledge. 
The main reason given by the opposition parties for boycotting the elections was that 
participation would have legitimised the Oslo agreements, which - they felt - did not 
250 The researcher has this infonnation, because whenever an interviewee responded that he/she had "other 
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sufficiently take into account fundamental Palestinian national rights and were considered 
to constitute an American-Israeli imposition of ideas. As Qais Abdul Karim, the leader of 
the DFLP in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, stated to the researcher of this thesis: 
'The Legislative powers of the Council are restricted according to the Oslo 
agreements. We were keen to make clear to the Palestinian public that they would 
not be electing a parliament with the least degree ofsovereignty or power to solve 
any of the main problems facing the Palestinian community. We wanted to make 
clear that the Council that was going to be elected was a consultative body rather 
than a legislative body. The actual objective ofthe elections was to legitimise the 
Oslo agreements rather than to elect a body that represents the people. PY251 
Hassan Youssef, believed to be one of the top Hamas leaders in the Nablus area, clarified 
his movement's perception of the elections as follows in a press conference held on 16 
November 1995 in Ramallah: 
"We confirm that we have nothing against the principle ofholding Palestinian 
elections, but they should only be held once certain preconditions have been met, 
including the complete withdrawal of Israeliforcesfrom Palestinian territory, the 
removal of all settlers and the dismantling of the settlements. There are many 
reasons for our refusal to participate, but broadly these lie in our dissatisfaction 
with the terms ofthe Oslo Agreement and the inadequacy of the election law. 252 
The decision taken by the opposition parties to boycott the elections was not an easy one. 
The question of whether or not to participate in the first Palestinian elections sparked 
intense debates and led to the formation of pro- and anti- participation camps within the 
different factions. The rift which emerged within the PFLP before the elections forms one 
example. Riad Malki was the most prominent member of the PFLP who wanted his 
organisation to participate in the elections. He explained his argument and why he felt the 
PFLP made a mistake by not entering the elections to the researcher as follows: 
reasons" for not voting, this interviewee was requested to specify the reason. 
251 The interview with Qais Abdul Karhn was conducted in Rmnallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997. 
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'Their arguments were very convincing, but you can not take them out ofcontext 
and speak about them in the abstract. You need to see the whole picture and be 
more realistic in terms ofassessing and understanding the situation. Then, you can 
not accept these arguments, you have to lookfor other arguments.. I was saying 
that to protect thefuture ofmypolitical organisation, it was very important to enter 
the elections, because they will create new realities and historical changes. They 
will bring new faces, new realities, and a new status-quo. Andpeople who live in 
the past will be ignored andforgotten. I said that we can notjust say 'no'all the 
time, simply because it is the easiest way. The most difficult thing is to say ýyes' 
and to see how this yes could be translated into a position, whereby you become 
more flexible in terms of how to adjust to new realities without losingyour own 
identity andprinciples. )253 
Nabil Shaath, Council member and Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and 
International Co-operation, gave his own view of why the opposition was boycotting the 
elections. In his opinion put to the researcher of this thesis, there were two reasons why the 
opposition parties did not take part in the elections: one was official, the other the real 
reason. 
'Their official reason, which in my mind is rubbish, is that if theyparticipated, it 
would have been an indirect approval of the Oslo accords. But, they said, had this 
been municipal council elections, we wouldn't have minded! That was their stated 
reason. The real reason was that they felt at the time ofthe elections that their 
chances of electing a decent contingent to the Council were so slim that they would 
really be scarredfor a long time to come. , 254 
Indeed, realities at the time in the region were in favour of the political factions and figures 
supporting Oslo. The elections took place on the eve of Israeli redeployment from the 
major West Bank cities and Palestinian flags were flying everywhere. Israeli flags were 
lowered and the Palestinian soldiers marching into West Bank cities were received with 
252 Dickie, P., "Elections on Course; Hamas Refuses to Run", The Jerusalem Times 17 November 1995. 
253 The interview with Riad Malki was conducted in Ramallah on 18 August 1997. 
254 The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on 21 August 1997. 
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great joy. At that time, people supported Oslo and wanted peace, because they were finally 
given hope. Political factions in support of Oslo benefited from this euphoric mood. 
Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, wrote in a 
commentary: 
'The public came out in force behind ArafatIthe PAIFatah, in what can only be 
considered a vast display ofsupportfor the current political process. The results of 
the elections should not come as a surprise to anybody, in light ofthefact that the 
Palestinian elections were held directly after the Israeli army finished its 
withdrawalfrom major Palestinian population centres. '255 
Table 3 256 , below, identifies each political party which took part the elections in January 
1996, the number of candidates and winners from each participant party, and the percentage 
of votes each political party received. 
Table 3: 
Affiliation # of Candidates # of Winners Percentage of votes 
Independent 503 35 57.51% 
Fatah 77 50 30.90% 
Palestinian People's Party 26 0 2.93% 
Popular Struggle Front 12 0 0.74% 
FIDA 11 1 2.04% 
NDC 5 1 2.25% 
Arab Liberation Front 8 0 0.65% 
Liberty & Independence Bloc 5 1 1.64% 
Palestinian Liberation Front 4 0 0.11% 
Islamic Rhad Movement (al-aqsa 4 0 0.24% 
Brigade) 257 
Future Bloc 4 0 0.19% 
National Democratic Movement 3 0 0.19% 
Islamic Struggle Movement 2 0 0.35% 
Progressive National Bloc 2 0 0.05% 
National Movement for Change 2 0 0.08% 
Baath Party 1 0 0.06% 
Palestinian National Coalition 3 0 0.08% 
Total 672 88 100% 
255 Khatib, G., "The Value of the Vote", Palestine Repo 2 February 1996. 
256 Dajani, DemocEggy in Palestine , P. 100. 
25% Islamic Jihad Movement/al-aqsa Brigade", should not be confused with the Islamic Rhad Movement, 
which opposed the elections and did not take part in the elections. 
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When taking a closer look at table 3 above, the most remarkable fact is that only 77 
candidates of 672 ran on the Fatah list. This relatively small number can be explained by 
examining the carefully balanced strategy by PLO Chairman and Fatah head Yasser Arafat, 
whereby he wished, on the one hand, to encourage some degree of pluralism, Whilst, on the 
other hand, attempting to create a Fatah list which transcended the mere inclusion of the 
well-known, bona fide Fatah supporters to include representatives of the large families from 
inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the representatives who returned from abroad. 
There were only 88 seats available in the Legislative Council. Arafat did not allow for 
more than 77 Fatah supporters to be on the Fatah list, because he did not want the elections 
to turn out into an internal Fatah election. The reasoning behind this strategy, can be found 
in the level of support Fatah enjoys amongst the public. Results in an opinion poll 
conducted by the JMCC can help clarify the point of why Arafat was in need of some 
degree of pluralism in the elections and attempted to prevent a single party election. When 
1199 interviewees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were asked in a public opinion poll 
in January 1996, which political or religious factions they trusted most, only 38.9% of the 
interviewees responded that Fatah was their most trusted faction . 
258 Although Fatah was by 
far the faction that enjoyed most support amongst the public, its support base was 
insufficient for Arafat's goals. He needed a parliament with members who, on the one 
hand, drew their support from different sections of Palestinian society, but, who would, on 
the other hand, strongly support his policies in the peace process. Therefore, Arafat worked 
258 JMCC, Public Opinion Polls on Palestinian Attitudes towards Politics, (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1996), January 
1996 poll. 
119 
towards not only attracting Fatah supporters to the Council elections, but attempted to 
broaden the scope beyond Fatah . 
259 As a result of this strategy, a candidate such as Imad 
Falouji (North Gaza), who was a known member of Hamas until the elections, was included 
on the Fatah list. Other examples include: Faraj al-Sarraf, a Christian from Gaza city and a 
reputed independent, and Azmi Shuaibi, a FIDA supporter from Ramallah. 
Arafat was also peculiar in accepting or refusing permission for many Fatah supporters to 
run on the party list. A closer look at events prior to the elections revealed that Arafat was 
seeking the inclusion of a larger proportion of representatives of the large, traditional 
families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and returnees at the expense of well-known 
Fatah supporters and some popular Intifaclah leaders. Indeed, Arafat refused permission for 
many Fatah leaders to run on the party list, even when those candidates had been successftd 
in the Fatah primaries, which were held before the national elections. Abdel Fatah Hamayel, 
for example, who was known to be a hard-core Fatah supporter, came out first in the 
Ramallah constituency during the Fatah primaries. Nevertheless, he was not allowed to run 
as a Fatah candidate in the January 1996 elections, and consequently ran and won as an 
independent candidate. Other examples are people like Qadoura Faris, also from the 
Ramallah area, Salah Tamari (Bethlehem), and Zyad Abu Zayad (Jerusalem). In total, more 
than 200 Fatah members ran as independent candidates in the elections. In early January 
1996, the Fatah Higher Council tried to prevent this trend by issuing a decree prohibiting 
Fatah members from running as independents and by using Palestinian security forces to 
259 Andoni, "The Palestinian Elections:... ", p. 7. 
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intimidate would-be candidates . 
260 All Fatah members who nominated themselves as 
261 independents were ordered to withdraw their candidacy or they would be suspended . 
According to Ali Jarbawi, an associate professor at Birzeit University, the tension within 
Fatah during the run-up to the elections, had serious implications for the movement ever 
since. In an article in the Journal of Palestine Studies, he wrote: 
'The fact that a number ofFatah members ran against the movement's official list, 
ignoring the party leadership's calls to pull out of the race (some won stunning 
victories), proves that Fatah's electoral success came at the expense of its 
coherence. Indeed, the elections saw the final division of the movement into 
different centres ofpower. #262 
Some well-known, popular Fatah intifadah 263 leaders were also refused permission to run 
on the Fatah ticket. In this way, Arafat tried to avoid militant Fatah people winning the 
elections. A classic example is Hussain Khader, who ran and won in Nablus, He was a 
young, outspoken Fatah activist during the Intifadah, from Balata camp near Nablus, and 
had been jailed as such by the Israelis. After being refused pennission to run on the Fatah 
list, he joined the Liberty and Independence Bloc and became their only successful 
candidate. 
As became clear from the illustrations above, instead of the young, popular Intifadah 
activists and the well-known hard-core Fatah leaders, Arafat opted for and ensured the 
260 Benda, S., Johnson, K. and Melia, T., A Report on the first months of the Palestinian Legislative Council, 
Jerusalem: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, May 1996. 
261 "Abbas Defends Commission", Palestine Ue ort, 12 January 1996. 
262 Jarbawi, A., "Palestinian Politics at Crossroads", Journal of Palestine Studies (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, 
p. 35. 
263 The word "Intifadah" is the Arabic term for "uprising. The Palestinian uprising broke out early in 
December 1987. 
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enlistment of representatives of the traditional, large families such as Ali Qawameh 
(Hebron) and Maher al-Masri (Nablus). In addition, he included some returnees on the 
Fatah list, such as Hassan Asfour (Khan Younis), who is also closely affiliated with the 
Palestinian People's Party, and Umm Rhad (Gaza city). 
Arafat has been largely successful in his attempt to expand the boundaries of the Fatah list. 
However, after the elections, a growing tendency surfaced. Within the Legislative Council, 
the Fatah supporters who ran outside the Fatah list proved to be more independent and more 
vocal than those who had run on a Fatah ticket. Candidates who ran as individuals were 
chosen for their own qualities and this became their strength, whilst some of the winners 
who ran on the Fatah list owe a lot of their success to Fatah. They are less outspoken and 
their main loyalty is to Fatah. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre, agrees. In an interview with the researcher of this thesis, he 
affmned: 
'Because a sizeable number of Fatah candidates who made it to the Legislative 
Council did not owe their success to Arafat, but rather to their grassroot support, 
they were able to become more critical and outspoken on various policy issues, 
which, in many instances, contravened with Arafat's wishes. The relative 
democratic features of the Council can partially be attributed to the often 
independent positions ofthose Fatah members. '264 
Table 3 above, also shows that 50 of the 77 Fatah candidates running for the Council 
elections were successful, and that they received 30.90% of the votes. At first, this seems 
strmge, when we note in figure 5, below, that 63.1 % of the voters in the survey conducted 
by the researcher claimed that they voted for Fatah. Critics might suggest that there is a 
264 The interview with Ghassan Khatib was conducted in Durham on 18 June 1998. 
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discrepancy between the survey result of 63.1% who voted for Fatah and the official 
number of 30.9%. However, one should keep in mind that the official number reflects only 
the percentage of people who actually voted for the 77 registered Fatah candidates. The 
percentage in the survey is higher because it includes both respondents who voted for the 77 
official Fatah candidates and those who voted for members of Fatah who ran as 
independent candidates, but were known for their Fatah affiliation. Jamil Rabah, a 
Palestinian political analyst and highly respected pollster, agreed in an interview with the 
researcher of this thesis. He explained: 
"While Fatah officially harvested 30.90% of the vote in the January 1996 elections, 
in practical terms, Fatah gained many more votes. I am not surprised to see that in 
your opinion poll 63.1 % said that they votedfor Fatah. The discrepancy can be 
explained by the fact that a large number ofFatah members ran as independent 
candidates or under a non-Fatah list. To most people, those candidates are Fatah, 
and they were identified by the public as such, irrespective ofwhether they ran as 
Fatah or not. )265 
FlEure S. - 
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Voting According to Political Faction 
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265 The interview with Jmnil Rabah was conducted in Durharn on 20 June 1998. 
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According to the results illustrated in figure 5 above, 2.6% of the respondents who voted, 
said that they voted for Hamas. Again, this result might seem strange, when considering 
that Hamas was one of the factions which officially boycotted the elections. Some of the 
candidates and winners in the elections, however, had strong Harnas affiliations, most of 
those stood in the Gaza Strip. Examples of such winners include the following Council 
members: Imad Falouji (North Gaza), Musa Za'bout (Gaza city), Yaghi Wajieh (Gaza city), 
Suleiman al-Rourni (Rafah), and Muawya Masri (Nablus). 266 
Not only were there more candidates with close Hamas affiliations standing in the elections 
in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, the results of the survey show that Gazans also 
voted more often for those candidates than Westbankers. As illustrated in figure 6 below, 
in the West Bank 1.5% of the surveyed respondents voted for candidates perceived to be 
Hamas, compared to 4.1 % in the Gaza Strip, which is more than three times higher. 
Figure 6. 
Total 
West Bank 
Gaza Strip 
Voting for Hamas affiliated Candidates in the 1996 Elections 
According to Area 
2.6% 
1.5% 
4.1% 
N=772 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 
266 JMCC, The Palestinian Council, (Second Edition), Jerusalem: JMCC, January 1998, pp. 179-222. 
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Table 4 below, indicates that most educated youth tended to vote more for Harnas than 
older, less educated people. These fmdings correspond with those of Khalil Shikaki, 
Director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus. In a recent article in 
Foreign Affairs, he wrote that although the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not 
have a consistent demographic characteristic, "disproportionately more support for them is 
found among illiterates and the most educated youth. , 267 
Table 4: Votinr for Hamas bv education and are. - 
Education (N=750) Age (N=724) 
Up to elementary school 2.9% 18-25 3.3% 
Up to preparatory school 2.8% 26-35 2.6% 
Up to secondary school 2.7% 3645 2.1% 
Some college 2.0% 46-55 2.7% 
College and above 3.8% 55+ - 
2.1.5. Agenda and Campaign Slogans 
Part of the electorate's success in voting according to acceptable democratic standards can 
be associated with its knowledge of the campaign slogans and the agendas of the election 
candidates. 268 In this section, the researcher will analyse which demographic subgroups of 
Palestinian society had superior knowledge of the agendas of the election candidates and 
which subgroups found campaigning more important than others. 
Of the surveyed people who were actual voters, male voters were more familiar with the 
campaign slogans than female voters. As illustrated in figure 7 below, not only did 81.3% 
267 Shikaki, K., "Peace Now or Hamas Later", ForeigLi Affairs , (77), no. 4, p. 32. 
268 Lodge, M., Steenbergen, M. and Brau, S., "Ile Responsive voter: Campaign Information and the 
Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation", American Political Science Revi (89), no. 2, June 1995, p. 321. 
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of male voters respond that they knew the agendas of the candidates, compared to only 
66.0% of female voters; nearly twice the amount of female voters, 27.7%, said that they 
were not familiar with the campaign slogans, compared to only 14.8% of male voters. 
Fkare 7. 
Knowledge by the Electorate of the slogans/campaign slogans of the Candidates 
According to Gender 
100% 
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This does not necessarily mean that male voters were more responsible voters. The fact 
that women were less familiar with campaign slogans than men is partly a result of women 
not being able or not being allowed to attend campaign rallies or meetings. When the 
JMCC asked in an opinion poll, conducted in February 1996,269 whether people had 
participated in any campaign rallies or meetings, only 29.0% of the interviewees replied 
positively. As illustrated in figure 8 below, 41.3% of these were men and only 18.1% were 
women. 
269 JMCC, Public Ovinion Polls, February 1996 poll. 
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Yes No No answer 
Firure 8.270 
Participation in campaign rallies or meetings 
According to gender 
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No 
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Figure 8, above, also indicates that, in total, 68.7% of the surveyed people did not 
participate in any campaign rallies or meeting. Of those, again, women responded more 
frequently than men that they did not participate in campaign rallies. Of the interviewed 
men, 56.3% responded that they did not participate in any campaign meetings, whereas 
79.6% of the women admitted that they did not take part in any rallies or meetings. Figure 9 
below, explains more about the reasons for not participating in such rallieS. 27' As 
illustrated, women replied three times more frequently than men that they did not take part 
in any campaign activities because they were not allowed to participate in mixed meetings. 
Moreover, 55.3% of those men who did not participate in campaign rallies referred to 
disinterest in such activities, compared to only 40.0% of women. With those results in 
mind, it seems fair to conclude that the superior knowledge by men of campaign slogans, as 
illustrated in figure 7 above, was not resulting from a greater disinterest in the campaign by 
270 The data illustrated in figure 8 were compiled from information in: IMCC, Public Qpinion Polls, February 
1996 poll. 
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women, but rather was the result of social constraints, which made it much harder for 
women than men to participate in campaign activities, and, therefore, to acquire 
information about the content of the candidates' campaigns. 
Firure 9. 
Couldn't participate in mixed meeting 
Not interested 
Didn't know about them 
Other 
Source: JMCC, February 1996 
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Table 5 below, illustrates a repetition of a trend found in some of the tables on voter turnout 
in previous sections of this thesis, in that, again, the more educated youth seemed to have a 
greater knowledge of the carnpaign slogans of the candidates than older and less educated 
people. 
Table 5: *Wen voting , didyou know the agendalcam paign slogans of the candidates? 
Education Age 
Up to Up to Up to Some College 18-25 26-35 5 46-55 55+ 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College & above 
N=70 N=142 N=255 N=205 N=78 N=241 N=235 N=145 N=73 N=30 
Yes 54.3% 61.3% 74.5% 84.9% 87.2% 78.8% 72.8% 78.6% 64.4% 53.3% 
No 42.9% 29.6% 20.4% 11.7% 10.3% 16.2% 23.01/o 20.7% 30.1% 30.0% 
No answer 2.9% 9.2% 5.1% 3.4% 2.6% 5.0% 4.3% 0.7% 5.5% 16.7% 
df 15 15 
Chi square . 0000 . 0000 
271 JMCC, Public Opinion Polls, Febnmry 1996 poll. 
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Reasons for not participating in activities 
According to gender 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
The results in table 5 above, help to strengthen arguments made by the researcher earlier in 
section 1.1.3. of this thesis. More younger than older respondents knew the campaign 
slogans, and were, therefore, more inclined and better equipped to vote responsibly. 
Furthermore, table 5 reveals that more interviewees with higher education knew the 
candidates' agenda than lower educated respondents. In the researcher's view, these results 
are again compatible with those found in section 1.1.3., where the researcher ascertained 
that the more educated people who chose not to vote, did so mainly because they did not 
find a candidate for whom they were prepared to cast their vote. Higher educated 
respondents were more familiar with the agenda of the election candidates, leading them to 
become more critical of those candidates than less educated respondents, and making them 
less inclined to vote for any of the candidates running. 
Table 6 below, further reinforces the argument about the influence of education upon voting 
behaviour and campaigning, in that, again, the higher educated Palestinian attached more 
importance to campaigning in the run up to the January 1996 elections than the less 
educated interviewees. 
Table 6., How important was the campalon. when vou cast vour vote? 
Total Education 
Up to Elem. Up to Prep. Up to Sec. Some College & 
College above 
N=772 N=70 N=142 N=255 N--205 N=78 
Very important 37.2% 32.9% 29.6% 37.3% 42.4% 43.6% 
Important 32.3% 20.0% 35.2% 35.3% 34.6% 25.6% 
Somewhat finportant 14.0% 12.9% 18.3% 13.7% 10.2% 17.9% 
Not important 13.2% 21.4% 15.5% 12.5% 8.8% 10.3% 
Absolutely not important 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 0.4% 3.4% - No answer 1.9% 11.4% - 0.8% 0.5% 2.6% 
df 25 
Chi square . 0000 
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2.1.6. Important Factors when Voting 
The survey respondents who voted in the January 1996 Palestinian elections were asked to 
determine the importance or influence of 13 factors on their voting behaviour. Below, 
figure 10 ranks the factors according to their importance. The indicated percentage is the 
stun of the answers of interviewees who said that a certain characteristic of candidates was 
"very important" or "importanf 'in influencing their voting behaviour. 
Firure 10., 
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections 
According to the General Public 
I Important 
-I 
Education 92.8% 
Reputation 91.5% 
Struggle history 89.5% 
Democratic values 88.3% 
Political affiliation 70.4% 
Campaign 69.5% 
Reliclion 64.7% 
Religious values 60.8% 
AMj2; 2&2Mic status 
45.9% 
Family relations 43.4% 
Residence 43.3% 
Gender 32.7% 
Age 30.6% 
The 13 factors above in figure 10, portray the results of the total sample of the survey. As 
is the case with other questions in the popular survey conducted by the researcher, the 
answers by the interviewees have, in addition, also been classified according to gender, 
area, refugee status, education and age. 272 Below, the researcher will clarify for each of the 
272 For full results of the popular survey, see Annex 5 of this thesis. 
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13 factors surnmarised in figure 10 above, whether or not they were of greater or lesser 
importance for certain demographic subgroups. 
Before going into finther detail below, it is worth noting that there was a general agreement 
amongst the surveyed people concerning the degree of importance of (1) education, (2) 
reputation, (3) struggle history, (4) political affiliation and (5) socio-economic status, no 
matter what demographic subgroup they belong to. The importance of these findings lies in 
the fact that the surveyed people who voted, agreed on the importance of the three highest 
ranked factors, namely the education, reputation, and struggle history of the candidates. On 
some other factors, opinions were more divided, whether it was according to age, area, 
education, gender or reffigee status. 
2.1.6.1. Education 
As indicated above in figure 10, education was the most important factor influencing voting 
behaviour in the 1996 elections. The educational background of the candidates in the 
elections was of high importance for all categories of voters. As a result of the great 
importance accorded by people to the level of education of the election candidates, the 
majority of the Council members are highly educated. Figure 11, below, shows that, 
thirteen of the 88 Council members carry Ph. D. s, eight have a Masters degree, one has a 
Diploma, whilst 54 Council members completed Bachelor's degrees. 273 In other words, 76 
out of the 88 Council members have at least one university degree. 
273 JMCC, The Palestinian Council, p. 223. 
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Firure M: 
Educational Background of the Council Members 
BA 
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2.1.6.2. Democratic Values 
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14.8% 
The importance of adherence to democratic values by a candidate was far more important 
for the more educated people than for those with less education. This is again an indicator 
of the apparent trend that the more educated people were more responsible voters, in the 
sense that their choice of candidates was based on the intrinsic values of the candidates 
rather than on more traditional values. 
Table 7. - How hnportant were democratk values when you castyour vote? 
Total Education 
Up to Elem. Up to Prep. Up to Sec. Some College & 
College above 
N=772 N=70 N=142 N=255 N=205 N=78 
Very important 59.8% 41.4% 51.4% 60.8% 66.8% 74.4% 
Important 28.5% 32.9% 39.4% 27.1% 24.9% 15.5% 
Somewhat important 6.7% 10.0% 4.9% 8.2% 4.4% 7.7% 
Not important 2.2% 7.1% 1.4% 2.0% 2.4% - 
Absolutely not important 0.8% - 1.4% 0.8% 1.0% - 
No answer 1.9% 8.6% 1.4% 1.2% 0.5% 2.6% 
df 25 
Chi square . 0000 
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2.1.6.3. Religion and Religious Values 
Before going into detail about the influence of religion and religious values of candidates 
on voting behaviour, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between those two terms. By 
asking about the importance of "religion" of the candidates, the researcher aimed to verify 
how important the knowledge was for the surveyed voters that certain candidates were 
Christian or Muslim. With the term "religious values", the researcher aimed to check the 
importance for the interviewed voters of knowing that the election candidates adhered to the 
religious practices of their specific religion. In this manner, the researcher attempted to 
verify, for example, whether or not voters would cast their votes for Muslim candidates 
who drank alcohol, and thus, did not strictly adhere to the teachings of their religion. 
Whilst it became clear above in section 2.6.6.1. that with regard to education there was a 
clear trend and general agreement amongst various sectors of the sample concerning its 
importance, no similar consistencies appeared concerning the issues of religion and 
religious values. As tables 8 and 9, below, indicate, religion and religious values were more 
important for women than for men, and they were more important for refugees than non- 
refugees. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, the importance of religious values and religion 
prevailed more than in the West Bank. These findings are consistent with those discussed 
earlier concerning voting behaviour in the Gaza Strip. As was indicated in section 1.1.4, 
respondents in the Gaza Strip voted more often for Hamas than their counterparts in the 
West Bank, which corresponds to the greater adherence to religion and religious values 
found in the Gaza Strip. 
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Table 8., How important was rellevion when vou castyour vote? 
Total Gender Area Refugee or Not 
Male Female West Bank Gaza Non-refugee Refugee 
N=772 N=391 N=376 N=453 N=319 N=397 N=355- 
Very important 39.4% 32.0% 46.8% 29.4% 53.6% 33.2% 47.3% 
Important 25.3% 27.4% 23.4% 23.8% 27.3% 26.2% 24.2% 
Somewhat important 11.9% 14.3% 9.3% 14.6% 8.2% 13.9% 9.0% 
Not important 19.3% 22.0% 16.5% 26.3% 9.4% 22.2% 16.1% 
Absolutely not important 2.5% 2.8% 2.1% 4.0% 0.3% 2.8% 1.7% 
No answer 1.7% 1.5% 1.9% 2.0% 1.3% 1.8% 1.7% 
df 10 5 10 
Chl square . 0164 . 
0000 . 0018 
Table 9: How Important were religious values when you cast your vote? 
Total Gender Area Refugee or Not 
Male Female West Bank Gaza Non-refitgee Refugee 
N=772 N=391 N=376 N=453 N=319 N=397 N=355 
Very important 34.2% 29.9% 38.6% 25.2% 47.0% 28.7% 41.1% 
Important 26.6% 24.3% 29.0% 23.6% 30.7% 27.7% 26.2% 
Somewhat important 16.3% 17.1% 15.4% 20.3% 10.7% 17.6% 14.4% 
Not important 18.1% 22.8% 13.3% 24.1% 9.7% 19.9% 15.5% 
Absolutely not important 2.3% 3.3% 1.3% 4.0% - 2.8% 1.4% 
No answer 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 2.9% 1.90/0 3.3% 1.4% 
df 10 5 10 
Chi square . 0365 . 0000 . 
0021 
2.1.6.4. Residence (localiW 
Before entering into specifics about the influence of residence upon voting behaviour, it is 
essential to briefly outline what is meant by this factor. By asking the surveyed voter about 
the importance of residence of the election candidates, the researcher aimed to measure 
whether or not the locality where candidates lived, was important in determining voting 
behaviour. More specifically, the researcher attempted to check whether or not it was an 
issue for voters that candidates were, for example, city dwellers or camp residents, locals or 
retumees. 
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Although, in general, the factor of residence did not have a very significant influence on 
voting behavioUr274' it is important to indicate the existence of a statistically significant 
relationship between the influence of residence on voting behaviour and the demographic 
subgroups of gender and refugee status. As shown in table 10 below, the factor of residence 
remained more important amongst refugees than amongst non-refugees. Also, surveyed 
women attached greater value to residence than men. 
Table 10. - How Important was residence when you cost yqyr vote? 
Total Gender Refugee or Not 
Male Female Non-refugee Refugee 
N=772 N=391 N=376 N=397 N=355 
Very important 19.7% 17.1% 22.6% 15.1% 25.4% 
Important 23.6% 21.2% 26.3% 24.2% 22.8% 
Somewhat important 19.4% 19.9% 18.9% 23.2% 15.8% 
Not important 32.5% 36.1% 28.5% 33.0% 31.3% 
Absolutely not important 2.6% 3.3% 1.6% 2.3% 2.8% 
No answer 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 2.0% 
df 10 10 
Chi square . 0280 . 0294 
The results in table 10 above can be explained as follows. It is the researcher's belief that 
the greater importance attached by women to the residence of the candidates they voted for 
is a result of the often persistent traditional beliefs in Palestinian society and the social 
constraints placed upon women. It was, for example, shown earlier in section 1. I. S., that 
women knew less about the campaign slogans of the candidates because they were not 
allowed to participate in mixed campaign meetings. Also, in many cases, the women's role 
remained centred around the family and home life. It is, therefore, understandable that, 
when voting, more women than men relied on the one thing which they did know and could 
verify, namely whether or not the candidate lived and was respected in their locality. 
274 As became clear from figure 10 above. 
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It is also not surprising that the factor of residence of the election candidates remained more 
important for refugees than non-refugees. Refugee camps remained a much closer 
community than the Palestinian towns and cities. Camp residents know each other better 
and have one main factor in common: their living conditions are much lower than those of 
non-refugees and they feel deprived compared to non-refugees. For refugees, therefore, it 
was much more important than for non-refugees to know the residence of the election 
candidates. It was crucial for them to know whether or not the election candidates shared 
their locality as they felt that one of their own could understand and represent their needs 
better than an "outsider". 
2.1.6.5. Gender 
The importance attached to the gender of election candidates varied in Palestinian society, 
depending on whether the respondents resided in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. As 
becomes clear from figure 12, below, the gender of the election candidates was more of an 
issue in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. This may be explained by the more 
traditional nature of Gazan society. Gazan residents continued to see the role of men as the 
main breadwinners and that of women primarily as homemakers rather than successful 
Council members. 
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Firure 12., 
Importance of Gender of Candidates in January 1996 Elections 
According to Area 
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At this stage, it is worth noting the success-story of Palestinian female candidates in the 
first national elections. Five women out of a total of 88 Council members were elected to 
the Legislative Council, taking about 5.7% of the Council seats. This is a relatively high 
success rate for women when compared to the number of women in parliaments in other 
countries in the region. In the 1996 elections in Jordan, for example, not one single woman 
managed to win a seat. Council member Marwan Bargouthi, who is also the secretary- 
general of Fatah in the West Bank, has stressed the significance of this aspect as follows to 
the researcher: 
II 
... a very important group of Palestinians respect women and are ready to elect 
women. They are different ftom the people in other Arab societies. Most ofthe 
Arab parliaments don't have women. For thefirst time in Jordan, they elected one 
woman, four years ago. But, amongst Palestiniansfive women were elected. In the 
Israeli Knesset, they have nine women out of 120 (Knesset members). So, ifyou 
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compare the number of 5 to 88, to 9 to 120 in Israel, I think it is a positive pointfor 
the Palestinians. ), 275 
As figure 13, below, illustrates, the success rate of female candidates in the 1996 elections 
was comparatively higher than the success rate of male candidates. About 19.2% of female 
candidates were successftd, compared to only 12.8% of the male candidates. Moreover, out 
of the five female Council members, two also became ministers. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi 
(Jerusalem) became Minister of Higher Education, and Intisar al-Wazir (Gaza city) was 
appointed Minister of Social Affairs. 
Firure 13: 
Comparison Between the Number of Candidates and Winners 
According to Gender 
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Finally, it is necessary to note that three out of the five female winners were from the Gaza 
Strip, which might seem surprising given what the researcher mentioned above about 
Gazans remaining more traditional in their thinking. It is, therefore, essential to point out 
that the three female winners in the Gaza Strip had two important advantages in common: 
275 The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997. 
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(1) all three women ran on the Fatah list, and (2) all three female winners owed a major 
share of their good reputation to the respect of the Gazan electorate for members of their 
families. More specifically: (1) Rawya, Shawwa (Gaza city) was the daughter of the former 
mayor of Gaza city, and was the wife of the current mayor; (2) Intisar al-Wazir's (Gaza 
city) late husband was Abu Jihad, one of the most respected Palestinian leaders; and (3) 
Jamileh Saydam's (Deir al-Balah) late husband was martyred. 
2.1.6.6. Age 
According to the survey results, the factor of age of the election candidates was the least 
important factor influencing the Palestinian voter. In general, all demographic subgroups 
attached similar low value to this factor. What is noteworthy, however, is that the more 
educated respondents gave even less importance to the age factor than less educated 
Palestinians. This again fits in the pattern which emerged from the previous tables, in that 
the more educated people thought and voted more rationall Yý276 and less according to a more 
traditional set of beliefs than the less educated people. 
Table H: How important was age when you cast your vote? 
Total Education 
up to Up to up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=772 N=70 N=142 N=255 N=205 N=78 
Very important 11.7% 14.3% 8.5% 13.71/o 12.2% 9.0% 
Important 18.9% 12.9% 16.9% 25.1% 18.0% 11.5% 
Somewhat important 19.6% 11.4% 26.1% 17.3% 20.5% 21.8% 
Not important 43.9% 42.9% 45.8% 41.2% 42.9% 51.3% 
Absolutely not important 3.8% 8.6% 1.4% 2.0% 4.9% 3.81YO 
No answer 2.2% 10.0% 1.4% 0.8% 1.5% 2.6% 
4f 25 
Chi Square . 0001 
276 The terin 'rational' was defined for the purpose of the thesis in Chapter One. 
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The assessment that age was not a very important factor and that people did not necessarily 
vote for older people, who are traditionally considered as being wiser, is also reflected in 
the relative youth of the Council members. The average age of the Council members is 
about 50, which is young considering that in traditional societies, older people hold the 
leadership. 
2.1.7. Satisfaction with the Legislative Council 
The people who voted in the first national elections were asked about their level of 
satisfaction with those candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, and for whom 
they themselves had voted. As indicated in table 12, below, a trend appeared, whereby 
interviewees with less education were more satisfied with those they voted into the Council 
than interviewees with a higher level of education. One can thus deduce that the higher 
educated respondents were more critical of the performance of the Council members than 
less educated Palestinians. Further details on the satisfaction of the Palestinian electorate 
with the Legislative Council will be provided in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Table 12: Of those who made It to the Council and whom you yoursey'have votedfor, 
are vou safisried. somewhat safisrIed or iihsadstkil with them? 
Total Education 
Up to Up to Up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=772 N=70 N=142 N=255 N=205 N=78 
Satisfied 15.9% 31.4% 16.2% 17.3% 9.8% 11.5% 
Somewhat satisfied 45.6% 32.9% 40.1% 45.1% 53.2% 48.7% 
Dissatisfied 27.7% 22.9% 34.5% 26.7% 25.9% 30.8% 
None made it to the PLC 7.9% 4.3% 7.7% 9.0% 7.8% 9.0% 
No answer 2.8% 8.6% 1.4% 2.0% 3.4% - 
df 20 
Chi Square . 0010 
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2.1.8. Expectations 
Asking people whether the election results met their expectations is another way of 
measuring their level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council. The answers to this 
question seem at first inconsistent with the trends which started to appear above. Higher 
educated people answered far more often that the election results met or somewhat met 
their expectations than less educated Palestinians. Moreover, nearly twice as many young 
respondents answered that the election results met or somewhat met their expectations than 
respondents aged 55 and older. Keeping in mind the findings earlier in this Chapter, such 
as the scepticism of the more educated voters, their higher efficacy when casting their vote, 
and their higher dissatisfaction with the candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, 
the answers to the current question seem only logical when one acknowledges that the 
ftdfilment of expectations is not necessarily positive, but could also imply negativity. In 
other words, the high percentage of more educated and younger Palestinians answering 
positively to the question of whether the election results met their expectations, should be 
interpreted as an expression of their scepticism and disappointment with the current 
situation. As Ghassan Khattib, political analyst and Director of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre commented on these results: 
'The higher percentage of educated andyoungpeople who said that the election 
results met their expectations should be put into context. Hereby, it is necessary to 
establish a link between evaluation and expectations. Even prior the elections, the 
higher educated in Palestinian society were more sceptical in their expectations 
about the elections, leading them to be more critical in their evaluation of the 
election results. As a result of their critical evaluation the election results did 
meet their expectations. The sceptical viewpoints of the young and educated 
before the elections corresponded with the election results and, therefore, met 
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their expectations. The results on this question point to a complex argument 
expectedfrom educatedpeople. '277 
Table 13a: Did the election results meet your ex, pectations? - Total Age 
18-25 26-35 3645 46-55 55+ 
N=I 195 N=379 N=366 N=203 N=105 N=66 
Met my expectations 19.5% 17.9% 18.3% 23.6% 25.7% 16.7% 
Somewhat met my expectations 37.7% 41.7% 39.3% 30.01/6 37.1% 16.7% 
Did not meet my expectations 28.3% 26.4% 29.01/6 36.9% 21.0% 31.8% 
No answer 14.5% 14.0% 13.4% 9.4% 16.2% 34.8% 
df 15 
Chi Square . 0000 
Table 13h: Did the election results meet vour expectations? 
Education 
up to Up to Up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=l 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=115 
Met my expectations 18.5% 16.7% 19.8% 20.1% 25.2% 
Somewhat met my expectations 22.7% 29.0% 37.6% 47.8% 43.5% 
Did not meet my expectations 29.4% 37.1% 31.2% 22.0% 20.9% 
No answer 29.4% 17.2% 11.3% 10.2% 10.4% 
df 15 
Chi Sqwm . 0000 
In short, the results of tables 13a and 13b above can be explained as follows. In general, in 
spite of the public's understanding of the restrictionS278 imposed on the Legislative Council, 
they were disappointed with it and evaluated it rather harshly. There are various reasons 
behind this harsh evaluation: 
1. There is a tendency of electorates to criticise newly established legislatures because of 
their dissatisfaction with the regime itself. As Mishler and Rose argued: 
'Wthough popular support may contribute to the supportfor the democratic 
regime, it is equally plausible that generalised supportfor the regime influences 
the popular standing of the legislature. 279 
277 The interview with Ghassan Khatib was conducted in Jerusalem. on 7 July 1999. 
278 The restrictions imposed on the good performance of the Legislative Council will be discussed in detail in 
some of the following chapters. 
279 Mishler and Rose, "Support for Parliaments and Regimes... ", p. 7. 
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2. Possibly, the electorate felt that the Council members carry a responsibility towards 
them as it was the public who brought them to power. As a result of the high voter 
turnout in the elections, the Palestinian electorate felt that the composition and popular 
legitimacy of the Legislative Council stems from their vote. The electorate, therefore, 
felt that it has the right to criticise the relative ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council, 
more so than the mismanagement and inefficiency of other Palestinian Authority 
institutions. 
3. The Legislative Council encompasses a large number of members of the Executive 
Authority and also a large number (33%) of returnees. The fact that a lot of members of 
the Executive Authority are also members of the Legislative Council has been sub ect to j 
heavy criticism from the Palestinian public. One of the tasks of the Legislative Council 
is to scrutinise the policies of the Executive Authority. The presence in the Legislative 
Council of such a large number of members of the Executive Authority makes this task 
very difficult and this does not escape the public eye. Moreover, there exists an 
increasing dislike amongst the public for returnees. According to an opinion poll 
conducted by JMCC in May 1997,46.8% of the respondents said that the return of the 
returnees was worse than they expected. Only 9.5% said that their return was better 
than they expected. 
4. The relative transparency of the Legislative Council compared to the Executive 
Authority and other official institutions, renders it more susceptible to criticism. 
5. The restrictions imposed on the Legislative Council by not only the Executive 
Authority, but also the Oslo agreements and the Israeli government leaves the public 
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increasingly sceptical as to whether the Legislative Council has sufficient room to 
manoeuver in order to fulfil the expectations of the electorate. 
The points briefly touched on, above, will be discussed in greater depth in the following 
chapters of this thesis. 
2.1.9. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility in Voting 
According to Jeffery Mondak, an electoral system that operates with an eye toward quality 
is an electoral system guided by a collective sense of rationality. 2"o As discussed before in 
Chapter One, this view of rationality and responsibility has been utilised extensively by 
scholars, both by those emphasising the empirical approach and those adhering to the 
behavioural approach. Many argued that the level of rationality of voters influences the 
legislative process. As Austen-Smith and Banks wrote: 
Vational voters will take into account the subsequent legislative game in making 
their decisions at the electoral stage ofthe process. In turn, rational candidates will 
take account of such deliberations in selecting their electoral strategy and 
subsequent legislative behaviour conditional on electoral success. '281 
When examining the first Palestinian elections in this section based upon the results of a 
public opinion poll, we found that the major differences in voting behaviour between the 
different subgroups depended on variables such as gender, area, refugee status or age. The 
most striking differences, however, appeared when examining voting behaviour of less 
280 Mondak, J. J., "Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents", The 
Journal of Politics, (57), No. 4, November 1995, p. 1066. 
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educated Palestinians and those with a higher level of education. We assumed that 
rationality in voting behaviour increased parallel to education. The data below affirm this 
assumption. When we asked people whether they thought people in general voted 
rationally and responsibly, the less educated Palestinian thought so more than the higher 
educated Palestinian. This seems to indicate that the higher educated respondents were 
more critical when casting their votes and better understood the responsibility of the 
electorate when voting representatives into office. They follow up and evaluate the 
Legislative Council, and are prepared not to only put the blame with the Council members 
or the Palestinian Authority for their average perfonnance, but also the electorate who was 
responsible for electing these representatives into the Legislative Council. 
Table 14. Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally? 
Total Education 
Up to Up to Up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=I 195 N=I 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=I 15 
Rationally 44.6% 53.8% 45.7% 46.1% 40.4% 39.1% 
Irrationally 43.8% 34.5% 38.5% 44.3% 49.0% 48.7% 
No answer 11.60/6 11.8% 15.8% 9.5% 10.5% 12.2% 
df 10 
Chi Square 
. 0774 
282 
Table 15. 'Do-vou think People voted responsIbIv or Irresponsibiv? 
Total Education 
Up to Up to Up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=I 195 N=119 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=I 15 
Responsible 55.6% 57.1% 63.3% 59.0% 47.5% 47.5% 
Irresponsibly 33.2% 30.3% 25.8% 31.7% 37.6% 45.2% 
No answer 11.2% 12.6% 10.9% 9.3% 15.0% 7.0% 
df 10 
Chi Square 
. 0025 
281 Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J., "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes", American Political 
Science Revitw, (82), No. 2, June 1988, p. 405. 
282 This result is statistically significant at 90% rather than at 95%, as Chi Square is higher than '. 05'. 
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2.2. PART TWO: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 AND THE 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS 
According to Lucian Pye, (1964), the central cause of political instability in transitional 
societies is the lack of an effective relation between the ruling elite and their peoples. It is 
the contention of the researcher that an essential part of establishing or maintaining 'an 
effective relationship' between the elite and the population consists of the elite's ability to 
gather and take into account information about the needs and behaviour of its constituents. 
It is for this reason that the researcher deemed it necessary to put before the Council 
members some of the same questions asked to the electorate about the Palestinian elections 
of 1996. Besides allowing for a more complete picture of the first Palestinian national 
elections, Part Two of this chapter will, in addition, allow for an assessment of where, if 
any, disparities exist between the Palestinian public and its representatives. 
The following questions were put before the Council members: What do Council members 
think were important factors influencing people to vote for a certain candidate or not? How 
do Council members evaluate the Palestinian electorate? Do they feel that Palestinian voter 
behaviour was rational or irrational? Was it responsible or iffesponsible? To what extent 
do Council members feel that they have lived up to their promises? How does their 
estimation correspond with the public's evaluation of this issue? 
It should be noted that in none of the studies consulted by the researcher both the public and 
the parliamentarians were systematically and simultaneously polled as is the case in this 
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research. As such, comparison is very difficult and the use of literature as a reference is not 
applicable. 
2.2.1. Important Factors in Voting 
The Council members were asked to determine the influence of 13 factors upon the voting 
behaviour of the electorate. The 13 factors are the swne factors as those used in the public 
opinion poll to evaluate the importance of certain influences upon the voting behaviour of 
the electorate. The percentage in figure 14 labelled "total", is the sum of the answers of 
Council members who responded that a certain factor was "very important" or "important' '. 
Figure 15 is a duplicate of figure 9 in section 2.1.6. It is reprinted here to clarify the 
differences in opinions between the general public and Council members concerning the 
importance of certain factors that influenced people when casting their votes in the January 
1996 elections. 
17"re 14. - 
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections 
According to the Council Members 
I Total II Very important II Important I 
Struggle history 88.4% 55.8% 'Aq A% 
Reputation 83.7% 62.8% 20.9% 
Education 74.5% 23.3% 51.2% 
Religious values 65.1% 163% 488% 
Political affiliation 60.5% 9r, 6% 349% 
Democratic values 55.8% 30.2% 25.6% 
ampaign 51.2% 16.3% 34.9% 
Family relations 51.2% 
ender 489% 140% 349% 
Socio-economic status 41.9% 9.3% 32.6% 
Reli ion 37.3% 14.0% 23.3% 
Residence 34.9% 2.3% 32.6% 
e 25.6% 2.3% 23.3% 
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Brure 15: 
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections 
According to the General Public 
I Important I 
Ldu"cabon u tio 92.8% 
R ut 0 eputati7n 10 91.5% 
t ggl Is Struggle history Struggle his 
F 
a 
89.5% 
ocr tic Democr tic values 88.3% 
Political affiliation 70.4% 
Campaign 69.5% 
Reliqion 64.7% 
Religious values 60.8% 
Mic Rtatus. 45.9% 
Family relations 43.4% 
Residence 43.3% 
Gender 32.7% 
Age 30.6% 
In general, the Council members know how people cast their votes in the last elections. 
The general public ranked education, reputation and struggle history as the three most 
important factors influencing their voting behaviour, and so did the Council members, 
albeit in a different order. The Council members ranked struggle history as the most 
important factor influencing the popular vote, whilst ranking education as the third most 
important factor. 
In some instances, Council members did not realise how important some factors were for 
the Palestinian electorate when voting. For, example, the electorate ranks "democratic 
values" fourth, with 88.3%, whilst the Council members only placed it sixth in importance, 
with 55.8%. Moreover, whilst Council members overestimated the importance of religious 
values in influencing Palestinian voters, they underestimated the importance of religion. 
Council members also thought gender was more of an issue for the public. 48.9% of the 
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Council members believed gender was an important factor influencing the popular vote, 
compared with only 32.7% of the electorate. 
It is possible to conclude that in general and on the most important factors influencing the 
vote in the 1996 elections, the Council members and the general public agreed. On other 
issues, however, some discrepancies were found in what the general public said were 
important factors influencing their vote, and what the Council members thought were 
important factors when the electorate cast its vote. 
2.2.2. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility of the Palestinian 
Electorate in Voting 
In order to provide an explanation of the results shown in tables 16 and 17, below, on the 
level of rationality and responsibility of the Palestinian voter, in the opinion of the Council 
members, some calculations are in order. 
Table 16. - On a scalefrom I to 10,1 being very rational and 10 being veiy Irrational, how wouldyou rate 
the Palestinian voter In the elections? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 4 9.3% 
2 5 11.6% 
3 14 32.6% 
4 5 11.6% 
5 12 27.9% 
6 
7 3 7.0% 
8 
9 
10 
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Table 17. - On a scalefrom I to 10,1 being very responsible and 10 being veiy Irresponsible, how wouldyou 
rate the Palestinian voter In the elections? 
Value label Frequency =43 Percent 
1 4 9.3% 
2 7 16.3% 
3 10 23.3% 
4 9 20.9% 
5 4 9.3% 
6 2 4.7% 
7 6 14.0% 
8 1 2.3% 
9 
10 
The material in tables 16 and 17, above, needs to be presented in a manner where direct 
comparison is possible between the perceptions of the Council members and the electorate. 
This will be done by multiplying the value labels (see tables 16 and 17) by the frequency of 
the responses to each. The value labels were ranked I to 10, with I representing the most 
positive evaluation. The total of the value labels multiplied by the response frequencies 
will then be divided by the number of respondents, so as to attain an average. 
It may be suggested that the value labels can be given the description illustrated in table 18, 
below. 
Table 18. - 
# Codes 
1&2 very responsible/ very rational 
3&4 moderately responsible/ moderately rational 
5&6 neither 
7&8 moderately irresponsible/moderately irrational 
9&10 very irresponsible/very irrational 
Perceptions concerning the level of rationality (table 16), on this basis, may be presented as 
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follows: 
* (lx4)+(2x5)+(3xl4)+(4x5)+(5xl2)+(7x3) 
* =4+10+42+20+60+21 
*= 157 
* 157: (N=43) = 3.65 
+ Result: The Council members evaluate the Palestinian voter during the last 
elections positively at the mte of 3.65, which can be translated as modemtely 
mtional. 
+ Perceptions concerning the level of responsibility (table 17) may be presented as 
follows: 
(IA) + (W) + (3xlO) + (4x9) + (5A) + (6x2) + (7x6) + (8xl) 
=4+14+30+36+20+12+42+8 
*= 166 
* 166: (N=43) = 3.86 
* Result: The Council members evaluate the Palestinian voter during the last 
elections positively at the rate of 3.86, which can be translated as moderately 
responsible. 
As shown above, in the minds of the Council members, the Palestinian voter passed the test 
on rational and responsible voter behaviour rather well. When compared with the results of 
the public opinion poll on the level of rationality and responsibility in voting 283 , we can 
deduce that the Council members rated the rationality and responsibility of the voter higher 
283 See tables 14 and 15 in section 2.1.9 in Part One of this Chapter. 
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than the public itself did. It will be recalled that only 44.6% of the respondents in the 
public survey thought that people voted mtionally, whilst 55.6% of the respondents thought 
that the electorate voted responsibly. 
In order to perform a further check on the opinions of the general public and the Council 
members concerning the level of rationality and responsibility of the Palestinian electorate, 
both the electorate and the Council members were asked whether, in their opinion, people 
'knew how to vote for the right candidate'. 
Table 19 shows that the responses of the interviewees in the general survey were rather 
harsh. Only 23.5% of the respondents felt that people knew how to vote for the right 
candidate. Moreover, trends similar to those detected earlier in Part One of this Chapter, re- 
appear. Again, higher educated respondents were more sceptical than the less educated 
respondents. Whereas 35.3% of the interviewees who received up to elementary schooling 
answered that, in general, people knew how to vote for the right candidate, only 17.4% of 
the interviewees who went to college and above did. 
Table 19., Do you that, in general, people know how to vote for the rkht candidate? 
Total Education 
Up to Elem. Up to Prep. Up to Sec. Some College College & 
above 
N=l 195 N=I 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N-- 115 
Yes 23.5% 35.3% 27.6% 22.41/o 18.8% 17.4% 
Some 51.8% 44.5% 48.4% 54.1% 54.5% 54.8% 
No 20.0% 13.4% 20.4% 20.1% 21.0% 24.3% 
No answer 4.7% 6.7% 3.6% 3.4% 5.7% 3.5% 
df 15 
__Chi 
Square 
. 00527 
152 
Figure 16 below indicates that, in general, Council members have a better opinion of the 
people's ability to vote for the right candidate than the electorate itself does. Amongst the 
public, only 23.5% felt positively about the people's knowledge of how to vote for the right 
candidate, compared to 32.6% of the Council members. Moreover, 20% of the 
interviewees in the public opinion poll answered that people do not know how to vote for 
the right candidate; only 2.3% of the Council members did so. 
Firure 16. 
People's Knowledge on How to Vote for the Right Candidate 
Comparison between the Opinions of the General Public and the Council Members 
Yes 
Some 
No 
No answer 
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 409% 50% 6( 
--- Y. . --- ---- -I- No- answer F some No I 
General publlc- 
I- -- -- 23.5-%- 51.8% 20%-- 4.7% 
Council members 
i 32.6% 65.1% 2.0% 
It may be suggested that part of the reason why the Council members evaluated the 
electorate's ability to vote for the right candidate more positively than the public itself, is 
because the Council members are in office as a result of this vote. A more positive result 
from the Council members on this question was, therefore, to be expected. 
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2.23. Promises and Campaign Slogans 
This section is concerned with the promises and campaign slogans of the Council members 
during the 1996 elections. Based on the information gathered by the researcher of this 
study in a public opinion poll and a survey conducted within the Legislative Council, the 
issue of campaign promises will be addressed by examining the results of the following 
evaluations. 
(1) An evaluation by the Council members on whether or not Council members, in general, 
lived up to the promises made during their campaigns. 
(2) An evaluation by the Council members on whether or not they themselves, as 
individuals, lived up to their campaign slogans. 
(3) A public evaluation of whether or not the Council members lived up to their promises. 
Before concentrating on the three evaluations introduced above, the researcher considered it 
usefid to provide a summary of the campaign promises made by successful candidates. The 
infonnation provided in table 22, below, is a sununary of a survey conducted by the JMCC 
in October 1996 284 , whereby Council members were asked to list their five priorities or 
campaign promises. It should be noted, however, that out of the 88 Council members, 26 
members failed to provide a list with their priorities. The purpose of the summary provided 
in table 22, therefore, is to give a general idea of the Council members' promises as a 
284 JMCC, The Palestinian Council. 
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source of information. It does, however, not My represent the promises of all successful 
candidates. 
Table 20. 
Promises & campaign slOgans # 
1. Establishing and uniform laws, encouraging socialjustice, rule of law, separation of powers, 
and good administration; activate the Legislative Council; consolidate parliamentary life; issue 
Council by-laws 
32 
2. Social and economic development; independent national economy; investment 
encouragement 
31 
3. Democracy 23 
4. Upgrading education 22 
5. Women's rights, equality 17 
6. Health care; health insurance 16 
7. Fight corruption; curtail favouritism 15 
8. Human rights 14 
9. Institution-building 13 
10. National unity; national integration; conciliation between political forces & Authority 12 
11. Improved infi-astructure 10 
12. Reduce unemployment; create job opportunities 10 
13. Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; strengthen Palestinian presence in Jerusalem 7 
14. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of press 7 
15. Rural development; opportunities in agricultural & border areas 7 
16. Continue process of national independence and the implementation of the agreements with 
Israel; achieve a better future and state 
6 
17. Environment 6 
18. Development of cultural dimensions 6 
19. Continue and follow-up with the peace process and the final status negotiations 5 
20. Solve the housing problem; improve living conditions; provide secured accommodwtion for 
all; reduce high prices of renting & housing 
5 
2 1. End settlements and by-pass roads 5 
22. Strengthen regional & international relations 5 
23. Release prisoners & detainees 5 
24. Solve the reftigee problem 4 
25. Monitor the PA 4 
26. Youth & development 4 
27. Independent judiciary 3 
28. Co-ordination between the different security apparatuses 3 
29. Water 3 
30. Development for poor, martyrs' families, and wounded 3 
3 1. Increase of wages 3 
32. Care for needs of childhood 2 
33. Development of tax systems 2 
34. National programs to link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip; safe passage 2 
35. Create independent sources of energy 2 
36. Upgrade the performance of the negotiators 2 
37. Establish free industrial zones 2 
38. Create an environment of security & stability 2 
39. Others (Establish Ministry of Prisoners, Martyrs & Wounded; encourage co-operative & 
non-govemmental activities; remove settlers inside Hebron; passports for the Diaspora 
Palestinians; compliance with Islam; include Samaritan community; end Israeli occupation; 
establish a multi-party system; role of the mosques in society, etc. ) 
14 
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When Council members were asked if, in general, Council members had lived up to their 
promises, only 14.0% answered positively, compared to 23.3% who gave negative answers. 
However, when Council members were asked whether they themselves, as individuals, 
thought they had lived up to their campaign slogans, 41.9% answered positively compared 
to only 7.0% negatively. 'Merefore, it seems safe to say that the Council members consider 
their own individual performance in this more favourably than that of their colleagues. 
Significantly, though, the ranking of the Council members' own performance is also 
relatively low. 
Firure 17. 
Comparison between Opinions of Council Members about if They 
Themselves Lived Up to Their Campaign Slogans, and if Council 
Members in General Lived up to Their Campaign Slogans 
No Yes No answer 23 3% 41.9%70 4.7% 
Yes 
14.0% 
No 'answer To some extent -n No To some extent 
58.0% 
4.7% 
7.0% 46.5% 
Council members in general Council members themsehies 
N=43 N=43 
MYes IN o MTo some extent CD No answer 
Figure 17, above, shows that a high number of Council members felt that the Council in 
general and even they themselves personally, had only lived up to their campaign slogans to 
44some extent". Perhaps one of the reasons causing so many Council members to feel that 
they only lived up to their campaign slogans to a certain extent could be interpreted in an 
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apologetic manner. Council members might in some cases have wanted to live up to their 
promises, but might have found obstacles on their way. 285 Dr. Nabil Shaath, Council 
member and Minister of Planning and International Trade, explained to the researcher what 
happened to him in his constituency of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip: 
"I remember, I was in the unique position ofbeing the Minister ofPlanning and 
International Co-operation when I ran for the elections. ... 
I signed the contract 
Lfor the building ofthe harbourl and President Chirac came to inaugurate the port 
which is only about 10 kilometres to the north ofKhan Younis. Iknewitwasgoing 
to employ 3,000 people. So, I told them Ns Khan Younis constituency] that I was 
sure that out of these 3,000 people at least 2,000 will comefrom your community. 
So, not only will you be building a port that will open up your roads tofreedom, but 
you will be employed for the next two years building it. Where is the port? I was 
not able to achieve it. "ere is the harbour? Not even one stone has been put to 
build it, ... Is it 
because 1jailed as a Minister or as a member ofthe Parliament? ... 
Before the Council'sfirst meeting, the bombs started ticking and two months later, 
Netanyahu came ticking, so the entire Authority has not delivered anything. Infact, 
we have nothing but retracts, we are going back all the time. The sieges are worse, 
the closures are more horrible, Israel's settlement policies are expanding ten-fold. 
So, ifyou want to relate this to thefailure of the Council, it hasfailed miserably! It 
was not able to achieve anything! This is what they call spurious correlation. I 
mean, when you correlate, let's say, over ten years the price of whiskey in New York 
and the salary of clergymen in Cuba They will correlate, but they have nothing to 
do with each other. )P286 
The popular evaluation of whether or not the Council members lived up to their campaign 
promises was negative. As illustrated in figure 16 below, overall, the Palestinian electorate 
did not think very highly of Council members with regard to the latter living up to their 
promises. Only 12.9% of the interviewees responded that the Council members had kept 
their promises compared to 62.2% who answered that the Council members did not adhere 
to their promises. It should be mentioned, however, that the interviewees in the public 
285 Further evidence of the difficulties the Council members are facing and the reasons behind the lack of 
opthnal perfonnance of the Legislative Council will be provided and discussed in greater depth in the 
following chapters of this thesis. 
286 The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997. 
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opinion poll were not given the option of answering that the Council members had lived up 
to their promises "only to a certain extent". This was done intentionally in order to push the 
interviewees to give a clear positive or negative answer. 
Firure 18. 
Did the Candidates Live Up toTheir Promises? 
Comparison between the Opinions of Refugees and Non-Refugees 
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Concerning the issue of Council members living up to their promises, there were no 
significant differences in people's opinions across the variables of gender, area, age or 
education. However, as figure 18 above indicates, a higher proportion of refugees than 
non-refugees responded that the Council members did not live up to their promises. This 
may be explained by the fact that the expectations of refugees were higher than those of 
non-refugees. Due to their living conditions and status, refugees are the subgroup of 
Palestinian society that has been seeing the least benefits from the peace process. In 
January 1996, they - more than any other demographic subgroup - saw the election of a 
Legislative Council as a first step on the road to an independent Palestinian state. instead, 
the peace negotiations have been stalled for most of the past two years, the Palestinian 
Authority has been confi-onted with an intransigent Netanyahu government, and frustration 
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and unemployment has been growing due to the worsening economic conditions and the 
continuing closure on 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugees were not only the people expecting most 
from the Legislative Council, but they were also the ones hardest hit by the deteriorating 
political and economic situation. Moreover, they may have felt that their expectations were 
misplaced as it seems that the policy of the Palestinian leadership is to postpone doing 
anyffiing about the refugee problem until this issue is addressed in the fmal status 
negotiations with Israel. 
2.3. PART THREE: PROSPECTS FOR VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN FUTURE 
ELECTIONS BASED ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND 
THOSE OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS 
Part One and Two above, examined the voting behaviour in the first Palestinian national 
elections in January 1996, both ftom the general public's point of view and from the 
perspective of the Council members. Part Three will address voting behaviour in any future 
elections and ask similar questions as in the previous parts, shedding some light on how the 
general public may vote in future elections. Following questions will be answered: Will the 
Palestinian electorate voting turnout remain as high as it was in the last elections? Will the 
people vote according to the same criteria? If not, which factors will gain in importance in 
future voting and which factors will have less influence? If people decide not to vote in 
future elections, what are their motives? 
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2.3.1. Would People Vote in Future Elections? 
In general, people remained enthusiastic about participating in any future elections. Out of 
the 1195 people surveyed, 67.5% said that they would vote again in the next elections, 
compared to 64.6% who said that they participated in the last elections. Compared to the 
results on the question whether or not interviewees voted in the last elections, about 9% less 
respondents answered that they would not vote in the next elections. Indeed, whereas 
34.4% of the respondents answered that they did not vote in the January 1996 elections, 
only 25.8% answered that they do not intend to vote in the next elections. It is the 
contention of the researcher that the difference in the results between the question 
concerning voter turnout in the last elections and the question on voter turnout in any future 
election results from the fact that the answers on voter turnout in the last elections were 
based on 'reality', Whilst the answers on the question of voter turnout in the next elections 
were based on the 'intentions' of the respondents. This line of thinking is reinforced when 
comparing the number of respondents who answered 'no answer'. Whereas concerning the 
1996 elections, only I% of the interviewees did not answer the question on whether or not 
they voted, concerning the next elections, 6.7% did not answer the question. In any case, 
the important message from the results on this question is that - based on the intentions of 
the respondents - voter turnout will remain high in the next elections. 
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Firure 19. 
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Intention to Vote in the Next Elections 
In the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip 
As shown in figure 19 above, Gazans remained more enthusiastic than Westbankers about 
participating in the next elections. Whilst 72.4% of the interviewees in Gaza replied that 
they would participate in the next elections, only 64.7% of the surveyed people in the West 
Bank responded positively. Moreover, about 5% more people in the West Bank tIm in the 
Gaza Strip stated that they would not vote in the next elections. However, although there 
remains a gap between the levels of enthusiasm for participating in elections between the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the results of the survey indicate that it has become less 
pronounced. Indeed, concerning the last elections it was assumed that people in the Gaza 
Strip voted more than people in the West Bank because they felt the presence of the 
Palestinian Authority more. The gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has 
decreased - with more people in the West Bank saying that they will vote in future elections 
161 
Yes No No answer 
- and can be explained by the fact that people in the West Bank also increasingly began to 
feel the presence of the Palestinian Authority, and thus might feel a greater desire or 
national obligation to participate in the next elections. 
Table 21 below, indicates that Palestinians with a higher education replied more often that 
they would participate in the next elections than less educated people. Compared to the 
results on the question on voter participation during the last elections (see Part One, section 
2.1.3), the gap between the less educated and more educated people concerning 
participation in elections increased Rather. About 73.0% of the people who had a college 
education or higher confirmed that they would vote in the next elections, compared to only 
59.7% of the interviewees who had up to elementary schooling. In addition, whereas 30.3% 
of the surveyed people who received only up to elementary schooling said that they would 
not participate in the next elections, only 20.9% of the people who went to college and 
above said so. 
Also noteworthy is that, younger people remain more enthusiastic about participating in 
future elections than the older generation, although to a lesser extent than in the 1996 
elections. Indeed, the results in table 21 indicate that, concerning the relation between 
voting in the next elections and the age factor, the value of Chi square is higher than . 05, 
reducing the statistical significance of this relation from 95% to 90%. 
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Table 21: Wouldyou say thalyou would vote again in the next elections? 
Education Age 
Up to Up to Up to Some College 18-25 26-35 3645 46-55 55+ 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College & above 
N=I 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=I 15 N=379 N=366 N=203 N=105 N=66 
Yes 59.7% 62.0% 70.4% 69.4% 73.0% 70.4% 63.7% 68.0% 74.3% 54.5% 
No 30.3% 31.7% 25.3% 22.9% 20.9% 23.2% 29.5% 25.1% 18.1% 33.3% 
No answer 10.1% 6.3% 4.4% 7.6% 6.1% 6.3% 6.8% 6.9% 7.6% 12.1% 
df 10 10 
ChiSquare . 0287 . 0704 
Those people who answered that they were going to vote in the next elections were then 
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asked whether or not they would vote according to the same criteriW . In general, out of 
the 807 people who said that they would vote in the next elections, only 23.8% replied that 
they would vote according to the same criteria; 27.9% answered that they would not vote in 
quite the same way; and 27.6% said that they would vote in a totally different way. About 
17.2% said that they could not compare their voting behaviour in the last elections with that 
in the next elections, because they did not participate in the last elections. As illustrated in 
figure 20 below, it is clear that the majority of the interviewees wish to change their voting 
behaviour in one way or another. This trend is hardly surprising. It seems logical that 
dissatisfaction 288 with the Legislative Council would be translated into a resolution to vote 
differently in the next elections in order to attempt to vote - in respondents' eyes - more 
capable representatives into the Legislative Council. 
287 With the term "according to the same criteria" in the question, the researcher attempted to find outý in 
general, whether or not respondents thought that similar factors as in the 1996 elections such as the level of 
education of the candidates, democratic values, religion of the candidates etc. would move them to vote for a 
certain candidate in the next elections and not for another. 
288 The dissatisfaction of the Palestinian electorate with the Legislative Council, the reasons behind it and the 
extent of it, will be discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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Voting Behaviour of the Electorate in the Next Elections 
According to the General Public 
According to the same criteria 
Not quite in the same way 
Vote in a totally different way 
Legislative Council members were also asked to state their opinion on whether or not the 
electorate in the next elections would vote according to the sarne criteria or not quite. 
Sigrlificantly, only 7.0% of the Council members thought that people would vote according 
to the same criteria. The majority of the Council members, 69.8%, said that people would 
not quite vote in the same way in the next elections, whilst 20.9% responded that the 
electorate would vote in a totally different way. 
The importance of the responses of the Council members lies in the fact that few Council 
members thought that people would vote according to the same criteria used in the January 
1996 elections. This might indicate that Council members knew that people were not very 
satisfied with their elected representatives, and, therefore, are bound to adapt their criteria 
when casting their vote in the next elections. Moreover, the results imply an implicit 
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acknowledgement by the Council members that something in the performance of the 
Legislative Council is not quite right. 
Firure 21: 
According to the same criteria 
Voting Behaviour of the Electorate in the Next Elections 
According to the Council members 
Not quite in the same way 
Vote in a totally different way 
No answer 
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23.2. Reasons for Not Voting in Future Elections. 
As was the case regarding the January 1996 elections, the researcher questioned the reasons 
behind the decision of the survey respondents not to vote in future elections. The sample of 
this question consists of the 25.8% of the surveyed people (308 interviewees) who 
responded that they would not vote in the next elections. As illustrated in figure 22 below, 
44.5% of the respondents answered that they would not vote in the next elections because 
they 'do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people'. The 
second reason, given by 26.0% of the respondents, is that voting would not make a 
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difference. Both reasons are very negative and indicate mistrust in the current Legislative 
Council, albeit that the former is more specific and the latter is more general. 
Rrure 22. 
It would not make any difference 
I do not believe the PLC represents 
the interests of the people 
Other reasons 
I do not believe in the PLC/ 
They are not going to fulfil their 
promises 
No answer 
Reasons for Not Voting in Future Elections 
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As was the case with regard to the last elections, a higher proportion of better educated 
respondents said that they would not vote in the next elections because they 'do not believe 
that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people' than those who enjoyed 
less education. Indeed, in the sample, only 19.4% of the people who received up to 
elementary education replied that they would not vote in the next elections because they 'do 
not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people', compared to 
54.2% of the surveyed people who went to college and above. In addition, whilst only 
20.8% of the people who went to college and above responded that they would not vote 
because it would not make a difference, 25.0% of the people who went only up to 
elementary school cited this reason. Again, this could be explained by the fact that more 
educated people tend to be better informed about political developments and about the lack 
of achievements by the Legislative Council, and therefore, tend to be more critical. For this 
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reason, more educated people are more inclined to give a specific reason for their reftisal to 
vote in the next elections, such as that they do not believe that the Legislative Council 
represents the interests of the people. Similarly, the more general reason for not voting in 
the next elections because it would not make a difference, was cited more by people who 
had less education, possibly because they are less informed, and thus less critical. 
Table 22a: Mv would vou not vote arain? 
Up to 
Elem. 
N=36 
Up to 
Prep. 
N=70 
Education 
Up to 
Sec. 
N--98 
Some 
College 
N=72 
College 
& above 
N=24 
It would not make any difference 25.0% 31.4% 24.5% 23.6% 20.8% 
1 do not believe the PLC represents the interests of 19.4% 42.9% 49.0% 51.4% 54.2% 
the people 
Other reasons 47.2% 18.6% 15.3% 19.4% 25.0% 
Do not believe in the PLC / they are not going to - 1.4% 2.0% fulfil their promises 
No answer 8.3% 5.7% 9.2% 5.6% 
df 20 
Chi&.,, 
. 0433 
The researcher detected a statistically significant relation between the question on the 
reasons behind the respondents' decision not to vote in the next elections and the 
demographic subgroup of age. This relation was not present concerning the January 1996 
elections. As indicated in table 22b, below, a similar trend as with the variable of education 
(discussed above) is apparent in regard to the age variable. The younger generation - more 
critical and militant - gave the more specific reason for not voting in the next election of 'I 
do not believe the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people' more than five 
times as frequently than the older generation of people over 55 years old. 
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Table 22b: P*v would vou not vote arain? 
18-25 
N=88 
26-35 
N=108 
Age 
36-45 
N=51 
46-55 
N=19 
55+ 
N=22 
It would not make any difference 23.9% 26.9% 23.5% 15.8% 27.3% 
I do not believe the PLC represents the interests of 56.8% 42.6% 45.1% 42.1% 9.1% 
the people 
Other reasons 13.6% 17.6% 25.5% 42.1% 50.0% 
Do not believe in the PLC / they are not going to 1.1% 1.9% - - - 
ftilfll their promises 
No answer 4.5% 11.1% 5.9% 13.6% 
df 20 
Chi Square . 0069 
In conclusion, the results on the question of why survey respondents would not vote in the 
next elections revealed two important points: 
1. Of those respondents who decided not to vote, most opted to give the specific answer 
that they 'do not believe the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people', 
rather than a more general reason not to vote. It will be most difficult for the Council 
members to convince this specific group that they do represent the interests of the 
people as this group is only likely to change its opinion after seeing real results from the 
Legislative Council. 
2. A larger proportion of the respondents who received higher education and who 
belong to the younger generation than those with less education and from the older 
generation, responded that they 'do not believe the Legislative Council represents the 
interests of the people'. Again, those two subgroups of Palestinian society seem most 
critical and will need to see real improvement from the Legislative Council in order to 
change their minds. 
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2.3.3. Important Factors when Voting in Future Elections. 
In order to be able to measure the influence of certain characteristics of candidates on 
voting behaviour in future elections, those surveyed were asked to detertnine the 
importance of the same set of pre-selected factors, also used in Part One of this chapter with 
regard to the assessment of voting behaviour during the last elections. Figure 23 below, 
ranks the selection of thirteen factors according to their relevance, when respondents will 
decide to vote for a certain candidate in future elections. As in Part One of this Chapter, the 
indicated percentages in figure 23 are the stun of the answers of the interviewees who said 
that a certain characteristic in candidates will be "very important" or "important" in 
influencing their vote. 
Firare 23: 
Importance of Factors when Voting in Future Elections 
Acmrding to the General Public 
I Important I 
Education 92.6% 
emocratic va ues 92.4% 
e utation 90.4% 
tru a Isto 68.4% 
Cam ai n 75.0% 
oi ca a ia on 67.5% 
IReligious values 61.1% 
60.8% 
oclo-economic status 1 48.6% 
Residence 43.7% 
ami re a ons 41 A 
a 35.7% 
Gender 33.9% 
The 13 factors in figure 23, above, portray the results of the total sample of the survey. As 
is the case with other questions in the popular survey conducted by the researcher, the 
answers by the interviewees have, in addition, also been classified according to gender, 
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area, refugee status, education and age. 289 Below, the researcher will clarify for each of the 
13 factors summarised in figure 23, whether or not they are likely to have greater or lesser 
importance for certain demographic subgroups. 
Before going into ftirther detail below, it is worth noting that there was general agreement 
amongst the surveyed people concerning the degree of importance of the following 
characteristics of candidates: (1) reputation, (2) political affiliation, (3) socio-economic 
status, (4) residence, (5) family relations, and (6) age. On some other factors, opinions 
remained more divided, whether by the subgroups of gender, area, refugee-status or 
education. In comparison with voting behaviour of the surveyed people during the last 
elections, it is clear that some gaps between these subgroups increased, whilst others 
decreased. 
For the purpose of comparison, figure 24, ranking the influence of the pre-selected 
characteristics of candidates on voting behaviour during the last elections, was added 
below. In general, a comparison between the results of figures 23 and 24, indicates that in 
the next elections the importance of education will remain the same. Moreover, the 
influence of the adherence of candidates to democratic values will gain importance when 
voting in the next elections, prevailing slightly over the importance of reputation and 
struggle history in evaluating a potential Council member. In addition, the results indicate 
that in the next elections more attention will be given by the electorate to the candidates' 
campaigns. In fact, there could be a trend where the content and quality of the campaigns 
289 For full results of the public opinion poll conducted by the researcher, see Annex 5 of this thesis. 
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will become more important than the actual political affiliation of the candidates. The 
remaining factors, such as religious values, religion, socio-economic status, residence, 
family relations, age, and gender fluctuate a little in importance, but not sufficiently to 
produce major changes in the way people are likely to cast their votes in the next elections. 
Firure 24: 
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections 
According to the General Public 
Education 92.8% 
Reputation 91.5% 
Struggle histo 89.5% 
Democratic values 88.3% 
Political affiliation 70.4% 
Campaign 69.5% 
Reliqion 64.7% 
Religious values 60.8% 
45.9% 
Famil relations 43.4% 
Residence idence 
M 
43 3; j 
Gender 32.7% 
Age 30.6% 
2.3.3.1. Education 
According to the results of the survey, education was the most important factor influencing 
the electorate's voting behaviour during the last elections, and will continue to be the most 
important factor moving the public to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections. In 
general, an overwhelming majority of 92.8% of the surveyed people responded that the 
factor of education was either very important or important. However, although no gaps in 
opinions according to the level of education were found about the importance of education 
in the results of the last elections, a trend emerged in this instance whereby the higher 
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educated respondents found the educational background of a candidate to become even 
more important in future elections. Indeed, concerning future elections, only 83.1% of the 
people who received up to elementary schooling considered the level of education to be an 
important (very important or important) characteristic of a candidates when voting in the 
coming elections, compared to 95.2% of the people who went to college and above. 
Table 23: How Important will education be when vou vote In the coming election? 
Total 
N=807 
Area 
West Bank 
N=489 
Gaza 
N=318 
Up to 
Elem. 
N=71 
Up to 
Prep. 
N=137 
Education 
Up to 
Sec. 
N=273 
Some 
College 
N=218 
College 
& 
above 
N=84_ 
Very important 58.6% 54.6% 64.8% 57.7 52.6% 59.0% 57.8% 69.0% 
Important 34.0% 37.6% 28.3% 25.4 40.1% 34.1% 36.7% 26.2% 
Somewhat important 4.5% 5.3% 3.1% 7.0% 5.8% 5.5% 2.8% 2.4% 
Not important 1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 5.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% - 
Absolutely not 0.1% - 0.3% - - - - - 
important 
No answer 1.7% 1.2% 2.5% 4.2% 0.7% 0.4% 2.3% 2.4% 
df 25 25 
Chi Square . 0025 . 
0000 
2.3.3.2. Democmtic Values 
As indicated in table 24 below, 92.4% of the surveyed people found adherence to 
democratic principles by a candidate in the election either important or very important in 
deciding whether or not to vote for that candidate in the next elections. Only 1.3% of the 
people thought that adherence by a candidate to democratic principles was irrelevant in 
their decision to vote for him/her in the next elections. Although the results give a very 
encouraging picture about the voters' developing sense of democratic awareness, there 
remains a gap between the more educated and less educated people in regard to this factor 
in any future elections. The divergence in opinions between the respondents who enjoyed 
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higher education and those who received less education that already existed in the January 
1996 elections, will - according to the survey results - persist in the next elections. Whereas 
84.5% of the surveyed people who received up to elementary education thought that 
adherence to democratic values by a candidate will be important (very important and 
important) when voting in the next elections, 91.6% of the people who went to college and 
above thought so. 
Table-24. How Important are democratic values when vou will vote in the comine election? 
Total Education 
Up to Up to up to Some College & 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College above 
N=807 N=71 N=137 N=273 N=218 N=84 
Very important 65.1% 53.5% 51.8% 68.9% 72.5% 70.2% 
Important 27.3% 31.0% 41.6% 26.0% 20.2% 21.4% 
Somewhat important 3.7% 5.6% 5.8% 3.3% 3.2% 2.4% 
Not important 1.2% 2.8% - 1.1% 0.5% 1.2% 
Absolutely not important 0.1% - - - 0.5% - No answer 2.6% 7.0% 0.7% 0.7% 3.2% 4.8% 
df 25 
- 
Square 
. 0000 
2.3.3.3. Religion and Religious Values 
The factors of religion and religious values are discussed together because the results of the 
survey indicate many similar trends between these two factors. The importance of the 
factors of religion and religious values lies in the level of division which appears between 
the different subgroups of those surveyed, where these values are concerned. All the gaps 
in opinion found between the different subgroups in regard to the influence of religion and 
religious values when examining voting behaviour during the last elections, remained 
consistent. 
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Religion and religious values remained more important for women than for men. Whereas 
54.7% of the surveyed men said that religion was important (very important or important), 
67.3% of the women found this factor important. Similarly, whereas respect for religious 
values by a candidate was important (very important or important) for 56.6% of the male 
interviewees, it was important for 66.0% of the women. 
Religion and religious values remained also more important in the Gaza Strip and amongst 
refugees than in the West Bank and amongst non-refugees. Only 53.0% of the Westbankers 
thought that religion is going to be an important (very important or important) factor 
influencing their vote in the next elections, compared to 73.0% of the Gazans who thought 
so. Moreover, whereas 56.4% of the non-refugees felt that religion is going to play a role in 
their vote in the next elections, 67.9% of the refugees think that religion is going to be an 
important factor influencing their selection of candidates. Similarly, 49.2% of the people 
surveyed in the West Bank felt that religious values were going to have impact on their 
voting behaviour, compared to 79.3% of people in the Gaza Strip who said so. In addition, 
56.6% of the non-refugees interviewed answered that religious values will be an important 
factor when casting their vote in the next elections, compared to 68.7% of the refugees. 
Table 25., How Intportant will religion be when vou vote In the cominz election? 
Total 
N=807 
Gender 
Male Female 
N=413 N=388 
Area 
West Bank 
N=489 
Gaza 
N=318 
Refugee or Not 
Non-refugee Reftigee 
N=431 N=348 
Very important 36.4% 30.0% 42.8% 29.7% 46.9% 32.0% 44.0% 
Important 24.4% 24.7% 24.5% 23.3% 26.1% 24.4% 23.9% 
Somewhat important 16.0% 17.7% 14.2% 18.2% 12.6% 18.1% 12.6% 
Not important 18.2% 21.5% 14.7% 23.5% 10.1% 21.1% 14.4% 
Absolutely not 2.7% 3.9% 1.5% 3.5% 1.6% 2.6% 2.6% 
important 
No answer 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 1.8% 2.8% 1.9% 2.6% 
df 10 10 10 
Chi Square 
. 0109 . 0000 . 00 
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Table 26., How Important wffl relf-alous values be when vou vote in the comixe election? 
Total 
N=807 
Gender 
Male Female 
N=413 N=388 
Area 
West Bank 
N=489 
Gaza 
N=318 
Refugee or Not 
Non- Refugee 
refugee 
N=; 431 N=348 
Very important 34.3% 30.0% 38.7% 24.5% 49.4% 28.1% 44.0% 
Important 26.8% 26.6% 27.3% 24.7% 29.9% 28.5% 24.7% 
Somewhat important 14.7% 15.5% 13.9% 17.6% 10.4% 16.5% 12.1% 
Not important 19.0% 23.0% 14.4% 26.8% 6.9% 21.8% 14.4% 
Absolutely not 2.6% 2.7% 2.6% 4.1% 0.3% 3.0% 1.7% 
important 
No answer 2.6% 2.2% 3.1% 2.2% 3.1% 2.1% 3.2% 
df 8 8 8 
ChiSquare 
. 0541 . 0000 . 0000 
In short, from the results in tables 25 and 26 above, it became clear that the divergence in 
opinions between Westbankers and Gazans, refugees and non-refugees, and between male 
and female respondents, which existed in the January 1996 elections concerning the 
importance of candidates' respect for religion and religious values, is likely to persist in the 
coming elections. 
2.3.3.4. Gender 
In general, the issue of the gender of candidates is the least important factor from the set of 
factors, which is likely to influence the electorate's voting behaviour in the next elections. 
In total, only 33.9% of the respondents said that the gender of the candidates' was going to 
be an important (very important or important) factor influencing their vote in the next 
elections, which is not significantly different from the survey results on the importance of 
gender in the January 1996 elections. 
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As was the case in the last elections, the gender of the candidates when considering for 
whom to vote in the next elections, remained more important for Gazan respondents than 
Westbankers. 
Different from the survey results on the importance of gender as an influence upon voting 
behaviour in the January 1996 elections, is that concerning the future elections, a higher 
proportion of women than men responded that the gender of the candidates will affect their 
vote in the next elections. The researcher of this thesis was unable to retract a conclusive 
interpretation of these findings as they can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one 
hand, the results could mean, that in the next elections, it will become more important for 
women to vote for female candidates. On the other hand, the opposite could be the case, in 
that women would not opt to vote for female candidates in the next elections, and would 
prefer to give male candidates their vote. 
Table 27. How important will render be when von vote In the cominz election? 
Total 
N=807 
Male 
N=413 
Gender 
Female 
N=388 
Area 
West Bank 
N=489 
Gaza 
N=318 
Very important 12.6% 11.9% 13.7% 10.4% 16.0% 
Important 21.3% 18.4% 24.5% 19.6% 23.9% 
Somewhat important 14.9% 16.0% 13.7% 14.3% 15.7% 
Not important 44.0% 45.5% 42.5% 49.1% 36.2% 
Absolutely not important 4.8% 6.1% 3.1% 4.5% 5.3% 
No answer 2.4% 2.2% 2.6% 2.0% 2.8% 
df 10 10 
ChiS 
_quare . 
0276 . 0010 
2.3.3.5. Age 
Age is another factor that is not likely to influence many voters in the next elections. In 
general, only 3 0.6% of the interviewees thought that the factor of age might play a role in 
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their decision whether or not to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections, compared 
to 35.7% of the respondents who still thought so concerning the January 1996 elections. It 
is also worth noting that the gap in opinions between less educated people and higher 
educated people concerning the importance of age, seen in the last elections, has 
disappeared. Indeed, all subgroups seem to agree on the importance of age or the lack 
thereof in regard to the next elections. 
Firure 25: 
Importance of Age in the Coming Elections 
No answer 
1.9% 
Not important 
39.0% 
N=807 
2.3.3.6. The CamRai 
Very important 
12.9% 
mewhat important 
19.5% 
The campaign has gained in importance in people's minds since the last elections. 
Whereas, in general, during the last elections 69.5% of the people thought that a candidate's 
campaign was an important factor in their decision to vote for him/her, 75.0% of the 
surveyed people said that the campaign of the candidates in future elections will play an 
important role (very important or important). The findings concerning the importance of the 
cwnpaign in future elections are significant, because they indicate a trend whereby the 
Important 
22.8% 
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Absolut. not important 
4.0% 
electorate is increasingly likely to cast its votes based on political considerations rather than 
traditional ones. 
Concerning the last elections, higher educated respondents tended to find the campaign of 
election candidates more important than those with less education. According to the results 
in table 29 below, this trend is likely to persist in the next elections. 
Table 28. - How important Is the canivaien when vou will vote In the coinke election? 
Total Education 
Up to up to Up to Some College 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College & above 
N=807 N=71 N=137 N=273 N=218 N=84 
Very important 37.8% 29.6% 34.3% 38.1% 42.2% 40.5% 
Important 37.2% 40.8% 43.1% 37.0% 34.9% 33.3% 
Somewhat important 13.3% 8.5% 10.9% 13.9% 15.1% 13.1% 
Not important 9.2% 14.1% 10.9% 10.6% 4.1% 8.3% 
Absolutely not important 0.6% 1.4% - - 1.4% 1.2% 
No answer 2.0% 5.6% 0.7% 0.4% 2.3% 3.6% 
df 2S 
Chi sý . 0249 
3.3-3-7. Struggle Histo 
In general, the influence of a candidate's struggle history remained an important factor in 
people's decision whether or not to vote for a certain candidate. However, a trend is 
appearing whereby the higher educated people are, the less important the factor of struggle 
history becomes. Indeed, whereas 84.5% of the people who received up to elementary 
schooling continued to see a candidate's struggle history as an important factor (very 
important or important), only 79.8% of the people who went to college and above thought 
so. Also, twice as many interviewees who went to college and above than those with only 
up to elementary education, replied that a candidate's struggle history would not be 
important when voting in the next elections. 
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This trend might be an indication that better educated people are becoming less impressed 
with what a candidate did in the past and are increasingly interested in a candidate's ability 
to improve their lives in the future. Credentials of the past are becoming less relevant. 
Table 29. How Important will sirm-a-ale hisforv be when vou vote in the comin-v election? 
Total 
N=807 
Up to 
Elem. 
N=71 
up to 
Prep. 
N=137 
Education 
Up to 
Sec. 
N---273 
Some 
College 
N=218 
College & 
above 
N=84 
Very important 55.6% 54.9% 46.0% 61.2% 61.0% 41.7% 
Important 32.8% 29.6% 40.9% 31.1% 28.4% 38.1% 
Somewhat important 5.2% 5.6% 6.6% 4.0% 5.0% 7.1% 
Not important 3.7% 5.6% 4.4% 1.8% 2.8% 10.7% 
Absolutely not important 0.4% - 0.4% 0.9% - 
No answer 2.2% 4.2% 2.2% 1.5% 1.8% 2.4% 
_ df 25 
Chi Square . 0272 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
In general, it is possible to conclude from the analysis in Chapter Two that the Palestinian 
electorate is passing through a period of transition. Indeed, whereas, generally, the 
Palestinian electorate voted in a relatively responsible and mature manner in their first 
general election experience on 20 January 1996, some subgroups continued to consider 
more traditional considerations. However, when voting, political and rational 
considerations such as the educational background of the candidates, their reputation and 
struggle history, their respect for democratic values, their political affiliation, and the 
content of the campaigns, prevailed over the more traditional considerations such as 
religion, masculine gender, old age or family relations of the candidates. 
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A closer look at the opinions of some important subgroups within Palestinian society 
revealed that there is still an underlying split between the more traditional way of thinIcing - 
and voting - and the more modem way, which is not uncommon for societies in ftdl 
political transition and development. In part One of this chapter, based upon the survey 
results, two main statistically significant trends appeared. 
Firstly, the young and higher educated interviewees were not only more critical and 
sceptical than the older and less educated, but also seemed more democratically aware and 
attached more importance to political considerations when voting. The findings of the 
researcher corresponded with some of those found by scholars such as Lipset, and Almond 
and Verba. As will be recalled, Lipset (1959) argued that educated people are more 
committed to democracy and participation. Moreover, according to Lipset, they are more 
tolerant of opposition. Almond and Verba (1963) in their study argued that the more 
educated are more politically informed and more active in organisations. 
Secondly, in Part One of this chapter, a trend appeared whereby the respondents from the 
Gaza Strip (and refugees), when voting, accorded greater value to the more traditional 
values such as family relations, residence, religion and masculine gender than survey 
respondents from the West Bank (and non-refugees). Scholars such as Huntington, Lipset 
and Dahl noted that this emphasis on family relations, residence, religion, and male gender 
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is detrimental to democratic development. As will be recalled, their studies showed that the 
movement away from traditional values is a step forward towards demoCMCY. 
290 
In short, the analysis of Part One of this chapter clearly indicated that the Palestinian 
electorate showed signs of democratic maturity, albeit certain voting patterns such as the 
emphasis on family relations and other traditional values, are inconsistent with the 
movement towards finther political development. Nevertheless, it is clear that the process 
of democratisation has started in Palestine. 
From the Council members' evaluation of the first Palestinian elections, in Part Two, it 
became clear that, in general, they know which factors influenced the electorate when 
casting their votes. The main flaws in the Council members' evaluation were, however, the 
underestimation of the importance of democratic values as an influence on the electorate's 
voting behaviour, and the overestimation of more traditional influences such as religion and 
gender. 
A second point worth remembering from Part Two was the Council members' 
acknowledgement of their partial failure to live up to their campaign promises and 
responsibilities. This indicates to recognition on their part that the perfonnance of the 
Legislative Council is not as optimal as it should be. 
m Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; Lipsetý S. 
"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American 
Political Science Review, (53), 1959. 
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Part Three of this chapter suggested that the democratic awareness in the voting behaviour 
of the Palestinian public is likely to expand in future elections. The importance of the 
campaign should increase in the future, whilst the influence of the more traditional values 
should decrease. The analysis in Part Three of this chapter, indicated that if elections under 
the Palestinian Authority were to become a regular phenomenon, the electorate would 
become increasingly sophisticated and rational as its electoral choices would be more 
influenced by the competence and the integrity of their representatives and less so by 
traditional influences. Under this scenario, as Mondak has argued, the electorate would 
retain incumbents if they are competent and effective, and would punish those who are 
not. 291 
In general, it is possible to conclude from the analysis in Chapter Two that the role and 
behaviour of the Palestinian public in the first general elections was of high standard, 
particularly when compared to elections and voting behaviour in Arab states surrounding 
the Palestinian autonomous areas and other developing countries. Therefore, the 
Palestinian January 1996 elections, being one of the prerequisites for democratic 
development, can be considered a success. They moved Palestine one step ftu-ther on the 
continuum towards democracy, increasingly enabling one to describe it as a partial 
democracy rather than a non-democracy. Moreover, increasing democratic awareness of the 
Palestinian electorate in ftiture elections is likely, creating an environment in which 
institution building and effective governance becomes more viable. 
291 Mondak, J. J., "Competence, Integrity, and 11. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
GENERAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
Before analysing how the existence of the Legislative Council influenced political 
development in the Palestinian autonomous areas, it is necessary to include some general 
perceptions on the Legislative Council, both by the general public and the Council 
members. In the previous chapter, it became clear that the Palestinian Authority fulfilled 
one of Potter's five characteristics of a partial democracy, as elections were held. The 
findings in this chapter will indicate in how far the situation in the Palestinian autonomous 
areas correspond with a second characteristic of a partial democracy. Indeed, they will 
show whether or not the effect of the elections and the authority of the elected government 
is restricted and compromised by other non-elected establishments. 
This chapter measures the level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council amongst both 
the Palestinian electorate and Council members, according to some fundamental factors 
required for any parliament to operate democratically and effectively. 
Furthermore, an overview will be provided of the main reasons provided by both the 
general public and the Council members for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the Legislative Council. 
Lastly, this chapter looks at some prospects for the Legislative Council in the future. 
Questions raised include: Do the Palestinian people expect the performance of the 
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Legislative Council to improve in the future? What is the Council members' vision of the 
ffiture performance of the Legislative Council? Are they optimistic or pessimistic? 
The overview of the general perceptions of both the electorate and Council members 
provided in this chapter will help to pinpoint on which issues the public and their 
representatives agree and on which issues their opinions differ. It should be noted that the 
researcher in this chapter opted to only provide a general overview of the perceptions of the 
public and the Council members. The findings of this chapter will be worked out in greater 
detail in the following chapters of this thesis. 
3.1. PART ONE: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE ON THE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
3.1.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different Factors 
After reviewing the literature, the interviewees in the public opinion poll were asked to 
evaluate the Legislative Council according to five common variables. These variables were 
deemed essential as they constitute the basis for democracy. They can be labeled as 
follows: democracy, effectiveness, responsiveness, independence from the Executive 
Authority, and pluralism. By examining the public's evaluation of these variables, it 
becomes easier to form an idea of the performance of the Legislative Council. Indeed, the 
higher any parliament scores on these five factors, the higher its performance is viewed, as 
these factors make up the characteristics and goals of a well-functioning parliament. 
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The researcher realises that other variables, such as economic development, due process of 
law, political culture, or the peace process could equally be important for the purpose of 
evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council. However, they were not 
considered useful as too many influences outside the capacity of the Legislative Council 
could impact these variables. For example, the Legislative Council's role in economic 
development is marginal because, on the one hand, economic policies remain highly 
contingent on Israeli measures, and, on the other hand, economic international aid remains 
solely in the hands of the Executive Authority and Arafat. Also, evaluating the legislative 
Council on the basis of due process of law is hard as to this date a Palestinian Constitution 
does not exist. The Legislative Council cannot be held responsible for that fact. On the 
contrary, conflict with Arafat regarding the Basic Law has been very intense. Lastly, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Six, it is difficult to evaluate the Legislative Council on its 
accomplishments in the peace process as negotiations are the mandate of the Executive 
Authority. Consequently, the only variables that could be measured and operationalised are 
the ones specified below. 
The variables used for a general evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council 
were examined by almost all the academics and scholars consulted in this thesis. As 
discussed in Chapter One, democracy is the means to, on the one hand, contain and channel 
conflicts in society and, on the other hand, to absorb the threats associated with such 
conflicts. It is, therefore, in the opinion of this researcher, highly important to evaluate the 
performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council on democracy. 
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Also discussed in Chapter One, was the notion of effectiveness. Lipset argued that 
effectiveness is the other pillar alongside economic development required for democratic 
development. Also, in his book with Diamond and Linz, Democrgcy in Developing 
Countries Lipset stressed the "importance of effective and democratically committed 
leadership" for the stability of democracies. 291 Similarly and more directly focussed to 
legislatures, Mondak argued for the importance of effectiveness in sustaining democracy. 
The notion of responsiveness is an equally important feature of democratic legislatures and 
constitutes one of the most important tenets of democracy. Burke defined the relationship 
between the representative and the public as follows: 
'Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect. , 292 
Mill wrote the following with regard to the notion of responsiveness: 
"The rulers should identify with the people; their interest and will should be the 
interest and will ofthe nation. 293 
The notion of separation of power and, in particular, the level of independence of the 
Legislative Council from the Executive Authority, is of particular importance to the 
Palestinian case. The researcher's attendance of several Council sessions and interviews 
with many Council members led to the importance of this variable. Moreover, many critics 
of the Palestinian political system accuse Arafat and the Executive Authority for 
291 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, (eds. ), DqmopM in DevelpRing Countries ' p. 49. 292Milton 
, C. Cummings Jr., and Wise, D., DemocE Uc under Pressure: An Introduction to the American 
Political Syst , Fifth Edition, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985, p. 484. 
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insufficiently acknowledging the Legislative Council. Such critics include: Edward Said, 
Ghassan Khatib, Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ahmed Khalidi, Ali Jarbawi, Iyad Sarraj. More 
universally, De Tocqueville in his famous study, Democracy-in Americ , gave paramount 
attention to the notion of separation of powers. Furthermore, not a single theorist on 
democracy argued that all powers should be concentrated in one institution. Also, in 
practice, all democratic states in the world are characterised by at least a minimum level of 
separation of power. 
As for pluralism, it is a sine qua none for democracy. Philippe Schmitter (1986), for 
example, argued that pluralism is a precondition of democracy. He noted: 
"Such participation is accomplished in large part consensually through political 
parties which compete to win electoral majorities, ally with others in dominant 
coalitions, or enter into consociational arrangements. 294 
Before going into the results of the survey, it is important to note that the Palestinian public 
is quite familiar with the terms used in the survey for the evaluation of the Legislative 
Council. These terms are used extensively by the Legislative Council, human rights 
organisations; and the media as well as the opposition. Moreover, they were debated 
frequently in civic education workshops conducted nation-wide by local and international 
organisations such as the Friedrich lebert Stiftung, IFES (International Foundation of 
Electoral Systems), Conrad Adenour Foundation, the British Council, the Centre for 
Democracy, and so on. In any case, in order to avoid confiLsion, the definition was 
293 
Mill, J. S., On Libegy Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981, p. 61. 
294 
Schmitter, P. C., "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey", in: O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, (eds. ), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Southern Egope p. 6. 
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explained to the interviewers. They were also instructed to explain interviewees what these 
concepts meant, if so requested. 
Table 30, below, indicates that the respondents rated the performance of their parliament 
highest in terms of democracy, with 62.9% judging it to be democratic. Results concerning 
all other factors, however, are negative. Only 42.0% of the interviewees considered the 
Legislative Council responsive; only 39% thought that it is effective; only 37.0% saw it as a 
pluralistic institution; and only 27.5% of the electorate regarded it as being independent of 
the Executive Authority. 
Table 30., How do you evaluate the Legislative Council with regard to thefollowing. 
Value Label The Electorate 
Democracy Democratic 62.9% 
Undemocratic 34.6% 
Effectiveness Effective 39.0% 
Ineffective 5.9% 
Responsiveness Responsive 42.0% 
Unresponsive 55.2% 
Independence from the EA Independent 27.5% 
Dependent 68.3% 
Pluralism Pluralistic 37.0% 
Unpluralistic 58.1% 
3.1.1.1. DemogM 
'Democracy' is the most general of the five selected factors. To some extent, one could 
even argue that democracy encompasses effectiveness, responsiveness, independence of the 
legislature from the Executive Authority, and pluralism. The Legislative Council was only 
evaluated positively by the Palestinian electorate in terms of democracy, whilst on specifies 
their assessment was harsher. 
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Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Democracy 
Views of the General Public 
uemocr 
56.09) 
N=119 
. ry democratic 
6.8% 
No answer 
2.6% 
Very undemocratic 
7.2% 
In general, it is possible to conclude that the Palestinian public found its representative body 
to be democratic; an opinion that is believed to be largely absent in other neighbouring 
Arab countries. The significance and the explanation behind this positive evaluation on the 
democratic nature of the Legislative Council will be illustrated and discussed in greater 
depth in the following chapters of this thesis. 
3.1.1.2. Effectiveness 
In total, 39.0% of the interviewees considered the Legislative Council effective (very 
effective or effective) compared to a majority of 58.9% who thought that the Council was 
ineffective (ineffective or very ineffective). Figure 27, below, indicates that women were 
less harsh in their evaluation of the Council's effectiveness than men. 
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Not democratic 
27.4% 
Firure 27. 
Very effective 
Effective 
Not effective 
Very ineffective 
No answer 
Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Effectiveness 
Views of the General Public 
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3.5% 
2.3% 
4.8% 
35.5% 
32.1% 
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45.3% 
9.7% 
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In Chapter Two, the researcher argued that in a still traditional society, women tend to be 
less concerned with voting or less involved with politics. At this stage, an additional 
explanation will be provided of why women - in this case - evaluated the Legislative 
Council more positively than men. This will be done by examining some results from a 
public opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre in May 
1995.295 
In the May 1995 public opinion poll conducted by JMCC, with a sample of 1069 people, 
the following two questions were asked: 
(1) VAiich in your opinion is/are the best sourcc/s of information about policies? 
(2) Are you willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political 
situation? 
... JMCC, Public QDinion Polls on Palestinian Attitudes towards Politics, Jerusalem: JMCC, 1996, May 1995 
poll. 
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As becomes clear from figure 28 below, most information was obtained by people through 
the means of radio and television. It is also apparent that women relied more on radio and 
television as a source of information than men did. Only 30.5% of men found radio and 
television the best source of information about policies compared to 49.0% of women. Men 
seemed to rely more on less centrally organised sources of information such as political 
leaflets, religious sermons and publications, and meetings and conferences. Therefore, men 
were more exposed to more pluralistic forms of information, whilst women who identified 
radio and television as their main source of information, were exposed to the official 
sources of information, which are less critical or even censored. As such, women might 
well have developed a less critical view of the political events taking place within 
Palestinian society. 
Firure 28. 
Newspapers & Magazines 
Radio & TV 
Political leaflets 
Religious sermons & publications 
Meetings & conferences 
Other 
Foreign & Hebrew press 
No answer 
Source: JMCC, May 1995 
Best Source of Information about Policies 
According to Gender 
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Figure 29 below, illustrates the results of the second question asked in the May 1995 poll, 
conducted by the JMCC. Concerning the question of whether or not the interviewees were 
willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation, the 
results in figure 29 below, reveal that women were less willing to do so than men. Only 
70.4% of the female interviewees responded that they were willing to put more effort into 
finding more information on the political situation, compared to 80.2% of the men. 
Fl-aure 29. 
Willingness to Put More Effort into Finding Information on the Political Situation 
According to Gender 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Yes No Other No answer 
Source: JMCC, May 1995 
In conclusion, the results illustrated in figures 28 and 29 above, indicated that women's 
main source of information about the political situation was radio and television, and that 
women were less inclined to find out more information about the political situation. These 
findings provide an additional explanation for women's more optimistic or positive view of 
political events and institutions, including the Legislative Council. 
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It is worth mentioning that the different attitudes of women to those of men concerning 
political events and political institutions, are not always as clear as in this section 
concerning the effectiveness of the Legislative Council. However, the explanation 
concerning women's differing attitudes to men was given in this section by the researcher, 
because there was a clear statistically significant relation (Chi square = . 0026) between the 
answers concerning the evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of effectiveness, and 
the gender of the respondents (see figure 27 above). 
3.1.1.3. Re§ponsiveness 
The notion of responsiveness has not only been used because, as discussed earlier, it is an 
essential element of democracy, but also because opinion polls conducted over time showed 
a relatively negative attitude of the public towards the Legislative Council. In the 
researcher's opinion, part of this negative opinion could be a result of the public's 
perception of a lack of responsiveness on the part of the Legislative Council. Hence, the 
necessity of measuring the public's attitude towards the responsiveness of their parliament. 
In general, the majority of the respondents in the survey saw the Legislative Council as 
unresponsive. Only 42.0% of the interviewees considered the Council responsive (very 
responsive or responsive) compared to 55.2% who responded that the Council is 
unresponsive (unresponsive or very unresponsive). There were no major differences across 
any of the subgroups, whether according to gender, area, refugee status, education, or age. 
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People across all lines agreed on the negative evaluation (and its degree) of the Legislative 
Council in tenns of responsiveness. 
Figure 30. 
Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Responsiveness 
Very responsive 
4.6% 
No answer 
2.5% 
ýry unresponsive 
9.8% 
Not responsive 
45.5% 
3.1.1.4. Indeondence from the Executive Authori 
The Legislative Council is evaluated most negatively in terms of its level of independence 
from the Executive Authority. Only 27.5% of the people surveyed thought that the Council 
is very independent or independent. An overwhelming majority of 68.3% regarded the 
Council as either dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority. The negative 
evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of its level of independence of the Executive 
Authority might seem quite surprising in view of the often harsh criticism expressed within 
the Legislative Council against the Executive Authority. The reasons behind the public's 
negative opinion in this respect will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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Views of the General Public 
Responsive 
37.5% 
Figure 3 1, below, also indicates a large gap in attitudes between the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip towards the Council's level of independence from the Executive Authority. 
VAiilst in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the evaluation of the Council in terms of 
its independence of the Executive Authority is in any case quite negative, people in the 
Gaza Strip were less harsh in their opinions than in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, 
32.8% of the interviewees responded that the Council was either very independent or 
independent from the Executive Authority, compared to only 24.5% in the West Bank. 
Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, 60.6% of the people surveyed considered the Council 
dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority, compared to about 12% more 
people sharing this opinion in the West Bank, namely 72.4%. 
Firure 31: 
Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of its Independence 
from the Executive Authority 
Views of the General Public 
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This divergence in opinions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could be explained 
by a number of different factors. First, however, the general context of the attitudes 
towards the peace process should be taken into consideration. In the Gaza Strip, even given 
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the closure, the political fiuits of peace are more obvious, which is why Gazans are usually 
more supportive about the peace process than the West Bankers are. Figure 32 illustrates 
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this trend over a period of one year, from August 1996 to July 1997 . 
Flume 32: 
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Level of Support for the Peace Process over One Year 
Comparison between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
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Despite, greater support in Gaza than in the West Bank for the peace process, Gazan 
opinion has been consistently more critical of the Palestinian Authority than West Bank 
opinion. The reason for this is that the Authority has a strong presence in Gaza, and Gazans 
are, therefore, very aware of its mismanagement. Figure 33 gives the results of public 
opinion on corruption in the Palestinian Authority in August 1997 297 . Although 
2% The data in figure 32 are deduced from a number of surveys conducted by JMCC on the subject. 
297 Results in figure 33 are part of a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in August 1997. 
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respondents in the West Bank are highly critical about the corruption issue, those in the 
Gaza Strip are even more so. 
Firure 33: 
Level of Corruption in the Palestinian Authority 
Comparison between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
There is a great deal 
There is a fair amount 
There is hardly any at all 
No answer 
At first sight, therefore, the results of figure 31 are surprising and inconsistent with those in 
figures 32 and 33: Gazans were less critical than West Bankers of the Council and its 
relation with the Executive Authority. The explanation for this may be that the question 
here is not exclusively concerned with the Palestinian Authority, but more specifically with 
the relation between the Executive Authority and the Council. The dependency of the 
Legislative Council on the Executive Authority might be less obvious in the Gaza Strip than 
in the West Bank for several reasons. 
One explanation could be related with the distribution of Council seats in the 1996 
elections. During those elections, 57 Council seats were available in the West Bank to 
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represent a population of approximately 1.5 million. 298 This means that on average in the 
West Bank each Council member represents about 29,395 people. In the Gaza Strip, this 
number is much lower. In the Gaza Strip, 37 seats were reserved for Council members to 
represent a population of 750,700, resulting in each Council member representing on 
average about 20,485 people. These munbers clearly illustrate that people in the Gaza Strip 
are better represented than in the West Bank. As such, Gazans might - more than West 
Bankers - feel that their representatives are effective in dealing with their constituents' 
needs and requirements. This could be the first explanation of why Gazans were less 
negative in the survey about the dependency of the Legislative Council on the Executive 
Authority. 
Another reason of why the dependency of the Legislative Council on the Executive 
Authority might be less clear in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank might have a 
geographic origin. The Gaza Strip is more geographically concentrated than the West Bank. 
Indeed, whereas the Gaza Strip can be compared to one large island, the West Bank consists 
of several small islands and is, therefore, often described as being cantonised. The ability 
for Gaza constituents to meet or know their representatives, therefore, is much higher. This 
again, could lead Gazans to perceive their representatives to be less dependent on the 
Executive Authority. 
In shod, the combination of higher representation and a better possibility for interaction 
with Council members might cause Gazans to perceive a greater degree of independence 
298 The population numbers are based on data from the Health Development Information Program. 
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among their Council members than people in the West Bank. However, one should keep in 
mind that, in general, both Gazans and West Bankers consider the Legislative Council to be 
highly dependent on the Executive Authority. 
3.1.1.5. Pluralism 
The second lowest rating given to the Legislative Council concerned its perceived 
pluralistic composition. Only 37.0% of the interviewees found the Council pluralistic (very 
pluralistic orpluralistic) compared to 58.1% who replied that the Council was unpluralistic 
(unpluralistic or very unpluralistic). This low score for the Legislative Council on 
plumlism does not come as a surprise, when one considers the actual composition of the 
Council. As figure 34 illustrates, 61% of the Council is composed of Fatah members. In 
addition 14% more Fatah members ran as independents and won seats in the Legislative 
Council. Thus, in total, 75% of the Council members (66, in number) belong to the same 
political affiliation. The remaining 22 Council members ran as independents, but some of 
them are known to be close to Hamas, PFLP, or Fida. Also, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
groups such as the DFLP, PFLP, Hamas and Islamic Rhad. boycotted the elections, even 
further reducing the chances for a pluralistic parliament. 
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Firure 34. - 
Independent 16 
18% 
PFLP I 
1% 
Harnas Independent 4 
5% 
Fateh Independent 12 
14% 
Political Affiliation of the Council Members 
FIDA I 
1% 
-88 
Fatch 54 
61% 
M Fateh 0 FIDA 0 Independent M PFLP 1: 1 Hamas Independent 0 Fateh Independent 
Source: JMCC, The Palestinian Council, 1997. 
3.1.2. Level of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council 
In light of the respondents' negative evaluation (as discussed in section 3.1.1) of most of the 
aspects of the fimctioning of the Legislative Council, the electorate's lower degree of 
satisfaction with the Council's perfonnance than its level of dissatisfaction is predictable. 
In general, only 38.3% of the people are satisfied (very satisfied or satisfied) with the 
performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 55.8% who are dissatisfied 
(dissatisfied or very dissatisfied) with its performance. Females are more positive than 
males for the same reasons discussed earlier in section 3.1.1.2. 
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Refugees are less satisfied with the performance of the Council than non-refugees. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, this phenomenon can easily be explained by the fact that 
refugees had higher and perhaps misplaced expectations of Council members than non- 
refugees, and are therefore more disappointed with the Council's performance. Therefore, 
even if Council members have not lived up to their campaign promises or do not perform as 
they should, they can not totally be blarned for the greater disappointment with the Council 
amongst refugees compared to the Palestinian electorate in general. 
Lastly, the trend that appeared in Chapter Two where the more educated Palestinians tended 
to be more critical than the less educated Palestinians, also applies here. As becomes clear 
from a comparative look at education in table 31b, 42% of the respondents who received up 
to elementary education were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council 
compared to only 35.7% of the interviewees who received college education and above. 
Also, whereas 45.4% of the first group were dissatisfied with the perforinance of the 
Council, 62.6% of the latter group were. 
Table 31a: Looking back at the laslyear and a haysince the Council was elected, what is your opinion 
about its performance in general? Wouldyousayyou are very safisfled, satisfled, dissatisfled or vejy 
dissatisfled? 
Total 
N= 1195 
Gender 
Male 
N=608 
Female 
N=580 
Refugee or Not 
Non-reffigee Refugee 
N=642 N=515 
Very satisfied 5.2% 5.6% 4.8% 4.5% 5.8% 
Satisfied 33.1% 30.3% 36.2% 35.0% 30.5% 
Dissatisfied 38.7% 41.9% 35.7% 37.7% 40.6% 
Very dissatisfied 17.1% 18.4% 15.3% 16.7% 17.91/o 
No answer 5.9% 3.8% 7.9% 6.1% 5.2% 
4f 8 8 
Chi Square 
. 0050 . 5389 
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Table 31b: Looking back at the laslyear and a ha#Wnce the Council was elected, what isyour opinion 
about Its performance In general? Wouldyou say you are very sathfied, satisfled, dissatisfied or very 
dUsafisjIed? 
Education 
Up to Elem. Up to Prep. Up to Sec. Some College College & 
above 
N=I 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=115 
Very satisfied 10.1% 4.1% 4.6% 3.5% 6.1% 
Satisfied 31.9% 33.9% 33.5% 33.8% 29.6% 
Dissatisfied 30.3% 37.1% 38.1% 41.4% 49.6% 
Very dissatisfied 15.1% 15.4% 20.6% 16.9% 13.0% 
No answer 12.6% 9.5% 3.1% 4.5% 1.7% 
df 20 
Chi Sqwre . 0000 
3.1.3. Reasons behind Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council 
Having established that more people are dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative 
Council than satisfied, it was deemed important to know the reasons behind the general 
public's positive or negative evaluation of the Legislative Council. In this section, the 
researcher will examine whether the general public agrees on the reasons behind their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council or whether 
the different opinions between the various subgroups of Palestinian society, discussed 
earlier, are being reinforced. 
3.1.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction 
In general, out of 38.3% of the surveyed people who said they were satisfied with the 
performance of the Legislative Council, 41.7% cited democracy as the most important 
reason for their satisfaction. Courage on the part of the Council members was given as the 
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second most important reason with 13.3%. The respondents listed responsiveness as the 
third reason for their satisfaction with the Legislative Council. 
Firure 35. 
Most Important Reason for Satisfaction with the 
Performance of the Legislative Council 
According to the General Public 
Democracy 41.7% 
Responsiveness 11.8% 
No answer 5.0% 
reasons 6.1 
New experience 0.9% 
9d"', Accessibility 6.1% 
Effechveness 7.4% 
N=458 
independence 7.6% 
Courage 13.3% 
There are some remarkable differences across the different subgroups in terms of how much 
importance they attach to the three most frequently stated reasons for satisfaction with the 
Legislative Council. With regard to attitudes towards the Council members' 
responsiveness, the results in figure 35 reinforce the findings of section 3.1.1.4 above, 
where it was shown that the respondents of the Gaza Strip have a less harsh assessment of 
the Council's dependent position vis-A-vis the Executive Authority than the West Bank 
respondents. As figure 36 shows, nearly twice as many Gazans than West Bankers gave 
responsiveness as their reason for satisfaction. Again, the explanation could be that people 
in Gaza enjoy a higher representation by Council members per population size, whilst 
living in a more geographically concentrated area. Therefore, interaction and personal 
contact with their Council members may be easier for Gazans than for West Bankers, 
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leading them to cite the Council's responsiveness more frequently than West Bankers as a 
reason for satisfaction. 
Firare 36. 
Responsiveness 
Democracy 
Effectiveness 
Independence 
Courage 
Accessibility 
New experience 
Other reasons 
No answer 
Most Important Reason for Satisfaction with 
the Performance of the Legislative Council 
Comparison between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
West Bank Gaza Strip 
N=286 N=172 
8.4% 17.4% 
43% 39.5% 
6.4% 8.7% 
8.7% . 8% 
12.6% 14.5% 
6.4% 5.2% 
1.4% 
7% 4.7% 
E: ]West Bank 
5.6% 4% 0 Gaza Strip 
Although a Chi square test on the relationship between the variable of education, on the one 
hand, and the reasons for satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council, on 
the other hand, showed no statistical significance, some distinct differences appear, when 
examining these variables. As indicated in table 34 below, more educated respondents 
cited democracy as the reason for their satisfaction with the Council much more frequently 
than less educated interviewees. About 41.5% of the respondents who went to college and 
above said that democracy was the most important reason for their satisfaction with the 
Council, compared to less than half of those who received up to elementary schooling, at 
18.0%. As will be recalled fi-om section 3.1.2, in general, the more educated respondents 
204 
were less satisfied with the Legislative Council dian the less educated ones. From the 
above, however, it became clear that the educated interviewees who were satisfied with the 
performance of the Legislative Council, were more positive in their assessment of the 
Council's democratic character than the less educated respondents. 
Also noteworthy is that whereas higher educated Palestinians chose democracy as their 
reason for satisfaction with the Council much more often than less educated people, the 
opposite was the case concerning courage and responsiveness. About 22.0% of the 
respondents who only went up to elementary school cited courage as the most important 
reason for their satisfaction, compared to only 12.2% of the interviewees who went to 
college and above. Similarly, only 9.8% of the interviewees who went to college and above 
were primarily satisfied with the Council because of its responsiveness, compared to 20.0% 
of the respondents who only received up to elementary education. This pattern might mean 
that the more educated people cited democracy more ftequently as their reason for 
satisfaction with the Council, because they support and respect the principle of democracy 
upon which the Legislative Council is based and which the Council members adhere to. 
However, when it comes to the reasons of courage and responsiveness for satisfaction with 
the Legislative Council, the more educated become more negative, because they expected 
more from the Legislative Council. Although the more educated appreciate the Council for 
the democratic principles it embodies, they do not think this is enough. Their more 
negative stance concerning courage and responsiveness could, therefore, be interpreted as a 
message to the Council members. The more educated Palestinians realise the intrinsic 
potential of the Council based upon the principles of democracy, but they expect more than 
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good intentions in the field of courage and responsiveness. They were more refined in their 
expectations of the Legislative Council and more critical in their evaluation than the less 
educated respondents. 
Table 32. - H*ich of the followinE Is the most important reason for vour satisfaction? 
Up to Elem. 
N=50 
Up to Prep. 
N=84 
Education 
Up to Sec. 
N=148 
Some College 
N=I 17 
College & 
above 
N=41 
Responsiveness 20.0% 8.3% 12.8% 10.3% 9.8% 
Democracy 18.0% 42.9% 43.9% 47.0% 41.5% 
Effectiveness 6.0% 9.5% 6.8% 6.8% 9.8% 
Independence 4.0% 9.5% 8.1% 8.5% 4.9% 
Courage 22.0% 9.5% 14.2% 12.8% 12.2% 
Accessibility 12.0% 8.3% 3.4% 6.0% 7.3% 
New experience - 1.2% 0.7% 0.9% 2.4% 
Otherreasons 10.0% 3.6% 4.7% 6.8% 7.3% 
No answer 8.00/0 7.1% 5.4% 0.9% 4.9% 
3.1.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction 
In general, out of the 55.8% who said that they were dissatisfied with the performance of 
the Legislative Council, 42.1 % gave its lack of effectiveness as the most important reason 
for their dissatisfaction. As illustrated in figure 37 below, lack of independence on the part 
of the Council was given as the second most important reason for dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the Council. The respondents listed the lack of responsiveness by the 
Council as the third reason for their dissatisfaction. 
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Firure 3 7. 
Which of the following is the most 
important reason for your dissatisfaction? 
Lack of responsiveness 18.7% 
Lack of democracy 7.2% 
Lack of effectiveness 42.1% 
Lack of independence 21% 
Lack of courage 5.8% 
Lack of accessibility 4.5% 
Other reasons 8.5% 
No answer 2.1% N=653 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
People's dissatisfaction with the Council's performance may be caused in part by the 
circumstances under which the Legislative Council has been operating. Besides the lack of 
legitimacy the Legislative Council enjoys from its constituencies due to its short existence, 
Council members are facing major challenges from different origins, such as (1) their lack 
of experience, (2) the continued Palestinian-Israeli friction, leaving the Council members 
often powerless, and (3) not least, the power struggle within the Palestinian structures, 
leading to attempts to limit the influence of the Legislative Council and thus affecting its 
effectiveness. 
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The public's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council does not 
necessarily translate into the public blaming their representatives for the malfunctioning of 
the Council. The results in figure 38, below, clearly illustrate that the general public is 
299 Further details about the obstacles facing the Legislative Council will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
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aware of the difficulties facing the Legislative Council. When the general public was asked 
in previous JMCC opinion polls whether they thought that the Legislative Council 
represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the majority of the interviewees 
responded that they felt the Legislative Council does represent the people, but to no effect. 
To what extent would you say that the 
Legislative Council represents the 
aspirations of the Palestinian people? 
-ý7ý. 
00e, ý 7-7 -7 
Represents the people well 
Represents the people well, but to no effect 
Represents the people badly 
No opinion 
The results in figure 38 seem to indicate that the Palestinian electorate does not view the 
Legislative Council categorically negative. Indeed, whilst recognising that the Legislative 
Council does represent the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the general public also 
acutely feels the limitations the Legislative Council is facing. 
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3.1.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future 
Despite the somewhat critical evaluation by the public of the Legislative Council, there is 
still place for some optimism. Although surveyed people rated the Legislative Council 
mainly negative in its performance during the first two years since it was elected, they were 
more optimistic about its performance in the future. As illustrated in figure 39 below, 
59.1 % of the interviewees said that they were optimistic (very optimistic or optimistic) 
about the future performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 36.7% who were 
pessimistic (pessimistic or very pessimistic). 
Fir, yre 39. 
Level of Optimism or Pessimism About the Future Performance of the Elected 
Legislative Council 
According to the General Public 
opumistic 
Very Pessimishc 
11.8% 
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Very Optimistic 
11.4% 
77777r. 
PRk, 
No Answer 
4.3% 
Pessimistic 
24.9% 
N= 1195 
It is also noteworthy that the respondents' answers to the question about their optimism or 
pessimism about the future performance of the Legislative Council, confmn and summarise 
many of the opinion patterns examined earlier in this chapter. The results in table 33 
reinforce, for example, the trend noticed before that women tend to be more positive than 
men in their evaluation of the Legislative Council and the political situation. Also, Gazans 
were more optimistic than West Bankers about the future of the Legislative Council, which 
is also consistent with what was found before. 
Table 33: In general, areyou optimistic or pessimistic about thefuture performance of the elected 
Leg#1adve Council? 
Male 
N=608 
Gender 
Female 
N=580 
Area 
West Bank 
N=756 
Gaza 
N=439 
Very optimistic 10.2% 12.8% 9.4% 14.8% 
Optimistic 44.2% 51.0% 44.2% 53.8% 
Very pessimistic 13.8% 9.5% 12.8% 10.0% 
Pessimistic 28.0% 21.9% 29.4% 17.1% 
No answer 3.8% 4.8% 4.2% 4.3% 
df 8 8 
Chi Square . 0110 . 
0000 
As will be recalled, the better educated, although believing in the principles the Legislative 
Council embodies, were seen as highly critical of it. Table 34 shows that in the minds of 
the more educated Palestinians hope for improvement in the future outbalanced their 
criticisms. Whereas 56.3% of the interviewees who received up to elementary schooling 
were optimistic about the future performance of the Legislative Council, 62.6% of the 
respondents who went to college and above shared this opinion. Similarly, whereas 37.0% 
of the fonner group were pessimistic about the fiiture perfonnance of the Council, only 
33.9% of the latter group were. The same pattern appears when comparing the levels of 
optimism and pessimism between the younger and older generations. Whereas, at times the 
younger generation evaluated the Legislative Council more negatively than the older 
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generation, they continued to be more hopeful about the Council's future performance. 
However, one should keep in mind that the strong element of hope, which appears to be 
influencing the young and higher educated Palestinians to be more optimistic about the 
future performance of the Legislative Council, may have a down side if their expectations 
are not met. In such a scenario, the strongest force of opposition could be expected to come 
from widiin this group. 
Table 34., In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about th efuture performance of th e elected 
Legislative Council? 
Up to 
Elem. 
N=119 
Up to 
Prep. 
N=221 
Education 
Up to 
Sec. 
N=388 
Some 
College 
N=314 
College 
& above 
N=l 15 
18-25 
N=379 
26-35 
N=366 
Age 
36-45 
N=203 
46-55 
N=105 
55+ 
N=66 
Vety 21.0% 12.2% 8.8% 8.61/6 11.3% 10.0% 7.9% 13.8% 19.0% 16.7% 
optimistic 
Optimistic 35.3% 43.9% 51.8% 48.7% 51.3% 53.3% 48.4% 45.3% 41.9% 34.8% 
Very 11.80/0 13.1% 11.1% 12.7% 8.7% 8.2% 14.2% 16.7% 6.7% 10.6% 
pessimistic 
Pessimistic 25.2% 26.2% 24.7% 26.4% 25.2% 24.0% 25.7% 20.2% 29.5% 27.3% 
No answer 6.7% 4.5% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5% 4.5% 3.8% 3.9% 2.9% 10.6% 
df 20 20 
Chi Square . 0015 . 0021 
3.2. PART TWO: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS ON 
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
31.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different Factors 
The Council members were asked to evaluate the Legislative Council according to the same 
five factors the general public was asked. By comparing the differences in the answers of 
the public and those of the Council members, it is possible to form a better idea of where 
the gaps in thinking between the two groups lie. In general, however, one can deduce that 
Council members evaluate the Legislative Council far more positively than the general 
pu Ic. 
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Table 35, below, indicates that 88.4% of the Council members considered the Legislative 
Council democratic. Thus, concerning the variable of democracy Council members and the 
public agreed in their Positive evaluation of the Legislative Council. Both groups gave 
democracy their highest score, albeit that the Council members rated the Legislative 
Council higher than the public did. This is rather logical as it could be expected that the 
Council members would be less critical about their institution than any other external 
group. 
Table 35 also shows that Council members' opinion on the selected criteria was positive, 
except on pluralism, which is also the single concept which the Council members evaluated 
more negatively than the general public. Whereas 37.0% of the public saw the Legislative 
Council as a pluralistic institution, only 23.3% of the Council members did so. This is not 
surprising as, indeed, the majority of the Legislative Council consists of Fatah members. 
Moreover, as mentioned before in Chapter Two, many members of the Legislative Council 
ran as Independents during the elections, but do, in fact, belong to Fatah. Genuine non- 
Fatah Council members are a minority in the Legislative Council. The Council members 
rated their institution more negatively in terms of pluralism than the public because they are 
better informed of the actual political affiliations of their colleagues. 
Concerning the remaining three factors, the opinion of the Council members and the public 
differed not only on the degree of importance given to these factors, but also on their 
ranking. About 81.4% of Council members considered the Legislative Council responsive, 
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compared to only 42.0% of the electorate. Moreover, whereas 74.4% of the Council 
members said that the Legislative Council is independent from the Executive Authority, 
only 27.5% of the public thought so. As such, the general public evaluated the Legislative 
Council most negatively in terms of its level of independence from the Executive Authority. 
Finally, whereas 72.1% of Council members regarded the Council as effective, only 39.0% 
of the public agreed. The disparity in opinions between the public and the Council 
members with respect to these variables may be explained by the following reasons: 
1. As mentioned above, it could be expected that the Council members would 
evaluate themselves higher than the public would. 
2. The Legislative Council is more transparent than other Palestinian institutions and 
is, as such, more likely to receive criticisms. 
3. As will be discussed in greater depth later in the thesis, the Legislative Council is 
attempting to do its job, but to date its efforts did not produce many tangible results. As 
anywhere in the world, the general public cares about the results and not only the 
efforts. The Council members, from their side, perceive themselves as attempting to do 
as much as they can and, therefore evaluate their performance more positively than the 
public. 
Table 35. How do you evaluate the Legislative Council with regard to the followinz- 
Value Label Council Members Electorate 
Democracy Democratic 
- 
88.4% 62.9% 
Undemocratic 7.0% 34.6% 
Effectiveness Effective 72.1% 39.0% 
Ineffective 25.6% 58.9% 
Responsiveness Responsive 81.4% 42.0% 
Unresponsive 11.6% 55.2% 
Independence from the EA Independent 74.4% 27.5% 
Dependent 23.3% 68.3% 
Pluralism Pluralistic 23.3% 37.0% 
Unpluralist c 72.1% 58.1% 
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3.2.2. Level of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council 
Figure 40 below, shows that Council members were far more satisfied with the performance 
of the Legislative Council than the general public. Indeed, 67.4% of the Council members 
were very satisfied or satisfied with the Council's performance, compared to less than 
50.0% of the general public, namely 38.3%. Similarly, only 32.6% of the Council members 
were very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with the Council's performance, compared to 55.8% of 
the general public. 
Fizxre 40. - 
Comparison between the Level of Satisfaction of the Council Members 
and the General Public on the Performance of the Council 
Very Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Very Dissatisfied 
No answer 
61%_51%__41% 31% 21% 1 1% 0% V 
Very Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied 
General VuWa 5.2% 33.1% 38.7% 
Council Memben%Mý 2.3% 6 27.9% 
The results in figure 40 are significant for mainly two reasons: 
_30% 
40% 
- 
50% 60% 70% 
Dissatsfied [ No answer 
%0 4.7' 0% 
Firstly, a relatively large number of Council members (1/3d) who took part in the survey 
were dissatisfied with the performance of their own institution. This seems to point to an 
acknowledgement on the part of the Council members that their performance has not been 
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what it should. Hereby, one should consider that besides the restrictions on the Legislative 
Council from the Executive Authority and the political situation, the Council members lack 
legislative experience, which is bound to affect their performance. As Marwan Bargouthi 
put it to the researcher, the Council members are in a learning process and need to work 
hard to understand of what the job of a parliamentarian consists, and then implement their 
newly acquired knowledge. 300 
Secondly, there is a large gap in opinions between the Council members and the general 
public. It is the researcher's contention that this can be attributed to two factors. On the one 
hand, the people were perhaps somewhat unrealistic in their hopes for the Legislative 
Council, which could partly explain their negative evaluation of its performance today. On 
the other hand, Council members are likely to deem themselves successful and were, in 
replying to this question, perhaps overestimating their success. 
3.2.3. Reasons for Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council 
3.2.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction 
The Council members were asked, as the general public was, to select reasons for their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. The Council members were 
allowed to give two reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction from a predetermined 
300 The interview with Council member Marwan Bargouthi was conducted on Friday 19 September 1997. 
215 
list of choices put to them. Figures 41 and 42, below, indicate the average results of the 
two reasons given by Council members who took part in the survey. 
Out of the 67.4% of surveyed Council members satisfied with the performance of the 
Legislative Council, an average of 3 1.0% listed democracy as the main reason for their 
satisfaction. Independence was given as the second most important reason for Council 
members' satisfaction. The Council members listed their responsiveness as the third reason 
for their satisfaction with their performance. 
Fisure 41: 
Most Important Reason for Satisfaction with 
the Performance of the Legislative Council 
According to the Council Members 
n nn -øI 
Democracy 31.09 
7% 
Effectiveness 
Like the general public, the Council members considered democracy as the most important 
element influencing their satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council. 
However, whereas the Council members cited independence as the second reason for their 
satisfaction, the general public listed courage. It is possible that the independence cited by 
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N=58 
Independence 24.1% 
Council members is perceived by the general public as courage. 301 The general public 
thinks that the Legislative Council is courageous in some of the positions it has taken over 
the last two years. However, for the public, this courage does not necessarily imply 
independence on behalf of the Council, because it does not see the sometimes courageous 
Council resolutions translated into actual legislation. The best example to illustrate this 
divergence in opinion between the Council members and the general public is the 
courageous stance taken by the Legislative Council during the corruption scandal in the 
summer of 1997.302 The corruption episode exemplified the courage of the Council 
members, but also highlighted the persistent dependence of their institution and its inability 
to reach results. In the publics' opinion, the Legislative Council will have to have more 
concrete outputs, before it will be considered independent rather than courageous. 
Furthermore, it is logical for the Council members to prefer associating the Legislative 
Council with independence rather than courage, as the latter does not necessarily bring 
tangible results, whilst the former - once established - would be a fait accompli. 
Concerning the third reason for satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative 
Council, namely responsiveness, the Council members and the public again agree on its 
importance. In short, it is possible to conclude that the Council members and the general 
public agree to a large extent on the reasons for their satisfaction with the performance of 
the Legislative Council. The extent to which they agree is apparent in figure 42 below. 
301 This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
302 The corruption scandal will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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Firure 42. 
Comparison between the Reasons of Satisfaction of the Council Members and 
the General Public with the Performance of the Council 
Responsiveness 
Democracy 
Effectiveness 
Independence 
Courage 
Accessibility 
Other reasons 
No Answer 
6111b 51% 41% jl'/o ZI'7o 11'/b 9'7o IU'7o ZU7o IU7o 4U7o ou-k t)u-/o tuto 
General Public Council Members 
n=458 n=29 
3.2.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction 
Of the 32.6% of Council members who are dissatisfied with the Council's performance, 
35.7% cited ineffectiveness as the main reason for their dissatisfaction. Lack of 
independence was cited as the second most important reason for their dissatisfaction. The 
Council members who took part in the survey listed the fact that they were too busy with 
personal issues as the third reason. The last reason was not included in the original list, but 
some dissatisfied Council members thought it should be included. Also, a large number of 
Council members preferred not to give any reason for their dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the Legislative Council. Hence, the large percentage of "no answer" in 
figure 43, below. 
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Fizure 43: 
Most Important Reason for Dissatisfaction with the 
Performance of the Legislative Council 
Accordina to the Council Members 
Lack of effectiveness 35.7% 
Lack of independence 25.0% 
Lack of courage 3.6% 
Lack of accessibility 3.6% 
Busy with personal iss 7.1 % 
Other reasons 7.1% 
N=28 
Lack of democracy 3.6% PVLack 
of responsiveness 3.6% 
No answer 10.7% 
Both dissatisfied Council members and members of the general public who are dissatisfied 
with the performance of the Legislative Council, agreed on the first two cited reasons for 
their dissatisfaction, namely ineffectiveness and lack of independence. However, whereas 
the Council members cited preoccupation with personal issues as the third main 
impediment to the satisfactory performance of the Legislative Council, the general public 
listed the lack of responsiveness by the Council. It could, of course, be that there is a causal 
link, i. e. that because Council members are too involved in their personal business, they fail 
to be sufficiently responsive to the needs of the public. 
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Firure 44: 
Comparison between the Reasons of Dissatisfaction of the Council Members 
and the General Public with the Performance of the Council 
Lack of Responsiveness 8.7% [:: 
]13.6% 
Lack of Democracy 7.2%E: 
)3.6% 
Lack of Effectiveness 42.1%1 35.7% 
Lack of Independence 21% 25% 
Lack of Courage 5.8% 3.6% 
Lack of Accessibility 4.5% 3.6% 
0% 7.1% 1 Busy With Personal Reason, 
Other reasons 8.5% 7.1% 
No Answer 2.1% 10.7% 
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2% 11% 21% 31% 41% 51% 61 % 
General Public Council Members 
n=653 n=14 
31.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future 
As discussed in section 3.1.4, the general public remained optimistic about the future 
performance of the Legislative Council. Council members themselves were even more so. 
No less than 86.0% of the surveyed Council members said that they were optimistic about 
the Legislative Council in the future, compared to only 11.6% who said that they were 
pessimistic. So, according to these results, the will and spirit amongst the majority of the 
Council members to continue to improve their legislative performance in the future is still 
strong. Ahmed Qrei' (Abu 'Ala), Speaker of the Legislative Council, projected these 
feelings of optimism in his speech at the opening of the third term of the Legislative 
Council on 7 March 1998 as follows: 
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'Palestinian legislators, today, have more confidence in the fiaure after they have 
passed, by their unity, steadfastness of attitude and support of their people, the test 
of hard beginnings, the test of transforming theory into ambition, determination 
and will, in the context of the nation's ambition to end the occupation, to achieve 
national independence, and build Palestinian democratic civil society, on the basis 
ofjustice, equality and the rule oflaw. "303 
However, this is not the case for all Council members. In October 1997, one of the most 
trusted, but critical Council members, Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi decided otherwise, and 
handed in his resignation. In an article he published in the local press explaining his action, 
'Abdel Shafi wrote: 
'The people placed their trust in the president ofthe National A uthorityjust as it 
placed its trust in the members of the Legislative Council. For this reason, it is 
obligatory that the relationship ofthe Council with the president and his executive 
apparatus he one of co-ordination and co-operation on a constitutional basis, 
according to a Basic Law. We are still awaiting its ratification.. The national 
unity, which is required to confront the present challenges, will not he achieved 
except through response to these considerations... We have a long, hard road 
ahead, which demands honesty, patience and strengthening ofour unity .. to see us 
through. This is what I had hopedfor when I sought membership in the Legislative 
Council. However, and unfortunately, none of this was achieved Therefore, I 
cannot fool myself or my fellow citizens in continuing to be a member ofthis 
CounciUM 
'Abdel Shafi did note, however, that: 
In the final analysis .. we must remember that this Council is unique due to its 
special situation. That is, it is a Legislative Council for a national liberation 
movement and its affairs cannot be measured by what takes place in the Councils of 
independent countries. "305 
303 "Abu 'Ala: PLC Speaker for the Third Time", Palestine Reporý 13 March 1998. 
304 Abdel Shafi, H., "In the Name of Duty and Honesty", Palestine Keport ,2 January 1998. (Translation by 
Joharah Baker of an article published in the Al-Quds newspaper on 18 December 1997. ) 
305 Abdel Shafl, H., "In the Name of Duty and Honesty", Palestine ReRort, 2 January 1998. (Translation by 
Joharah Baker of an article published in the AI-Quds newspaper on 18 December 1997. ) 
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FiEure 45: 
Level of Optimism amongst Council Members about the 
Performance of the Legislative Council in the Future 
opfimisbc 
86.1% 
N=43 
No answer 
2.3% 
3simistic 
11.6% 
As shown in figure 46 below, 18.6% of the Council members were very optimistic, whilst 
69.8% of them were cautiously optimistic. The large number of Council members who 
replied that they were 'cautiously optimistic' seems to indicate that they tried to remain 
realistic in their expectations and optimism. About 9.3% of the Council members were 
cautiously pessimistic about the Legislative Council in the future, and a minority of 2.3% 
was very pessimistic. 
Firure 46: 
Level of Optimism and Pessimism about the Performance 
of the Legislative Council in the Future 
According to the Council Members 
Cautiously optimistic 
69.9% 
N=43 
y optimistic 
18.6% 
Cautiously pessimistic 
9.2% 
pessimistic 
2.3% 
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3.3. CONCLUSION 
From the above, it became clear that the public evaluated the performance of the Legislative 
Council much more negatively than the Council members did. In fact, the public only 
evaluated the Legislative Council positively in tenns; of democracy, and evaluated the 
Legislative Council negative in terms of responsiveness, effectiveness, its pluralistic 
composition and its independence from the Executive Authority. The Council members, on 
their part, only evaluated the performance of their institution negatively in terms of 
pluralism. 
The minority of the Palestinian public who was satisfied with the performance of the 
Legislative Council, said this was the case mainly because of the democratic nature of the 
Legislative Council, the courage demonstrated by the Council members and their 
responsiveness. The 2/3d of the Council members who were satisfied with the Legislative 
Council, were so mainly because of its democratic nature, its independence from the 
Executive Authority and its responsiveness. 
The dissatisfied section of Palestinian public opinion stated that the lack of effectiveness, 
the lack of independence and the lack of responsiveness were their main reasons for their 
dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. Amongst the Council members, 1/3 rd was 
dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council and they stated its lack of 
effectiveness, its lack of independence from the Executive Authority and the fact that many 
Council members are too busy with personal issues as their main reasons of dissatisfaction. 
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The above findings clearly indicate that the perfonnance of the Legislative Council is less 
than optimal. This is not a result of its undemocratic nature, but rather because its ability to 
both represent its constituents effectively and to be responsive to their needs, is restricted by 
its lack of independence from the Executive Authority. As such, it is clear that Potter's 
characteristic of partial democracies whereby the effect of the elections and the authority of 
the parliament is undermined by non-elected establishments is valid in the Palestinian case. 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapters Five and Seven of the thesis, the 
effectiveness of the Legislative Council is not only restricted by its lack of independence 
from the Executive Authority, but is equally impeded by the structure of dual leadership 
that exists between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. In this web of institutional 
confusion, the leverage of the Council members is insufficient and, as such, they are unable 
- as the transitionalists Shain and Linz, or O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead would 
argue - to neutralise authoritarian actors or convince them to subordinate their strategies in 
order to enhance ftuther democratic development. In other words, for now, the process of 
dernocratisation. in the Palestinian autonomous areas has not yet reached Rustow's 
habituation phase as the moderate section of the elite, i. e. the Legislative Council, is still a 
minority and is unable to convince the remainder of the Palestinian elite to adhere to 
democratic principles and rules out of habit rather than duty. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
PERCEPTIONS OF WMETHER THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IS 
DEMOCRATIC 
A prerequisite for any parliament to function as a democratic institution is for its 
parliamentarians to believe in and adhere to certain basic democratic principles. In this 
regard, the researcher strongly agrees with the transitionalists, in general, and Rustow, in 
particular, in that the last phase towards democracy cannot be attained without a belief in 
democratic principles by the ruling establishment. This chapter will attempt to examine the 
democratic awareness of the Council members and will determine whether or not the 
Legislative Council has the democratic basis necessary to ftirther the process of 
democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In order to do so, three types of 
questions were presented to the Council members. 
The first set of questions concentrated on assessing the extent to which Council members 
agree on what defines democracy by asking them to evaluate selected countries according to 
the extent of their democracy. 
The second set of questions were intended to check the level of the Council members' 
belief in such democratic basics as separation of power, rule of law, and the constitution. In 
this regard, the researcher presented the Council members with questions pertaining to the 
relations between the parliament, the executive branch and the constitutionality of laws. 
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The third set of questions involved asking Council members a number of questions that 
exemplify their adherence or non-adherence to the principles of democracy elaborated upon 
in the second set of questions. In short, the objective of the third set of questions is to 
evaluate the extent to which Council members are ready to adhere to the basic democratic 
principles, even if in some cases the content of the questions put to them does not conform 
with their own personal beliefs. 
The results of the three sets of questions will give answers to the following three questions: 
1. Do the Council members have a common understanding of democracy? 
2. Do the Council members have a common understanding of the basic democratic 
principles? 
3. Are the Council members willing to act according to those principles? 
As a result, a comprehensive understanding of the democratic awareness of the Council 
members will be attained. 
4.1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVEL OF 
DEMOCRACY 
One way to examine the level of understanding of democracy amongst Council members is 
by asking them to rank selected countries according to their level of democracy and to see 
how they perceive other countries in terms of their adherence to democracy. The researcher 
selected a group of countries consisting of Egypt, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Turkey, the United States, Yemen, and Sweden. The researcher chose these countries as 
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they represent various cultures, regions, religions, and systems of government. The 
selection includes Arab countries, Islamic non-Arab states, European countries and the 
United States. With the selection the researcher also took into consideration Western 
countries perceived by the Palestinians either as hostile or fair to their cause. 
As illustrated in figure 47 below, in general, the majority of the surveyed Council members 
thought that Sweden was the most democratic country, followed by France. The United 
States was put in third place. Whereas none of the Council members who filled in their 
questionnaires, viewed Sweden and France to be undemocratic, 7.0% considered the United 
States to be undemocratic (undemocratic or very undemocratic). The fact that the United 
States was only ranked as the third most democratic Western country, might be a result of 
the US's negative connotations amongst Palestinians. Many perceive the involvement of 
the US government in the peace process as unbalanced in favour of Israel. 
Figure 47. 
Council Members' Perceptions of the Level of Democracy in Selected Countries 
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It was thought useful to split figure 47 into two adjacent figures: one ranking the Arab 
countries, and a second one ranking the Western countries. Looking at figure 48, below, it 
becomes clear that the Council members considered Western countries as being much more 
democratic than Arab countries. Vanhanen reached similar conclusions. Of the 12 countries 
regarded in Vanhanen's methodology as 'deviating non-democracies' in North Africa, 
Central Asia and the Middle East, seven of those deviating non-democracies are Middle 
Eastern countries and four are North African. According to Vanhanen: "It is remarkable that 
they are all Arab. 9-006 
It is also noteworthy that none of the Arab countries were evaluated positively as being 
democratic by a majority of the respondents. Indeed, none of the Council members 
considered any of the Arab countries included in the selection to be very democratic. 
Amongst the selected Arab countries, the interviewed Council members considered Tunisia 
to be the most democratic, with 3 7.2% saying so. Egypt was second with 25.6%, and 
Yemen came third with 18.6%. Jordan came only in fourth place, whilst none of the 
Council members considered Saudi Arabia to be democratic. 
Firure 48. 
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The evaluation of the Council members of the level of democracy in the selected countries 
corresponds strongly with the classifications of David Potter. 307 The countries thatthe 
Council members rated highly (France, Sweden and the United States) are classified by 
Potter as liberal democracies. Similarly, Potter classified countries such as Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia and Tunisia that were given a low rate by the Council members in terms of 
democracy, as authoritarian regimes. Whereas the Council members evaluated Turkey 
negatively in terms of its democratic record, Potter classified Turkey as a liberal democracy. 
It should be noted, however, that Potter did so with some reservation given the Turkish 
regime's policies of repression in part of the country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
Council members evaluated Turkey negatively. Especially, when taking into consideration 
that the Council members were surveyed at the time when the conflict between the Turkish 
military and the Islamic Salvation Party erupted in Turkey. 
In general, one can deduce from the results in figures 47 and 48 that the Council members 
do seem to be equipped with sufficient knowledge about the features and characteristics of 
democratic or undemocratic countries around the globe to be able to rank them according to 
their level of democracy. In the researcher's opinion, the Council members were generally 
realistic in their ranking, although, in certain instances, they might have been slightly 
swayed by their emotions or by the events taking place at the time. 
307 Potter, D., "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds. ), Democratisation 
pp. 37-38. 
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4.2. LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIC AWARENESS AMONGST THE COUNCIL 
MEMBERS 
In the survey of the Council members, the researcher included questions on voting 
behaviour, constitutional amendments, accountability, and sources of interpretation of the 
law in order to measure the level of democratic awareness and sense of responsibility on the 
part of the Council members. Moreover, the questions attempt to assess the importance of 
the rule of law and the judicial process, the significance of separation of powers, and the 
level of the Council members' willingness to abide by some or all of these principles. 
The question on whether or not a representative would vote on a bill that is popular, yet 
undemocratic aims to examine whether the Council members understand and accept the 
principle of due process of law. The question on constitutional amendments will indicate 
the extent to which Council members abide by Constitution and respect its paramount 
significance. The question concerning the accountability of the Cabinet and the President 
will indicate the Council members' understanding of the principle of separation of powers. 
As for the question on which should be the highest source of interpretation of the law and 
the constitution, it gives information on the importance of the role of the judiciary in the 
political process. 
For each question in this section, the Council members were provided with examples or 
explanations in case they needed any clarifications. In general, however, the Council 
members' understanding of the questions was very good. 
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4.2.1. Voting behaviour 
Council members were asked how they would vote on a bill that was popular, but regarded 
as being undemocratic according to democratic tenets. The majority of Council members, 
58.1%, answered that they would vote against the bill, whilst 20.9% of the Council 
members said that they would abstain firom voting. About 16.3% of the Council members 
replied that they would still vote for the bill. 
Firure 49: 
Being a representative of the 
people, how would you vote on a 
bill that is popular, yet regarded 
upon as being undemocratic 
according to democratic tenets? 
I would vote for the bill 
I would vote against the bill 
I would abstain from voting 
No answer 
16 . 3% 
58.1% 
20.9% 
4.7 
0% lo% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 700A 
N=43 
From this question, it becomes clear that the majority of the interviewed Council members 
would vote responsibly as they are willing to sacrifice popular sentiments in favour of their 
democratic principles. 
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4.2.2. Constitutional amendments 
When the Council members were asked how the Constitution should be amended, 67.4% 
responded that it should be amended by a two-third majority vote in the Legislative 
Council. Only 4.7% of the interviewed Council members answered that a simple 
parliamentary majority should amend the Constitution. In fact, the Council members 
preferred a referendum amongst the people to a simple parliamentary majority. It is also 
significant that none of the Council members thought that the President should be able to 
arnend the Constitution unilaterally. 
Fi--ure 50. 
In principle, the constitution 
should be amended by. 
A simple parliamentary majority 
AW majority 
A referendum amongst the people 
No answer 
U% I U'Yb ZU'70 JU')b 4U'70 OU')b OU'70 f V7b OV')b 
The majority of the Council members replying that the Constitution should only be 
amended by a two-third majority, indicates their understanding of the draft Palestinian 
Basic Law and their seriousness where the Constitution is concerned. This is reinforced by 
the large number of Council members who opted for a constitutional amendment through a 
referendum amongst the people rather than through a simple parliamentary majority. These 
'm 
,a 
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answers testify to the commitment that the Council members feel to uphold and protect the 
future Palestinian Constitution. 
It is important to keep in mind that, until this day, there is still no Constitution to set out the 
rules in the Palestinian autonomous areas. The draft Basic Law, which is the transitional 
Constitution for the duration of the interim period, has gone through three readings in the 
Legislative Council. Since September 1997, the approved version of the Basic Law by the 
Legislative Council has been with President Arafat, who is supposed to ratify the law before 
it can be enacted. Proposed legislation usually becomes law automatically, if it has not been 
ratified by the President one month after it has been handed to him. However, although this 
month has long passed, the Basic Law can still not be enacted, because before it becomes 
legal, it has to be published in the Official Gazette. Permission for publication in the 
Official Gazette can only be given by President Arafat. On 28 December 1998, Arafat - 
after being pressured by the members of the Legislative Council, by various NGOs and by 
members of his own Fatah group - promised the Legislative Council that he would ratify the 
Basic Law, but not in the form it was presented to him. He requested the Council members 
to divide the Basic Law into various separate laws and for it not to be called or seen as the 
"Basic Law". This might indicate that president Arafat is not against the content of the 
Basic Law, but wants to avoid the ratification of a Constitution in this interim phase by a 
Palestinian government whose powers are limited by the interim peace agreements with 
Israel. 
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4.23. AccountabUity 
4.2.3.1. AccountabilLty of the President 
The Council members were asked to whom, in their opinion, the President should be 
accountable. As illustrated in figure 51 below, an overwhelming majority of the Council 
members, 90.5%, answered that the President should be accountable to the Legislative 
Council. When responding to this question, the Council members were allowed to choose 
more than one option. 3"8 In this case, their second choice was that the President should be 
accountable to the people: 32.6% of the Council members stated this view. The fact that 
the Council members' first option was the Legislative Council, and their second choice was 
the people, indicates that Council members take their responsibility as representatives of the 
people seriously. Indeed, they did not give the Cabinet or the Courts of Law as a second 
option as to whom the president should be accountable. The Council members chose the 
people. 
Firure 51: 
Perception of the Council Members as to Whom the 
President Should be Accountable 
The PLC 90.5 
N=71 
Presklerit above aocDun 2.4% 
The Courts of Low 2.4% 
The People 4.8% 
308 More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 4 of the thesis. 
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A similar question was asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in May 1995. As 
figure 52 indicates, the popular response is very different from that of the Council 
members. Although the surveyed people at that time agreed with the Council members that 
the Parliament should hold the President accountable, they did so to a much lesser extent. 
This is not surprising in as far that it is natural that the Council members would defend the 
role of their own institution. Only 36.91/o of the interviewees thought that the parliament 
should hold the president accountable, whilst 32.9% said that the Courts of Law should do 
so. Moreover, only 5.1 % of the interviewees responded that the people should hold the 
President accountable, which is slightly less than the number of interviewees who replied 
that the President is above accountability. It should be noted, however, that the public 
might have changed its views on the subject since May 1995 as, at that time, the general 
elections had not yet taken place and the Legislative Council was not yet established. 
Firure 52: 
Whom Must Hold the President Accountable? 
According to the General Public 
Parliament 
Cabinet 
Courts of law 
President above accountability 
People 
More than one of the above 
God/Islam 
No answer 
Source: JMCC, May 1995 
0% lo% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
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4.2.3.2. Accountability of the Cabinet 
The Council members were also asked to whom they thought the Cabinet should be 
accountable. As indicated in figure 53 below, a surprisingly small number of Council 
members responded that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council. The 
majority of the surveyed Council members, 47.6%, said as stipulated in the draft Basic Law, 
that the Cabinet should be accountable to the President. However, as with the previous 
question, the Council members were, here also, allowed to choose more than one option. -'09 
In this case, the majority of the Council members, 65.1 %, opted for a second choice that the 
Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council. 
Firure 53: 
Perception of Council Members as to Whom 
the Cabinet Should be Accountable 
Law & Courts 11 
26.2% 
The PLC 
26.2% 
The President 20 
47.6% 
N=73 
With regard to this question, the Council members were clearly divided over whether the 
Cabinet should be accountable to the Parliament or to the President. Some Council 
members seemed to prefer a system similar to the British one, where the Cabinet is 
309 More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 6 of the thesis. 
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accountable to the Parliament. Others felt that the American system, where the Cabinet is 
accountable to the President, is preferable. In either case, the supreme power remains with 
the Parliament as most Council members, as stated earlier, pointed out that the President is 
accountable to the Parliament. 
4.2.4. Highest source of interpretation 
When asked, which, in their opinion, should be the highest source of interpretation of the 
law and the Constitution, 46.5% of the Council members who filled up the questionnaire, 
responded that the High Court should be the highest source of interpretation. As is clear 
from figure 54 below, significantly, none of the Council members thought that the President 
or the religious institutions should be the highest source of interpretation. 
Fizure 54. 
Which in your opinion 
should be the highest 
source of interpretation? 
"ME" Ai ýJOOOF 
The parliament 
The High Court 
Constitutional Court 
Parliament + High Court 
No answer 
lo% 20% 30% 40% so% 60% 
'm 
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The replies of the Council members indicate their respect for the principle of separation of 
powers and show that they have a clear idea of the responsibilities of each institution under 
this principle. 
In general, one can conclude from these results that, according to the selected criteria, 
Council members do have a high sense of democratic awareness, whilst at the same time 
they acknowledge the limits of their institution. Indeed, although they believe that the 
president is ultimately accountable to the Legislative Council, the results of the survey also 
indicated that in two instances they believe in the principle of separation of powers. Firstly, 
they stated that the High Court should interpret the law and the Constitution. Secondly, the 
Council members gave the President the authority over the Cabinet. 
4.2.5. Level of adherence by Council members to other basic democratic principles 
The results in figure 55 below, illustrate a very strong belief amongst Council members 
about some other basic democratic rights and principles than those discussed above. When 
Council members were asked about the principle of separation between state and religion, 
59.5% said that they believed in this principle, whilst 30.9% of the Council members said 
they did not. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 93.0%, said 
they believed in individual rights, whilst none of the Council members replied that they did 
not believe in individual rights. Furthermore, 93.0% of the Council members believed in 
the rule of the majority, whilst 88.4% believeO in respecting the rights of minorities. About 
97.6% of the Council members believed in judicial review, compared to only 2.4% who did 
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not. Nearly all Council members, 97.6%, believed in freedom of assembly, whilst 90.7% of 
the Council members acknowledged the rights of opposition. Lastly, 95.4% of the 
interviewed Council members believed in the freedom of press, whilst only 2.3% did not. 
About 2.3% remained undecided on the issue. 
Aftitude of Council Members Regarding Various Issues 
Separation between state & religion 
Individual rights 
Rule of majority 
Rights of minority 
Judicial review 
Freedom of assembly 
Rights of opposition 
Freedom of press 
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Similar questions on some of the democratic rights discussed above were put before the 
general public in a survey conducted by the JMCC in May 1995. From the results presented 
in table 37 below, it becomes clear that the Council members have a much higher 
democratic awareness than the public does. When asked about the right of the government 
to intervene in some democratic freedoms and rights, only 39.7% of the surveyed people 
replied that the government should not intervene with people's freedom of expression. 
Only 26.2% of the people said that the government should not intervene in freedom of 
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assembly. Only 29.2% of the interviewees said that the government has no right to interfere 
with the opposition, but 53.8% answered that the goverment should not interfere with their 
individual rights. In short, on average between 10% to 15% of the surveyed people said 
that the government always has the right to interfere with the rights and freedoms selected 
in table 36. 
Table 36. Does the rovernment have the rikht to Intervene In: 
All the time Sometimes No intervention No opinion/NA 
Freedom of expression 11.7% 44.8% 39.7% 3.8% 
Freedom of assembly 17.5% 50.5% 26.2% 5.8% 
Individual rights 10.0% 28.01/o 53.8% 8.2% 
OnDosition 15.0% 38.4% 29.2% 17.4% 
N=1069 
Unlike with the public, the results on the questions put before the Council members 
presented in figure 55 above speak for themselves. In conclusion, based on the survey 
results, there is no doubt that a huge majority of the Council members not only know the 
selected democratic principles, but also believe in these principles and rights. This leads 
the author to conclude that whatever criticisms are expressed about the Legislative Council 
and whatever causes a less than perfect perfortnance of the Legislative Council, it is not 
resulting from a lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of democracy or democratic values 
on the part of the Council members. 
4.3. WILLINGNESS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS TO ACT ACCORDING TO BASIC 
DEMOCRATIC TENETS 
Whilst, in general, people accept certain principles such as justice, equality or rule of law, 
they often act differently when confronted with specific incidents or situations. In this 
section, the researcher will attempt to assess the extent to which Council members are 
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willing to act and vote on specific issues. In this regard, a number of questions were put to 
the Council members. These questions were designed in a manner that the answers will 
reflect whether the Council members act according to the principles of democracy. 
Before analysing the level of agreement amongst Council members on various issues, it is 
necessary to outline how the questions were presented to Council members and how their 
responses were measured. The Council members were presented with a variety of 
statements, and were asked to express their level of agreement or disagreement with these 
statements on a scale of I to 5, whereby "I" stands for "strongly agree", and 'T' for 
"strongly disagree". For the purpose of this study, "I" and 'T' were interpreted as "agree", 
whereas "4" and "5" were interpreted as "disagree". If Council members ticked number 3 
on a certain question, it was understood as "neither" or "middle", i. e. the Council member 
in question was undecided or hesitant on the topic, and could neither agree or disagree with 
the statement. 
It is also necessary to point out that the percentages presented in figures 57,58,59 and 61, 
are so-called "valid percentages". This means that the Council members who filled in a 
questionnaire, but did not give their opinion about the statements in these figures, are not 
included in the results. In other words, the value of "missing" or "no answer" has been 
excluded. 
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4.3.1. Adherence to the Constitution and reliance on religious interpretation 
As becomes clear from figure 56, Council members answered very differently on the 
questions of whether the ideal Council member should adhere to the constitution, and 
whether he/she should rely on religious interpretation. 
About 93.0% of the Council members who filled in the questionnaires, agreed that the ideal 
Council member should adhere to the Constitution, but, in fact, 100% of the Council 
members who actually answered this question agreed that the ideal Council member should 
adhere to the Constitution. This result indicates that Council members, in general, are very 
democratically aware. 
On the question of whether Council members should rely on religious interpretation, 
opinion was much more divided. Whereas the majority of the Council members who 
answered this question disagreed with the proposition, 9.3% of those who answered said 
that they did think that the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation. 
About 11.6% of the Council members were undecided on the topic, and could neither agree 
nor disagree. Significant, however, is that 51.2% of the Council members interviewed 
refused to answer the question. It is the researcher's contention that the refusal of most 
Council members to answer this question is a reflection of their disapproval with relying on 
religious interpretation. It also implies that Council members realise the sensitivities 
involved in the role of religion and, as such, they refused to be portrayed as opponents to 
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religious interpretation. One should, indeed, bear in mind, that in general, religion remains 
an 
important factor in Palestinian society. Nevertheless, despite these religious influences, the 
majority of Council members who answered the question disagreed with the statement that 
the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation, and opted for a more 
pragmatic approach. 
Fikure 56. 
The Ideal Council Member Should: 
Disagree 
27.9% 
Agree 
93.0% 
Neither 
11.6% Agree 
9.3% 
Adhere to the Constitution 
n=43 
Missing 
7.0% 
4.3.2. Breaking the law to protect national security 
The statement in figure 57 below says that there are some situations in which the PA is 
justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security. A majority of 58.5% of the 
Council members who responded to this statement disagreed, whilst 29.2% agreed. About 
12.2% were unsure whether to agree or not. 
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51.2% 
Rely on religious interpretation 
n=43 
Flimre 5 7. 
There are Some Situations in which the PA is Justified in 
Breaking Laws in order to Protect National Security 
Level of Agreeme -: xý- ýý *'ý-- -ribers 
Agree 
29.2% 
Disagree 
58.6% 
In any case, the significance of there being a majority who did not think that the Authority 
is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security becomes even more 
significant when considered in its context. Indeed, even given the situation of uncertainty 
in the political developments, the majority of the Council members did not agree that there 
are some situations in which the PA is justified in breaking laws. In saying so, the Council 
members were much more "responsible" than the people they represent. In a public opinion 
poll conducted by the JMCC in May 1995,1069 people from the West Bank (including 
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were asked the same question. About 75.5% of the people 
surveyed said that in some situations the PA should be allowed to break the law. Only 
19.3% of the interviewees responded that they did not think that there were any situations in 
which the PA would be justified in breaking laws, whilst 5.0% of the surveyed people did 
not express an opinion. 
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NeMW N=41 
12.2% 
4.3.3. Impeachment of the President 
The statement presented in figure 58 is concerned with the principle of impeachment of the 
President if he acts against the Constitution. Whilst 19.0% of the Council members 
disagreed that the president should be impeached if he acted against the Constitution, 
47.6% agreed. Abdul Jawad Saleh, Minister of Agriculture at the time of the interview and 
a member of the Legislative Council, was one of the Council members clearly in favour of 
the principle of impeachment and expressed this to the researcher as follows: 
"I promoted the idea of impeachment of the President ... I think that no person, 
whatever his status, should be exempted from questioning and interrogating, or 
should be exemptedfrom such a democratic procedure. P, 3 10 
Meanwhile, a large number of Council members remained undecided on this issue, with 
33.3% of Council members saying that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
statement. When Jamil Rabah, a pollster and political analyst was asked about the reasons 
behind the high number of hesitant Council members on this issue, he explained to the 
researcher: 
'The issue of impeachment against President Arafat was brought up by several 
Council members in the aftermath of the release of the corruption report. Most of 
the Council members at the time refused the principle of impeachment because of 
the political ramifications ofsuch a decision. Your question on impeachment came 
at a time when the issue was still very much in the minds ofthe Council members. 
That is why many were hesitant to state their position in your questionnaire. "311 
310 The interview widi Abdul Jawad Saleh was conducted in Ramallah on Saturday 23 August 1997. 
311 The interview with Jamil Rabah was conducted in Ramallah on 9 November 1998. 
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If the President Acts against the Constitution, He 
should be Impeached 
Level of Agreement Amongst Council members 
Neith( 
33.31 
Agree 
47.6% 
N=42 
Disagree 
19.0% 
The people seemed to be more outspoken about the issue of impeachment of the President 
than the Council members. Perhaps this could be explained by the absence of the issue of 
impeachment, which, as discussed earlier was a "hot" issue in the Legislative Council at the 
time of the survey of the Council members. The general public, when answering the 
question on impeaclunent was not pressured by a political event, as was the case in the 
Legislative Council. As a result, in the same public opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in 
May 1995,68.8% of the people said that they favoured the principle of impeachment of the 
President by the Parlimnent. About 22.9% of the people surveyed disagreed with the 
principle of impeachment, whilst 8.3% did not answer the question. 
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43.4. Women in the Legislative Council 
The statement in figure 59 is concerned with the importance of having women in the 
Legislative Council. An overwhelming majority of 87.8% of the Council members agree 
that it is important to have women in the Legislative Council. Only 7.3% of the Council 
members think that it is not important to have women in the Legislative Council, whilst 
4.9% of the Council members remain unsure about the issue. 
Fl-aure 59: 
3a 
N=41 
it is certain from the answers on the above question that the Council members do believe in 
the rights of women to participate in the Legislative Council and, thus, to hold positions. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that initiatives or laws concerning women issues 
pass easily in the Legislative Council. The suggestion to establish a Women Affairs 
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It is Important to have Women in the 
Legislative Council 
Level of Agreement Amongst Council memters 
Committee is one example of an initiative which to this date did not pass the vote. As 
Marwan Bargouthi explained to the researcher: 
"You know that during the discussions four months ago, I suggested in the 
Legislative Council to establish a Women Affairs Committee. And there were hot 
discussions in the Council, but unfortunately my suggestion was rejected by voting. 
We got 20 votes with, and 18 against. So, we have the majority. But to change, we 
need 51 persons present in the Council. So, itfailed But we will repeat that and I 
don't think that the majority ofthe Council doesn't support the women. Part ofthe 
Council is very conservative and very religious, but we have a group who is 
absolutely with the women's'rights. We are the group ofthe women! # 312 
Albeit the resolution to establish a Women Affairs Committee did not materialise, it is the 
researcher's belief that this is by no means an indication of a rejection or disapproval by 
Council members of women rights. The failure to pass such a resolution is perhaps 
indicative to the apathy Council members have concerning social issues. Many Council 
members indicated to the researcher that, in their opinion, political considerations are not 
only more important, but paramount. 
As illustrated in figure 60, the general public also feels strongly - albeit less than the 
Council members - about the importance of having women in the Legislative Council. 
Indeed, 71.4% of the interviewees responded that it was important to have women in the 
Legislative Council, compared to 22.4% who said that it is not important to have women in 
the Legislative Council. Also, worth mentioning is the gap in opinions between men and 
women on this issue. As could be expected, a far larger number of female respondents 
stated that it was important to have women in the Council. 
312 The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Rarnallah on Friday 19 September 1997. 
248 
Firsire 60. 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Level of Importance of Having Women in the Legislative Council 
43.5. Alcohol drinking as a personal choice 
The statement in figure 61 below attempts to took at Council members' opinion on personal 
liberties through the question of whether or not drinking alcohol is a personal choice. The 
statement on drinking alcohol was chosen on purpose as it was deemed an extreme example 
of personal freedom in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, a surprising 56.4% of the Council 
members said that drinking alcohol was a personal choice and should not be treated as a 
crime. About 30.8% of the Council members did not agree that drinking was a personal 
choice and were of the opinion that it should be treated as a crime, whilst 12.8% were 
undecided on the topic and could neither agree nor disagree with the statement. 
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Yes No No opinion 
Firsire 61: 
Alcohol Drinking is a Personal Choice and Should not 
be Treated as a Crime 
Level of Agreement Amongst Council Members 
Disagree 
30.8% 
39 
The results in figure 61, above, indicate that the Council members, even in an entity where 
the majority of the people are Muslim and are - according to the Koran - not supposed to 
drink alcohol, have a liberal and tolerant attitude. Moreover, the results show that the 
majority of the Council members do not merely accept the principle of personal freedoms as 
a concept, but believe in it as a basic tenet of democracy. This extreme example illustrates 
the willingness of the Council members to act on the principles they believe in, even in a 
case that is presumably inconsistent with their own behaviour and preferences. 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
In general, the researcher, based upon the survey results in this chapter, reached four main 
conclusions. 
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Firstly, the majority of the Council members have a common understanding of what 
democracy refers to. Not only was there a consensus amongst most of the surveyed Council 
members that Western countries are more democratic dian Arab countries, in most cases, 
their answers also paralleled the classification of countries by respected scholars in 
democmcy. 
Secondly, the majority of Council members clearly show a positive attitude towards the 
agreed upon principles commonly regarded as tenets of democracy. 
Thirdly, the responses of the Council members to questions on specific cases reflect their 
willingness to act upon the principles of democracy in practice. 
Fourthly, Council members show a grasp and belief in democracy that extends to a level 
beyond that of the public. They are more democratically aware and their answers indicate 
that their priority as Council members is to uphold the principles of democracy and not 
merely to represent the public irrespective of what democracy entails. 
The knowledge, belief and adherence by the Council members in basic tenets of democracy 
lead the researcher to conclude that when the Legislative Council and its members are 
assessed in isolation from other actors such as the Executive Authority, the PLO and Israel, 
the potential to evolve from a partial democracy to a full-fledged democracy does exist in 
the Palestinian autonomous areas. 
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PART TWO: 
DOES THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PLAY AN 
EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE SYSTEM? 
ABSTRACT 
Having established in Part One of this thesis that the first Palestinian Legislative 
Council is an effective democratic institution in its formation and is operating in a way 
which reflects democratic values, Part Two will examine whether this Legislative 
institution plays an effective role in the Palestinian political arena. The means used in 
this assessment are, again, primarily those of testing perceptions. 
In the following chapters, the researcher will analyse the relationships between the 
Legislative Council and different institutions within Palestinian society, including its 
relationship with the Executive Authority, with president Yasser Arafat, and with the 
PLO. In addition, the impact of Israeli policies and practices upon the performance of 
the Legislative Council and the process of democratisation in the autonomous areas will 
be examined. 
A closer look at the interaction between the various actors mentioned above will point 
to two conclusions. Firstly, although the Legislative Council can be considered to be 
internally democratic, its effectiveness as a legislative body in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas is restricted. Secondly, the slow progress on the Palestinian 
democratisation track is caused both by the nature of the Palestinian Authority and the 
Israeli measures and policies. Over the following chapters, the author intends to pursue 
the theme that a fundamental change in Israeli policies, accompanied by a swift 
improvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, are paramount prerequisites for 
effective democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas and, more specifically, for 
the Legislative Council to play a more effective role. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND 
PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter attention will be focused on outlining the structure of the Palestinian 
government as it is prone to many ambiguities. In addition, an overview will be provided 
of the various schools of thinking concerning political development in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas. In short, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary 
background information on both the structure of the Palestinian Authority and the way it is 
viewed, in order for the researcher to be able to build up the argument more clearly in the 
following chapters. 
5.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
Before providing details of the structure of the Palestinian Authority, it was thought useful 
to give a short background of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and this for 
mainly three reasons: 
I. The Palestinian Authority was established as a result of the negotiations between 
the PLO and Ismel. 
2. To this date the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people and its 
jurisdiction is higher than that of the Palestinian Authority. 
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3. As will be discussed in section 5.1.2.2. of this chapter, there is no clear dividing 
line between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. 
5.1.1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation 
5.1.1.1. Background 
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded by a group of Palestinian figures 
upon a decision by the Arab League in 1964 in Jerusalem to act as a body to address 
Palestinian concerns and aspirations. Various institutions were created to coordinate, decide 
and implement the goals of the PLO. One of those institutions was the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC) or the Palestinians' quasi-parliament. 
The PNC was set up to form the legislative body of the PLO. Its members were not elected, 
but mainly appointed by the PLO's Executive Committee. The appointments always took 
into consideration the representation of Palestinians world-wide. After Arafat became the 
chairman of the PLO in 1969, the Palestinian military factions were also included in the 
PNC. 
The Executive Committee is the Executive branch of the PLO. Its powers are wide and it 
has operational control over the PLO's sub-organisations and the budget. The eighteen 
members of the Executive Committee are elected by the PNC. 
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5.1.1.2. The political development of the PLO 
The June 1967 war, which led to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, had a major impact on the PLO. At that time, the rhetoric of the PLO leadership was 
not perceived by the Palestinians as effective in dealing with the new realities and the 
Israeli occupation of the remaining part of Palestine. In the meantime, the successful 
military activities against Israel by such Palestinian military movements as Fatah (headed 
by Yasser Arafat) and the PFLP (headed by George Habash) provided those factions with 
more clout within the Palestinian circles. As a result, by 1969, Arafat took over the 
chairmanship of the PLO and the main activities of the organisation began to revolve 
around fighting the Israeli occupation. The impact of Arafat's take-over was large. 
According to Hussain Mohamad, adjunct professor at Northern Kentucky University, in the 
Palestine-Israel Journal: 
'The take-over of the PLO in 1969 by Fatah under the chairmanship of Yasser 
Arafat was a watershed in the history of the Palestinian movement, raising the hopes 
ofPalestinians everywhere. 013 
In 1974, the PLO was recognised by both the United Nations and the Arab League as the 
sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Since then, the PLO emerged 
as a strong body with effective control over many Palestinians, especially those Palestinians 
in the refugee camps located in many of the Arab countries. This control included 
responsibilities over the health, education, social affairs and security of the residents in 
those refugee camps. VAiilst the PLO's control was limited in some countries such as 
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Syria, for example, it was extremely wide for some time in countries such as Jordan and 
Lebanon. 
The PLO's military involvement first in Jordan and later in Lebanon produced major 
developments that culminated in the forced deportation of the PLO leadership from 
Lebanon to Tunis in 1982. This development reduced the military posture of the PLO to an 
almost negligible level and left the PLO leadership no other alternative but to follow a more 
diplomatic and political course. 
With the emption of the Intifadah in late 1987, the PLO gained a new momentum. The 
strength of the Intifadah and the gains it generated led the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to 
capitalise on this success and to start establishing new bases of support in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. 
The success of the Intifadah and the absence of a relatively effective military posture 
bordering the Occupied Territories ffirther transfonned the PLO's strategy which was based 
on armed struggle to a more realistic one, represented by the willingness to proceed with a 
political process to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, in November 1988, the PLO in its 
18'h session of the PNC in Algiers accepted United Nations Security Resolutions 242 and 
338, which implied a recognition of the state of Israel. In this session, the PLO declared 
313 Moharnad, H., "The Changing Meaning of Statehood in PLO Ideology and Practice", Palestine-Israel 
Journal, (6), no. 2,1999, p. 10. 
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Palestinian independence. In this declaration, the Palestinian leadership expressed its 
vision of the state of Palestine: 
"a. The State of Palestine is the state ofPalestinians wherever they may be. The 
state isfor them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs 
to pursue in it a complete equality of rights. In it will be safeguarded their 
political and religious convictions and their human dignity by means of a 
parliamentary democratic system of governance, itsetf based on freedom of 
expression and thefteedom toform parties. The rights of the minorities will duly 
be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the 
majority. Governance will be based on principles ofsocialjustice, equality and 
non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, 
religion, colour or sex, and the aegis ofa constitution which ensures the rule of 
law and an independentjudiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure 
from Palestine's age-old spiritual and civilisational heritage oftolerance and 
religious coexistence. 
b. The State ofPalestine proclaims its commitment to the principles andpurposes 
of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. It 
proclaims its commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non- 
Aligned Movement. )314 
The diplomatic and political efforts of the PLO were soon damaged by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 when the PLO's position vis-i-vis the war was not clearly in favour of the 
Kuwaitis. The conclusion of the war, nonetheless, introduced another momentum. This 
time, the international community launched an initiative in an attempt to end the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and to proceed with the vision of a "New World Order", outlined by 
President George Bush in the aftennath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, on 30 
October 1991 the Madrid Conference convened and the Palestinian side was represented by 
a non-PLO joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. 
http: //www. Miftah. org/documents/dependence//. htxnl. 
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The aftermath of the conference saw a number of bilateral and multilateral meetings. 
However, whilst these negotiations were taking place, secret meetings between Israel and 
the PLO were underway in Oslo. These meetings led to the conclusion of an agreement 
between the PLO and Israel, called the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The signing of this 
agreement on 13 September 1993 set the cornerstone of the peace process and provided the 
basis upon which the Palestinian Authority was established. 
5.1.2. The Palestinian Authority 
In this section, the structure of the Palestinian Authority as agreed upon in the peace 
agreements between Israel and the PLO will be outlined. In addition, the ambiguities that 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority brought with it will be overviewed. 
5.1.2.1. Structure of the Palestinian Authori 
The structure of the Palestinian Authority was first outlined in the Declaration of Principles 
signed in Washington between the PLO and Israel on 13 September 1993. The details of 
the structure and the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority were later specified in the 
Ismeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed between 
the parties in Washington on 28 September 1995. 
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The Palestinian Authority consists of two main branches: on the one hand, the Executive 
Authority, headed by Ra'eeS315 Yasser Arafat, and, on the other hand, theLegislative 
Council. Indeed, as stipulated in Article 3 of the Interim agreement: 
"Both the Raees of the Executive Authority and the Palestinian Council constitute 
the Palestinian Interim Seý(-Government Authority which will be elected by the 
Palestinian people. Y316 
According to Article 3.7 317 of the Interim agreement, the organisation, structure and 
functioning of the Counci, 318 should be in accordance with the Interim Agreement. All 
meetings of the Council and its committees, with the exception of the Executive Authority 
should be open. 
The Council, according to article 3 319 of the Interim agreement, is granted the Legislative 
320 
and Executive powers. According to Article 18 , the legislative powers of the Council 
imply primary and secondary legislation, including a Basic Law and other laws and 
regulations. The Basic Law or any other law should not contravene with the Agreement. 
However, article 18 also grants the president of the Executive Authority the power to 
initiate or propose legislation to the Council and to promulgate legislation adopted by the 
Council. Moreover, the President is empowered to issue secondary legislation and 
315 Hereinafter the researcher will use "Presidenf' instead of "Ra'ees! '. 
316 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreeme , p. 12. 
317 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Aweeme , p. 12. 
318 When in the Interim agreement reference is made to "die Councir', it actually refers to "the Palestinian 
Authority". This is one of the ambiguities resulting from the peace accords. This ambiguity in terminology will 
be discussed in greater detail in section 5.1.2.2 of this chapter. 
319 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim AgLceme , p. 12. 
259 
regulations "relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary 
legislation adopted by the Council. "321 
Axticle 18.4. a states that any legislation that is inconsistent with the Declaration of 
principles, the interim agreement or any other agreement between Israel and the PLO is 
void. 
"a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or 
military orders, which exceeds thejurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise 
inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other 
Agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, 
shall have no effect and shall be void ad initio. 
b. The Raees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate 
legislation adopted by the Council if such legislationfalls under the provision of this 
paragraph. 322 
According to article 5 323 of the Interim agreement, all executive powers granted to the 
Council under this agreement "shall be bestowed with the Executive AuthoriV' of the 
Council and will be executed on behalf of the Council. All decision-making processes and 
internal procedures shall be detennined by the Executive Authority. The president shall be 
a member of the Executive Authority by virtue of his position. 
320 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agree p. 20. 
321 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Aueem p. 20. 
322 JMCC, Ismoli-Patestinian Interim Ageemen , p. 
20. 
323 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12-13. 
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5.1.2.2. Ambiguities and difficulties caused by the structure of the PA 
The limitations imposed on the Palestinian Authority by the agreements with Israel created 
a climate full of contradictions and prone to many interpretations. As a result, three 
ambiguities or difficulties that affect the less than optimal performance of the Palestinian 
Authority, were identified by the researcher: 
1. The functioning of the Palestinian Authority is affected by the internal disputes 
between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council because of the 
ambiguous terminology used in the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements. 
2. The performance of the Palestinian Authority is affected by the dual power structure 
between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as a result of the lack of a proper legal 
fi-amework determining the relationship between both. 
3. The fimctioning of the Palestinian Authority is not optimal as a result of the 
limitations Israel put on this institution in the peace agreements. 
It is the researcher's belief that the performance or functioning of the Palestinian Authority 
might be affected by a combination of the above stated difficulties. They will be shortly 
outlined below, and will be discussed in detail in chapters seven and eight of this thesis. 
5.1.2 2.1. The Executive Authority and the Legislative Council 
In examining the first view, part of the strained relationship between the Executive 
Authority and the Legislative Council could be explained by the ambiguous description of 
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the tasks of the different branches of the Palestinian Authority in the peace agreements. 
Indeed, the name 'Palestinian Authority' is only mentioned in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; 
in the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority is 
referred to as 'the Council'. It may be suggested that part of the confusion amongst the 
general public about the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council, and the antagoniSM324 
between the Legislative Council and the Executive branch, can be explained by the 
language used in the agreements. Many are confused because, in the Interim Agreement, 
the 'Council' does not only imply the parliament, but the whole Palestinian Authority, 
whereas, in reality, the term 'Council' is only used to refer to the Legislative Council, 
which is part of the Palestinian Authority. Nabil Shaath affirmed these findings in an 
interview with the researcher: 
'There is no PNA in the Interim Agreement. PNA only exists in the Gaza-Jericho 
, Aja325 iated Agreement. When we came to the Interim Agreement, which Abu negot 
they already carved a rolefor the Council that is really a mix up, because the word 
'Council' mentioned in the agreement is really a synonymfor the Palestine National 
Authority. Ifyou go to the agreement, there is no PNA. It is always the Council, the 
authority ofthe Council, the work ofthe Council, association between Israel and the 
Council. That gave me a lot oftrouble with donors when this Interim Agreement 
was signed Some donors wanted to change all the agreements and turn themftom 
the Palestinian Authorily to the Council. Isaid. not the Council, it is a misnomer 
now. The Council now is not a unique Council, it is now a parliamentary Council, 
separatedfrom the branch of the Executive Authority. 326 
The difficult relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
324 See Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
325 Abu 'Ala is Ahmed Qrei', the Speaker of the Legislative Council. 
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5.1.2 2.2. The Palestinian Authority and the PLO 
The ambiguous relationship and the duality of authority between the Palestinian Authority 
and the PLO created confusion. The main cause of this confusion stems from the fact that 
the source of powers and limitations of both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority are 
different. As becomes clear from figure 62, below, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority 
have separate legal fi-ameworks and there is no legal framework that determines the 
relationship between both. As a result, many perceive the Palestinian Authority as a 
permanent structure replacing the PLO. This is clearly not the case. The structures of the 
Palestinian Authority are a result of the Oslo agreements and their mandate is limited in 
time to the interim agreement. As article IIIA of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, reads: 
'The Council and the Raees [president] ofthe Executive Authority ofthe Council 
shall he electedfor a transitional period not exceedingfive yearsfrom the signing of 
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4,1994. . 327 
Moreover, there is confusion, for example, over whether the Executive Authority or the 
Executive Committee should be the executive institution making decisions on behalf of the 
Palestinian people. Also, the Legislative Council members are automatically members of 
the Palestinian National Council, leading many to wonder whether or not the Legislative 
Council forms a part of the PNC structure. 
326 The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997. 
327 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreemeg, p. 12. 
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Ficure 62: 
Structure of Palestinian Political Institutions 
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In the absence of a legal fi-amework determining the relationship between the Palestinian 
Authority and the PLO, the researcher finds the confusion hardly surprising. As Yezid 
Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki wrote: 
'The absence ofa basic law or other constitutional document has led to continuing 
legal ambiguity about the precise powers and responsibilities of each branch of the 
Palestinian government. ... The confusion of mandates and overlap ofauthority between PLO and PA institutions has impeded transparency, accountability, the 
rule oflaw, and other elements ofgood governance. 328 
The ambiguous relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority will be further 
analysed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
3211 Sayigh, Y. and Shikaki, K., (Principal Authors) Strengthening Palestinian Public Instituti , United States 
of America: The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1999, pp. 34-35. 
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1. Z23. Israel 
The demands set by Israel in the agreements further add to the confusion and paralyse the 
proper functioning of the Palestinian Authority. This is evident in many of the articles of 
the agreement. To this researcher, the most stringent demands are those pertainirýg to the 
fulfillment of the Palestinian Authority of its responsibilities according to this agreement to 
prevent any actions that Israel considers harniful to its state or Israeli citizens. The other 
major restriction in the view of this researcher is article 18.4. a, referred to in section 5.1.2.1 
of this chapter, which stipulates that the President of- the Executive Authority should 
prevent the promulgation of a law that passed the Legislative Council if this law is 
determined by Israel to be in contravention with the Interim Agreement. To many 
observers, Israel's wide intexpretations in this regard placed the Palestinian Authority under 
great pressure. 
The Israeli demands and restrictions, described above, can be directly observed. Other 
difficulties in the Palestinian Authority were an outcome of Israeli measures and practices. 
Indeed, the continuous building of Jewish settlements, the isolation of Jerusalem, the 
restrictions on movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip led to an increase in 
criticisms of the Palestinian Authority. In other words, Israeli violations reflected negatively 
on the Palestinian Authority. 
In Chapter Eight of this thesis, the researcher will assess in greater detail the impact of the 
demands, restrictions and violations on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority as well 
as on its democratic and human rights record. 
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5.2. PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN 
AUTONOMOUS AREAS 
5.2.1. Public perceptions 
There is a general sense amongst public opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that 
democratic development in these areas is negligible and that the democratisation record of 
the Palestinian Authority has not been good. When asked in a survey conducted in 
December 1997 329 about the perception of the democratic situation under the Palestinian 
Authority, 41.2% of the 1147 people surveyed said that the democratic situation under the 
PA is either bad or very bad, compared to only 28.1 % who said that it was either good or 
very good. About 30.8% of the interviewees considered the democratic situation under the 
Palestinian Authority nor good nor bad. 
Firure 63: 
Public Perception of the Democratic Situation under 
the Palestinian Authority 
December 1997 
Bad 
17.2% 
Good nor bad 
30.8% 
Very bad 
24.0% 
Good 
19.1% 
Very good 
9.0% 
4=1147 
329 Rabah, J., Palestinian Public QRinion Since the Peace Process, Jerusalem The Arab Thought Fonun, July 
1998. 
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The surveyed people were also asked to specify what, in their opinion, caused the 
Palestinian Authority to act undemocratically. As shown in figure 64, below, only 12.3% of 
the respondents said that the nature of the Palestinian Authority is the cause of its 
undemocratic practices. 330 Of the interviewees, 40.5% said that the nature of the PA and the 
Israeli measures combined are the cause of the undemocratic measures of the PA, whilst 
another 42.9% said that the Israeli practices and measures are the only reason why the PA 
acts undemocratically. 
Firure 64: 
Cause of the Undemocratic Measures of the 
Palestinian Authority 
December 1997 
Israeli practices 
42.4% 
Nature of PA 
12.4% 
-I= 1110 
Other re 
4.51ý 
As becomes clear from figure 64, above, the respondents were not given the option to 
respond that the nature of Arab society or Arab culture is responsible for the undemocratic 
measures taken by the Palestinian Authority. This may seem surprising as many academics 
330 Rabah, J., Palestinian Public Qpinion Since the Peace Proce 
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PA and Israeli prac. 
40.8% 
stressed the importance of culture as an influence on democracy in many societies. 331 When 
Jamil Rabah, political analyst and the person in charge of asking the survey question in 
figure 64, was asked why Arab culture was not included as an option, he explained to the 
researcher: 
"In 1995, we worked on a survey within Palestinian society to examine and assess 
the level of people's awareness of democracy and the values it embodies. The 
results of this study led us to the conclusion that people are democratic and that 
their knowledge, understanding and belief in democratic principles is strong. As a 
result, it became our beliefthat neither the influence of culture nor religious and 
traditional influences formed an impediment on the respondents' understanding of 
democracy. It was on the basis of this study in 1995 that we decided in our later 
polls not to include cultural variables as theyproved to be insignificant. It is the 
public's perception that the main obstacles to democrac emanateftom political y 
factors such as the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian politicalpractices. , 332 
In conclusion, the results of the survey are significant in that they provide evidence of two 
realities: 
1. Many Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority to be undemocratic. 
2. Although a large percentage of Palestinians do not discard the impact of the 
nature of the Palestinian Authority upon the poor level of democracy in the autonomous 
areas, most think that the Israeli practices negatively influence the chances of 
democracy under the PA. 
The above findings are also echoed in the writings of Palestinian academics and human 
rights activists. They are outlined below. 
331 For more information, see Chapter One of this thesis and section 5.2.2.1. of this chapter. 
332 The interview with Jamil Rabah was conducted in Ramallah on 9 November 1998. 
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5.2.2. Expert perceptions 
After reviewing the Palestinian literature on democratic development in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas, the researcher identified three main lines of thinking. The first school 
follows the line that the Palestinian Authority can not be democratic due to the nature of 
Arab society. The second school blames the lack of democratic development in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas solely on the nature of the Palestinian Authority. The third 
school puts the blame for the lack of democratic development on the nature of Israeli 
policies and measures. 
5.2.2.1. Culture and Arab SocipV 
As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, a strong school of thought emphasised. the role 
of culture in the democratic development of societies. As will be recalled, experts such as 
Almond and Verba, Putnam, and Lijphart examined culture in various societies and 
concluded that its impact on democratisation is strong. Experts such as Schmitter and Di 
Palma, however, were not in favour of including the role of culture in their studies of 
democratisation. Lipset, Huntington, Kedouri, and Lewis, in their studies on 
democratisation in the Islamic world, and particularly in the Arab world, stressed the impact 
of religion on democracy. Piscatori, on the other hand, dismissed the impact of Islam on 
the democratisation process in the Muslim world. 
Dr. Ahmed Khalidi, a former negotiator in the Arab-Israeli multilateral peace talks, believes 
that the undemocratic measures of the Palestinian leadership are not surprising, given the 
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nature of Arab society which breeds undemocratic regimes. In an article in the Journal of 
Palestine Studies, he explained: 
'In the gap between what is acceptable democratic practice in the West and what the 
limits ofreality and history have imposed on the Palestinians, some have seen cause 
for shock and despair. But to expect otherwise is either naive or ill informed No 
matter what image the Palestinians have ofthemselves - in particular the carefully 
cultivated self-image ofthe large and vociferous Palestinian intelligentsia - the truth 
is that Palestinian society in its basic structure and orientation isjundamentally no 
different ftom the Arab societies that surround it. Even afervent belief in thejustice 
and morality of the Palestinian cause should not blind us to the realities of 
Palestinian social andpolitical conditions and to thefact that the kind ofregime that 
will initially emergeftom these conditions will in many ways replicate other regimes 
that have sprung ftom similar conditions. To expect afull-blown democracy is a 
historical exercise in wishful thinking and in a peculiar sense is both patronising 
and discriminatory. 333 
Although the researcher does not wish to dismiss the influence of culture upon democratic 
development, its impact on the democratic process under the Palestinian Authority will not 
be emphasised in this thesis and this for mainly two reasons: 
1. Scientific data and survey results on the impact of culture on the level of Palestinian 
democratic development are scarce. 
2. It is the researcher's belief that Arab culture has undoubtedly some impact on the 
Palestinian democratic process, but its impact is negligible compared to the impact of 
both the nature of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli practices. 
333 Khalidi, A., "The Palestinians' First Excursion into Democracy", Journal of Palestine Studies (25), no. 4, 
Summer 1996, pp. 20-28. 
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5.2.2.2. Nature of the Palestinian Authori 
Whereas Khalidi blames Arab culture, Dr. lyad Sarraj 
334, 
an outspoken critic of the 
Palestinian Authority, puts the blame for dissatisfactory democratic development on the 
nature of the Palestinian Authority itself, and does so in a two-fold manner. On the one 
hand, he blames the dictatorial tendencies of President Arafat's leadership. He writes: 
'Arafat truly believes that he can control the Palestinian people and dictate what is 
right and wrong. He does not believe that everyone else could understand the 
situation or know what to do ... He thinks 
he is the only one who comprehends the 
great conspiracy against the Palestinian people, therefore he works as ifby divine 
inspiration in defence of the people's rights. Anyone who opposes him is considered 
the enemy, either directly or indirectly. The problem is thatpeople aroundArafat 
don't help him in changing his views. On the contrary, they reinforce them. 335 
Sarraj also condemns the Palestinian leadership collectively, in particular those returning 
from exile after the peace agreements with Israel. He believes that their influence forms an 
additional reason for the lack of democratic development and describes this phenomenon as 
follows: 
'After the PA entered the area, there was a clashing ofcultures. The culture of the 
PA is the culture of the gun. We, inside the occupied territories, who did not deal 
with guns affirmed this because we always considered them as heroes and symbols 
of the revolution. ... So these people came and they had their own problems and they had their dreams and aspirations as a people and as individuals. They came into a 
culture which was very aware, not ignorantpeople who knew nothing about what 
was going on around them. We were not Yemen or Sudan; we had our sense of 
nationalism and our hopes. We were able to accommodate, however, ý ironically, we 
334 Dr. Iyad Sarraj is the director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme. His constant criticism 
of the PA led to his arrest three times between December 1995 and June 1996. Currently, he heads the 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights. 
335 San-ai, I., "The Conspiracy of Silence", Palestine 29 August 1997. 
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learned during the years of the [Israeli] occupation about democracy, human rights 
and fteedom of expression; we saw the Israeli soldiers on television speak their 
mind, whatever that might be. But the newcomer came with a deep sense of 
insecurity. They were aftaid of Hamas and of the Israelis and they were afraid of 
themselves, that there wasn't enough money; they were afraid of the people and of 
America. The Palestinians ffrom inside] had a lot of constructive criticism [to 
offer] which posed a threat to the PA because they were not used to criticism, since 
they had lived in an Arab state where the citizen has no value. . 336 
The impact of the nature of the Palestinian Authority on the democratisation process in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas will be further discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. 
5.2.2.3. The Israeli iinpact 
The third and last line of thought found by the researcher in readings on democratic 
development in the Palestinian autonomous areas holds the view that the Palestinian 
Authority is pressured to act undemocratically due to the imbalance in the peace process, 
whereby the Palestinian Authority is often forced to act forcefully to satisfy Israel's security 
needs. Accordingly, undemocratic measures and failure to uphold the rule of law are 
justified by the Palestinian Authority in the name of salvaging the peace process. This 
views is perhaps best described by Khalil Shikaki, a Palestinian political analyst and 
Director of the Centre for Palestine Studies and Research in Nablus: 
... the peace process and the PA it engendered also had negative repercussions on 
the transition to democracy. Holding to the view that the requirements ofdemocracy 
may contradict those ofnational reconstruction, and that in the early stages ofstate 
building it is more important to assert the state's right to monopolise power and 
eliminate competitors for the people's loyalty than to democratise the political 
system, the PA adopted undemocratic policies aimed at ýProtecting' the peace 
process and the process of national reconstruction. Meanwhile, the donor 
community's emphasis on building the capacity ofthe PA, rather than supporting 
336 Sarraj, I., "The Conspiracy of Silence", Palestine KeRort, 29 August 1997. 
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institutions of civil society, reveals a similar belief that the success of the peace 
process requires political stability achievable only through the creation ofa strong 
central authority. 337 
It is the belief of the researcher that the slow democratic development in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas can not be blamed on any of the three reasons taken by themselves, but is 
more likely to be a result of a combination of these factors. The researcher will contend, 
however, that the Israeli pressures constitute the most important factor leading the 
Palestinian Authority not to support democratic development to a greater extent. It is the 
assumption of the researcher that given a fair outcome of the peace process and a reduction 
of Israeli pressures, democratic development in Palestine will expand. In order to reinforce 
the researcher's assumption, Chapter Seven will concentrate on how influences and 
relationships within the Palestinian autonomous areas affect the level of democratic 
development, whilst Chapter Eight will focus upon the impact of Israeli measures, pressures 
and policies. By doing so, a more comprehensive picture will be obtained of how much of 
the lack of democratisation. in Palestinian society can be attributed to the intrinsic 
undemocratic nature of the Palestinian Authority and the efforts of its leadership to contain 
and suppress pluralism and due process of law, and how much of this lack is related to 
Israeli measures. First, however, in Chapter Six, the effectiveness of the Legislative 
Council in representing its constituents will be examined and how this effects the 
relationship between the Council members and the people they represent. 
337 Shikaki, Kbalil, " The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in 
Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 2, Winter 1996, p. 9. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 
REPRESENTING ITS CONSTITUENTS 
Before entering into a discussion of the factors influencing democratic development within 
the Palestinian autonomous areas, it is important to examine how effective the Legislative 
Council is in representing its constituents, in the views of both the Council members 
themselves and the general public. In the view of the researcher, this knowledge is crucial 
as the role of the Legislative Council in ftu-thering the democratic process may be weakened 
by its incapability to represent its constituents and their expectations effectively. As 
transitionalists such as Shain and Linz argued, the role of the moderate section of the elite 
in moving democratisation forward might be jeopardised by, amongst others, a weakening 
of political participation and representation in the system. 
The information in this chapter will indicate that the relationship between the Legislative 
Council and the general public is not optimal. It is the aim of the researcher - based on 
results of public opinion polls and a survey conducted within the Legislative Council - to 
enlighten the reader on whether or not this mediocre relationship is a result of too high 
expectations on the part of the public, an inadequate knowledge by the Council members of 
the needs of the constituencies they represent or the Council members' incompetence. 
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6.1. Evaluation of the Relationship between the Legislative Council and the Public: in 
view of Public Opinion 
In order to get a better idea of public opinion on the performance of the Legislative Council, 
the researcher asked in an opinion poll whether or not the people felt that the Legislative 
Council represents their views or concerns. As shown in figure 65, below, only 13.2% of 
the surveyed people replied that the elected Council members represent their views or 
concerns, whilst 54.3% answered that the Council members represent people's concerns to 
some extent. About 27.2% of the interviewees replied negatively. When compared to the 
public attitude on other topics, the results in figure 65 imply negativity and scepticism on 
the part of the public towards the Legislative Council. 
Floure 65. - 
Do the Council Members Represent the Views/Concerns of the People? 
According to the General Public 
To a certain exte 
54.3% Yes 
3.2% 
No answer 
5-3% 
N=l 195 No 
27.2% 
When looking at the different subgroups included in the opinion poll, interestingly, similar 
trends as in Part One of this thesis re-appear. As shown in table 37, the more educated 
interviewees were more negative in their opinion. Only 11.3% of the surveyed people who 
went to college and above thought that the elected Council members represent the views 
and concems of the people, compared to 23.5% of the people who received up to 
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elementary schooling. Also consistent with earlier trends, younger people thought that the 
Council members did not represent the people's concerns more frequently than older 
people. Indeed, whereas 25.6% of the people between 18 and 25 years old responded that 
they did not think that the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people, only 
16.7% of the people above 55 thought so. 
Table 3 7. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views1concerns of the 
Ueople? 
Education ALe 
Up to Up to Up to Some College 18-25 26-35 3645 46-55 55+ 
Elem. Prep. Sec. College & above 
N=1 19 N=221 N=388 N=314 N=l 15 N=379 N=366 N=203 N=105 N=66 
Yes 23.5% 12.2% 13.4% 10.2% 11.3% 13.5% 12.3% 14.8% 15.20/a 13.6% 
To a certain extent 50.4% 52.01/6 53.9% 57.0% 57.4% 56.2% 49.5% 55.2% 57.1% 57.6% 
No 19.3% 26.2% 30.9% 27.7% 27.0% 25.6% 33.3% 24.6% 22.9% 16.7% 
No answer 6.7% 9.5% 1.8% 5.1% 4.3% 4.7% 4.9% 5.4% 4.8% 12.1% 
One could argue that the rather negative opinion of the Palestinian public stems from the 
lack of familiarity with the new institution of the Legislative Council. A comparative look 
at the results of a similar question asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC shortly 
after the January 1996 elections, however, reveals that the general public's belief in the 
Council members' ability to represent their points of views, has declined over time. 
As illustrated in figure 66, below, in February 1996,23.6% of the surveyed people 
responded that the elected members represented their points of view, compared to only 
13.2% who continue to think so in August 1997. Compared to August 1997, less people in 
February 1996 seemed to feel that the Council members represented their views only to a 
certain extent. Indeed, it seems that people who were absolutely positive back in February 
1996 that the Council members represented their points of view, increasingly think that the 
elected members only represent their views and concerns to a certain extent. One can, 
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therefore, deduct that the relatively negative evaluation of the Legislative Council is not a 
result of the lack of familiarity by the Palestinian public with its workings. On the cont-xy, 
at the time of the researcher's survey, looking back at the record of the workings of the 
Legislative Council over a time-frame of more than two years, the general public was less 
convinced of the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing their views or 
concems. 
Given the Election Results, To what Extent Would You Say 
that the Elected Members represent Your Point of View? 
According to the General Public 
Represent my point of view 
Represent my point of view to a certain extent 
Do not represent my point of view 
No opinion 
23.6% 
40.8% 
23.9% 
11.7% 
N=1255 
0% lo% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Source: JMCC, February 1996 
The results in figure 67, below, support the trend described above. Indeed, similarly, the 
electorate was also critical of the Legislative Council, when asked if they thought that the 
Council members know what people need. Only 29.3% of the surveyed people answered 
that the Council members knew the needs of the people sufficiently. The majority 
evaluated the Council members negatively, with 50.5% of the interviewees saying that the 
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Council members do not know enough about the needs of the people, and 16.2% replying 
that the Council members do not know at all what the people need. 
Firure 67. 
To What Extent Do Council Members Know What People Want/Need? 
Accordinq to the General Public 
Not a lot 
50.4% 
N=1 195 
In conclusion, the results gathered from figures 65/66/67 taken together, reinforce each 
others' significance and give a clear message that the Palestinian public does not think 
highly of the Council members as far as their knowledge of the views or the needs of their 
constituents is concerned. In other words, in general, people do not consider the Legislative 
Council to be an effective institution. This may be the case, but is the Legislative Council 
ineffective simply because the Council members do not know the needs of the people? Or 
could it be that the Council members know the needs of their constituencies, but are 
ineffective in translating this knowledge into policies due to restrictions imposed on their 
institution by other forces? 
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Not at all 
4.1% 
16.2% 
6.2. EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL AND THE PUBLIC ACCORDING TO THE COUNCIL MEMBERS 
6.2.1. In general 
In general, Council members are positive about their relationship with their constituents. 
As shown in figure 68 below, when asked about the level of communication between the 
Legislative Council and the people, 60.5% of the Council members considered it to be 
good, and 34.9% thought that the level of communication is average. 
Firure 68. 
Evaluation by the Council Members of the Level of 
Communication with the People 
? Nr,, J.?. 3% 
., 0 
Good 60.5% 
, verage 34.9% 
The Council members were also asked to evaluate the manner in which the public affects 
the functioning of the Legislative Council. This question was asked in order to find out 
whether or not the Council members thought that their constituents provide them with 
positive indicators on how to perform their duties as legislators. In other words, this 
question attempts to assess whether or not, in the opinion of the Council members, the 
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relationship between the Council members and the electorate who voted for them is 
positive. As shown in figure 69 below, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 
namely 86.0%, said that the people affect the work of the Legislative Council positively. 
Firure 69. - 
Evaluation by the Council Members of How the People 
Affect the Functioning of the Legislative Council 
Affect Positively 85.90A 
answer 4.7% 
Does not Affect 4.7% 
N=43 
'44414INEMPVAffect 
Negatively 4.7% 
MAffectPositively MAffect Negatively IMDoesnotAffed E3Noanswerl 
When comparing the replies of the Council members in figures 68 and 69 above, it appears 
that the Council members were very positive about the effect people have on the 
functioning and work of the Legislative Council. This positive evaluation is not surprising 
as the Legislative Council and its legislators are able to ftmction as a result of the public's 
vote. However, the Council members remained relatively cautious in their assessment of the 
level of communication with the people. Perhaps, this caution can be explained as an 
acknowledgement by the surveyed Council members of a degree of ineffectiveness in 
reaching their constituents and a realisation on their part of how much room for 
improvement there is in this respect. 
6.2.2. Effectiveness in representing views and needs of the population 
In this section, the opinions of the Council members on whether or not they represent the 
views of the people effectively and know their needs will be provided. From the results in 
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figures 70 to 73 below, two main points will appear: (1) the Council members feel that they 
know the needs of the public better than the public thinks, and, (2) the Council members 
feel that they represent their constituents better than the public thinks. 
The results in figure 70 indicate that 41.9% of the elected members said that they represent 
the views and concerns of the people well. Although this percentage is much higher than 
the percentage of the public perception with respect to the Council members' representation 
of their concerns, one should keep in mind that less than 50% of the surveyed Council 
members answered the question positively. Indeed, the majority of the Council members, 
namely 51.2%, replied more modestly and stated that they only represent the views and 
concerns of the people to a certain extent. Only 2.3% of the Council members thought that 
they did not represent the concerns of the people at all compared to 27.2% of the general 
public. 
Firure 70. 
To a Certain 
No ai 
60% 
-50% 
40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% e 
Yes 
- 
To. C"in 
-Noanswer Council Memb 41.9% 51.2% 2.3% 4.7% 
_Gene 
ibAtli V 54.3% 27 2%__ 5.3% 
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Comparison between the Feeling of the Council Members and 
the General Public on Whether the Elected Members Represent 
the Views/Concems of the People 
As shown in figure 71, below, the Council members were also modest about the extent of 
their knowledge about the people's needs. Although 55.8% of the Council members replied 
that they know sufficiently about the needs of the people, 34.9% of them said that they do 
not know sufficiently about what people want. None of the Council members replied that 
the Council members do not know at all what the needs of the people are. 
Fizure 71 
To What Extent do the Council Members Know What People Want/Need? 
According to the Council Members 
A lot 
55.8% 
N=43 
No answer 
9.3% 
ot a lot 
9.9% 
Whereas the previous figure showed what the Council members thought they - as a group of 
representatives - knew about the people's needs, figure 72 is concerned with the question of 
whether they themselves, as individuals, think that they know what people want. It is clear 
that Council members value themselves, as individuals, higher than their colleagues. As 
shown in figure 72, a majority of 67.4% of the Council members think that they personally 
know the needs of their constituents. Only 27.9% of the Council members agreed that they 
did not know a lot about the needs of the people. Again, none of the Council members who 
answered this question said that they personally did not know at all what the needs of the 
people are. 
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Figure 72: 
Do You Yourself Know What People Want/Need? 
According to the Council Members 
)answer 
4.7% 
A lot 
674 "', 
Not a lot 
27.9% 
N=43 
Finally, figure 73 provides a summary of the differences in opinions between the general 
public, the Council members in general, and the Council members as individuals on the 
question of whether the Council members know the needs of the people. 
Firure 73: 
Level of Knowledge of the Needs of the Public 
Comparison between the Views of the General Public, 
the Council in General, and the Individual Member 
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From the above, it is clear that the Council members evaluate their performance much more 
positive than the general public, both in terms of their knowledge of the needs of the people 
and their capability of representing the people well. This may seem natural, but the Council 
members do seem to have answered the questions realistically. On the one hand, their 
answers were only moderately positive; on the other hand, the results seem to indicate that 
the Council members - although stating that they have a fair knowledge of the needs of the 
people - do acknowledge that they do not represent their constituencies optimally. 
61.3. About the knowledge by Council members of the needs of the people 
In this section, the researcher will examine in how far the negative views of the general 
public about the Council members' knowledge of the public's needs were justified or not. 
In this section it will become clear that the Council members, generally, are aware of the 
needs of the Palestinian people and that there are other factors which influence the less than 
optimal representation by the Council members. 
In order to find out whether or not Council members really know their constituents' needs, 
they were asked to make two choices from a predetermined list of problems facing 
Palestinian society, which - in their opinion - are the most pressing problems. The results 
presented in figure 74 below are cumulative results of the two answers given by each 
Council member who filled in their questionnaire. 
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As illustrated in figure 74,25.1% of the Council members considered the economic 
situation the most important problem facing Palestinian society today. The political 
situation came out as the second most pressing problem facing Palestinian society, with 
17.5% of the surveyed Council members saying so. 
Firure 74. - 
The Most Important Problems Facing Palestinian Society Nowadays 
According to the Council Members 
Economic situation 25.1% 
12% 
Social problem 3.5% \q4 
Occupation 15 1I/. 
q 
Lack of 
N=86 
Corrupbon 4.7% 
Electionfraud 2.4% 
Separabon of powers 1.2% 
Closure 2.3% 
Politcal sttuabw 17.5% 
The general public was also asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in April 1996 
to identify the most important problem facing Palestinian society. Although the public 
opinion poll dates fi-om a different time, the results in figure 75, below, show that the 
problems in Palestinian society identified by the public are remarkably similar to those 
perceived by the Council members. Indeed, 39.8% of the interviewees, answered that the 
most important issue facing Palestinian society was the improvement of the economy. 
Moreover, as shown in figure 75 below, 23.1% of the surveyed people thought the 
completion of the negotiations with Israel was the most important issue, whilst 11.8% 
thought it was the achievement of democracy and freedom of expression. 
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Absence of rule of low 14.0% 
Firure 75. 
The Single Most Important Issue Facing Palestinian Society 
According to the General Public 
Completing negotiations with Israel 
Improving our economic situation 
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Source: JMCC, April 1996 
Out of the infonnation gathered from figures 74 and 75, it is safe to say that the Council 
members and the general public think similarly about the main problems facing Palestinian 
society. Both the Council members and the public agree that the economic situation is the 
most pressing problem. Similarly, the Council members and the general public also seem to 
agree on the gravity of the political situation as a serious problem facing Palestinian society. 
Judging by the findings above, it would appear that Council members are aware of the 
concerns of the people. As such, the Palestinian electorate's evaluation of the Legislative 
Council might have been too harsh on the question of whether or not the Council members 
know what the people need. 
To test the above assumption even further, Council members were also asked to identify, in 
their opinion, the three most important needs of the people from a pre-determined list. 
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Again, the results in figure 76, below, are cumulative results of the three answers given by 
each surveyed Council member. 
F-Imure 76. 
Infrastructure 11.7% 
Political situation 11.7% 
Eoonomy 20.9% 
Most Important Needs of the People 
According to the Council Members 
Equal o=fties 2.3% 
Democracyflaw/justice 21.7% 
Public 1i 31% 
Security 7.8% Accountability 0.8% 
N=129 
Cure for corrupbon 2.3% 
Unemployment 14.7% 
As shown in figure 76, above, the people's most important need, according to the Council 
members, is the need for democracy, law and justice. This choice is closely followed - in 
the Council members' minds - by the people's need to see an improvement in the economy. 
Indeed, some 21.7% of Council members said that democracy, law and justice are important 
needs of the people; 20.9% felt an improvement in the economy was an important need for 
the people. It is also noteworthy that 14.7% of the Council members mentioned 
unemployment as an issue which the people need to see resolved, which reinforces the point 
that the Council members do realise that an improvement in the Palestinian economy is of 
utmost importance to their constituents. 
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6.3. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it can be said that the less than optimal relationship between the Palestinian 
people and their representatives is not a result of unreasonably high expectations by the 
public nor is it due to the inadequate knowledge by the Council members of the needs of the 
constituencies they represent. 
In general, the Council members are aware of the needs of their constituents, but the latter 
do not realise this fact because they do not see this knowledge translated into policies. 
Hence, the popular disappointment with the performance of the Council members and their 
dissatisfaction with the level of effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing 
their concerns. 
As established above, the Council members' failure to effectively represent their 
constituents' concerns, can not be blamed on their lack of knowledge of the most pressing 
problems facing Palestinian society or on their incompetence. Indeed, there are other 
factors at work, influencing the perfonnance of the Legislative Council and restricting its 
effectiveness. If those influences are dealt with or disappear, and based on the fmdings in 
this chapter, the potential of the Legislative Council representing its constituents effectively 
becomes real. The influences detrimental in the ability of the Legislative Council to 
represent its constituents effectively will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight of this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
IMPACT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON 
PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 
In order to provide a better understanding of the extent to which democratic development 
within the Palestinian autonomous areas is influenced or even impeded by internal 
dimensions, this chapter will concentrate on the relationship between the Legislative 
Council and various Palestinian political actors and institutions. 
By concentrating on the Palestinian elite and by examining the degree to which inter-elite 
competition strains ftuther democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas, the 
analysis in this chapter clearly follows the transitionalist approach. As will be recalled from 
Chapter One of the thesis, transitionalist scholars such as O'Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead, and Shain. and Linz, differentiated between different types of elites and stressed 
that the transition to democracy can only be consolidated if the moderate section of the elite 
is able to increase in number and promote democratic practices, whilst attempting to 
neutralise the less democratic members of the elite. Furthermore, these scholars 
emphasised that the potential for further democratisation in a period of transition is largely 
dependent on the willingness of the elite to continue on the path of democracy. 
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The findings in Chapter Seven will also clearly indicate that the form of goveniment in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas is a partial democracy. Indeed, on the one hand, what follows 
will show that the authority of the Legislative Council is compromised by the interference 
of other non-elected establishments within the Palestinian "entity", which diminishes the 
degree of accountability of the government to the people. On the other hand, Palestinian 
citizens enjoy some degree of freedom of expression and political opposition does exist, 
although it is too weak to exert real pressure. 
Chapter Seven is divided into two main parts. In the first part of the chapter, the researcher 
will focus on the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. 
In the second part of the chapter, effort will be concentrated on clarifying the relationship 
between the Legislative Council and President Yasser Arafat. The arguments made by the 
researcher in this chapter will be supported by the researcher's public opinion poll, by the 
survey conducted within the Legislative Council and by numerous interviews. 
The election of the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 1996 marked a 
transformation of the Palestinian political system. As Ali Jarbawi, a Palestinian political 
analyst and professor at Birzeit University, argues, this transformation shifted the "centre of 
Palestinian political life from the "outside" to the "inside"" - that is, from abroad to 
Palestine itself. The Palestinian institutions generated by the peace process, notably the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), consisting of the Executive Authority and the Legislative 
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Council, are both "inside". 337 In the following pages, the researcher will examine the scope 
of the h-ansformation of the Palestinian political system. In this regard, two issues will be 
assessed. First, in this chapter the extent to which the shift of the centre of Palestinian 
political life led to the legitimisation of the "inside" at the expense of the "outside" will be 
examined. Secondly, the issue of to which extent - amongst the inside institutions - the 
Executive Authority not the Legislative Council gained power as a result of the rapid 
transformation of the Palestinian political system will be tackled. 
7.1. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
7.1.1. The nature of the relationship between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council 
One of the main causes for strain in the relationship between the Legislative Council and 
the Executive Authority, bringing to the surface deficiencies and mismanagement in the 
structure and workings of the Palestinian Authority stems, as indicated in Chapter Four, 
from the phrasing of the Oslo agreements. The specific mandates of both the Executive 
Authority and the Legislative Council are unclear, leaving the specifics of the workings of 
the Authority up to different interpretations according to the parties concerned. 
On the one hand, members of the Legislative Council feel ignored by the Executive 
Authority and charge the Executive Authority, headed by Arafat, for not respecting the 
337 Jarbawi, A., "Palestinian Politics at a Crossroads", Journal of Palestine Studies$ (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, 
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legislative role of the Council, and for not ratifying laws passed by the Legislative Council, 
in particular the Basic Law. Failure to ratify the Basic Law, many Council members argue, 
has left the Palestinian autonomous areas without any legal framework; instead, they are 
simply controlled by the rule of Yasser Arafat and his Executive Authority. Members of the 
Executive Authority, on the other hand, think that the Legislative Council is interfering and 
often acting outside its jurisdiction. Complicating the situation further, is the fact that some 
Council members are also members of the Executive Authority and have divided loyalties, 
leading to ftirther paralysis in the Legislative Council. Interviews which the researcher 
conducted with members of either or both the Executive Authority and the Legislative 
Council provide evidence of these divisions. 
Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, a Council member until he resigned in October 1997 and head of 
the Red Crescent Society in Gaza, expressed the frustration of many Council members with 
the Executive Authority to the researcher as follows: 
I think initially, the elected members expressed an attitude of seriousness 
towards their task as the representatives of the community, and, indeed, 
responded very well to whatever they werefaced with. They adopted resolutions, 
but, regrettably, the Executive Authority took a very negative attitude towards the 
PLC, and that, of course, was veryfrusiratingfor the Council members.. I didn't 
at all expect that being a Council member would be as bad as this. I thought that 
the challenges which we are facing required a strong co-ordination and co- 
operation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. Iwas 
hoping that a good aecutive Authority performance would substitutefor the 
negative aspects of Oslo, but the contra), y happened 338 
Dr. Nabil Shaath, who is both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority, 
was very critical of the Legislative Council and represented the view of the members of the 
pp. 29-39. 
338 The interview with Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi was conducted in Rmnallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997. 
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political leadership who thought that the Legislative Council was, on many occasions acting 
outside its jurisdiction. He told the researcher: 
'7 think this PLC or this Council is trying to test the limits ofits Authority. So, it 
has acted sometimes as a court and madejudgements and verdicts, even before 
asking anybody questions about the verdict. In the last months, it acted like a 
kangaroo court. No due process, no rights to the accused, itjust acted by typical 
medieval edict. It acted sometimes as it was the Executive Authority and made 
edicts to ministers about what to do with this and what not to do with that. Not 
that the ministers listen all the time, but they, in many cases acted as the 
Executive Authority, as the Judiciary Authority as well as the Parliamentarian 
Authority. In fact, if you want to be more specific, in theirfirst year they did 
absolutely no legislation. They were doing nothing butpolitical edicts, executive 
edicts and counjudgements about corruption. PP339 
Moreover, Nabil Shaath clearly identified more with the Executive Authority than with the 
Legislative Council. He said in his interview with the researcher: 
'T am a member of the Council, but I am also part ofthe Executive Authority. 
Therefore, in my conflict of inner identification, I do not identify with the Council. 
I mean, if I were to choose, I can not identify with the Council. I did notfind in 
the Council a real expression either ofthe democracy I thought was necessary to 
build our society, or of the parliamentary authority that was supposed to be a 
real control of the democracy, due process of law, and the rights ofpeople.. My 
idea was that this was the conference that was going to set the rule oflaw and the 
right ofman in Palestine. And that it was going to put the modern legislation that 
will create in Palestine institutions that are different and much better than all 
those in the countries around us. And Ifound great disappointment Maybe it 
was a stupid expectation. 040 
Hanan Ashrawi, also both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority 
until she resigned on 5 August 1998, represents a view on the other side of the spectnun 
than that of Nabil Shaath. Although at the time of the interview she was a member of the 
Executive 
339 The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997. It should 
be mentioned that this was at the time when the corruption report was being debated in the Legislative 
Council. Amongst the ministries singled out was the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation. The 
inquiry and the corruption report will be discussed later in this chapter. 
340 The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997. 
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Authority, she explained to the researcher that she identified herself more with the 
Legislative Council: 
'Having these two positions in a sense is rather strange, because Ifeel and 
identify with the people and I feel that the cabinet members and the Executive 
Authority should be entirely accountable before the Council. I would like to 
empower the Council, so that it can do its job, in terms of monitoring, 
accountability as well as legislation. I take the Council seriously... I have certain 
jobs in the Cabinet, certain tasks and responsibilities which I tty to fityll 
professionally and honestly, and I try to be part of formulating the political 
discourse. But, at the same time, Ifeel that ifwe lose touch with the people, ifwe 
lose touch with the system ofrepresentation, then, there are no political decisions 
that are worth anything, because politics andpolitical decisions are not made in 
a vacuum. And we can not have a rift between whatpeoplefeel, want and believe 
and between the decision-makingprocess. I sometimes certainlyfeel that there is 
this rift and it is not conducive to confidence or to the decision-makingprocess. 
341 
In addition to the interviews, the author also asked the Council members about the relation 
between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority through the distributed 
questionnaires. In the results, the tension between the two branches of the Authority was 
clear. As illustrated in figure 77 below, Council members viewed the relationship between 
the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority very negatively. About 27.9% of the 
Council members stated that the Legislative Council is very restricted by the Executive 
Authority, and 5 8.1 % said that the Executive Authority exerts some restrictive pressure on 
the Council. Only 14.0% of the Council members thought that the Legislative Council is 
not restricted at all by the Executive Authority. 
341 The interview with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 16 September 1997. 
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Firure 77. - 
Perceptions of the Council Members Regarding Restrictions 
of the Executive Authority on the Council 
Very Restricted 
27.9% 
Some Restricbons 
58.1% 
N 43 
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In the survey conducted by the researcher, the Palestinian public was also asked about the 
relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority as it is important 
to know how they perceive this relationship and its effect on the democratic process. 
In general, the public was even harsher than the Council members in their evaluation of the 
relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. This could be 
explained by two main reasons: 
1. A large number of Council members are also members of the Executive Authority 
and, as such, were bound to be less critical of the restrictive effects of the Executive 
Authority on the Legislative Council. 
2. The public perceives the Executive Authority as dominating the Legislative 
Council. This perception affects the democratic legitimacy of these institutions. 
As illustrated in figure 78 below, 35.7% of the surveyed people thought that the Legislative 
Council was very restricted by the Executive Authority. However, more Council members 
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NO Restnatons 
14.0% 
than people thought that there were some restrictions by the Executive Authority upon the 
Legislative Council. 
Firure 78. 
Perceived Restrictions of the Executive Authority on the Council 
Comparison Between the Council Members and the General Public 
Very Restricted by the EA 
43.2 
Somewhat Restricted by the EA 
ot Restricted by the EA 
No Answer 
Soufce: JMCC, Jenisalem, Januafy 1998 
Below, additional results from the survey conducted within the Legislative Council, fin-ther 
illustrate the difficult relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive 
Authority. 
When the Council members were asked to describe their level of communication with the 
Executive Authority, only 14.0% of the respondents said that it was good. About 46.5% of 
the Council members described their level of communication as average, whilst 37.2% 
considered it to be bad. 
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Moreover, as indicated by figure 80, below, only 4.7% of the Council members who 
participated in the survey said that the Executive Authority had a positive affect on the 
functioning of the Council. In addition, the majority of the Council members, 79.1 %, said 
that the Executive Authority had a negative impact on the performance of the Legislative 
Council. About 9.3% did not think that the Executive Authority had any effect at all on the 
functioning of the Legislative Council. 
Firure 80. - 
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The Council members' negative answers to the two aforementioned questions could 
perhaps be explained by their feeling of fi-ustration regarding the marginalisation of their 
institution and its resolutions by the Executive Authority. When asked why the Executive 
Authority often ignored the resolutions of the Legislative Council, 37.2% of the Council 
members answered that it was due to the attitude of the Executive Authority, whilst 20.9% 
blamed the Executive Authority's inefficiency. About 32.6% cited the combination of the 
attitude and inefficiency of the Executive Authority as the main reason for the resolutions of 
the Legislative Council not being implemented. 
Firure 81: 
Why, in your opinion, were most 
resolutions by the Legislative 
Council not implemented by the 
Executive Authority? 
Attitude of the EA 
Inefficiency of the EA 
Resolutions are outside the 
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Combination of attitude and 
inefficiency of the EA 
No Answer 
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7.1.2. Case study of the relationship between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council 
Both the interview material and the survey results, above, indicate a clear perception that 
the Executive Authority, headed by President Yasser Arafat, has captured the prevalent role, 
at the expense of the Legislative Authority. Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, a Council member from the 
Gaza Strip and a professor of political science, has expressed this perception in an article in 
the Journal of Palestine Studies, when he wrote: 
"It is natural for an executive power to try to expand its influence to protect 
itself and its interests; competition between the executive and legislative 
branches of government is appropriate as long as it is democratic, legal, and 
peaceful. In the Palestinian case, however, the FA is seeking to marginalise the 
legislature, which is entrusted with enacting legislation and with monitoring the 
conduct of the executive itself. In this attempt, the executive is not observing 
democratic rules. , 342 
That being said, some argue that whilst certain violations were committed by the PA, it is 
incorrect to portray the Palestinian leadership as dictatorial and intrinsically disrespectful of 
democratic principles. Indeed, whilst it is true that the restrictions imposed by the Executive 
Authority on the Legislative Council are evident, the Legislative Council has, nonetheless, 
been free to criticise the Executive Authority harshly. At no time was this more evident 
than in August 1997 when the Palestinian Authority itself appointed an inquiry to 
investigate corruption in certain ministries and government agencies. 
342 Abu Amr, Z., " The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessmenf', Journal of Palestine Studies, 
(26), no. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 90-97. 
299 
This inquiry, which fell short from criticising Arafat, submitted a report to Arafat, that was 
later forwarded to a special committee of the Legislative Council. This committee ffirther 
examined the report and, subsequently, submitted recommendations to the Legislative 
Council. One of these reconunendations was that the Cabinet should resign in response to 
the proofs they had accumulated regarding widespread mismanagement of public funds. 
After the ministers in question were questioned in the Legislative Council, sixteen of the 
twenty Cabinet ministers submitted their resignation to President Arafat. 
The corruption episode and the demand by the Legislative Council for the resignation of the 
Cabinet did, indeed, seem to indicate a level of democratic practice in the Palestinian 
autonomous areas that should not be discounted. However, to what effect? At the time of 
the corruption report, President Arafat did not accept the resignation of his Cabinet. 
Eventually, the persistent delaying tactics or the outright ignoring of the Legislative 
Council's resolutions and recommendations by Arafat and the Executive Authority, and the 
fact that Arafat did not accept the resignation of his Cabinet, led in mid-December 1997 to 
a decision by the Council members to suspend all the Council sessions until the end of 
December. Moreover, the Legislative Council threatened to hold a no confidence vote if 
Arafat and the Executive Authority did not act upon the Council's recommendations. As 
Abbas Zaki, a leading Fatah Legislative Council member, said in an interview at that time 
with the newspaper Al-Ayyam: 
If the Executive Authority does not respondpositively to our demands, we will cast 
a vote ofno confidence against the government by 30 December 1997, so that we do 
not set foot into the new year with protests that confirm the incapacity of the 
Palestinian institutions. . 343 
343 AI-Ayy , Wednesday 24 December 1997. 
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Arafat then responded by promising (1) to accept the two-month-old resignation of his 
ministers; (2) to reshuffle the Cabinet within six weeks; and (3) to ratify certain laws, 
provided certain amendments were made. The Cabinet, however, was not reshuffled within 
this time-fi-ame and the Legislative Council did not act upon its threat of a no confidence 
vote until 30 May 1998, when the Council members voted to hold an extraordinary session 
on 15 June 1998 to bring the no confidence vote back to the agenda. 344 
At the end of May 1998, tension between the Legislative Council and the Executive 
Authority had reached another peak because the latter had not responded to comments 
submitted by the Legislative Council on the budget that had been presented to them. At the 
heart of the Legislative Council's reservations about the budget was the discovery that 
significant goverment expenses incurred by the president's office were not included in the 
budget, whilst a significant share of income to the Palestinian Authority was also 
345 
excluded . In short, the dispute over the budget summed up the complaints voiced by the 
Legislative Council since August 1997 about the problem of corruption and 
mismanagement within the Palestinian Authority and the Executive Authority's persistent 
disregard for resolutions and legislation adopted by the Legislative Council. 
Three days before the Legislative Council was due to hold its extraordinary meeting on a no 
confidence vote in the Executive Authority, on 12 June 1998, Arafat requested the 
postponement of the Council session for 10 days in order to give him time to hold 
344 This was stated in al-Quds, 31 May 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summgy, 31 
May 1998. 
345 Khatib, G., "Reshuffle Turns up Jokers? ", Palestine EeR 19 June 1998. 
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consultations with various Palestinian parties, forces and parliamentary blocs to prepare a 
346 
new ministerial list to be presented to the Legislative Council . The Legislative Council 
from its side agreed to postpone the vote of confidence until 25 June 1998; the opposition 
parties, from their side, agreed to participate in the consultations with Arafat, but refused 
Arafat's invitation to join the new ministerial formation. 347 In the meantime, various 
Council members voiced their high expectations for the need of a proper Cabinet reshuffle 
rather than cosmetic changes in the Cabinet. Council member Hikmat Zeid from Jenin 
stated in an interview widi al-Hayat al-Jadida: 
'Slight changes or additions are not acceptable; the ministers who were proved to 
be involved in the poor performance must be renewed,, the corruptionfile must be 
opened and taken seriously. "" 
On 23 June 1998, Council member Ziad Abu Amr, a representative of Gaza city, 
commented: 
"We are in need for reforms since we are observing the constructingprocess and 
meanwhile facing a tough confrontation with Israel. The change which is 
demanded by our people urges us to search for efficiency, experience and 
specialisation of the persons who will occupy leadingpositions in the society. The 
change should not include changingpersons only, but it should include policies and 
patterns. 349 
On 24 June 1998, Arafat requested a ftirther two week postponement of the no confidence 
vote. After criticism by some Council members that no by-laws existed to postpone a no 
346 This was stated in al-Ayy , 12 June 1998. The reference was taken from IMCC Dailv Press Summ 
12 June 1998. 
347 This was stated in al: &yXam 15 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press SgmmM 
15 June 1998. 
348 This was stated in al-Hgyat al-Jadi 14 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press 
Sgmmn, 14 June 1998. 
349 JMCC DaiLy Press S 23 June 1998. 
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confidence vote, Arafat officially declared the resignation of the ministerial Cabinet in a 
350 letter he sent to the Legislative Council . In doing so, 
he managed to solve the problem of 
postponement of the no confidence vote by the Legislative Council, as a parliament can not 
issue a no confidence vote in a government which no longer exists . 
351 After this latest 
move, many started losing hope of ever seeing any serious Cabinet reshuffle and dismissed 
Arafat's actions as another stalling tactic. 352 Disappointment was not limited to the Council 
members, but frustration became also increasingly clear on the Palestinian streets. lyad 
Sarraj summarised popular discontent and complaints as follows in a commentary in al- 
Quds newspaper: 
'The complaints have become widespread - about poor services, the excess of 
bureaucracy and delay within ministries, the multiplying of salaries, expansion of 
the administrative system, conflicts of interests, the intensification of power 
struggles, the absence of planning and sometimes the absence of the minister 
himself to carry out other duties which take himfarfrom his ministry; the arbitrary 
appointments which are not based on qualification as much as on personal or tribal 
loyalty, and a policy of suffocating the peoplefor their daily bread. t. 353 
Finally, on 5 August 1998, Arafat announced his long-awaited new Cabinet, thereby giving 
rise to what Ahmed Qrei', Speaker of the Legislative Council, described as "one of the most 
important sessions of the Legislative Council since its establishment ýq . 
354 
350 This was stated in al-Ayyam, 25 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press SMMMM 
25 June 1998. 
351 'Abdelsalam, N., "Here We Go ... AgaiW', Palestine Report, 26 June 1998. 
352 Seitz, C., "Rumblings of an Alternative", Palestine Kep , 19 July 1998. 
353 Sarraj, I., "If I Were a Minister", al-Ouds 17 June 1998. Translated for Palestine Rej2o 24 July 1998 by 
Joharah Baker. 
354 JMCC Daily Press Summga, 10 August 1998. 
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As becomes clear from table 383,15 below, which gives details of the new Cabinet, Arafat 
kept most of the old Cabinet in place, and simply enlarged it by adding some new ministers 
of state. 
Table 38. 
Name Position Affiliation Other details 
Mohammed Nashashibi Min. of Finance Independent kept same portfolio 
Yasser Abed Rabbo Min. of Information and FIDA kept same portfolio 
Culture 
Nabil Sha'ath Min. of Planning and Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
356 
International Cooperation 
Munther Salah Min. of Higher Education Independent new member of cabinet; was 
head of al-Najah university; 
replaces Hanan Ashrawi who 
resigned 
Intisar al-Wazir Min. of Social Affairs Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Mitri Abu 'Eita Min. of Tourism and Independent new member of cabinet; 
Antiquities replaces Elias Freij who died; 
CM 
Freih abu Medein Min. of Justice Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Sa'eb Erekat Min. of Local Governance Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Abdul Rahman Hamad Min. of Housing Fatah kept same portfolio 
Maher al-Masri Min. of Economy and Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Commerce 
Abdul Aziz Shahin Min. of Supplies Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Riyad al-Za'noun Min. of Health Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Ali at-Qawasmi Min. of Transportation Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Imad al-Falouji Min. of Communication & Close to Hamas kept same portfolio; CM 
Postal Services 
Hilanat Zeid Min. of Agriculture Fatah- new member of cabinet; 
independent replaces Abdel Jawad Saleh 
who resigned; CM 
Jamil Tarifi Min. of Civil Affairs Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Sa'edi al-Krunz Min. of Industry Fatah new member of cabinet; 
replaces Bashir Bargouthi; 
CM 
Nabil Qassis Min. in charge of Independent was negotiator in the 
"Bethlehem 2000" Washington talks 
Azzam al-Ahmad Min. of Public Works Fatah kept same portfolio; CM 
Nabil 'Amr Min. of Parliament Affairs Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
Rafiq al-Natsheh Min. of Labour Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
Bashir Bargouthi Min. without Portfolio PPP lost portfolio as Min. of 
Industry 
Yousef abu Safleh Min. of State Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
Hassan Asfour Min. of State Independent new member of cabinet; CM 
Hisham Abdul Raziq Min. of State Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
Salah al-Ta'mari Min. of State Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
355 Table 38 was compiled by the researcher using information from several sources. Mainly: The Palestinian 
Council, JMCC, Jerusalem, January 1998,2nd edition; JMCC website (www. jmcc. org/new/ncabinet). 
356,, CK'stands for "Council member". 
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Ziad abu Zayad Min. of State Fatah new member of cabinet; CM 
Talal Sidr Min. of State Close to Hamas lost portfolio as Min. of 
Youth and Sports 
Vacant portfolios: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, Ministry of Interior. 
A closer look at table 38, above, reveals that the most obvious feature of the new Cabinet 
reshuffle is that it does not at all respond to the underlying reasons for the Legislative 
Council's calls for ministerial changes. Arafat kept in place the two ministers who were 
most referred to in the corruption report, namely Minister of Civil Affairs Jamil Tarifi, and 
Minister of Planning and International Co-operation Nabil Sha'ath. Moreover, he 
reassigned two ministers, Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi, who were both known 
for their integrity and outspokenness. Abdel Jawad Saleh, who was Minister of Agriculture 
in the previous goverranent, was appointed as Minister of State. Hanan Ashrawi, who used 
to be Minister of Higher Education, received the Tourism and Antiquities portfolio in the 
new Cabinet. As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, both ministers 
reftised their positions in the new Cabinet and resigned. Another move by Arafat was to 
keep fonner Minister of Industry, Bashir Bargouthi (PPP) on the Cabinet team as Minister 
without Portfolio, despite the fact that Bargouthi has been seriously ill for the past year and 
was unable to communicate, and despite three letters from his party to Arafat, on his behalf, 
requesting his resignation. 
Another striking feature is that the new names included in the Cabinet seemed to include 
some of the most critical Council members. This led Ghassan Khatib, director of the 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, to comment as follows in his weekly 
editorial: 
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'The old game ofneutralising critics through absorption continues: Rafiq Natsheh, 
Hikmat Zeid, and Nabil Amr, all critical and sometimes outspoken Fatah LC 
members, are examples ofthis strategy, which is aimed at reducing the criticisms in 
the Council and the Council pressure on the Executive A uthority. 357 
As mentioned above, both Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi declined their new 
appointments. They explained their reasons behind their decisions on 6 August 1998 in 
their respective press conferences. Abdel Jawad Saleh, who was also a Council member 
from the Ramallah district and received the highest number of votes during the elections in 
1996, stated: 
I was familiar through eight years in the PLO Executive Committee with Mr. 
Arafat's work; his personal problems and his political attitudes. I thought when I 
was in the PLO that it was useless to work under him for the benefit of the 
Palestinian people. When I came back to Palestine after twenty years of exile, I 
thought that in Palestine where our people exist, we could make a difference. I 
tried, being a minister in the Cabinet, to enhance the role ofthe people to enhance 
and create a democratic environmentfor the Palestinian society, but, injact, all my 
attempts have failed. When Ifought corruption inside my ministry, I referred some 
of the high-ranking officials to the Attorney General. The Chairman himseýf 
interfered in stopping a legal procedure against them. I came to afeeling that I 
should, even as a minister, be unequivocally against what is going on. ... Arafat's 
reshuffle was a slap in theface of democracy. "358 
Hanan Ashrawi, who remained a Council member representing the Jerusalem constituency, 
clarified her position and her reffisal to remain a minister as follows: 
I have had a very long and candid discussion with president Arafat .. I respec(fully declined from this appointment because Ifeel that the whole issue ofcomprehensive 
and pervasive reform that is needed, is not being met by this new Cabinet... The real 
issue is whether we can ensure internal empowerment toface external challenges. I 
have thought very long about this decision and I am convinced that this new 
formation does not respond to the public demand and to the genuine needfor this 
type of reform... We have to send a message to the Palestinian people and to the 
world at large that we are building a contemporary state withfull rule of law and 
accountability, with professionalism and responsibility, to ensure also the rights 
357 Khatib, G., "New Cabinet? ", Palestine Rep ,7 August 
1998. 
358 Reuters, printed press, 6 August 1998. 
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and fteedoms of the Palestinian people and toface the external challenges that we 
are currentlyfacing. Particularly in view of the current Israeli government and the 
policies that specifically seek to destroy the peace process... . 359 
Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi in their press conferences set the tone for very 
intense and heated debates within the Legislative Council, on 7,8 and 9 August 1998, 
concerning whether or not the new Cabinet should be granted a vote of confidence. The 
contradicting positions and hesitation amongst Council members worried President Arafat 
sufficiently for him to convene a meeting of the Fatah Council members on the evening of 7 
August 1998, in order to try and convince them to grant the new Cabinet their vote of 
confidence. 
360 
The diverging opinions amongst Council members which became obvious during the 
Legislative Council debates, were explained by some Council members to the researcher, 
who was present in Rarnallah at the time of the confidence vote on 8 and 9 August 1998. 
Ziad Abu Zayyad, a Fatah-affiliated Council member of Jerusalem and a newly appointed 
Minister of State, sunimarised his decision to give the new Cabinet his vote of confidence 
to the researcher. In the researcher's opinion, his explanation exemplified the success of 
Arafat's tactic to neutralise, critics within the Legislative Council by including them in the 
Cabinet. Abu Zayyad stated: 
I want the Legislative Council to accept the new government .. But, I still have a 
conflict within me. On the one hand, I do not think that what has happened was a 
good thing to happen. I do not like the way this government crisis was dealt with. I 
think it should have been dealt with in a very different and much better way. On the 
other hand, since I am now a member ofthis government, ofcourse, I would like to 
359 Reute , printed press, 6 August 1998. 
360 Ilis was stated in a]- 7 August 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summ 
7 August 1998. 
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have a vote of confidence by the Legislative Council. But, still, I have my own 
criticism against the way things were done. , 361 
Azmi Shu'aibi, a FIDA-affiliated Council member from the Ramallah constituency, 
explained more about Arafat's tactics in the Cabinet reshuffle and clarified to the researcher 
why he did not want to give the new Cabinet his vote of confidence: 
I do not want the vote ofconfidence in the Cabinet. I think the principle ofreform 
in the government depends on the reports ofthe Legislative Council and even the 
reports of the governmental committee, which said clearly that in order to re- 
organise the government, it is necessary to remove some of the persons who 
misused their public positions. ... 
The president looked at the Legislative Council as 
a problem and he wants to solve this problem. That is why he is bringing more 
members from the Legislative Council to the government, so that he can weaken the 
Council. , 362 
Eventually, on 9 August 1998, exactly one year after the corruption report first caused the 
Legislative Council to demand a Cabinet reshuffle, the Council members granted the new 
Cabinet their vote of confidence. 55 Council members were in favour of a vote of 
confidence, 28 voted against, and 3 Council members abstained from the vote. A few hours 
after receiving the vote of confidence ftom the Legislative Council, the new government 
was sworn in in Gaza. 
363 
After the vote of confidence by the Legislative Council, many observers and analysts 
became pessimistic about the future prospects of the Legislative Council and feared that the 
Legislative Council, by granting the vote of confidence to the Executive Authority, risked 
361 The interview with Ziad abu Zayyad was conducted in Ramaflah on Saturday 8 August 1998. 
362 The interview with Azmi Shu'aibi was conducted in Ramallah on Saturday 8 August 1998. 
363 This was stated in al-A erence was taken from JMCC Dail P ss . jymn, 
10 August 1998. The ref re 
S 10 August 1998. 
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losing popular confidence. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre, commented in an article in Palestine Report: 
'The main danger posed by the Council's approval ofthe new Cabinet is that it will 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible from now on, for the Council to gain the 
public's support in anyfuture confrontation with the Executive Authority. So, by this 
vote, the Legislative Council has to a great extent undermined itself, its popularity 
and its present andfuture credibility. "3ý 
Ghassan Khatib's fears may prove correct, but as far as the researcher of this thesis could 
gauge from the comments of several Council members after the vote of confidence in the 
Executive Authority, the Council members, despite the confidence vote, did not intend to be 
silent in any future confrontations with the Executive Authority. 
On the contrary, despite some of the Council members' obvious disappointment, they 
seemed determined to continue their attempts to hold the government accountable in case of 
any shortcomings or mismanagement. Hussarn Khader, a Council member from the Nablus 
area, was disappointed, but his harsh comments to the researcher suggested that he would 
not stop being critical. He commented as follows: 
'T believe that the only duty which the Legislative Council has been successful in 
implementing in its three year history was embodied today in legalising the 
corruption of the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, voting implies vindicating 
everyone whose name appeared in the report ofthe monitory committee and the 
special committee of the Council. )j365 
As a result of her resignation, Hanan Ashrawi's popularity was boosted, which was 
exemplified when an ordinary citizen approached her outside the Legislative Council 
premises and said: "I am a citizen of Bethlehem and I came here today especially because I 
364 Khatib, G., "PLC Shoots Itself in the Foot", Palestine RM , 14 August 1998. 
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wanted to tell you that in my opinion you are the only man in Palestine! " Ashrawi, 
re is people's trust in her, also has no intention to be silenced as a Council member. 
She commented to the researcher: 
'7 had hoped that we would be able toform a corrective move to try andput the 
whole internal empowerment institution buildingprocess on track But obviously 
there is a majority in the Council that wants to give this new government a chance. 
I will suspend judgement. I will give them a chance. I will do everythingpossible 
to help in internal empowerment institution building, rule oflaw, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. If they meet the requirements of the people, we will give 
them a chance. Ifnot, we will hold them accountable. P, 366 
Hanan Ashrawi also had a word of warning about disappointing the expectations of the 
people and the potential loss of credibility of the Palestinian Authority in the eyes of the 
population. She stated in an interview with the researcher: 
I believe they [the Palestinian people] do not want to see political games being 
played, they do not want to see personal agendas. They want to see a national 
agenda and they want to see both legislative and executive branches that are 
receptive to their rights and needs, that would work in order to rectify whatever 
problems and ills we have internally. So, I hope this government and the 
Legislative Council pay very serious attention to the demands of the people, because 
I have a feeling that there is apervasive sense oflet down. We shall do our best to 
try not to allow a sense oflet down to prevail, because that would be -I do not want 
to say destructive - but negative in terms ofnational interest. )367 
7.1.3. Conclusion 
The above, solidified the researcher's belief that there are both positive and negative 
aspects in the Palestinian democratisation process. On the one hand, there is room for 
criticism of the government within Palestinian society and within the Legislative Council. 
365 The interview witli Hussain Khader was conducted in Rainallah on Sunday 9 August 1998. 
366 The interview with Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Rainallah on Sunday 9 August 1998. 
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This is a positive democratic development, which is absent in most countries in the region. 
On the other hand, there are negative aspects to the democratisation process in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas as those criticisms are for the time being to no effect. This 
can be partly blamed on the Executive Authority's reluctance to cooperate with the 
Legislative Council, but some blame does also fall on the Legislative Council itself, 
because it often failed to act upon its strong verbal warnings. In this manner, the 
Legislative Council helped to create an impression that whatever they said, it would not be 
translated into actual actions. 
This phenomenon, according to Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre, turned the Legislative Council into a second "Hyde Park" rather 
than a true parliament. In one of his commentaries, Ghassan Khatib explained popular 
disappointment with the performance of the Legislative Council as follows: 
'The previous legislative sessions left the publicfeeling greatly disappointed with 
the Council, not because Council members failed to raise the right issues and 
wasted time on unimportant subjects, and definitely not because Council members 
weren't courageous enough to stand up and expose the poor performance and 
mistakes of the Executive branch and security forces. The publicfelt let down 
because, in practical terms, the Council failed to make a difference in any area, 
whether legislation, holding the Executive Authority accountable, or any ofthe 
other well-publicised tasks and objectives of the Council. In other words, while the 
Council and the Council members have been sincere in representing the public's 
needs and concerns, they havefailed to serve the public in any practical way. Y, 368 
According to Council member and newly appointed Minister of Parliament Affairs Nabil 
Amr, however, the problems within the Palestinian Authority are just a matter of lack of 
367 The interview with Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on Sunday 9 August 1998. 
368 Khatib, G., "Hyde Park? ", Palestine &epo 20 March 1998. 
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governmental experience. With patience things will improve. On 28 December 1997, he 
said in a radio interview on Palestine Radio: 
'There is a problem of communication between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council. This is due to thefact that our experience isfresh. The conflict 
is a healthy one and should not be viewed negatively... Let us not be veryjudgmental 
and let us give this experience a chance. " 
President Yasser Arafat seemed to agree with Nabil Amr's analysis of the relationship 
between the Executive branch of the Palestinian Authority and the Legislative Council. In 
his speech in the Legislative Council on the occasion of the start of the third term of the 
Parliament, on 7 March 1998, Arafat stated: 
'We must not forget that we are still on the road to mature democracy, which we 
have not yet reached ... No one can 
deny that mistakes have been made and will be 
made, but the true gaugefor a society and its institutions is the number ofmistakes. 
Are they constantly decreasing or continually increasing? The events of 1997 show 
that they are decreasing and that the [state] institution is on the path to greater 
growth. I hope that we can maintain this positive trend and build our system on 
stronger and firmer foundations, so that our institutions will be based on laws 
adhered to by all. ), 369 
Despite Arafat's optimism and given the current situation in the Palestinian autonomous 
areas, the researcher has strong reservations about the possibility of ftirther democratic 
development and this for mainly two reasons: 
1. There is a strong Executive Authority presence in the Legislative Council that 
obstructs the expected performance of the Legislative Council. Not only is the 
Palestinian Cabinet large, but the number of parliamentarians in the Legislative Council 
is also relatively low compared to most other countries. 
369 "President Arafat's Speech at the PLC's Third Term Opening", Palestine Report, 13 March 1998. 
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2. The interests and goals of the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council are 
not geared in the same direction. The Executive Authority is politically obliged by the 
peace accords to execute policies that contradict with the work of the Legislative 
Council. Indeed, whilst the Executive Authority seems to be increasingly concerned 
about Palestinian-Israeli relations, the efforts of the Legislative Council are more 
directed at internal Palestinian affhirs. Whenever the Legislative Council attempts to 
hold the Executive Authority accountable for its mistakes and mismanagement, a more 
pressing issue in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process directs the attention away from 
the internal problems. It is, therefore, the firm belief of the researcher that the impasse 
in the peace process over the past few years has taken its toll on the Legislative Council 
and has left it isolated and ineffective. 
As a result of the above-mentioned factors, the Legislative Council finds itself caught in a 
paradox. The potential for democratic development is present within the Legislative 
Council. However, the Legislative Council is unable to carry out its responsibilities under 
the current conditions. In order to be able to monitor the Executive Authority, the 
Legislative Council is in bad need of guidelines and powers that are in accordance with, 
inter alia, the rule of law, the principle of separation of power and ajudicial review. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
might prove to be the only hope for the Legislative Council to be able to function as a true 
and effective institution. 
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7.2. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT 
When examining the relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, 
it is important to include the head of the Executive Authority, Ra'is Yasser Arafat. Arafat, 
as a non-voting member of the Legislative Council and from his strong position widiin the 
Executive Authority, has a major impact on the Legislative Council. When Council 
members were asked how they would evaluate the level of communication with the 
President, their views were about as negative as their earlier evaluation of the Executive 
Authority. Only 14.0% of the Council members who participated in the survey found the 
level of communication with the President good. Most surveyed Council members, 44.2%, 
rated the level of communication with the President as average, and 37.2% of the Council 
members thought that the level of communication with the President was bad. 
Firure 82: 
Evaluation by the Council Members of the Level of 
Communication with the President 
Average 
44,2% ood 
answer 
4.7% 
Bad 
N=43 37.2% 
MGood MAverage Mad C3No swer 
As shown in figure 83, below, 69.8% of the surveyed Council members responded that the 
President affected the fimctioning of the Council negatively, whereas only 11.6% replied 
that the President affected the functioning of the Legislative Council positively and the 
same percentage felt he did not affect it at all. 
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Firure 83: 
Evaluation by the Council Members of How the President 
Affects the Functioning of the Legislative Council 
Affects Negatively 
69.8% 
kffects Positively 
11.6% 
No answer 
7.0% 
s not Affect 
11.6% 
N-43 
MAffects Positively MAffects Negatively =DoesnotAffect E3Noan 
Part of the explanation for the negative evaluation by Council members of their relation 
with President Arafat may lie - in the eyes of the Council members - with Arafat's attempts 
to restrict the powers of the Legislative Council. To some of the Council members Arafat 
is an authoritarian leader as so many other leaders in neighbouring Arab countries, who 
does not want to share power and only wants a puppet parliament. As Dr. Haidar Abdel 
Shafi commented to the researcher, in July 1997, at the time of the corruption debate in the 
Legislative Council: 
'V am sure there will be a serious debate and that the members will express their 
opinions strongly, but what will be the outcome of this? You see, in the absence of 
the Basic Law or the Interim Constitution, or even if there would be a Basic Law, I 
don't see that Arafat is going to comply. You have here the example of a real 
dictatorship, because Arafat has the Authority, he has the military, and so on. So he 
is not going to listen. He will say that decision-making is mine, to hell with 
everyone, the decision is mine. , 370 
Council member Marwan Bargouthi, from the Ramallah constituency, gave a similar 
opinion about President Arafat to the researcher, albeit more moderately: 
370 The interview with Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997. 
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"We have a special case ofa President We don't have a traditional president who 
was elected for four years and will leave afterfour years. We have a leader who 
started as a leader more than 30years ago. Mr. Arafat is the chairman of the PLO 
since 30 years, and a leader ofFatah. He is a historical symbolfor the Palestinian 
people. So, he is more than a usual president. These things give him some 
privileges and distinguished power, and he was also elected by the people. In my 
opinion, Mr. Arafat took a very important decision with the general elections in 
order to strengthen democracy, but it is not real democracy orfull democracy as 
one would think He has his own opinion about democracy as well. I think all the 
presidents in the world and all the governments in the world like to keep and 
strengthen their powers. It is not easyfor anyone who has power to give it away. 
Also, for 30 years, Mr. Arafat used to work with the institutions of the PLO and he 
was the decision-maker. This is the fact. The arrival of new institutions in the 
political field that participate in the political decision-making, is not easyfor him. 
371 
There might be a deeper, less forward reason for Arafat being unwilling to give too much 
power to the Legislative Council. At this stage in the peace process, Arafat might find it 
safer to maintain the strength of the PLO. All the Palestinian Authority institutions derive 
their existence, jurisdiction and legitimacy from the peace process and the peace 
agreements signed by Israel and the PLO. These same peace agreements, however, give the 
PLO more independence, because its powers are not limited by the interim period. The 
Palestinian leadership, and notably Arafat, is fearful of allowing Israel to determine the 
course of Palestinian politics, and is, therefore, unwilling to marginalise the PLO or its 
Executive Committee in favour of the Legislative Council whose jurisdiction is limited by 
the peace agreements with Israel. This view is based on the belief that the Legislative 
Council is merely a transitional body that is elected only for that purpose and by only a 
fraction of the Palestinian people. It stems from the belief that the PLO remains the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that the Palestinian National Council 
(PNC) continues to be their true legislature. Therefore, accepting the Legislative Council as 
371 The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on Friday 19 September 1997. 
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the representative of the Palestinian people, or even giving it a larger role, is unacceptable, 
as it could ultimately lead to the marginalisation of the PLO and, consequently, undermine 
the principle goals of the PLO, namely the right of return and the right to self- 
detennination. Burhan Dajani, in an article in the Journal of Palestine Studies, explained 
this point as follows: 
"The concentration ofthe self-rule authority as the exclusive Palestinian negotiator, 
which could only come about through Israel's own legislation, would confirm, with 
Palestinian assent, Israeli law as supreme in all the territories, as has been defacto 
the case since 1967. Moreover, if the Palestinians agree to the self-rule authority as 
the negotiator, everything that the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative ofthe 
Palestinian people, could ask with regard to a host of issues - including the 
refugees, now numbering in the millions, displaced by Israel - could be disqualified 
by virtue of the fact that the self-rule authority represents only the Palestinians of 
the occupied territories. , 372 
As a result of this line of thinking, the researcher believes that Arafat opted for a strategy 
whereby the real decision-making body consists of a combination of members of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO and the Cabinet of the Palestinian Authority. It is 
important to note here that until the Cabinet reshuffle of August 1998 not enough Council 
members were included in the Executive Authority. Indeed, in the Cabinet that lasted until 
the summer of 1998, Arafat had not included the number of Legislative Council members 
required according to Article V. 4. c of the Interim Agreement, which read as follows: 
'The Raees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, 
in number not exceeding twenty percent ofthe total membership ofthe Executive 
Authority, who are not members ofthe Council, to exercise executive authority and 
participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings 
of the Council. P) 373 
372 Dajani, B., "An Altemative to Oslo", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 4, Sununer 1996, p. 14. 
373 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreemen p. 13. 
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Consequently, according to the Interim Agreement, 80% of the Cabinet should consist of 
Council members and the remaining 20% of the Executive Authority could be chosen by 
Arafat from outside the Legislative Council. This option provided Arafat with two 
advantages. Firstly, it enabled Arafat to include some non-Fatah members in the Cabinet, 
thus, giving the Executive Authority a more pluralistic face. A possible example is Talal 
Sidr, who was Hamas-affiliated and received the portfolio of the Ministry of Youth. 
Secondly, it allowed Arafat to bring into the Executive Authority members of the PLO's 
Executive Committee. The prime example in this category was Yasser Abed Rabbo, a 
member of the PLO's Executive Committee, who was also the head of FIDA and became 
Minister of Information. 
At this stage, it is important to point out that, concerning the previous Cabinet, Yasser 
Arafat did not follow Article V. 4. c of the Interim Agreement to the letter, and that in a two- 
fold manner. Firstly, only 2/3 - instead of 80% - of the Cabinet members were also 
members of the Legislative Council. Since the Cabinet reshuffle in August 1998, this 
situation has been rectified. In fact, in the new Cabinet more than 80% of the Cabinet 
members are also Council members. 374 Secondly, since the establishment of the Executive 
Authority, not one of its meetings has taken place with only the Cabinet members present. 
Instead, regular meetings were being held by members of the Executive Authority and 
different people of Arafat's choice. These were usually additional members of the PLO 
Executive Committee, negotiators in the peace talks with Israel, heads of the security 
services, and high-ranking Fatah officials. It is this group of people, not only the members 
374 For more details, see table 38 on pp. 300-301 in this Chapter. 
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of the Executive Authority, who take the decisions, whilst the Legislative Council remains 
largely disregarded. It exemplifies the insistence of Arafat on keeping the PLO involved in 
the political decision-making. 
From the above, it is clear that the interlinkages between the PLO, the Executive Authority 
and the Legislative Council deepen the ambiguity surrounding the Palestinian Authority and 
its jurisdiction. As Ahmad Khalidi noted in the Journal of Palestine Studies: 
... the relationship between the 
PLO, the PNC, and the elected Council [is] a 
relationship that is still clouded with uncertainty and constitutional complexity. " 
375 
Clearly, the Palestinian political system is complex and vague. It falls within the 
constraints of the agreements with Israel, and the fears of marginalising the Palestinian 
rights delineated by the Palestinian National Charter and as portrayed by the PLO and its 
institutions. Arafat, being the leader of both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority is, as 
such, susceptible to criticism from the proponents of both sides. On the one hand, he is 
accused of marginalising the Legislative Council; on the other hand, he is denounced for 
compromising Palestinian national rights. Facts, however, seem to lead to only one possible 
conclusion: Although, on the surface, Arafat seems to attempt to balance responsibilities 
between the different Palestinian institutions, in reality, he is unwilling to entrust the 
Legislative Council with major powers, because its mandate is only a transitional one and is 
restricted by the peace agreements with Israel. Moreover, by involving PLO institutions and 
PLO factions into the decision-making, Arafat is able to provide his rule with more 
legitimacy and is able to give his authority a more pluralistic image. 
375 Khalidi, "The Palestinians' First Excursion... ", p. 29. 
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7.3. CONCLUSION 
From what has been discussed above, the following conclusions can be extracted. 
Firstly, from the results of the survey and the interviews conducted by the author of this 
thesis, it is clear that the relationship between the Legislative Council and both the 
Executive Authority and its head, President Yasser Arafat has been strained. 
Secondly, the main reasons for the strained relationship between those institutions can be 
explained by the political strategy of President Arafat. By forming a decision-making body, 
which places the weight of the PLO into the Executive Authority of the Palestinian 
Authority, Arafat created a problem of dual leadership, void of a legal ftmework. In doing 
so, Arafat marginalised the only elected institution, the Legislative Council, rendering it 
weak, if not ineffective. Although the current stalemate in democratic development in the 
Palestinian autonomous areas is, in part, resulting from an effort by the Palestinian 
leadership to avoid power-sharing, it is the researcher's belief that it is also caused by the 
political conditions, inherent to the Oslo agreements, that do not allow for substantive 
democratic nation-building to materialise at this point in time. 
Thirdly, it is the contention of the researcher that Arafat's actions are related to the political 
risks involved in giving the Legislative Council too large a role in Palestinian political 
decision-making, thus threatening the very existence of the PLO and, consequently, the 
rights of the Palestinian people living in the Diaspora. Arafat's fears are a result of the 
persisting imbalances in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, in turn resulting in a halt in 
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the democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas and an ineffective 
performance by the Legislative Council. The impact of Israeli policies will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight of this study. 
In short, although the findings in Chapter Seven clearly showed that the Palestinian 
autonomous areas may be classified as a partial democracy, given the current political 
situation, it is highly unlikely that the Palestinian regime will evolve into a full democracy 
any time soon. The Legislative Council, in spite of being the only elected institution and 
despite its honourable aims, is currently clearly the underdog amongst the Palestinian 
institutions and the elite. As long as the Palestinian autonomous areas do not become a 
sovereign state and as long as all issues at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process are 
not settled, it is against Palestinian national interest to increase both the powers of the 
Legislative Council and the influence of the democratic and moderate elements amongst the 
elite. Unfortunately, the more time goes by, the less likely it becomes that the Palestinian 
autonomous areas will democratise further and the more the impact of the Legislative 
Council as a force in favour of further democratisation is weakened. Indeed, the inability of 
the Legislative Council to convince other sections of the Palestinian elite to subordinate 
their interests in favour of democracy, de-legitimises it as a viable, effective and 
scrutinising legislature. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICIES ON 
PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 
In this last chapter, the researcher aims to demonstrate that the lack of progress in 
democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas and the weak performance of 
the Legislative Council can not only be blamed on the nature of the Palestinian authority, 
but is also obstructed by the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements and by Israeli policies and 
actions. As such, in this chapter the researcher intends to examine two major Israeli 
influences on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority: 
1. The impact of the provisions of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements that oblige the 
Palestinian Authority to act contrary to both the democratic policies expected from it 
and the PLO's pledge to establish a democratic state as envisaged in the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence. 
2. The impact of Israeli unilateral actions in the areas outside the control of the 
Palestinian Authority. 
In order to illustrate the Israeli factor, several examples in which Israeli policies influenced 
Palestinian internal politics since the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996, will 
be given. First, however, an overview of the perception of the Israeli impact will be 
provided. 
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8.1. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAELI IMPACT 
As briefly illustrated before in Chapter Five, part of public opinion blamed the lack of 
democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas on the undemocratic nature 
and "revolutioxf 'mentality of the Palestinian leadership, whilst the other part put the blame 
on the impact of Israeli policies, whereby the Palestinian leadership was pressured to act 
undemocratically. Also in Chapter Five 374 , it became clear that a total of 83.4% of the 
surveyed people thought that slow democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous 
areas is in one way or the other caused by Israeli policies and pressures. Perhaps Khalil 
Shikaki's analysis reflects most closely the perceptions of the Palestinian public. He 
explained in the Journal of Palestine Studies: 
'The peace process and the PA it engendered also had negative repercussions on 
the transition to democracy. Holding to the view that the requirements of 
democracy may contradict those ofnational reconstruction, and that in the early 
stages of state building it is more important to assert the state's right to 
monopolise power and eliminate competitors for the people's loyalty than to 
democratise the political system, the PA adopted undemocratic policies aimed at 
ýprotecting'the peace process and the process ofnational reconstruction. %375 
When the Council members were asked whether or not they felt that Israeli policies and 
practices had a negative effect upon the functioning of the Legislative Council, their 
evaluation of the Israeli impact was very harsh. An overwhelming majority of 88.4% of the 
Council members who completed the questionnaire felt that Israeli policies and practices 
have a negative effect upon the functioning of the Council. 
374 See Figure 64 in Chapter Five 
375 Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and... ", p. 90. 
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Figure 84 below, finiher shows that only one Council member thought that Israeli policies 
and practices have a positive effect on the functioning of the Legislative Council, and only 
4.7% said that Israeli policies and practices do not affect the functioning of the Legislative 
Council at all. 
Firure 84: 
Impact of Israeli Policies and Practices on the 
Functioning of the Legislative Council 
Affects negatively 
Ný43 
Affects positively 2.3% 
No answer 4.7% 
Doesn't affect 4.7% 
MAffects positively MAflocts negatively EJDoesn't affect__C: ]No answer 
In conclusion, whilst Shikaki's analysis seems to be in line with the public's attitude as 
explained in Chapter Five, it is the researcher's contention that the policies of the 
Palestinian Authority are not merely a result of its need to stabilise and strengthen its 
institutions. It is the belief of the researcher that two Ismeli-related conditions further 
preclude the Palestinian Authority from being democratic. First, the Interim agreements 
themselves contain provisions that force the PA to be undemocratic. As Mustafa 
Barghouti, a prominent figure in the Palestinian NGO community and the director of the 
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, pointedly stated: 
'The Palestinians have a far greater ability to influence democratisation than the 
other conditions for a lastingpeace. But here, too, Israelplays a heavy role. The 
terrible pressures being brought to bear on the PA to carry out acts that are totally 
contrary to respect for human rights and the law (including through threats 
regarding loss of international financial support and delaying implementation of 
aspects of the agreement) are, to say the least, unbecomingfor a country that claims 
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to be a democracy. They reflect Israel's contempt for the Palestinian side, its 
deeply held belief that Arabs can be controlled only byforce. Certainly, one does 
not expect Israel to encourage Palestinian democracy, but a democratic country 
should at least refrain form encouraging and indeed insisting on undemocratic 
acts. 076 
Secondly, Israeli unilateral actions in the areas still under its jurisdiction and the 
consequences of those measures on the Palestinian population further strain the PA and 
compels it to be undemocmtic. 
In the next section, it is the intention of the researcher to make these Israeli pressures 
clearer by concentrating upon the main examples in which Israeli policies influenced 
Palestinian internal politics since the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996. 
8.2. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
Only a few weeks after the elections of the first Legislative Council, in which the general 
public had rightfully or wrongly vested so much hope, events started to overturn the mood 
of celebration. On 25 February 1996, in response to the Jerusalem suicide bomb attack, 
Israel imposed a complete closure on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
One week later, following the Ashkelon attack, the closure was extended to an internal 
closure, i. e. a virtual Israeli siege of the major Palestinian towns and cities, making it 
impossible for anyone to move and paralysing all civic and economic life. The internal 
376 Barghouti, M., Tosteuphoria in Palestine", Journal of Paleatine -Studies , 
(25) no. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 
97-113. 
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closure, which was to be repeated several times, forced Palestinians to face the hard reality, 
that the peace agreements provided the basis for a full dependency relationship between the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel, and a reinforcement of Israel's grip over the situation. The 
mirage of equal partnership was shattered. Increasingly people started complaining that at 
least before the Oslo agreements, in case of closures, they could move between the different 
towns and villages within the West Bank and Gaza, whereas now they were besieged in 
their tiny islands of "liberated land", whenever Israel deemed this necessary for its 
"security". 
The closures by Israel of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and even between different 
areas within the West Bank had become much more frequent since the signing of the peace 
agreements and increasingly began to affect the social and economic well-being of the 
Palestinians. Besides affecting people's right to move freely, the closures indirectly 
restricted many Palestinians' right to work. According to Radwan Shaban of MAS, the level 
of poverty inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip increased in the aftermath of the 
signing of the agreement. To Shaban, increased poverty was a direct result of continued 
Israeli measures, particularly in their firequent closures of the West Bank. 
"One of the disturbing economic outcomes in the WBGS since 1993 is the high 
level of poverty. Mostly, this has occurred as a result of the worsening labour 
market conditions. Given a poverty level of$650 per capita annually qess than 
$2 per day), approximately one-fifth (19.1 percent) of the WBGSpopulation was 
poor at the end of 1995. This is indeed large, and implies that about one-half 
million of the estimated 2.5 million Palestinians are poor. ... Since 1995, the 
situation seems to have deteriorated much more. The profile ofpoverty reveals 
the nature of hardship. An averagefamily with a regularly employedperson at 
the going wage rate should be able to avoidpoverty. The incidence ofpoverty is 
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very much tied to the softness in the labour market and the repeated and severe 
shocksfrom border closures. %377 
The Israeli closure policies, the flooding of Palestinian markets with Israeli goods and the 
restrictions on movement, led to harsh economic realities that produced a level of 
frustration among Palestinians. Polls show that most Palestinians feel that the economic 
conditions worsened since the peace process. As Rose-Marie Barbeau wrote: 
'Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, regardless of whether or not they 
support the peace process, appear tojeel that the current process, or perhaps the 
way in which it has been implemented, is 'bad for business'... In December 
1997,43.7 percent ofpeople asked to compare their currentpersonal economic 
situation with that before the peace process felt that their situation hadgot 
worse, while 38.1 percent felt that there had been no deterioration but also no 
improvement. ... The responses in 1997 indicate that 
b this time Palestinians y 
were already seeing the effect ofthe closures and that other policies affecting the 
economy were adding up and taking a personal toll. "378 
People looked to the Legislative Council to do something against the closure and its 
resulting economic and personal hardships, but found the Council powerless. What is 
more, the Israeli government even harassed the Council members moving from one place to 
another to meet their constituencies or attend their meetings. On several occasions the 
Gazan Council members were unable to attend Council meetings in the West Bank due to 
failure to receive a permit from the Israeli authorities, further exemplifying the dependency 
relation of the Palestinian Authority upon Israel. Public support for the Palestinian 
leadership decreased as there was growing realisation that even if the Palestinian Authority 
- at least on the surface - had all the characteristics of an independent state, complete with a 
377 Shaban, R. A., "Palestinian Economic Development: Recent Experience and Strategic Consideration", p. 
23. Paper presented at the Palestinian Ministry of Labour's International Conference on Employment, 
Ramallah, 13 May 1998. 
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President, ministries, a cabinet and a parliament, it was in fact powerless and left at the 
mercy of Israeli policies. 
The Palestinian general public became even more desperate when the Labour Party with 
Shimon Peres as its candidate lost the general elections on 5 May 1996 against the Likud 
Party and Benyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu won the elections with his slogan of "security 
first", and continued to use this term to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority to ensure 
that they dealt with the Hamas threat. In this respect, the Netanyahu government often 
accused the Palestinian Authority of not adhering to Article 2.2 of the Interim Agreement. 
This article reads as follows: 
'2. Both sides will, in accordance with this agreement, act to ensure the 
immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or 
act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or 
Israelis. To this end, they will co-operate in the exchange of information and co- 
ordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively 
respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act ofterrorism, 
violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an 
occurrence. 
3. With a view to implementing the above, each side shall, in accordance with the 
provisions ofthis Agreement, cany out thefollowingfunctions in the areas under 
its security responsibility: 
a protect all residents of, and all other persons present in, these areas; 
b. actively prevent incitement to violence, including violence against the other 
side or persons under the authority ofthe other side; 
c. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons 
directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement, and 
d prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm to infrastructure 
serving the other side, including, inter alia, roads, water, electricity, 
telecommunications and sewage infrastructure. x379 
378 Barbeau, R., Palestinian SlIpl2ort for the Peace Process. Jenisalem: Jerusalem Media and Communication 
Centre, Februaty 1999, p. 33-34. 
379 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 30. 
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The demands required of the Palestinian Authority to suppress any opposition to the peace 
process in general and to the Israeli policies in particular were fin-ther elaborated in the Wye 
River Memorandum, signed in Washington, D. C. on 23 October 1998. Indeed, as shown 
below, the Palestinians were asked to issue a decree prohibiting incitement. The article 
reads as follows: 
"Drawing on the relevant international practice andpursuant to Article XYII (1) 
of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will 
issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and 
establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or 
threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing 
Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject. "380 
Whilst accusing the Palestinians for not adhering to the peace agreements, Netanyahu was 
himself endangering the peace process with provocative decisions by his government. 
Indeed, Israel undertook many unilateral actions such as opening the tunnel in the old city 
of Jerusalem, building a settlement on Jabel Abu-Gneim. (Har Homa), permitting the 
building of Jewish houses in the middle of the Arab neighbourhood of Ras al-Amoud in 
Jerusalem, delaying the ftu-ther redeployment from part of the West Bank by trying to 
bypass the peace agreements, and many more fact-creating policies which are less 
publicised. It may be surprising to many, for example, that the settler population increased 
381 from 109,500 in 1993 to 169,339 in June 1998 . 
380 The Wye River Memorandum has been published by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre. 
References of this document are taken from the text as published by the JMCC, and page references, therefore, 
refer to that publication. See JMCC, The Me River Memorandum. Jerusalem: Occasional Document Series, 
December 1998, p. 10. 
381 http: //www. finep. org/charts/chart9gi I-10. gif 
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This is an increase of more than 60,000 settlers in the West Bank alone, excluding the 
settlers around East Jerusalem. With regard to this increase, Geoffrey Aronson commented: 
'The continuing expansion of settlements, facilitated by Oslo, is a reflection of 
Israel S' basic understanding of its continuing fteedom of action during its 
diplomacy with the PLO. "382 
Another less publicised example concerns the allocation of water. Israeli settlers are allotted 
almost five times the amount of water available to the average Palestinian. As stated in 
mi 's fact sheet: 
'The amount of water at the disposal ofthe Palestinian territories is only one 
third ofthe amount required to meet basic survival and sanitation needs. Instead 
of the desired amount of 150 litres dailyperperson, Palestinians have to make 
do with only 50-85 litres and an ongoing severe shortage ofrunning water. In 
contrast, in the surrounding Jewish settlements each settler is provided with 280 
to 300 litres daily. The settlers 'unlimited quantity ofrunning water has served 
tofill swimmingpools and to water ornamental lawns. "383 
All these unilateral actions are in contradiction with the provisions of the Interim 
Agreement and, later, with those of the Wye River Memorandum. As Article 
31(7,8) of the Interim Agreement stipulates: 
7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status ofthe 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status 
negotiations. 
8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial 
unit, the integrity ofwhich will be preserved during the interim period "384 
382 Aronson, G., "Prospects for Palestinian Sovereignty sabotaged", http: //www. fmep. org/reports/v9n3. html. 
p. 2. 
383 http: //www. miftah. org/facts/sheets/water2. htmi, p. 2 
384 JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim AgLeement. p. 24. 
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The Wye River Memorandum reiterated the prohibition for unilateral action from either 
side under section 5, which stipulates: 
'Tecognising the necessity to create a positive environmentfor the negotiations, 
neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status ofthe West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement. 085 
Despite Israel's unilateral actions, the pressure on Arafat and his Palestinian Authority 
became even more intense when the US government started defining the concept of security 
in the same way as the Israelis. As Ghassan Khatib, Director of the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre and respected political analyst, noted in one of his editorials: 
... the concept of security as understood 
by Israel and, consequently, as used by 
Dennis Ross, is limited to Israeli security only, while the Oslo agreement deals with 
security of both the parties involved in the conflict, i. e. Israelis and Palestinians. %386 
The American and Israeli pressures on Arafat to strengthen security measures against 
Hamas were particularly effective. Whereas Israel pressured Arafat and the PA by 
intensifying the closure, the American Administration used the aid issue as a means to do 
so, at a time when the pro-Israel Congress was embarrassing the PA because of its human 
rights violations. It was through the strangling grip of the internal closures and the 
economic pressures that Arafat was forced to utilise undemocratic measures against his own 
people. 
Left without alternatives, the Palestinian Authority did crackdown on Hamas, imprisoning 
many opposition leaders, activists and students on mere suspicion of sympathies to anti- 
385 JMCC, The Me River Memorandum p. 16. 
386 Khatib, G., "Security for WhotW', Palestine Report, 22 August 1997. 
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Oslo groups, without trials or due process of law, and by closing several offices and 
institutions related to Hamas or Islamic Jihad. A report of Human Rights Watch affirms the 
impact of combined Israeli and American pressures on the actions of the Palestinian 
Authority as follows: 
"In responding to violence by militant groups, Israel has, with US support, exerted 
intense pressure on the PA to crack down on such groups, without making any 
reference, at least publicly, to the means employed As the PA has indiscriminately 
rounded up hundreds ofsuspected militants in response to acts ofviolence against 
Israelis, both Israel and the US have signaled to Arafat that they are little 
concerned with -abuses when they are committed in the name of1sraeli security and 
saving the Israeli-PLO peace process.... 087 
Meanwhile, the Palestinian public grew increasingly frustrated against their own Authority. 
Especially, when they saw that the Legislative Council was being completely ignored when 
issuing resolution after resolution urging the Executive Authority to comply with the 
internationally recognised human rights standards when dealing with its people. 
Increasingly, the Palestinian leadership was perceived by the Palestinian public as a 
surrogate to the Israelis. As Usher Graham wrote in an article in the Journal of Palestine 
Studies: 
T%at the P, 4's policy of internal security actually betrays is a culture ofdefeat 
This is not just due to thefact that the current Palestinian political leadership has 
and is lowering Palestinian's national claims to a series of desegregatedparts of 
the West Bank and Gaza. More corrosively, it is born of an obsessive ethos of 
"national security " and "national interest " that, once their political and ideological 
content is unpacked, turn out to be no more than the practical implementation of 
Israel's territorial and security ambitions in the occupied territories. " -388 
387 Human Rights Watch, "Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights under the Palestinian Authority", A 
Human Rights/Middle East Report, (9), no. 10 September 1997, p. 6. 
388 Usher, G., Journal of Palestine Studies, (25) no. 2, Winter 1996, p. 33. 
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Indeed, Israel's insistence on isolating the issue of security without implementing such 
outstanding clauses of the Interim Agreement as further redeployment and geographic 
contiguity of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has greatly pressured Arafat into adopting 
measures that are domestically unpopular and internationally embarrassing. Consequently, 
the Palestinian people are caught between the harsh reality of an omni-present Israeli 
occupation, and a regime that is plagued by corruption, mismanagement, a certain degree of 
authoritarianism. In short, the Palestinian Authority constitutes a regime that is empowered 
to suppress its people, without being capable of delivering the promises it gave when it 
entered into agreements with Israel. In combination with the unilateral Israeli measures 
such as settlement building, closures, arrests, demolition of houses, and land confiscation, 
the Palestinian Authority becomes more helpless and acts increasingly in an undemocratic 
manner. According to Mustafa Bargouthi, this does not only damage democratic 
development within the Palestinian autonomous areas, but also puts the relation between 
the government and its people at risk. 
'With no democratic civil society 389 to act as a moderatingforce, the PA is all 
the more vulnerable to pressures to violate human rights, including carrying 
out arbitrary arrests and trials, with the risk that these actions will not only 
undermine the building of democracy but even prevent normal relations 
between the PA and its own people. " -390 
It is also the researcher's belief that a continuation of the situation as is, with a stalemate in 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the growing dissatisfaction, frustration and 
disappointment amongst the Palestinian public with their leaders, could eventually lead to a 
389 It should be noted that the researcher does not subscribe to the view held by Mustafa Bargouthi that there 
is no democratic civil society to act as a moderating force in Palestine. 
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further deterioration in the democratic record of the Palestinian Authority and in the 
inability of the Legislative Council to properly execute its mandate. 
8.3. CONCLUSION 
From the above, it became clear that Israel's exaggerated, but tactical and advantageous 
security concerns have undeniably pressured the Palestinian Authority into adopting 
undemocratic measures and violating basic human rights. Indeed, whether the Palestinian 
Authority, as Sarraj or Khalidi argue391, is inherently undemocratic, or whether it is run by 
one individual who believes that he has the mandate to act as suits him by virtue of being 
the chairman of the PLO and by his election victory, clearly does not undermine nor reduce 
the role of the Israelis in hampering political development and the democratisation process 
in the Palestinian autonomous areas. This supports, therefore, the contention of the author 
described at the beginning of the second part of this study, in that, unless the impact of 
Israeli pressures upon the Palestinian Authority is reduced, and unless the Palestinian-Ismeli 
peace process is revived rapidly and in a more balanced manner, the chances for democratic 
development in the Palestinian autonomous areas are rapidly decreasing. 
Without the necessary prerequisites, mentioned above, there is a risk that governance by the 
Palestinian Authority will increasingly resemble that of governments in neighbouring Arab 
countries as, in this scenario, the Palestinian Authority will not take any chances, and a 
more substantial role - and therefore, more effective role - for the Legislative Council 
390 Barghouti, M., "Posteuphoria in Palestine... ", p. 91. 
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becomes highly unlikely. As such, the possibility for the Palestinian regime to regress from 
a partial democracy into a non-democracy rather than evolving towards further 
dernocratisation is real. Indeed, a precarious and hollow role for the Legislative Council 
will gradually diminish accountability of the Palestinian government to its citizens and 
general elections might not be repeated. The regime might become increasingly 
authoritarian and suppress criticisms, thereby undermining freedom of expression, silencing 
political opposition and restricting the room to manoeuvre of independent organisations 
critical of the regime. In such a scenario, all characteristics that, according to Potter, 
describe a partial democracy will vanish froni the Palestinian political scene. 
391 See Chapter Five. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the role of the Legislative Council in flirthering democratisation 
in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In pursuing this analysis, the researcher divided the 
thesis into two main parts. Part One of the thesis, (which also includes a literature review 
on democratisation theories both in general and region-specific), addressed the 
effectiveness of the Legislative Council in its formation and its internal organisation. Part 
Two examined the extent to which the Legislative Council has played an effective role in 
the Palestinian political system. The researcher has aimed, thus, to provide a clear picture 
of the viability of the Legislative Council firstly as a democratic institution, and secondly, 
as an essential element in the Palestinian democratisation process. 
Throughout the thesis, the researcher has argued and exemplified that the Legislative 
Council is a democratic institution in its formation, but that it is heavily constrained to be 
an effective actor in the process towards democratisation by several elements. These 
include: (1) less democratic members of the Palestinian elite and non-elected Palestinian 
institutions, (2) the impact of Israeli policies in a period of transition, and (3) the absence 
of sovereignty in the Palestinian autonomous areas. Despite the presence of these 
detrimental elements to democratisation on the Palestinian political scene, the researcher 
has shown that the Palestinian regime has evolved from a non-democracy to a partial 
democracy. In classifying the Palestinian autonomous areas as a partial democracy, the 
researcher has relied on David Potter's five characteristics of such a democracy, 
discussed in Chapter one of the thesis. 
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It should be noted that in dealing with the subject matter, the researcher has been 
reluctant to adopt any specific theory available on the process of democratisation. This 
reluctance stems from the absence of democratisation theories dealing with the process 
of democratisation in a non-sovereign "entity". However, keeping in mind the specific 
nature of the Palestinian autonomous areas, the researcher has found the emphasis by the 
transitionalist approach both on the role of the elite and the various stages that have to 
be passed in a transition to democracy, useful in reaching a better understanding of the 
viability of establishing democracies in both Palestine and the Arab world. 
The methodology utilised in this thesis was based on the collection of material from four 
different sources. The first source centred on a review of the relevant literature. The 
second was constituted by extensive interviews conducted with a range of officials, 
academics and members of the Palestinian NGO community. The third was a survey 
conducted by the researcher on the views and attitudes of the Council members with 
regard to the prospects of democratisation and their understanding of the factors 
influencing this process. The fourth was a public opinion poll carried out by the 
researcher examining the level of public expectations with respect to democratic 
development in Palestine and their feelings about the role of the Legislative Council in 
this regard. 
As observed from Chapter One of this thesis, there has been little quantitative work on 
democratisation in the Arab world. Moreover, the general literature on democratisation 
pays little attention to the Arab world. Perhaps the lack of data in most of those 
countries could explain why the focus has primarily been on Arab and Islamic culture. 
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In recent years, however, some scholars on the politics in the Middle East and the Arab 
World have included influences other than culture in their studies of democracy in the 
region. New ideas and explanations regarding the lack of democratic development in the 
various Arab countries included the role of oil and the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Despite that, their studies remained normative in nature. 
Whilst survey research in undemocratic societies, particularly in Arab countries is rare, 
the situation in Palestine is Merent. Survey research can be easily conducted. As such, 
this thesis, by examining the Palestinian experience based on quantitative data, may be of 
relevance in understanding the impact of legislatures on the process of democratisation in 
other countries. In addition, the specific nature of the Palestinian Authority and the 
interim agreements that limit it, could be useful in understanding the obstacles to 
democratic development in other societies that do not enjoy fiffl independence or full 
sovereignty and which are severely limited by external factors. 
Chapter Two of this thesis concentrated on the first Palestinian elections, Palestinian 
voting behaviour and the Council members' perceptions thereof In this chapter, it 
became clear that by holding elections, one of the pre-requisites to evolve to a partial 
democracy had been fulfilled. Although transitionalists would stress the role of the elite 
in deciding to hold elections, the researcher believes that the importance and role of 
Palestinian voting behaviour could not be ignored. After all, the voting pattern of the 
public has a major influence on the composition of the parliament and the competence of 
its members. From Chapter Two it became clear that, in general, the prospects for a 
mature and responsible Palestinian voting behaviour are strengthened by a set of 
variables which underlie democratic consciousness. However, it is the 
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researcher's belief that although, when voting, "rationar' considerations prevailed over 
more traditional ones, the Palestinian electorate is stiff in a "habituation" phase. Indeed, it 
was clear that the older, the less educated and the Gaza residents remained more under 
the influence of traditional factors than the younger, the educated, and the West Bank 
residents. When asked about voting behaviour in future elections, this underlying split in 
society seems to be fading as an increasing number of interviewees stated that their 
future voting behaviour was going to be dictated by rational considerations rather than 
emotional or traditional sentiments. A possible explanation for the stated shift in ftiture 
voting behaviour could be a result of the Council members' failure to live up to their 
promises and responsibilities. Perhaps this, in turn, encouraged the electorate to 
increasingly value the competence and reputation of the candidates rather than their old 
age, family relations or masculine gender. In this regard, it is important to note that the 
Council members overestimated the importance of traditional values in the voting 
behaviour of the Palestinian electorate in the first Palestfiiian elections. Potential 
candidates in future elections might want to take this into consideration. Moreover, 
future candidates might want to take into account that in future elections there might not 
be a conducive political environment allowing candidates to hide their incompetence 
behind their affiliation. Indeed, as will be recalled, the first elections took place 
immediately after a major Israeli redeployment from parts of the West Bank. As a result 
of these events, members of Arafat's Fatah party were often favoured over non-Fatah 
candidates. In short, in future elections, the candidates n-dght not be able to take 
advantage of a conducive political environment and traditional support. Moreover, as a 
result of past experience, the electorate is likely to be more critical and sophisticated in 
their voting behaviour. 
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The changing political environment that followed the elections clearly introduced 
practical challenges to the Council members who were attempting to match their 
performances to the voters' expectations. The Hamas and Jihad bombings in February 
and March 1996 led to an increase in restrictions and imposed firther hardship on the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During this period, the Legislative 
Council was scrutinised by the public and its weaknesses were rapidly exposed. The 
public expectations of the Council members were high, but the capabilities of the 
Legislative Council were severely restricted. These findings were reflected in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. It became clear that both the public and the Council members 
recognised the weaknesses and deficiencies of the new-born parliament. However, 
despite the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council in addressing the challenges it was 
confronted with, both the Council members and their constituents continued to cherish 
the democratic tendencies of the Legislative Council. This belief in the democratic 
nature of the Legislative Council might explain the optimism, discussed in Chapter 
Three, of both the public and the Council members regarding the future performance of 
the Legislative Council. This optimism is an indication that positive change in Palestinian 
society is feasible, provided that certain conditions are met. As discussed in Part Two of 
this thesis, those conditions, as David Apter argued, require political stability and most 
importantly sovereignty. 
The political change needed to attain sovereignty requires and necessitates, inter alia, a 
strong belief and understanding by the representatives of basic democratic tenets and 
practices. As became clear in Chapter Four, this condition seems to be fuwffled. The 
Council. members' understanding of the principles of democracy and their willingness to 
act accordingly convinces the researcher of the viability of a Palestinian democracy 
340 
and the potential for good governance as far as this institution is concerned. The 
assertion by the Council members not only of their understanding of democratic 
principles, but also of their deep belief and their willingness to act according to these 
principles, indicates that at least that part of the Palestinian elite is ready to move to 
Rustow's last phase on the path to democracy, which he referred to as the habituation 
phase. 
VVhilst the foundation for democracy seems to be strong and both the Council members 
and the Palestinian public are receptive to the idea of democracy, the efforts towards 
actual democratic transformation are obstructed by severe political circumstances that 
prevent substantive change. In Part Two of the thesis, the researcher examined more 
closely the possible impediments towards ftirther democratisation. These were briefly 
addressed in Chapter Five where the structure and the nature of the Palestinian Authority 
and the PLO were discussed and the various limitations imposed on the Legislative 
Council were introduced. 
Chapter Six of the thesis examined the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in 
rePresenting its constituents. The researcher found that contrary to the views of such 
scholars as Huntington and Lewis, for example, who blame Islam for the deterioration of 
the Arab political systems, the basis for a strong and healthy relationship between the 
representatives and their constituents seems present. As became clear in Chapter Six, the 
ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing the public is neither due to its 
elitist nature as could be suggested by Lucian Pye nor is it the result of its members' lack 
of understanding or inadequate knowledge of the needs of the public they represent. This 
led the researcher to conclude that the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council 
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stems from the complex relationship between various other actors, including between: 
(1) the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, (2) the Palestinian Authority 
and the PLO, and (3) the overall Palestinian political institutional structure and Israel. 
The relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, on the 
one hand, and between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, on the other hand, were 
examined in Chapter Seven. It is the contention of the researcher that the seemingly 
intentional ambiguous relationship between the PLO and the PA impeded a proper and 
effective functioning of the Legislative Council. It became clear in Chapter S even that 
rightly or wrongly, its effectiveness is undermined by political and national considerations 
that steer the policies pursued by Arafat and the PLO leadership. In their vision, an 
effective Legislative Council could constitute a major threat, not only to the PLO as an 
institution, but to the Palestinian national cause. Being a product of the peace process, 
the Legislative Council is subject to the limitations and shortcomings stemming from that 
peace. In short, as a result of Arafat's balancing act in trying to keep all Palestinian 
institutions satisfied, but under his control, the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are 
caught in a complex web of arrangements that are neither legally framed nor structurally 
clear, but undoubtedly undennine the effectiveness of the Legislative Council. It is 
worth noting that the researcher in her endeavour to understand the confusing structure 
of the Palestinian elite and the role of the Council members within this elite, relied 
heavily on the transitionalist democratisation approach. As will be recalled from Chapter 
One of the thesis, transitionalists such as O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, when 
examining the process of democratisation, differentiated between dfferent types of elites 
and stressed the role of the democratic camp within the elite in consolidating the 
transition to democracy. 
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Whilst, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the ambiguous nature of the Palestinian Authority 
and Arafat's national calculations had their toll on the Legislative Council, the impact of 
Israel on the functioning of this institution has been even more severe. To the researcher, 
the role of Israel in marginalising the Legislative Council and rendering it ineffective is 
very significant. As discussed in Chapter Eight, various stipulations in the peace 
agreements limit the powers of the Legislative Council. The most indicative example of 
such a limiting stipulation is that Arafat, in his capacity as President, is obliged to refuse 
ratification of any legislation that could be interpreted by Israel as a threat to its security 
or a violation of its interpretation of the agreements. Arafat's refusal of such demands 
would lead to severe Israeli measures and Israel's reffisal or postponement of the 
fulfilrnent of its obligations under the signed agreements. Therefore, it seems to the 
researcher that Arafat was unwilling to sacrifice any potential progress in the peace 
process in favour of an active Legislative Council. Under such conditions, the 
Legislative Council was clearly paralysed. On the one hand, its jurisdiction was impeded 
by the Palestinian leadership due to Israeli demands. On the other hand, its inability to 
fulfil the promises it gave to the public rendered it weak and ineffective in the eyes of the 
people it supposedly represents. 
In conclusion, on most accounts, the Legislative Council proved ineffective as a political 
institution. The expectations of the people when they cast their votes were undoubtedly 
shattered. On the one hand, the Legislative Council was not successful in passing any 
legislation necessary for good governance and, as such, the presidential decrees remain 
the "law of the land". On the other hand, the Legislative Council was incapable of 
having any major role in the process of "checks and balances". 
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Whilst this is indeed the case, the whole picture is not so negative. By its very existence, 
the Legislative Council made a difference. Through the elections, declared by most 
observers as fair and free, the Palestinians had their first democratic experience in 
choosing their representatives. Moreover, the public nature of the debates in the 
Legislative Council and the platforms it provided instigated public debate about issues 
that used to be swept under the carpet before the Legislative Council was established. 
Also, on many occasions, albeit without many results, the Legislative Council scrutinised, 
challenged and voiced its opposition to the Palestinian decision-making establishment in 
a manner unpractised before in most Arab countries. 
To the researcher, the above examples are a testimony of the potential of the Legislative 
Council in furthering the Palestinian democratisation process. Up to date, however, the 
Legislative Council failed to deliver on its potential because an essential prerequisite has 
yet to be fulfilled. 
The failure of the Legislative Council to function effectively is not a consequence of the 
Arab or Islamic culture as hinted by scholars such as Huntington and Kedourie. Neither 
is it due to economic and social conditions as Lipset would have argued. On the 
contrary, throughout this thesis, the researcher has found fertile grounds upon which 
Palestinian democracy could be based. The public is receptive and responsible and their 
electoral choices proved to be sensible and rational. The Council members seem to be 
equally responsible and aware of their democratic responsibilities. However, for an 
institution such as the Legislative Council to function properly, one major component is 
missing and that is sovereignty. As such, the researcher concludes that continuous 
presence of the Israeli occupation authority on Palestinian territory, the 
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control it has over movement and the usage of Palestinian resources, and its interference 
in and pressure on the Palestinian decision-making establishment, render any attempt for 
a democratically viable institution meaningless and absurd. 
At the time of the completion of the thesis at the end of 1999, the researcher observed an 
increasing trend in Palestinian society of rejection of Western values and an increasing 
importance of religion as a base for argumentation. Although this observation was made 
in the post- 1998 period and as such does not fall within the scope of this thesis, the 
researcher believed it was vital to mention this observation as it n-dght be an element in 
causing a regression in the Palestinian autonomous areas from a partial democracy to a 
non-democracy and might impede other states in the region to move forward on the path 
towards democracy. 
Since this researcher moved to the Palestinian autonomous areas, it became clear that 
although democratic principles and values continue to be appreciated by both the 
Palestinian public and their representatives, their importance in further development of 
society is increasingly threatened by a level of hostility to Western values. The 
researcher insists on pointing out the role of the media in this respect. On a daily basis, 
the Arab public is exposed through the media to harsh criticisms of Western values, 
symbols and policies. Palestinian and Arab media, including the widely viewed Arab 
satellite stations, constantly portray the West as being imperialist, immoral and 
materialistic. Although the hostility towards the West is to some degree understandable 
given the historic support offered by the West to Israel and the frequent double standards 
used by the West in its foreign policies, it seems regrettable to this researcher that 
democracy is dismissed as an instrument of the West rather than debated as a tool to 
attain Arab national interests. 
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It should be mentioned that issues such as corruption in the Arab world or 
authoritarianism in some Arab countries are discussed in many circles, but rarely are 
mechanisms suggested to address such practices and problems. Seldom is the Arab 
inteRectual discourse able to universalise the positive attributes of democracy as 
practised in the West. Furthermore, the attempts to find a democratic theory specific to 
the Arab or Islanic enviromnent keep failing as a result of the inability to arrive at a 
commonly agreed upon terms of reference for the interpretation of the Koran and the 
Sunna. 
Democracy in the region can only succeed if it is considered objectively as a usefid tool 
and a way of life, regardless of whether or not this system of governance is used in the 
West. The attainment and application of democracy may help Arab countries to fulfil 
their national interest. Calling for democracy without strong belief 4 and support for its 
basic principles such as the judicial process, individual rights and freedoms, women 
empowerment, checks and balances, fair elections and freedom of speech renders 
democracy void of any meaning. Dismissing liberal democratic principles simply because 
they are applied in the West is both irrational and detrimental as it leaves the future of the 
Arab people in the hands of authoritarian or totalitarian leaders whose policies are not 
necessarily in the best interest of their citizens. 
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ANNEXES 
xi 
PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON THE ELECTIONS AND THE PLC 
Question Answer Value Code 
Have you, ýo-W in the elections of January I H 1. Yes (if yes, go to question la) I 
96? ý 96? 2. No (if no, go to question lb) 2 Q1 3. No answer 9 
Ia. For which political faction did you Q2 vote? 
1b. Why didn't you vote? 1.1 didn't register on time. I 
2.1 didn't believe that it would make 2 
a difference 
3.1 didn't find candidates for whom 1 3 
would cast my vote 
4. Others 4 
5. No answer 9 Q3 
Did t he e 1 ection results meet your 2. I. Met my expectations I 
t expecta ions , 
r 
expectations? 2. Somewhat met my expectations 2 
3. Did not meet my expectations 3 
4. No opinion 9 Q4 
3. When voting, did you know what was the I. Yes (if yes, go to question 3a) I 
agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates? 2. No 2 
3. No answer 9 Q5 
3a. Did the candidates live up to their 1. Yes I 
promises? 2. No 2 
3. No answer 
I 
9 
I 
Q6 
I 
-i 4.1 will read to you some categories of people, please tell me whether you have voted for them in general or 
not whether you will vote for them again or not. 
voted did not vote will vote again will not vote again depends 
Returnees 1 2 3 4 5 Q7, 
Relatives 1 2 3 4 5 Q8 
Females 1 2 3 4 5 Q9 
1 Christians I11 2 31 41 5 1 Q10 
I People with struggle history I11 2 31 41 5 1 Q1, 
5. How important were the following factors, when you casted. your vote? (Important to stress how you have voted, 
not how you will vote) 
very important important somewhat not important absolutely not 
mportant 
Democratic values 1 2 3 4 5 Q12 
Political affiliation 1 2 3 4 5 Q13 
Religion 1 2 3 4 5 Q14 
Religious values 1 2 3 4 5 Q15 
Struggle history 1 2 3 4 5 Q16 
Education 1 2 3 4 5 Q17 
Residence 1 21 3 4 5 Q18 
Socio-econ. status 1 21 3 4 5 Q19 
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p, r-putation 1 2 3 4 5 Q20 
Family relations 1 2 3 4 5 Q21 
Cionder 1 2 3 4 5 Q22 
Age 1 2 3 4 5 Q23 
Carnpaýign_ 11 21 3 4 5 Q24 
uestion Answer Value Code 
6- To what extent would you say that the 1. The people are responsible I 
Palestinian people were responsible for voting 2. The people are somewhat 2 
such Council? responsible 3 
3. The people are not responsible 9 
4. No answer Q25 
7. Would you say that you would vote again in I. Yes (if yes, go to question 7a) I 
the next elections? 2. No (if no, go to question 7b) 2 
3. No answer 3 Q26 
7a. Would you vote according to the same 1. According to the same criteria I 
criteria, not quite, or would you vote in a 2. Not quite in the same way 2 
totally different way? 3. Vote in a totally different way 3 
4. No answer 9 Q27 
7b. Why wouldn't you vote again? I. It wouldn't make any difference 1 
2.1 don't believe the PLC represents 2 
the interests of the people 
3. Other reasons 3 
4. No answer 9 Q29 
8. Do you think that, in general, people know 1. Yes I 
how to vote for the right candidate? 2. Some 2 
3. No 3 
4. No answer 9 Q29 
9. How important would the followine factors be for vou when votinp, in the next elections? 
very important important somewhat 
important 
not important absolutely not 
imp t 
Democratic values 1 2 3 4 5 Q30 
Political affiliation 1 2 3 4 5 Q31 
Religion 1 2 3 4 5 Q3 
Religious values 1 2 3 4 5 Q33 
Struggle history 1 2 3 4 5 Q34 
Education 1 2 3 4 5 Q35 
Residence 1 2 3 4 5 Q36 
Socio-econ. status 1 2 3 4 5 Q37 
Reputation 1 2 3 4 5 Q38 
Family relations 1 2 3 4 5 Q39 
Gender 1 2 3 4 5 Q40 
Age 1 2 31 4 5 Q41 
Campaign 1 2 31 4 5 .. 
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10. Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally, responsibly or irresponsibly. What about you, did you vote 
rationally or irrationally, responsibly or irresponsibly? 
people voted- 
people voted- 
rationally I irrationally 2 
responsibly 3 irresponsibly 4 
you voted- 
you voted- 
rationally 5 irrationally 6 1 Q43 
responsibly 7 irresponsibly 81 Q44 
Question Answer Value Code 
1. Of those who made it to the Council and I. Satisfied I 
whom you yourself have voted for, are you 2. Somewhat satisfied 2 
satisfied with them, somewhat satisfied, or 3. Dissatisfied 3 
dissatisfied with them? 4. None made it to the PLC 4 
5. No answer 9 Q45 
12. Given the election results, do you think the 1. Yes I 
elected members represent the views/concerns of 2. To a certain extent 2 
the people? 3. No 3 
4. No answer 9 Q46 
13. To what extent would you say the Council I. A lot I 
members know what the people want/need? 2. Not a lot 2 
3. Not at all 3 
4. No answer 9 Q47 
14. Some people say that the PLC is very I. Very restricted by the EA I 
restricted by the Executive Authority, others say 2. Some restrictions by the EA 2 
there are only some restrictions by the EA, and 3. No restrictions by the EA 3 
others say there are no restrictions by the EA. 4. No answer 9 Q48 
What do you think? I I 
15. In general. how dovou evalnate the Palaoininn Lepiqlative rojinril in the fhUnwincO T-TnLv Anitt 
Democracy is it.. very democratic democratic not democratic very undemocratic Q49 
1 2 3 4 
Effectiveness very effective effective not effective very uneffective Q50 
1 2 3 4 
Responsiveness very reponsive responsive not responsive very unresponsive Q51 
1 2 3 4 
Independence from the EA veryindependent independent dependent very dependent Q52 
1 2 3 4 
Independence from the Judiciary -very independent independent dependent very dependent Q53 
4 
Pluralism 
_T very pluralistic pluralistic I not plurali 
I 
very unpluralistic Q54 
2 3 4 
16. Do you ieve in the importance of having I. Yes I 
women in the Legislative Council? 2. No 2 
3. No answer 9 
Q53 
17. Why do you think there is a need for women T. Women need to-demand their T- in the Legislative Council? rights 2 
376 
2. Better for democracy 3 
3. Other reasons 9 Q56 
4. No answer 
18- Why don't you believe in having women in I. Men can represent women's needs I 
the Legislative Council? 2. No difference between the needs of 2 
men and women 
3. Not qualified for this position 3 
4. Other reasons 4 Q57 
5. No answer 9 
19. Looking back at the last year and a half since 1. Very satisfied (go to question 19a) I 
the Council has been elected, what is your 2. Satisfied (go to question 19a) 2 
opmion about its performance in general? 3. Dissatisfied (go to question 19b) 3 
Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, 4. Very dissatisfied (go to quest. 19b) 4 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? 5. No answer 9 Q58 
20a. Which of the following are the 3 most I. Responsiveness I 
important reasons for your satisfaction? 2. Democracy 2 
3. Effectiveness 3 
4. Independence 4 
5. Courage 5 
6. Accessibility 6 
7. Other reasons 7 
8. No answer 9 Q59 
20b. Which of the following are the 3 most I. Lack of responsiveness I 
important reasons for your dissatisfaction? 2. Lack of democracy 2 
3. Lack of effectiveness 3 
4. Lack of independence 4 
5. Lack of courage 5 
6. Lack of accessibility 6 
7. Other reasons-- 7 
8. No answer 9 Q60 
21. In general, are you optimistic about the I. Optimistic (if yes, go to q. 21 a) I 
performance of the elected Legislative Council in 2. Pessimistic (if yes, go to q. 21 b) 2 
the future? 3. No answer 3 
Q61 
2 Ia. Are you optimistic or very optimistic? 1. Optimistic I 
2. Very optimistic 2 Q62 
21b. Are you pessimistic or very 1. Pessimistic 3 
pessimistic? 2. Very pessimistic 4 Q63 
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ANNEX3 
OPINION POLL HITHIN THE PALESTINL4N LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
1. In your opinion, how important were the following factors when people cast their vote? Please note: 
Mlt is important to stress how people have voted, not how they will vote, (2)Important to state what in 
vour oDinion the DCODle think. not what vou think. 
very important important somewhat 
important 
not important absolutely not 
important 
Democratic values 1 2 3 4 5 Q1 
Political affiliation 1 2 3 4 5 Q2 
Religion 2 3 4 5 Q3 
Re! uj2Rý. nlues 
i]i 
ous v l i i 2 3 4 5 Q4 
Stru le histo Sý 
E 
1 2 3 4 5 Q5 
tion F-d u ca 1 2 3 4 5 Q6 
Residence 1 2 3 4 5 Q7 
jo. econ. status 1 2 3 4 5 Q8 
tion 1 2 3 4 5 Q9 
F. Wil relations 1 2 3 4 5 Q10 
2 3 4 5 Q11 
3 Q12 
n ai 
±5 
Q13 
Question Answer Value Code 
2. On a scale from I to 10,1 being very rational, EEEEEEEEE 
10 being very irrational, how would you rate the 
Palestinian voter in the elections? E 
123456789 10 
on a scale from I to 10,1 being very EEEEEEEEE 
responsibly, 10 being very irresponsibly, how 
would you rate the Palestinian voter in the 
E 
Q15 
elections? 123456789 10 
4. Do you think, in the next elections, people 1. According to the same criteria 1 
would vote according to the same criteria, not 2. Not quite in the same way 2 
quite, or would they vote in a totally different 3. Vote in a totally different way 3 Q16 
way? 
5. In general, do you think that people know how I' Yes I 
to vote for the right candidate? 2. No 2 
3. Only to a certain extent 3 Q17 
6. In general, would you say, when people voted, 1. Yes 1 
they knew the agenda/campaign slogans of the 2. No 2 
candidates? 3. Only to a certain extent 3 Q18 
7. In your opinion, what are the two most Problem 1: 1 
important problems facing Palestinian society Problem 2: 
nowadays? 2 Q19 
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f luestion Answer Value Code 
8. In general, would you say people are satisfied, a would 1. Satisfied I 
,ý somewhat sati ied, or dissatisfied with those 
iiisfied 
, or dIssat ý 2. Somewhat satisfied 2 Q20 
u cil? who made it to the Council? li Co 3. Dissatisfied 3 
0 Sul 9. Given the election re ts , esults, do you think the r I. Yes 1 
it elected membensrepresent the views/concerris of 
i 2. To a certain extent 2 Q21 
the people? 3. No 3 
10. To what extent would you say the Council 1. A lot I 
members know what the people want/need? 2. Not a lot 2 Q22 3. Not at all 3 
To what extent would you say that you know I. A lot I 
what the people want/need? 2. Not a lot 2 3. Not at all 3 Q23 
1 la. What are the tools you as Council 
member use to know the needs of the people 
a represent? Q24 
Inost important needs of the people? 2. Q25 
3. 
c, How do you make sure that they are the a 
E 
CýS? needs? - 
i 
Q26 
ur opinion, did the Council members, in 12. In yo 1. Yes I F 
ej general, live up to their promises/campaign 2. No 2 ! 
logans? 3. No answer 9 
Q27 
13. As a Council member, would you say you I- Yes I 
yourself are living up to your promises/campaign 2. No 2 Q28 
slogans? 
14. Looking back at the last year and a half since I. Very satisfied (go to quest. 14a) I 
the Council has been elected, what is your 2. Satisfied (go to question 14a) 2 
opinion about its performance in general? Would 3. Dissatisfied (go to question l4b) 3 
you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, 4. Very dissatisfied (go to q. l4b) 4 Q29 
dis tisfied or very dissatisfied? 
14a. Which of the following are the most 1. Responsiveness I 
important reasons for your satisfaction? 2. Democracy 2 
3. Effectiveness 3 
4. Independence 4 
5. Courage 5 
6. Accessibility 6 Q30 
7. Other reasons 7 
14b. Which of the following are the most I. Eck of responsiveness I 
important reasons for your dissatisfaction? 2. lack of democracy 2 
3. Lack of effectiveness 3 
4. Lack of independence 4 
5. Lack of courage 5 
6. Lack of accessibility 6 Q31 
7. Other reasons 7 
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Question Answer Value Code 
15. Some people say that the PLC is very I. very restricted by the EA I 
restricted by the Executive Authority, others say 2. Some restrictions by the EA 2 
there are only some restrictions by the EA, and 3. No restrictions by the EA 3 
others say there are no restrictions by the EA. 
Q32 
What do you think? 
16. Most of the resolutions of the PLC were not 1. Attitude of the EA I 
irriplemented by the Executive Authority. In your 2. Inefficiency of the EA 2 
opinion, why is that? 3. Resolutions are outside the 3 
scope of authority of the PNA 
4. Others 4 Q33 
---- injistic or pessimistic about the 17. Are you oPtitnistic Or NssiT! st! c 19 1. Optimistic (if yes, go to 1 
rforniance of the elected Legislative 
Council in question 16a) pe 
the future? 2. Pessimistic (if yes, go to 2 Q34 
questions l6b) 
17a. Are you optimistic or very optimistic? 1. Optimistic 1 
2. Very optimistic 2 Q35 
l7b Are pessimistic or very pessimistic? I. Pessimistic 3 
, 2. Very pessimistic 4 
Q36 
I- 
18. How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following? How about 
Democracy is it.. very democratic democratic not democratic very undemocratic 
Q37 
1 2 3 4 
Effec iveness very effective effective Not effective very ineffective Q38 
1 2 3 4 
Responsiveness very responsive responsive not responsive very unresponsive Q39 
1 2 3 4 
Independence from the EA very independent independent Dependent very dependent 
Q40 
1 2 3 4 
Independence from the Judiciary very independent independent Dependent very dependent Q41 
4 
2 3 
Pluralism very pluralistic pluralistic not pluralistic very unpluralistic Q42 
2 3 4 
19. Of the following issues, could you please state how much it affects the functioning of the Council. 
Would vou sav it affects the functioning positively, negatively, or it doesn't affect it at all? 
positively Negatively doesn't affect 
Israeli policics and practices 1 2 3 Q43 
The Executive Authority 1 2 3 Q44 
The Judiciary 1 2 3 Q45 
The President 2 3 Q46 
The people 2 3 Q47 
The media 2 3_ , 
Q48 
20. How would vou evaluate the level of communication with the following? 
good avcrage bad 
The Executive Authority 1 2 3 Q49 
The Judiciary 1 2 3 Q50 
The Prcsident 1 2 3 Q51 
The pcoplc 1 2 3 Q52 
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2 1. In YOU opinion, which country in the world is the most democratic? Please rate the folloNNIng countries. 
(Mease cirri, ua-- 
I 
COUNTRY verýv democratic democratic I Tmlemocratic very undemocratic 
Egypt 1 2 3 4 Q53 
France 2 3 4 Q54 
Jordan 2 3 4 Q55 
I Saudi Arabia 2 3 4 
Q56 
Tunisia 1 2 3 4 
Turkey 1 2 3 4 Q58 
United States 1 2 3 4 Q59 
Yeme 2 3 4 Q60 
Sweden 2 3 4 Q61 
22. Being a representative of the people, how I. I would vote for the bill I 
would you vote on a 
bill that is popular, yet 2.1 would vote against the bill 2 Q62 
regarded upon as 
being undemocratic according 3.1 would abstain from voting 3 
ratic tenets? to dcraoc . 23-111 nciple, 
do you think that the 1. A simple parliamentary I 
Collstitution 
should be amended by: majority 
2. A 2/3 parliamentary majority 2 
3. A referendum amongst the 3 
people Q03 
4. The president 4 
24. Whom of the following must hold the I. The PLC I 
president accountable? (You may choose more 2. The Cabinet 2 
than one option) 3. The Courts of Law 3 
4. President above accountability 4 
5. The people 5 Q64 
6. God/Islam 6 
5. Whom of the following must hold them I. The President I 
accountable? (You may choose more than one 2. Law & Courts 2 
option) 3. The PLC 3 Q65 
4. The people 4 
26. Which in your opinion should be the highest I. The President I 
source of interpretation? 2. The Parliament 2 
3. The High Court 3 
4. The religious institutions 4 
5. Other 5 Q66 
27. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements. The ideal Council member 
should: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree) 
Adhere to the Constitution 1 2 3 4 5 Q67 
Be tough-minded 1 2 3 4 5 W 
Rely on religious interpretation 1 2 3 
] 
4 5 Q(-)g 
Follow the principles on which he was elected 1 2 3 4 5 Q70 
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28. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1: strongly agree, and 5: 
strongly disagree) 
A--ree Disaeree 
There are s me situations in which the Authority is justified in breaking laws 
in order to protect national security. 
1 2 I 3 4 5 Q71 
If the President acts against the Constitution, he should be impeached. 1 2 3 4 5 Q72 
The quota system is important to have representation for minorities. 1 2 3 4 5 Q73 
_ Majority right is absolute 1 2 -- 31 4 5 Q74 
it is important to have women in the Council. 1 2 3 4 5 Q75 
Using the threat of violence as a political weapon is never justified. 1 2 3 4 Q76 
There is too much concern for law and order, and not enough for rights. 1 2 Q77 
Alcohol drinking is a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime. 1 2 3 Q78 
29. How strongly do you believe in the following: (1: strongly believe, and 5: strongly do not believe) 
strong1v stron--Iv not 
n between religion and the state ý! ionýl 1 2 3 4 
-5 -] -Q79 
Irldividual nghts ... - 
1 2 3 4 5 Q80 
ýtljc 
of the majority I ule 5 Q81 
V. 11 orities hts OIL MI f -T- 7- 3 -T- 5 Q92 
tyudi 
ial revlew ic' 2 3 4 Q83 
F Freed reedOln of assembly F1 2 3 4 5 Q94 
tt s of opposition j V Q85 
30. Which, in your opinion, shall be the terms of 1. PLO I 
reference for the negotiations during the interim 2. PNA 2 
phase: the PLO or the PNA? 
- 
3. Other 3 Q86 
The PLC has discussed many issues -ýI. I. Yes, PLC should be involved. I 
pertaining to Israeli practices such as settlements Why? 
and closures, etc. To what extent would you say 
that discussing such issues falls within the 2. No, PLC should not be involved. 2 
jurisdiction of the PLC, or do you think that the Why? 
PLC should not be involved? I 
Q87 
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ANNEX 6: Results of the Survey within the Legislative Council 
1. In your opinion, how important were the jolloningfactors when people cast their votes? Please 
note: (1) It is important to stress howpeople have voted, not how they jvill vote. (2) Important to state 
what, in your opinion, the people think not whatyou think 
a. Democratic values 
Value label Frequenc y= 43 Percent 
Very important 13 30.2% 
Important 11 25.6% 
Somewhat important 14 32.6% 
Not important 3 7.0% 
Absolutely not important - - Missing 2 4.7% 
b. Political affiliation 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Very important 11 25.6% 
important 15 34 9% Somewhat important 14 . 32 6% Not important 2 . 
Absolutely not important - 
4.7% 
Missing 1 2.3% 
RReHp, *On 
- Value label 177re q2uenc ýýý Percent 
V eý ry, im pn o rr tt an nn tt 6 14.0% 
Important 10 23.3% 
Somewhat important 11 25.6% 
Not important 9 20.9% 
Absolutely not important 5 11.6% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
d. Religious values 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Very important 2 16.3% 
Important 21 48.8% 
Somewhat important 10 23.3% 
Not important 3 7.0% 
Absolutely not important - - Missing 2 4.7% 
e. Struggle history 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Very important 24 55.8% 
Important 14 32.6% 
Somewhat important 4 9.3% 
Not important 1 2.3% 
Absolutely not important - - Missing 
- 
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L Vdifentian 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very important 10 23.3% 
Important 22 51.2% 
Somewhat important 6 14.0% 
Not important 2 4.7% 
Absolutely not important -- 
Missing 3 7.0% 
!. Residence 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very important 1 2.3% 
Important 14 32.6% 
Somewhat important 5 11.6% 
Not important 18 41.9% 
Absolutely not important 3 7.0% 
2 4.7% 
h Socio-economic status 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
very important 4 9.3% 
Important 14 32.6% 
Somewhat important 18 41.9% 
Not important 4 9.3% 
Absolutely not important 1 2.3% 
4.7% 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Very important 27 62.8% 
important 9 20.9% 
Somewhat important 5 11.6% 
Not important 1 2.3% 
Absolutely not important - - 
Missing 1 2.3% 
Family relations 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Very important 8 18.6% 
Important 14 32.6% 
Somewhat important 16 37.2% 
Not important 3 7.0% 
Absolutely not important - - 
Nussing 2 4.7% 
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k- Gpntip" 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very important 6 14.0% 
Important 15 34.9% 
Somewhat important 10 23.3% 
Not important 5 11.6% 
Absolutely not important 4 9.3% 
Nfissing 3 7.0% 
1. Am 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very important 1 2.3% 
Important 10 23.3% 
Somewhat important 14 32.6% 
Not important 13 30.2% 
Absolutely not important 3 7.0% 
4.7% 
w. Campm: 
Value label 
-- 
Frequency = 43 Percent 
- 7 Very important 7 16.3% 
Important 15 34.9% 
Somewhat important 19 44.2% 
Not important 1 2.3% 
Absolutely not important - - 1 2.3% 
2. on a scale from I to 10,1 being very rational, 10 being very irrational, how wouldyou rate the 
palestinian voter in the elections? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
4 9.3% 
25 11.6% 
3 14 32.6% 
45 11.6% 
5 12 27.9% 
6 
7 
8 
9 
7.0% 
10 
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I On a scale from I to 10,1 being very responsible, 10 being verY irresponsible, how would. vou rate 
the Palestinian voter in the elections? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 4 9.3% 
2 7 16.3% 
3 10 23.3% 
4 9 20.9% 
5 4 9.3% 
6 2 4.7% 
7 6 14.0% 
8 1 2.3% 
9 
10 
4. I)o you think, in the ne-W elections, people would vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or 
would they vote in a totally different way? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
According to the same criteria 3 7.0% 
Not quite in the same way 30 69.8% 
Vote in a totally different way 9 20.9% 
ssi 2.3% 
5. In general, do you think people know how to votefor the right candidate? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes 14 32.6% 
NO 1 2.3% 
only to a certain extent 28 65.1% 
missing - - 
6. In general, would you say, when people voted, they knew the agendalcampaign slogans of the 
candidates? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes 8 18.6% 
No 9 20.9% 
only to a certain extent 24 55.8% 
Nlissing 2 4.7% 
7. In your opinion what are the two most importantproblemsfacing Palestinian society nowadays? 
a. Problem 1: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Tribalism 5 11.6% 
Factionalism - - 
Loss of hope 1 2.3% 
Absence rule of law 3 7.0% 
Economic situation 9 20.9% 
Social problems - - 
Occupation 13 30.2% 
Lack of comprehensive plan 1 2.3% 
Political situation 7 16.3% 
Closure 1 2.3% 
Separation of powers - - 
Election fraud 2 4.7% 
Corruption 1 2.3% 
Settlements - - 
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b. Problem 2: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Tribalism 1 2.3% 
Factionalism 2 4.7% 
Loss of hope - 20 9% Absence rule of law 9 . 2% 30 Economic situation 13 . 
Social problems 3 
7.0% 
Occupation - 
1 2.3% Lack of comprehensive plan 
Political situation 8 
18.6% 
Closure 1 2.3% 
Separation of powers 1 2.3% 
Election fraud - - 
Corruption 3 7.0% 
2.3% 
8. in general, would you say people are satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or dissatisfied with those who 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Satisfied 5 11.6% 
Somewhat satisfied 31 72.1% 
Dissatisfied 5 11.6% 
4.7% 
9. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views1concerns of the 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes 18 41.9% 
To a certain extent 22 51.2% 
No 1 2.3% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
10. To what extent wouldyou say the Council members know what the people wantlneed? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
A lot 24 55.8% 
Not a lot 15 34.9% 
Not at all - - 
Missing 4 9.3% 
11. To what extent wouldyou say thatyou know what the people wantlneed? 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
A lot 29 67.4% 
Not a lot 12 27.9% 
Not at all - - 
Missing 2 4.7% 
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12. H%ar are the tools you as a Council member use to know the needs of thepeopleyou represent? 
a. First tool: 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Meetings 36 83.7% 
Follow-ups - - 
newspapers 1 2.3% 
Lectures/Workshops 1 2.3% 
Complaints/letters - 
Field visits 2 4.7% 
Polls 1 2.3% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
b. Second tool: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Meetings 2 4.7% 
Follow-ups 8 18.6% 
newspapers 2 4.7% 
Lectures/Workshops 6 14.0% 
Complaints/letters 13 30.2% 
Field visits 7 16.3% 
Polls - - Missing 5 11.7% 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Meetings 3 7.0% 
Follow-ups - - 
newspapers 7 16.3% 
Lectures/Workshops 4 9.3% 
Complaints/letters 11 25.6% 
Field visits 2 4.7% 
Polls 1 2.3% 
Missing 15 35.0% 
13. R%at are in your opinion the three most important needs of thepeople? 
a. First need 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Infrastructure 6 14.0% 
Democracy/law/justice 4 9.3% 
Equal opportunities 1 2.3% 
Public liberties 1 2.3% 
Security 2 4.7% 
Political situation/future 10 23.3% 
Economy 13 30.2% 
Cure for corruption - - 
Unemployment 5 11.6% 
Housing - - 
Land and water 
Accountability - - 
Missing 1 2.3% 
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b. Second need: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Infrastructure 3 7.0% 
Democracy/law/justice 12 27.9% 
Equal opportunities 1 2.3% 
Public liberties 2 4.7% 
Security 6 14.0% 
Political situation/future 1 2.3% 
Economy 8 18.6% 
Cure for corruption 2 4.7% 
Unemployment 7 16.3% 
Housing 1 2.3% 
Land and water - - 
Accountability - 
c- Third need: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
infrastructure 6 14.0% 
Democracy/law/justice 12 27.9% 
F, qual opportunities 1 2.3% 
Public liberties 1 2.3% 
Security 2 4.7% 
political situation/future 4 9.3% 
Economy 6 14.0% 
Cure for corruption 1 2.3% 
Unemployment 7 16.3% 
14ousing 1 2.3% 
Land and water - - 
Accountability 1 2.3% 
1 2.3% 
14. How do you make sure that they are the needs? 
a. First way: 
Value label Frequency = 43 Percent 
Listen/communicate 25 58.1% 
Field visits/meetings 2 4.7% 
Closure - - 
Incoming complaints 5 11.6% 
Rcsearch/studies 1 2.3% 
Newspapers - - 
Personal sense 5 11.6% 
Shortages - - 
We are part of the people 4 9.3% 
Nfissing 1 2.3% 
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b. Second wav: 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Listen/communicate 5 11.6% 
Field visits/meetings 8 18.6% 
Closure 1 2.3% 
Incoming complaints 9 20.9% 
Research/studies 5 11.6% 
Newspapers 3 7.0% 
Personal sense - 
Shortages 1 2.3% 
We are part of the people 2 4.7% 
Combination of the above 2 4.7% 
Nfissing 7 16.3% 
Value label Frequency 43 Percent 
Listen/communicate - - 
Fic1d visits/meetings 2 4.7% 
Closure - - 
Incoming complaints 6 14.0% 
Research/studies 8 18.6% 
Newspapers 3 7.0% 
Personal sense 3 7.0% 
Shortages - - We arc part of the people 8 18.6% 
Combination of the above 2 4.7% 
11 25.6% 
uncil members, in general, live up to their p romisesIcampaign slogans? 
Value labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes 6 14.0% 
No 10 23.3% 
To some extent 25 58.1% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
16. As a Council member, would you say you yourse? f are living up to your promises/campaign 
sjogans? 
_ Value labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes 18 41.9% 
No 3 7.0% 
To some extent 20 46.5% 
Nfissing 2 4.7% 
17. Looking back at the lastyear and a hay'since the Council has been elected, what isyour opinion 
about its performance in general? Wouldyou say you are very satisfied, satisfied dissatisfied or very 
4*44fle, 
Value labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very satisfied 1 2.3% 
Satisfied 28 65.1% 
Dissatisfied 12 27.9% 
Very dissatisfied 2 4.7% 
Missing - - 
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18 Mch of thefolloi4ng are the most important reasonsfor your satisfaction? 
a. First reason: 
Value label Frequency = 29 Percent 
Responsiveness 12 41.4% 
Democracy 14 48.3% 
Effectiveness 2 6.9% 
Independence 1 3.4% 
Courage - - 
Accessibility 
Other reasons 
Nfissing 
b. Second reason: 
Value label Frequency = 29 Percent 
Responsiveness 
Democracy 4 13.8% 
Effectiveness 1 3.5% 
independence 13 44.8% 
Courage 9 31.0% 
Accessibility - 
other reasons 1 3.5% 
Missing 
-- 
1 3.5% 
9. " ich of th efolloi4ng are th e most important reasonsfor your dissatisfaction ? 
First reason: 
Value label Frequeqcir= 14 Percent 
Lack of responsiveness 
Lack of democracy 1 7.1% 
Lack of effectiveness 8 57.1% 
Lack of independence 3 21.4% 
Lack of courage - 
Lack of accessibility - 
Busy with personal issues 1 7.1% 
Other reasons - 
Missing 1 7.1% 
b. Second reason: 
Value label Frequency = 14 Percent 
Lack of responsiveness 1 7.1% 
Lack of democracy - - 
Lack of effectiveness 2 14.3% 
Lack of independence 4 28.6% 
Lack of courage 1 7.1% 
Lack of accessibility - - 
Busy with personal issues 1 7.1% 
Other reasons 2 14.3% 
Missing 3 21.4% 
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20. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are 
Only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the Evecutive Autkority. 
W%at do vou think? 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very restricted by the EA 12 27.9% 
Some restrictions by the EA 25 58.1% 
No restrictions by the EA 6 14.0% 
Missing -- 
21. Most of the resolutions of the PLC were not implemented by the Executive Authority. Inyour 
opinion, why is that? 
Label Value FrequenEy = 43 Percent 
Attitude of the EA 16 37.2% 
Inefficiency of the EA 9 20.9% 
Resolutions are outside the scope 2 4.7% 
of the PNA 
Combination of attitude and 14 32.6% 
inefficiency of the EA 
4.7% 
22. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the 
future? 
Label Value Frequency= 43 Percent 
Optimistic 37 86.0% 
Pessimistic 5 11.6% 
1 2.3% 
23. Are yo istic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very optimistic 8 18.6% 
Cautiously Optimistic 30 69.8% 
Very pessimistic 1 2,3% 
Cautiously pessimistic 4 9.3% 
Nfissing -- 
24. How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in thefollaiving? How about.. 
a. Democrac 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic 6 14.0% 
Democratic 32 74.4% 
Not democratic 3 7.0% 
Very undemocratic -- 
Missing 2 4.7% 
b. Effectiveness 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very effective 1 2.3% 
Effective 30 69.8% 
Not effective 10 23.3% 
Very ineffective 1 2.3% 
_ 
Nfissing 1 2.3% 
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c. Responsiveness 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very responsive 4 9.3% 
Responsive 31 72.1% 
Not responsive 4 9.3% 
Very unresponsive 1 2.3% 
Missing 3 7.0% 
d. IndeDendence from the Executive Authorit 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very independent 7 16.3% 
Independent 25 58.1% 
Dependent 9 20.9% 
Very dependent 1 2.3% 
Missing 1 2.3% 
e. independence from the Judicia 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Veryindependent 12 27.9% 
Independent 25 58.1% 
Dependent 2 4.7% 
Very dependent 
- 
Missing 4 9.3% 
f. pluralism 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
very pluralistic 4 9.3% 
pluralistic 6 14.0% 
Not pluralistic 26 60.5% 
Very unpluralistic 5 11.6% 
missing 2 4.7% 
25. Of the jol/mving issues, couldyou please state how much it affects thefunctioning of the Council. 
Wouhlyou say it affects thefunctioningpositively, negatively, or it doesn't affect it at all? 
a. Israeli policies and practices 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Affects positively 1 2.3% 
Affects negatively 38 88.4% 
Doesn't affect 2 4.7% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
b. The Executive Authorit 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Affects positively 2 4.7% 
Affects negatively 34 79.1% 
Doesn't affect 4 9.3% 
Nfissing, 3 7.0% 
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C. The Judiciarv 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Affects positively 6 14.0% 
Affects negatively 14 32.6% 
Doesn't affect 18 41.9% 
Nfissing 5 11.6% 
d. The President 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Affects positively 5 11.6% 
Affects negatively 30 69.8% 
Doesn't affect 5 11.6% 
Missing 3 7.0% 
_ 
Label Value Frequency 43 Percent 
- Afrects Positively 37 86.0% 
Affects negatively 2 4.7% 
Doesn't affect 2 4.7% 
missing 2 4.7% 
f. The media 
Label Value Frequency 43 Percent 
Affects positively 16 37.2% 
Affects negatively 24 55.8% 
Doesn't affect 2 4.7% 
1 2.3% 
26. ffow wouldyou evaluate the level of communication with thefolloiving? 
a. The Executive Authority 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Good 6 14.0% 
Average 20 46.5% 
Bad 16 37.2% 
Nfissing 1 2.3% 
b. The Judiciary 
Label Value Frequency 43 Percent 
Good 9 20.9% 
Average 17 39.6% 
Bad 14 32.6% 
Nfissing 3 7.0% 
c. The President 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Good 6 14.0% 
Average 19 44.2% 
Bad 16 37.2% 
Nfissing 2 4.7% 
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d. The PeoDle 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Good 26 60.5% 
Average 15 34.9% 
Bad 1 2.3% 
Mssing 1 2.3% 
2 7. In your opinion, which country in the world is the most democratic? Please rate thefollowing 
countries. 
a. ELYvDt 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic - 
Democratic 11 25.6% 
Undemocratic 21 48.8% 
Very undemocratic 3 7.0% 
18.6% 
b. France 
___L_abel 
Value Frequency= 43 Percent 
Very democratic 26 60.5% Democratic 25.6% Undemocratic 
Very undemocratic 
Nfissing 6 14.0% 
Jordan 
LaDei vame Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic -- 
Democratic 5 11.6% 
Undemocratic 22 51.2% 
Very undemocratic 8 18.6% 
_Missing 
8 18.6% 
d. Saudi Arabia 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic 
Democratic -- 
Undemocratic 6 14.0% 
Very undemocratic 28 65.1% 
Missing 9 20.9% 
e. Tunisia 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic -- 
Democratic 16 37.2% 
Undemocratic 15 34.9% 
Very undemocratic 3 7.0% 
Missing 9 20.9% 
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f Turke 
Label Value Frequency = 43 Percent 
Very democratic 1 2.3% 
Democratic 11 25.6% 
Undemocratic 18 41.9% 
Very undemocratic 4 9.3% 
Mssing 9 20.9% 
g. United States 
Label Value Frequency 43 Percent 
Very democratic 13 30.2% 
Democratic 21 48.8% 
Undemocratic 1 2.3% 
Very undemocratic 2 4.7% 
6 14.0% 
b. Yemen 
3 Percent 
-ýýery democratic - - 
Democratic 8 18.6% 
Undemocratic 21 48.8% 
Very undemocratic 5 11.6% 
20.9% 
rweden 
Label Value Frequencv 43 Percent 
Very democratic 36 83.7% 
Democratic 4 9.3% 
Undemocratic - - 
very undemocratic - - 
Missing 3 7.0% 
28. Being a representative of the people, how wouldyou vote on a bill that ispopular, yet regarded 
upon as being undemocratic according to democratic tenets? 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
I would vote for the bill 7 16.3% 
1 would vote against the bill 25 58.1% 
1 would abstain from voting 9 20.9% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
29. In principle, do you think that the constitution should he amended by: 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
A simple parliamentary 2 4.7% 
majority 
* 2/3 parliamentary majority 29 67.4% 
* referendum amongst the 11 25.6% 
people 
The president - - 
Missing 
___ 
1 2.3% 
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30. R%om of the jolloiWng must hold the President accountable? (You may choose more than one 
option) 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
TbePLC 38 88.4% 
The Cabinet - 
The Courts of Law 1 2.3% 
President above accountability 1 2.3% 
The People 2 4.7% 
GodIlslarn - 
Missing 1 2.3% 
b. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
The PLC -- 
The Cabinet 3 7.0% 
The Courts of Law 9 20.9% 
President above accountability -- 
The People 14 32.6% 
God/Islain 3 7.0% 
Missing 14 32.6% 
31. K*om of the folloising must hold the Cabinet accountable? (You may choose more than one 
option) 
a. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
The President 20 46.5% 
Law & Courts 11 25.6% 
ThcPLC 11 25.6% 
The People -- 
Missing 1 2.3% 
b. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
The President 
Law & Courts -- 
The PLC 28 65.1% 
The People 3 7.0% 
Missing 12 27.9% 
atio_ 32. "ich in your opinion should he the highest source of interpret on? 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
The President -- 
The Parliament 10 23.3% 
The High Court 20 46.5% 
The religious institutions 
Constitutional Court 7 16.3% 
Parliament + High Court 5 11.6% 
Mssing 1 2.3% 
445 
33. In principle, do you agree or disagree n*h thefolloning statement& The ideal Council member 
Should. * (1: strongly agree, and S. strongly disagree) 
a. Adhere to the Constitution 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 37 86.0% 
2 3 7.0% 
3 
4 
5 
Nfissing 3 7.0% 
b. Be flexible 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 8 18.6% 
2 6 14.0% 
3 5 11.6% 
4 3 7.0% 
5 
Nfissing 21 48.8% 
_ 
c. Rely on_ religious interpretation 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
4 9.3% 
2 
3 5 11.6% 
4 3 7.0% 
5 9 20.9% 
Nfissing 22 51.2% 
34. In principle, do you agree or disagree with thefOllOlVing statentents: (1: strongly agree, and 5: 
strongly disagree) 
a. There are some situations in which the Authority is justified in breaking laws in order to protect 
national security. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 6 14.0% 
2 6 14.0% 
3 5 11.6% 
4 5 11.6% 
5 19 44.2% 
Nfissing 2 4.7% 
b. If the President acts against the Constitution, he should be impeached. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 15 34.9% 
2 5 11.6% 
3 14 32.6% 
4 5 11.6% 
5 3 7.0% 
Missing 1 2.3% 
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c. The Quota svsteni is imoortant to have representation for minorities. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 8 18.6% 
2 8 18.6% 
3 12 27.9% 
4 2 4.7% 
5 11 25.6% 
Missing 2 4.7% 
d. It is important to have women in the Council. 
Value Labels Frequcncy 43 Percent 
1 32 74.4% 
2 4 9.3% 
3 2 4.7% 
4 1 2.3% 
5 2 4.7% 
Nfissing 2 4.7% 
e. Using the threat of violence as a political weapon is never justified. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 29 67.4% 
2 
3 1 2.3% 
4 1 2.3% 
5 10 23.3% 
Missinz 2 4.7% 
f. There is too much concern for law and order, and not enough for rights. 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 9 20.9% 
2 8 18.6% 
3 12 27.9% 
4 1 2.3% 
5 6 14.0% 
Missing 7 16.3% 
g. Alcohol drinking is a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime. 
_ Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 19 44.2% 
2 3 7.0% 
3 5 11.6% 
4 3 7.0% 
5 9 20.9% 
Missing 4 9.3% 
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3S R%ich, in your opinion, shall be the terms of referencefor the negotiations during the interim 
Ph ase-7 th e PL 0 or th e PNA ? 
Value Labels Frequency= 43 Percent 
PLO 24 55.8% 
PNA 5 11.6% 
PLC 8 18.6% 
PLO & PNA 5 11.6% 
Missing 1 2.3% 
36. Him strongly do you believe in thefolloiving. (1: strongly believe, and 5: strongly do not believe) 
a. Separation between religion and state 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 20 46.5% 
2 5 11.6% 
3 4 9.3% 
4 3 7.0% 
5 10 23.3% 
Missing 1 2.3% 
- 
b. Individual rights 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 35 81.4% 
2 5 11.6% 
3 3 7.0% 
4 
5 
Missing 
c. Rule of mýjority 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 33 76.7% 
2 7 16.3% 
3 2 4.7% 
4 
5 1 2.3% 
Missing - - 
d. Rights of minorities 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 34 79.1% 
2 4 9.3% 
3 3 7.0% 
4 
5 2 4.7% 
Missing - - 
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Judicial review 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
1 39 90.7% 
2 2 4.7% 
3 
4 
5 1 2.3% 
Nfissing 1 2.3% 
f. Freedom of assembly 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 41 95.3% 
2 1 2.3% 
3 
4 
5 1 2.3% 
Miss' - 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 37 86.0% 
2 2 4.7% 
3 3 7.0% 
4 
5 1 2.3% 
Missing - - 
h. Freedom of press 
Value Labels Frequency 43 Percent 
1 38 88.4% 
2 3 7,0% 
3 1 2.3% 
4 
5 2.3% 
Missing - 
37. The PLC has discussed many issues pertaining to Israeli practices such as settlements and closures, 
etc. To what extent wouldyou say that discussing such issuesfalls within thejurisdiction of the PLC, 
or do you think that the PLC should not he involved? 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
Yes, PLC should be involved 43 100.0% 
No, PLC should not be - - 
involved 
Missing 
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A R%y is it the PLCsjurisdiction? 
Value Labels Frequency = 43 Percent 
People's representative 22 
51.2% 
PLC = part of PLO 1 
2.3% 
National responsibility 3 
7.0% 
Effect people represent 14 
32.6% 
Israeli practices (are on land in I 
2.3% 
which PLC is responsible) 7% 4 Nfissing 2 . 
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